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Abstract:	The	1940s	were	the	last	time	sovereign	debt	levels	for	many	advanced	economies	
were	comparable	to	recent	times.	Following	the	Second	World	War	the	United	Kingdom	is	
viewed	as	having	achieved	the	highest	public	debt	to	income	ratio	while	still	avoiding	default	
of	any	country	in	last	three	centuries.	However,	previous	research	on	the	UK	during	this	
period	has	largely	overlooked	British	post-war	debt	sustainability	and	the	role	played	by	
financial	repression.		
	
This	thesis	presents	a	conceptual	framework	of	the	mechanisms	for	achieving	sovereign	debt	
sustainability,	along	with	their	resultant	political	economy	trade-offs.	The	conventional	
historical	view	that	the	UK	avoided	default	on	its	sovereign	financial	agreements	following	
the	Second	World	War	is	re-examined	and	Britain	is	found	to	have	‘partially	defaulted’	in	the	
years	following	the	Second	World	War.	This	thesis	provides	a	historical	narrative	of	the	
intellectual	origins	and	policies	of	modern	financial	repression	in	Britain	and	presents	
alternative	qualitative	and	quantitative	measurements	of	financial	repression.		
	
Monetary	innovation	accompanied	1930s-40s	financial	regulation,	particularly	the	
development	of	sophisticated	currency	black	markets	in	New	York	and	Switzerland.	
Statistical	analysis	of	new	daily	time	series	data	from	these	markets	provides	a	quantitative	
market	perspective	on	historical	turning	points	during	the	1940s.	A	currency	taxonomy	and	
discussion	of	the	causes	behind	the	rise	and	decline	of	alternative	currencies	is	presented.	
While	alternative	currencies	also	featured	during	the	1940s	they	were	arguably	less	
numerous	and	less	innovative	than	during	the	Great	Depression	period.	
	
The	British	case	ultimately	illustrates	the	complex	dynamics	and	trade-offs	of	sovereign	debt	
sustainability	vis-à-vis	other	competing	policy	objectives,	such	as	a	desire	for	open	markets	
and	economic	growth,	financial	stability,	and	geopolitical	priorities.	
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1	Introduction	
1.1	Topic	and	time	period	motivation	
	
	
Sovereign	debt,	financial	regulation,	and	monetary	innovation	are	three	distinct	yet	
intertwined	topics	that	have	recently	become	relevant	to	policymakers	and	practitioners	
who	are	seeking	a	better	understanding	of	current	events,	such	as	the	Eurozone	debt	crisis,	
the	regulatory	response	to	the	2008	financial	crisis,	negative	real	and	nominal	interest	rates,	
and	the	introduction	and	use	of	new	currencies.	This	thesis	contributes	to	enhancing	both	
our	knowledge	of	these	distinct	topics	while	also	highlighting	the	interplay	between	them.	
	
While	the	topics	explored	in	this	thesis	are	contemporary,	this	thesis	is	a	work	of	
economic	history.	The	time	and	place	under	study	here	is	the	United	Kingdom	during	the	
mid-20th	century,	which	provides	an	attractive	case	study.	Following	the	end	of	the	Second	
World	War	Britain	achieved	the	highest	public	debt	to	income	ratio	of	any	country	in	last	
three	centuries.	At	the	same	time,	the	UK,	according	to	some	scholars,	managed	to	avoid	
defaulting	on	its	sovereign	debt	during	the	post-Second	World	War	period.1		
	
Sovereign	debt	problems	in	recent	decades	have	been	confined	to	emerging	markets.	
Indeed,	prior	to	the	restructuring	of	Greek	public	debt	in	2012	the	last	time	an	advanced	
economy	defaulted	was	shortly	after	the	Second	World	War	when	Germany	defaulted	on	its	
sovereign	debt	in	the	early	1950s.2	However,	today	many	advanced	economies	are	either	
already	or	on	the	verge	of	a	sovereign	debt	crisis.	Here	an	important	distinction	should	be	
noted	between	sovereign	debt	reduction,	or	how	to	pay-down	or	pay-off	the	nominal	public	
debt,	over	sovereign	debt	sustainability,	which	is	defined	simply	as	maintaining	any	given	
level	of	public	debt	without	triggering	a	sovereign	debt	crisis.	
	
																																																						
1	(Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009)	
2	(Ritschl,	2012)	
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The	topic	of	sovereign	debt	and	default	has	been	studied	extensively.	However,	the	
ongoing	problems	suggest	that	our	understanding	of	sovereign	debt	dynamics,	particularly	
for	advanced	countries,	remains	limited.	Much	of	the	sovereign	debt	literature	of	the	last	
several	decades	examined	debt	sustainability	from	an	emerging	market	perspective.	
However,	in	marked	contrast	with	many	of	today’s	developed	countries,	many	developing	
countries	in	recent	years	have	achieved	comparatively	low	debt-to-income	levels	while	
stockpiling	significant	reserves.	This	thesis	is	motivated	to	revisit	the	last	period	when	
advanced	economies	struggled	with	sustaining	large	public	debts.	
	
The	period	of	the	1940s	continues	to	hold	relevance	today	for	several	reasons.	Many	
of	the	institutions	and	frameworks	developed	during	this	decade	remain	important	to	the	
functioning	of	today's	global	economic	and	financial	system.	True,	the	Bretton	Woods	
system,	GATT,	and	other	institutions	have	evolved,	been	modified,	or	replaced.	However,	
much	of	the	international	framework	established	in	the	1940s	remains	the	status	quo.	For	
example,	the	1940s	heralded	the	end	of	a	monetary	system	featuring	two	reserve	currencies,	
British	sterling	and	the	U.S.	dollar,	to	one	where	the	the	U.S.	dollar	achieved	(and	still	
retains)	primacy.	However,	some	scholars	argue	that	by	the	year	2020	we	will	have	shifted	to	
a	multi-polar	world	where	the	dollar	reserves	are	more	balanced	against	the	euro	and	the	
Chinese	renminbi.3	Revisiting	the	1940s	provides	a	window	into	the	last	reserve	currency	
transition	period	and	the	impact	on	economic	events.	
	
Financial	policies	promoted	by	advanced	countries	since	the	1970s-80s,	often	
referred	to	as	the	‘Washington	consensus’,	included	deregulated	markets	and	free-flowing	
capital.	However,	as	the	case	for	capital	controls	and	other	macroprudential	measures	
associated	with	financial	repression	have	come	back	into	favour	at	the	IMF	and	other	
institutions	it	is	useful	to	revisit	the	post-Second	World	War	period,	which	was	the	last	time	
restrictions	on	capital	account	flows	were	widely	implemented	in	advanced	economies.4	In	
addition,	there	is	renewed	interest	in	how	we	should	define	and	measure	the	impact	of	
																																																						
3	(B.	J.	Eichengreen,	2011)	
4	(Arora,	Habermeier,	Ostry,	&	Weeks-Brown,	2013)	
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financial	repression,	and	a	disagreement	in	the	literature	has	emerged	over	whether	today	
we	are	witnessing	a	return	of	financial	repression	in	advanced	economies.	This	thesis	
critiques	both	recently	developed	and	past	methods	for	measuring	financial	repression	and	
proposes	complimentary	approaches	that	will	provide	a	clearer	understanding	of	this	topic.	
	
One	important	side	effect	of	1940s	financial	repression	and	regulation	was	
widespread	monetary	innovation.	The	definition	of	monetary	innovation	used	in	this	thesis	is	
expanded	to	encompass	both	the	definition	presented	by	Sylla	(1982)	of	the	“development	
of	new	forms	money”	and	the	innovative	use	of	pre-existing	forms	of	money	and	currency.5	
This	thesis	examines	1940s	currency	black	markets,	where	national	currencies	such	as	British	
sterling	were	exchanged	in	New	York,	Switzerland,	and	other	markets	in	spite	of	legal	
prohibitions	and	the	coordinated	efforts	of	policymakers	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	The	
1940s	were	also	a	period	of	fixed	exchanges	rates,	and	the	exchange	of	national	currencies	
on	black	markets	often	occurred	at	a	significant	premium	or	discount	to	their	official	(legal)	
exchange	rates.	
	
Following	the	2008	financial	crisis	and	subsequent	Eurozone	crisis	we	have	seen	
capital	controls	introduced	in	countries	such	as	Iceland	and	Cyprus,	while	other	countries	
such	as	China	and	Argentina	have	maintained	significant	restrictions	on	the	use	of	domestic	
and	international	currencies.	At	the	same	time	new	technological	advances	have	made	
possible	the	world’s	first	decentralized	alternative	currencies.	Based	on	these	and	other	
factors,	today	we	appear	to	be	witnessing	another	period	of	significant	monetary	innovation.	
The	1940s	was	arguably	the	last	period	of	significant	monetary	innovation,	and	it	may	be	
useful	to	revisit	this	period	for	historical	insights	and	perspective	on	contemporary	
developments.	
	
During	the	1940s	currency	black	markets	proliferated	in	a	number	of	financial	centres	
around	the	world.	This	development	represented	a	significant	departure	from	the	type	of	
																																																						
5	(Sylla,	1982,	p.	21)	
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monetary	innovation	seen	in	the	1930s.	During	the	Great	Depression	there	was	a	dramatic	
rise	in	the	use	of	new	and	innovative	alternative	currencies,	such	as	scrip	currencies	issued	
by	local	towns	and	organizations	featuring	demurrage	(e.g.,	the	Austrian	Freigeld).6	In	the	
1940s	alternative	currencies,	such	as	cigarettes	and	other	types	of	commodity	money,	
continued	to	be	used.7	However,	in	contrast	to	the	1930s,	there	was	nothing	particularly	
innovative	about	1940s	commodity-based	alternative	currencies.	Further,	their	financial	and	
macroeconomic	impact	appears	to	be	rather	insignificant	in	comparison	to	1940s	currency	
black	markets.	The	1940s	currency	black	markets	were	closely	monitored	by	central	bankers	
and	other	policymakers,	and	they	appear	to	have	played	an	important	role	in	events	such	as	
sterling’s	1949	devaluation.	In	sum,	it	is	useful	to	revisit	the	1940s	to	better	understand	the	
forces	that	drive	and	shape	monetary	innovation,	particularly	the	relationship	between	
monetary	innovation	and	financial	regulation.	
	
1.2	Literature	motivation	
	
A	substantial	and	authoritative	body	of	scholarly	work	exists	on	British	economic,	
financial,	and	political	history	for	the	period	surrounding	the	Second	World	War.	Given	this	
literature	a	reasonable	question	to	ask	is	whether	another	study	of	this	period	can	contribute	
anything	that	materially	advances	our	understanding	of	mid-20th	century	British	economic	
history?	However,	a	review	of	the	literature	points	to	several	significant	gaps.	Prior	to	
Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	(2011)	the	role	of	financial	repression	in	British	debt	sustainability	in	
the	post-Second	World	War	period	received	little	or	inconsistent	attention.8	There	is	also	an	
absence	of	scholarship	on	the	topic	of	British	debt	sustainability	in	the	post-Second	World	
War	period,	and	1940s	currency	black	markets	have	received	limited	mention	in	the	
literature.	There	are	several	possible	explanations	for	these	omissions.	First,	much	of	the	
previous	scholarship	was	performed	prior	to	the	development	of	modern	techniques	for	
assessing	debt	sustainability,	including	commonly	used	measures	such	as	the	ratio	of	public	
																																																						
6	(Schwarz,	1951)	
7	(Bignon,	2009)	Bignon	studied	cigarette	currency,	which	were	used	throughout	Germany	following	the	Second	
World	War	until	German	monetary	reform	in	June	1948.	
8	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	
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debt	to	gross	domestic	product	(debt-to-GDP	ratio).9	Second,	until	recently	the	study	of	
financial	repression	was	largely	confined	to	emerging	markets.	Indeed,	prior	to	Reinhart	and	
Sbrancia	there	had	been	very	little	to	no	prior	discussion	in	the	literature	of	the	role	played	
by	financial	repression	on	public	debts	in	the	latter-half	of	the	20th	century	in	advanced	
countries.10	Third,	post-Second	World	War	Britain	has	also	generally	been	viewed	as	having	
successfully	avoided	default	on	its	large	public	debt	through	a	combination	of	economic	
growth	and	inflation.11	However,	a	review	of	the	historical	evidence	indicates	other	debt	
sustainability	mechanisms,	such	as	financial	repression	and	financial	aid,	were	also	at	work	in	
Britain.	Rather	than	completely	avoiding	a	default	on	its	sovereign	obligations,	the	UK	in	fact	
'partially	defaulted’	multiple	times	following	the	war.	Finally,	new	archival	data	on	1940s	
currency	black	markets	has	been	obtained	and	indicate	that	these	markets	were	more	
important	in	events	such	as	the	1949	devaluation	of	sterling	than	previously	believed.	
	
One	of	the	strengths	of	the	existing	literature	is	that	much	of	it	was	written	by	
individuals	who	could	provide	first-hand	accounts	of	the	events,	data,	and	personalities	that	
shaped	this	period.	One	exemplar	is	Sir	Alec	Cairncross’s	recounting	of	various	internal	policy	
discussions	on	topics	like	sterling’s	1949	devaluation.	Cairncross’	Years	of	Recovery	(1985)	is	
generally	considered	as	the	definitive	scholarship	on	the	immediate	post-Second	World	War	
period.	Along	with	Cairncross,	Sir	Richard	Clark,	Worswick	and	Ady,	Dow,	Robbins,	and	
Gardner	occupied	various	roles	inside	government.	Their	inside	accounts	have	brought	to	
light	many	important	facts	that	would	otherwise	gone	unrecorded	by	the	non-observer/non-
participant	historian.	However,	‘official’	histories	and	research	conducted	by	participants	
raises	concerns	around	arms-length	objectivity.12	For	example,	one	wonders	whether	part	of	
the	explanation	for	why	these	participant	scholars	did	not	judge	Britain	as	having	defaulted	
																																																						
9	See	for	example	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983),	which	does	not	include	any	mention	of	Britain’s	debt	to	
income	ratios	in	the	chapter	on	sterling’s	1949	devaluation.	
10	See	for	example	(De	la	Torre,	Gozzi,	&	Schmukler,	2007;	Easterly,	1993;	Galindo,	Micco,	Ordoñez,	Bris,	&	
Repetto,	2002;	Goldsmith,	1969;	Lanyi	&	Saracoglu,	1983;	McKinnon,	1973;	Roubini	&	Salaimartin,	1992;	Shaw,	
1973;	Todaro	&	Smith,	2003;	World	Bank,	1989)	
11	(Buiter,	1985)	
12	See	for	example	(Burk,	1989;	Clarke	&	Cairncross,	1982;	Dalton,	1962;	Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	
and	Social	Research.,	1964;	Fforde,	1992;	Robbins,	1947;	Sayers,	1968,	1976;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	1964)	
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on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement	is	because	many	of	these	individuals	were	a	part	
of	the	policy	apparatus.	
	
Much	of	the	existing	economic	and	historical	literature	that	focuses	on	the	1945-51	
period,	such	as	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952)	and	Dow	(1964),	was	written	not	very	long	after	
this	period	and	prior	to	the	public	release	of	certain	archival	materials.	For	example,	the	
Bank	of	England	typically	releases	archival	files	to	the	public	from	the	final	date	in	the	file	
series,	meaning	the	year	2000	may	be	the	earliest	a	confidential	data	file	that	covers	the	
period	of	1945-1970	may	be	released.13	One	relevant	example	is	the	subject	of	hidden	bank	
reserves;	the	Bank	of	England	allowed	London	banks	to	keep	some	reserves	off-balance	
sheet	and	hidden	from	economic	historical	analysis	until	Capie	(2010).14	Accurate	reserve	
data	is	helpful	for	understanding	the	impact	of	financial	repression,	including	how	the	the	
mix	of	assets	held	by	banks	may	have	been	impacted	by	the	policies	associated	with	financial	
repression.15		
	
Thirty	years	have	now	passed	since	Cairncross	published	Years	of	Recovery	in	1985,	
which	is	the	last	major	work	of	scholarship	focussed	on	1945-51.	Since	then	there	have	been	
advances	in	economic	history	methods,	such	as	the	development	contemporary	measures	of	
debt	sustainability,	understanding	the	impact	of	growth	and	interest	rates	on	debt	
sustainability,	financial	repression,	and	the	aforementioned	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio.	This	
fact	likely	explains	the	absence	of	these	measures	in	Years	of	Recovery.	Cairncross	and	his	
contemporaries	primarily	viewed	the	key	post-war	British	economic	challenges	from	a	
balance	of	payments	perspective	but	provide	very	little	to	no	discussion	of	Britain's	debt	
overhang	from	the	war.16	Surprisingly,	there	is	not	a	single	table	showing	UK	public	debt	data	
																																																						
13	British	rules	governing	how	long	government	materials	must	be	delayed	before	release	to	the	archives	
continues	to	evolve.	The	previous	rule	was	effectively	60	years,	which	has	been	updated	to	30	years	at	present.	
However,	in	the	case	of	the	Bank	of	England	some	files	are	still	protected	for	50	and	even	100	years.	
14	(Capie,	2010;	Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1964)	
15	(Brock,	1989)	For	example,	inaccuracies	in	bank	balance	sheet	data	utilized	by	(Cipolla,	1956;	Worswick	&	
Ady,	1952,	pp.	210-211,	Tables	1	and	2)	may	have	resulted	in	inaccurate	research	conclusions.	
16	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	9)	
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in	Cairncross’	collected	works,	which	is	a	rather	significant	omission	given	Britain’s	record-
setting	debt	burden.	
	
A	reoccurring	theme	expressed	in	the	literature	that	frustrated	many	who	studied	
this	period	is	both	the	imprecision	or	lack	of	data	available	for	analysis,	along	with	the	major	
revisions	that	occurred	in	economics	statistics.	Cairncross	(1985)	noted	that:	
	
“even	now	we	do	not	have	the	details	necessary	for	a	consistent	picture	of	the	
different	elements	in	the	balance	of	payments.	It	is	necessary	to	piece	things	
together	from	figures	of	different	vintages	and	reliability”.17		
	
For	example,	Britain’s	1947	capital	drain	was	originally	calculated	the	following	year	at	£349	
million,	or	approximately	half	of	the	actual	figure	of	£643	million	that	was	later	reported.18	A	
further	example	is	Britain’s	current	account	deficit	in	1947,	which	was	originally	estimated	at	
£350	million,	later	reported	to	have	increased	to	£675	million,	and	has	since	been	revised	
downward	to	£381	million	(much	closer	to	the	original	estimate)	due	to	improvement	in	
‘invisibles’.19	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	a	number	of	figures	cited	in	the	literature	are	often	
perfectly	round	numbers,	which	are	expressed	without	the	usual	‘approximately’	or	other	
reservations	when	rough	estimates	are	given.	For	example,	Dow	(1962)	states	that	the	cost	
of	rubber	tripled,	wool	and	cotton	doubled,	and	numerous	other	commodities	went	up	in	
price	by	50%.20	Cairncross	(1985)	states	that	inflation	during	Second	World	War	increased	by	
50%.21	A	lack	of	precision	with	inflation	figures	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	assessing	
financial	repression	and	debt	liquidation.	
	
Specific	to	financial	repression,	much	of	the	historical	literature	appears	to	suffer	
from	a	blind	spot	for	the	subject.	For	example,	Skidelsky	states:	
	
																																																						
17	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	xii,	26)	Cairncross	references	concerns	about	the	Central	Statistical	Office	(CSO)	revising	
stats	and	originally	reported	data.	
18	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	153-154)	
19	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	153)	
20	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	55)	
21	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	14)	
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“Compulsory	savings…restricted	working-class	consumption	without	
robbing	workers	of	the	rewards	of	greater	effort”	and	the	program	
“drastically	restricted	the	consumption	of	the	wealthy	without	imposing	
penal,	disincentive	tax	rates”.22		
	
Skidelsky’s	interpretation	here	completely	overlooks	the	effects	of	inflation	on	compulsory	
savings.	In	addition,	Cairncross	discusses	the	low	levels	of	post-war	personal	savings	but	does	
not	explain	why	levels	could	be	low	other	than	pent-up	demand	from	the	war	and	post-war	
restrictions.23	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952)	arguably	come	closest	to	describing	certain	aspects	
of	financial	repression.	However,	their	view	that	the	“history	of	the	national	debt	over	the	
next	few	years	is,	in	the	main,	the	history	of	nationalization”	completely	overlooks	the	
effects	of	inflation	on	the	real	value	of	public	debt.24	
	
While	the	literature	does	cover	changes	in	real	wages	there	is	only	a	limited	
discussion,	and	very	little	analysis,	of	who	were	financial	repressions’	winners	and	losers.	Tax	
policy	is	only	covered	briefly	in	the	literature.	Beyond	period	derogatory	mentions	of	the	
‘rentier’	not	enough	information	on	the	institutions	and	individuals	who	held	British	public	
debt	and	savings	is	presented	to	assess	who	was	impacted	by	low	or	negative	real	interest	
rates.	For	example,	when	Dow	(1962)	notes	the	increase	in	the	dividends	tax	from	5%	to	
12.5%,	he	doesn’t	link	this	development	with	financial	repression	by	noting	that	such	a	tax	
hike	made	Britain’s	sovereign	debt	more	attractive	from	an	investment	perspective	vis-à-vis	
equities.25	
	
The	existing	literature	could	also	perhaps	be	criticized	for	a	failure	of	imagination.	For	
example,	in	the	justifications	for	financial	controls,	Cairncross	(1985)	does	not	include	the	
repayment	of	debt	as	one	of	the	possible	purposes.26	In	his	unpublished	memo	on	the	
convertibility	crisis,	Sir	Hugh	Ellis	Rees	(1962)	states	there	was	never	a	chance	of	successfully	
																																																						
22	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	55)	
23	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	37)	
24	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	202)	
25	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	pp.	27-28)	
26	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	302)	
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making	sterling	convertible.27	What	the	literature	fails	to	consider	is	whether	sterling	could	
have	been	successfully	made	convertible	if	sterling’s	exchange	rate	had	been	further	
reduced.	Similarly,	there	is	consistent	mention	of	a	“dollar	shortage”	problem.28	However,	
the	so-called	dollar	shortage	problem	could	also	be	recast	as	a	problem	of	overvalued	
sterling,	which	the	literature	fails	to	mention.	
	
Numerous	inaccuracies	and	incomplete	interpretations	are	also	found	in	the	
literature.	For	example,	Cairncross	states	“for	many	years	to	come,	an	enormous	weight	of	
liquid	liabilities	overhung	the	balance	of	payments,	threatening	a	flight	from	the	pound,	
limiting	the	freedom	of	action	of	the	government”	(emphasis	added).29	However,	given	
capital	controls	and	other	restrictions,	characterizing	Britain’s	liabilities	in	1945-51	as	‘liquid’	
is	inaccurate.	Other	points	made	by	Cairncross	are	poorly	supported	by	facts,	such	as	his	
claim	that,	following	the	Second	World	War,	London	suffered	a	catastrophic	blow	to	its	
position	as	an	international	banking	capital.30	Cairncross	was	also	incorrect	when	he	stated	
that	there	were	no	cancellations,	or	forgiveness,	of	the	Sterling	Balances	(British	Second	
World	War	debt	owed	to	Commonwealth	countries).31		He	also	claims	that	sterling’s	
devaluation	didn’t	result	in	inflation,	but	this	argument	is	unconvincing;	Cairncross’	own	data	
and	charts	show	that,	following	the	1949	devaluation,	there	was	in	fact	a	significant	increase	
in	inflation	in	1951.32	The	implications	of	British	policies	on	other	countries	are	also	often	
given	limited	attention.33	
	
A	further	justification	for	re-examining	this	period	is	the	perennial	debate	over	the	
causes	of	Britain’s	relative	economic	underperformance	following	Second	World	War.34	For	
																																																						
27	(Cairncross,	1985,	Ch.	6;	Ellis	Rees,	1962)	
28	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	68-69)	
29	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	8)	devaluation	is	an	idea	rarely	considered	in	the	literature,	perhaps	due	in	part	to	the	
dislike	for	the	idea	of	devaluation	expressed	by	Keynes	at	certain	times.	
30	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	8)	
31	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	119)	Australia	and	New	Zealand	both	cancelled	balances.	See	(Pressnell	1986,	p.	366)	
32	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	211)	See	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	40)	for	table	on	inflation.	
33	There	are	less	prominently	cited	histories	covering	the	colonies,	for	example	(Krozewski,	2001)	
34	See	for	example	(Coates,	1994;	Crafts,	1993;	Dornbusch	&	Layard,	1987;	Elbaum	&	Lazonick,	1986;	Middleton,	
2000)	
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example,	Crafts	(1993)	argues	that	British	post-war	economic	policy	was	beneficial	in	the	
short-term	but	detrimental	longer-term.35	However,	none	of	the	research	on	Britain’s	relative	
underperformance	includes	Britain's	debt	overhang.	One	of	the	contributions	of	this	thesis	is	
to	provide	a	debt	sustainability	and	financial	repression	perspective	to	the	ongoing	and	still	
very	important	debate	over	why	Britain’s	economy	lagged	during	the	'Golden	Age	of	
Economic	Growth'.36	
	
Overall,	one	is	struck	in	reviewing	the	literature	on	this	period	by	how	none	of	the	
economic	histories	by	Cairncross,	Sayers,	Worswick	and	Ady,	Pollard,	or	Dow	expressed	
Britain’s	debt	position	using	current	methods	of	analysis,	such	as	comparing	the	country’s	
growth	and	interest	rates,	or	expressing	public	debt	in	relation	to	national	income.37	This	
ratio	was	already	being	used	by	prominent	economics	scholars	based	in	Britain	who	were	
researching	Britain’s	fiscal	history	at	the	time	of	Cairncross’s	account,	which	was	published	in	
1985.38	According	to	Buiter’s	(1985)	“not	quite	exact”	arithmetic	(he	does	not	describe	his	
calculation	method),	from	1948-84	government	deficits	were	in	line	with	real	income	
growth,	meaning	that	the	reduction	in	Britain’s	debt-to-income	ratio	was	was	equal	to	the	
effect	of	inflation.39		
	
As	to	why	Cairncross	et	al	did	not	employ	the	deb-to-income	ratio	in	their	research	
several	possibilities	come	to	mind.	First,	Hatton	and	Chrystal	expressed	the	view	in	1991	that	
“debt/income	ratio	alone	is	a	poor	indicator	of	the	financial	solvency	of	the	public	sector”.40	
Perhaps	the	Hatton	and	Chrystal	view	was	representative	at	the	time.	It	appears	that	there	
may	have	also	been	a	misunderstanding	by	previous	economic	historians	of	Britain’s	debt	
levels.	For	example,	Hatton	and	Chrystal	state	that	they	“do	not	see	cause	for	alarm”	in	
																																																						
35	(Crafts,	1993)	
36	(B.	Eichengreen,	1996)	
37	See	for	example	(Cairncross,	1985;	Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964;	Pollard,	
1962,	1973,	1983,	1992;	Sayers,	1956;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1952)	
38	(Buiter,	1985,	p.	16)	
39	It	is	unclear	why	Buiter	excludes	the	years	1945-1947	in	his	analysis,	a	time	period	which	covers	the	peak	in	
British	public	debt-to-GDP.	
40	(Hatton	&	Chrystal,	1991,	p.	76)	The	authors,	beyond	citing	Buiter,	also	offer	no	explanation	of	how	Britain	
was	able	to	sustain	such	debt	load	follow	Second	World	War.	
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Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	level	of	debt.41	Another	possible	explanation	for	the	
literature’s	omission	of	debt-to-income	analysis	may	be	data	availability.	Both	public	sector	
debt	and	borrowing	requirements	were	not	available	prior	to	1965,	although	national	debt	(a	
narrower	measure	of	government	debt	than	‘public	debt’)	and	GDP	are	included	by	Hatton	
and	Chrystal	and	briefly	discussed.42	Overall,	there	is	a	clear	justification	for	revisiting	mid-
20th	century	British	economic	history	around	with	new	data	and	analysis	on	the	topics	of	
debt	sustainability,	financial	repression,	and	monetary	innovation.	
	
1.2	Thesis	structure	and	methods	overview	
	
The	research	topics	of	this	thesis	are	explored	in	five	chapters	(Chapters	2-6)	in	the	
following	order:	Chapter	two	examines	the	literature	surrounding	sovereign	debt	
sustainability	and	presents	a	conceptual	framework	of	the	mechanisms	for	achieving	
sovereign	debt	sustainability,	along	with	their	resultant	political	economy	trade-offs.	Chapter	
three	explores	the	subject	of	sovereign	credit	event	determination	and	default	by	examining	
the	case	of	British	post-Second	World	War	debt	sustainability.	Chapter	four	examines	the	
case	of	British	financial	repression,	offers	a	critique	of	existing	methods	for	measuring	
financial	repression,	and	suggests	alternative	approaches	to	measuring	and	comparing	
financial	repression.	Chapter	five	examines	new	archival	and	quantitative	data	from	the	
1940s	currency	black	markets	and	analyses	historical	turning	points	from	the	perspective	of	
these	markets.	Chapter	six	surveys	the	history	of	alternative	currencies,	presents	a	taxonomy	
of	different	types	of	currencies	and	alternative	currencies,	and	discusses	why	alternative	
currencies	rise	and	decline.		
	
Archival	source	materials,	including	new	quantitative	data	and	narrative	accounts,	
from	the	Swiss	National	Bank,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank,	and	Bank	of	England,	are	
referenced	throughout	the	thesis.	A	statistical	structural	break	test	is	performed	in	chapter	
																																																						
41	(Hatton	&	Chrystal,	1991,	p.	77)	
42	(Krugman,	1988;	Manasse,	Roubini,	Schimmelpfennig,	&	International	Monetary	Fund.	Fiscal	Affairs,	2003;	
Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009,	pp.	51-67;	Sachs,	1983)		
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five	on	new	currency	time	series	data	obtained	from	archival	sources.	It	is	worth	noting	that	
mid-20th	century	British	economic	history	is	well	trodden	research	territory.	A	literature	
review	of	British	mid-20th	century	economic	history	is	presented,	and	a	number	of	gaps	and	
incomplete	interpretations	are	identified.	The	critical	examination	and	synthesis	of	the	
existing	literature,	along	with	alternative	interpretations,	represent	one	of	the	contributions	
made	in	this	thesis.	The	literature	review	also	informed	other	contributions,	including	a	
currency	taxonomy	and	compositor	indicator	for	comparison	of	financial	repression	across	
nations.	
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2	The	Seven	Mechanisms	for	Achieving	Sovereign	Debt	
Sustainability	
	
Abstract:	This	paper	surveys	the	literature	on	sovereign	debt	and	summarizes	the	
political	 economy	 trade-offs	 of	 the	 seven	 distinct	 mechanisms	 for	 achieving	
sovereign	 debt	 sustainability.	 Two	 mechanisms	 for	 achieving	 sustainability	 –		
financial	 aid	 and	 asset	 exchange	 –	 are	 often	 underemphasized	 or	 entirely	
overlooked	by	economists	even	though	they	frequently	play	an	 important	role	 in	
sustaining	public	debts.	These	two	mechanisms	may	receive	less	attention	due	to	
prior	 emphasis	 on	 sovereign	 debt	 reduction,	 or	 how	 to	 pay-down	 or	 pay-off	
nominal	 public	 debts,	 over	 sovereign	 debt	 sustainability,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	
maintaining	 any	 given	 level	 of	 public	 debt	 without	 triggering	 a	 sovereign	 debt	
crisis.	 Examples	 of	 each	 of	 the	 different	 mechanisms	 for	 achieving	 debt	
sustainability	and	their	respective	policy	trade-offs	are	discussed.	In	the	absence	of	
sufficient	economic	growth,	which	 is	 the	near	universally	preferred	 solution	 to	a	
debt	problem,	or	financial	aid,	which	typically	requires	international	coordination,	
financial	 repression	 is	 a	 relatively	 attractive	 for	 policymakers	 in	 advanced	
economies.	
	
	
	
JEL:	H63,	E58,	E61,	E62,	H12,	H27,	P24	
	
Keywords:	sovereign	debt,	debt	sustainability,	economic	growth,	fiscal	consolidation,	
inflation,	asset	sales,	asset	exchange,	financial	aid,	financial	repression,	debt	forgiveness,	
default,	repudiation.	
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2.1	Introduction	
	
The	economic	harm	inflicted	by	unsustainable	levels	of	sovereign	debt,	also	often	
referred	to	as	public	debt,	can	include	unemployment,	lost	output,	the	destruction	of	wealth,	
and	other	undesirable	outcomes.	This	harm,	combined	with	the	seeming	perennial	nature	of	
sovereign	debt	problems,	has	made	public	debt	one	of	the	most	extensively	studied	topics	in	
economics.43	In	recent	years	a	vigorous	debate	has	emerged	over	whether	high	levels	of	
sovereign	debt	lead	to	lower	economic	growth.44	While	the	debate	continues	over	the	
impact	of	debt	on	growth,	what	is	not	in	dispute	is	need	for	further	research	on	public	debt.45	
	
In	the	decades	prior	to	the	2010	Eurozone	crisis,	sovereign	debt	sustainability	
challenges	were	exclusive	to	developing	countries,	and	instances	of	sovereign	default	tended	
to	bunch	together.46	For	example,	modern	emerging	market	default	episodes	include	the	one	
led	by	Mexico	in	August	1982,	which	was	followed	shortly	thereafter	by	Argentina,	Brazil,	
Nigeria,	the	Philippines,	Turkey	and	others.	The	late-1980s	and	late-1990s	again	saw	several	
Latin-American	countries	default,	along	with	several	Asian	countries.47	Argentina’s	2001	
default,	which	entailed	an	approximately	75%	‘haircut’	on	its	$100	billion	in	debt,	
represented	the	then	largest	sovereign	default	in	history.48	Before	the	2012	Greek	debt	
restructuring,	the	now	largest	default	in	history,	the	last	time	an	advanced	economy	
defaulted	was	in	1953	when	Germany	restructured	debts	following	the	Second	World	War.49	
																																																						
43	In	this	paper	a	sovereign	debt	‘difficulty’	or	‘problem’	refers	to	whether	a	government	can	service	its	
sovereign	(public)	debt,	meaning	pay	interest	and	principal)	while	also	meeting	agreed	upon	terms	(e.g.,	
payment	deadlines).	A	country	which	has	successfully	accomplished	both	the	former	and	the	latter	can	be	said	
to	be	‘sustaining’	its	public	debt.	
44	See	for	example	(Cecchetti,	Mohanty,	&	Zampolli,	2010;	Kumar,	Woo,	&	International	Monetary,	2010;	
Panizza	&	Presbitero,	2012;	C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2010)		
45	It	should	be	noted	here	that	the	subject	of	what	meets	the	criteria	of	a	sovereign	default	or	‘credit	event’	is	
the	subject	of	some	debate	and	covered	elsewhere	(Hileman,	2015)	
46	(Lindert	&	Morton,	1989;	Marichal,	1989;	Suter,	1992)	
47		(Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009,	pp.	18,	96;	Sturzenegger	&	Zettelmeyer,	2006)	
48		(Porzecanski,	2010)	
49	(C.	M.	Reinhart,	2010;	Ritschl,	2012)	
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In	recent	years	many	developing	economies	have	achieved	comparatively	low	debt-
to-income	levels	while	concurrently	stockpiling	significant	reserves.	Starting	in	2003	debt-to-
income	ratios	in	developed	countries	began	diverging	from	developing	countries	(Figure	1).50		
	
Figure	1:	Sovereign	Debt	Divergence	–	Public	Debt-to-GDP	(%)	for	G-20	Advanced	and	
Emerging	Countries,	1999-2009	
	
	
Note:	advanced	countries	include	Australia,	Canada,	Italy,	Japan,	Republic	of	Korea,	United	States,	
Germany,	France,	United	Kingdom.	G-20	Emerging	include	Argentina,	Brazil,	People's	Republic	of	
China,	Indonesia,	India,	Mexico,	Russian	Federation,	Saudi	Arabia,	Turkey,	South	Africa	
	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	
	
	
Today,	public	debt	levels	for	advanced	countries	as	a	whole	are	now	in	line	with	the	
periods	following	the	two	world	wars	(Figure	2).	A	perhaps	important	difference	between	
those	periods	and	today	is	that	the	accumulation	of	today’s	public	debts	occurred	in	the	
absence	of	a	world	war.	The	inability	to	make	large	cuts	to	temporary	wartime	expenditures,	
as	was	possible	following	the	world	wars,	is	perhaps	an	important	factor	behind	why	many	
advanced	economies	are	currently	struggling	to	manage	debt	levels.	In	addition,	the	absence	
																																																						
50	(Blanchard,	Faruqee,	&	Klyuev,	2009;	Dominguez,	Hashimoto,	&	Ito,	2011)	China’s	approximately	$3	trillion	in	
foreign	reserves	receive	wide	publicity.	However,	less	well	known	is	the	fact	that	according	to	(Central	
Intelligence	Agency,	2010)	Russia,	Saudi	Arabia,	Brazil,	India,	Thailand,	Algeria,	Mexico,	Malaysia	and	Indonesia	
also	hold	reserves	comparable	to	or	in	excess	of	many	advanced	countries.	
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of	war	or	other	‘great	cause’	behind	the	accumulation	of	debt	could	influence	the	degree	of	
social	commitment	to	service	public	debts.51	Further	complicating	the	current	debt	picture	is	
the	dramatic	increase	in	private	debt	levels,	which	in	crisis	may	get	shifted	onto	the	public	
sector	balance	sheet.52	
	
Figure	2:	Public	Debt-to-GDP	(%)	for	Advanced	Countries,	1880	–	2010	
	
Note:	advanced	countries	include	Australia,	Canada,	Italy,	Japan,	Republic	of	Korea,	United	States,	
Germany,	France,	and	United	Kingdom	
	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	
	
	
The	objective	of	this	paper	is	not	to	detail	the	various	ways	in	which	a	sovereign	debt	
sustainability	problem	can	arise,	which	has	been	detailed	elsewhere.53	This	paper	instead	
outlines	the	different	mechanisms	by	which	countries	can	address	unsustainable	public	debt,	
either	prior	to	or	once	a	sovereign	debt	crisis	is	underway.	
	 	
																																																						
51	(James,	2011;	Ritschl,	1996)	
52	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2011)	
53	For	more	on	how	countries	get	into	debt,	as	well	as	why	and	when	sovereign	debt	problems	arise	see	
(Aizenman	&	Powell,	1998;	Borensztein,	Yeyati,	&	Panizza,	2006;	Campos,	Jaimovich,	&	Panizza,	2006;	Panizza,	
Sturzenegger,	&	Zettelmeyer,	2009pp.	17-20;	Tomz	&	Wright,	2007)	
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2.2	Literature	survey	
	
A	major	barrier	to	understanding	sovereign	debt	sustainability	is	the	absence	of	a	
definitive	quantitative	measure,	or	set	of	measures,	for	determining	debt	sustainability.	This	
gap	exists	for	a	number	of	reasons,	including	the	difficulty	of	understanding	behavioural	
aspects	of	sovereign	debt	such	as	sentiments	and	motivations,	the	challenge	of	modelling	
creditor	perceptions,	the	difficulty	in	measuring	both	the	sovereign’s	ability	and	or	
willingness	to	repay	its	debt,	and	a	number	of	other	factors.54	However,	several	quantitative	
measures	of	debt	sustainability	are	currently	employed	to	evaluate	safe	(meaning	non-crisis	
triggering)	levels	of	sovereign	debt,	including	i)	the	nation’s	debt-to-income	ratio,	ii)		the	
government’s	primary	budget	balance	(whether	there	is	a	deficit	or	surplus	before	interest	
expense	is	accounted	for),	iii)	GDP	growth	rate	compared	to	the	rate	of	interest	paid	on	
public	debt,	and	iv)	the	average	time	to	maturity	of	the	total	government	debt	portfolio.55	It	
is	unclear	how	much	weight	should	be	given	to	any	one	measure	or	set	of	measures,	and	
attempts	to	compare	debt	sustainability	measures	across	different	countries	over	time	to	
identify	strong	relationships	between	variables	has	yielded	inconclusive	results.56	Overall,	
because	a	significant	portion	of	public	debt	is	regularly	refinanced	(‘rolled	over’)	in	capital	
markets,	sovereign	debt	sustainability	is	tied	to	the	fickle	confidence	of	market	participants	
in	both	the	sovereign’s	ability	and	commitment	to	meet	obligations.	
	
The	last	time	a	significant	number	of	advanced	country	defaults	took	place	was	in	the	
years	following	the	First	World	War.	57	The	emerging-market	orientation	of	recent	literature	
may	limit	its	usefulness	vis-à-vis	advance	economies.	Significant	socio-political	and	
institutional	differences	exist	between	developing	and	advanced	economies	which	may	
																																																						
54	(Neck	&	Sturm,	2008,	p.	1)	
55	(Economist,	2010)	
56	For	example,	as	of	2011	Portugal’s	debt-to-income	ratio	is	approximately	60%,	which	is	in	line	or	below	that	
of	the	U.S.,	Germany,	Belgium,	and	the	UK.	These	latter	countries	have	thus	far	not	encountered	any	difficulties	
in	the	public	debt	capital	markets.	However,	Portugal	for	a	time	was	unable	to	find	private	financing	at	a	
sustainable	rate	of	interest.	Compare	and	contrast	the	case	of	Portugal	with	Japan,	which	has	a	debt-to-income	
ratio	of	approximately	220%	yet	also	enjoys	one	of	the	lowest	borrowing	rates	of	any	sovereign.	A	commonly	
cited	explanation	for	the	financing	difficulties	encountered	by	Portugal’s	government	is	the	country’s	relatively	
low	rate	of	economic	growth.	However,	Japan	also	has	a	low	economic	growth	rate.	
57	(M.	Winkler,	1933)	
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shape	how	debt	crises	are	managed.58	Further,	the	sheer	size	of	debts	on	advanced	country	
balance	sheets	may	put	some	frequently	employed	emerging	market	debt	sustainability	
options,	such	as	repudiation,	in	conflict	with	financial	stability.	In	other	words,	rather	than	
focus	on	debt	reduction	advanced	economies	may	instead	to	focus	on	debt	sustainability.	
	
The	case	of	Britain	following	both	the	Napoleonic	Wars	and	Second	World	War	
illustrates	the	distinction	between	sovereign	debt	reduction	and	sustainability.	Britain’s	debt-
to-national	income	ratio	in	both	periods	experienced	a	steady,	significant	decline,	adjusting	
from	approximately	250%	to	under	50%	over	the	course	of	several	decades	(Figure	3	and	
Figure	4).		
	
Figure	3:	Net	Public	Debt/GDP	(%)	for	the	United	Kingdom,	1820	–	1910	
	
	
													Sources:	(Mitchell,	1988),	UK	Central	Statistical	Office	
																																																						
58	See	for	example	(Acemoglu	&	Robinson,	2012;	Aoki,	1996)	
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Figure	4:	Public	Debt/GDP	(%)	for	the	United	Kingdom,	1946	–	1974	
	
	
																			Sources:	(Mitchell,	1988),	UK	Central	Statistical	Office	
	
However,	the	UK’s	nominal	level	of	public	debt	was	comparatively	unchanged	over	
the	same	period,	particularly	when	measured	against	the	change	in	nominal	GDP.	The	period	
following	the	Napoleonic	Wars	coincided	with	the	classical	gold	standard	and	relatively	
modest	inflation,	so	most	of	the	change	in	Britain’s	debt-to-income	ratio	was	derived	from	
economic	growth.59	In	contrast,	inflation	played	a	greater	role	in	the	decline	of	Britain’s	debt-
to-income	ratio	following	the	Second	World	War.60	Overall,	the	British	case	highlights	how	
the	popular	question	of	“how	will	we	pay-off	the	debt?”	should	be	substituted	with	“how	will	
we	sustain	the	debt?”.	
	
A	number	of	leading	economists	identify	up	to	five	options	for	addressing	a	sovereign	
debt	problem,	and	Taylor	(2011)	describes	these	five	options	as	collectively	exhaustive,	
																																																						
59	(Ritschl,	1996)	
60	(Buiter,	1985pp.	18-19;	C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	
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stating	they	are	“an	iron	law	that	is	well	known”.61	These	five	options	(and	their	respective	
effects	on	the	debt/GDP	ratio)	are	i)	real	economic	growth	(boost	the	denominator),	ii)	fiscal	
consolidation	(reduce	or	slow	the	numerator);	iii)	repudiation	(reduce	the	numerator),	iv)	
inflation	(reduce	the	real	value	of	repayment	of	the	principal,	increase	the	denominator	
relative	to	the	numerator),	and	v)	financial	repression	(reduce	interest	rate	paid	which	slows	
growth	of	the	numerator).	
	
This	paper	argues	that	the	above	five	sovereign	debt	reduction	options	are	not	in	fact	
collectively	exhaustive,	and	that	two	distinct	options	have	been	underemphasized	or	mostly	
overlooked	–	financial	aid	and	asset	exchange.	
	
	 	
																																																						
61	See	for	example	(Buiter,	1985,	p.	22;	Nasar,	2011,	pp.	220-221;	C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	pp.	1-2;	
Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	1;	Taylor,	2011,	p.	49)	The	five	options	for	reducing	sovereign	debt	are	listed	by	all	except	
Buiter,	who	lists	only	four	(he	does	not	include	financial	repression).		
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2.3	The	seven	mechanisms	for	achieving	sovereign	debt	sustainability	
	
This	section	discusses	each	of	the	seven	distinct	mechanisms	for	achieving	sovereign	debt	
sustainability	along	with	their	respective	political	economy	trade-offs	(Table	1).	
	
	 Economic	growth	can	reduce	a	nation’s	public	debt-to-income	ratio,	which	is	perhaps	
the	most	widely	referenced	measure	of	sovereign	debt	sustainability.	An	expansion	in	a	
nation’s	products	and	services	typically	generates	additional	tax	revenue	without	
necessitating	an	increase	in	tax	rates.	While	economic	growth	certainly	has	its	critics,	this	
feature	makes	economic	growth	particularly	attractive	to	a	wide	cross-section	of	
stakeholders.62	It	should	be	noted	that	in	some	cases	Gross	National	Product	(GNP)	growth	
would	be	a	more	useful	numerator	than	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	in	evaluating	debt	
sustainability	via	the	debt-to-income	ratio.63	
	
	 	 Some	go	as	far	as	to	argue	that	economic	growth	has	historically	been	the	only	means	
by	which	relief	from	the	burden	of	large	public	debts	has	been	achieved.	In	other	words,	the	
presence	of	sufficient	economic	growth	is	the	only	reliable	means	for	assessing	debt	
sustainability.64	However,	a	misconception	has	emerged	around	the	role	of	economic	growth	
in	the	resolution	of	the	large	Second	World	War	public	debts.	For	example,	Sen	(2011)	states	
that	“the	big	public	debts	of	many	countries	when	the	second	world	war	ended	caused	huge	
anxieties,	but	the	burden	diminished	rapidly	thanks	to	fast	economic	growth”.65	This	view	is	
incomplete	as	shown	by	Buiter	(1985)	and	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	(2011),	who	both	document	
the	effect	of	inflation	on	the	reduction	of	sovereign	debt	burdens	for	many	countries	in	the	
post-Second	World	War	period.	For	example,	according	to	Buiter	the	positive	effects	of	
economic	growth	on	the	UK’s	debt	burden	were	entirely	offset	by	fiscal	expansion.	In	other	
																																																						
62	For	a	brief	overview	of	some	of	the	criticism	of	economic	growth	see	(K.	Rogoff,	2012)	
63	For	most	countries	Gross	Domestic	Product	and	Gross	National	Product,	which	excludes	the	profits	of	foreign	
residents	and	corporations,	are	nearly	identical.	However,	present	day	Ireland,	which	is	home	for	the	regional	
headquarters	and	operations	of	many	foreign	companies,	is	an	exception.	An	estimated	20%	of	Irish	GDP	is	
generated	by	‘ghost	corporations’	and	considered	un-taxable	under	domestic	law	(Johnson,	2010a,	2010b).		
64	(A.	Winkler,	2011)	
65	(Sen,	2011)	
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words,	without	inflation	the	UK’s	debt-to-GDP	ratio	would	have	remained	unchanged	
following	the	Second	World	War.66	
	
	 	 While	economic	growth	is	often	the	preferred	solution	for	a	debt	problem,	
generating	sufficient	growth	can	prove	elusive.	There	is	considerable	debate	and	uncertainty	
over	how	best	to	achieve	economic	growth,	and	some	research	suggests	that	there	may	be	a	
negative	correlation	between	high	debt-to-income	levels	and	economic	growth.67	
Considerable	debate	also	exists	over	the	timeframe	required	to	affect	meaningful	change	in	
a	nation’s	growth	trajectory,	as	well	as	how	much	influence	policymakers	ultimately	wield	
over	growth	fundamentals	such	as	demographics	and	productivity.	In	other	words,	even	if	a	
country	desires	growth	it	may	be	a	difficult	for	technocrats	to	engineer,	particularly	in	a	short	
timeframe.	
	
	
	 	
																																																						
66	(Buiter,	1985,	pp.	18-19)	
67	See	for	example	(Cecchetti	et	al.,	2010;	Kumar	et	al.,	2010;	Panizza	&	Presbitero,	2012;	C.	M.	Reinhart	&	
Rogoff,	2010)	
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Table	1:	Political	Economy	Tradeoffs	of	Seven	Sovereign	Debt	Sustainability	Mechanisms	
Mechanism	 Description	 					Advantages	 					Disadvantages	
1.	Economic		
				Growth	
Growth	of	a	nation's	
taxable	GDP	of	
sufficient	size	to	
service	debt	
+ Automatically	generates	
increased	tax	revenue	
without	higher	tax	rates	
+ High	political	support	
− Potentially	difficult	to	
achieve	
− Opposition	to	growth	(e.g.,	
environmental	externalities)	
2.	Financial		
				Aid	
Bridge	financing	to	
enable	economic	
growth;	debt	
forgiveness	and	or	
restructuring	can	also	
constitute	aid	
+ Large	source	of	funds	
available	internationally	
+ Can	engender	improved	
economic	efficiency	
+ Expand	foreign	trade	
+ Rescheduling	debt	can	be	
mutually	beneficial	
− Rarely	provided	with	no-
strings	attached	
− Unpopular;	difficult	to	
implement	debtor	
concessions	
− Aid	arrives	too	late	(‘throw	
good	money	after	bad’)	
3.	Fiscal		
				Consolidation	
Reducing	government	
expenditure	and	or	
increasing	tax	revenue	
+ Fiscal	adjustments	are	
within	domestic	control	
+ Avoidance	of	foreign	
commitments	
+ High	transparency	
− Counter-growth	and	may	
lead	to	an	ill-timed	
economic	contraction	
− Politically	unpopular	
− Implementation	challenges		
4.	Asset	Exchange	 The	trade	of	tangible	
and	intangible	
government	assets,	
such	as	state-owned	
enterprises,	bullion,	
geopolitical	influence,	
etc.	
+ Source	of	hard	currency	
+ Liberalization	may	help	
boost	economic	growth	
+ May	be	reversible	through	
later	repurchase	and	or	
nationalization	
− May	only	reduce	debts	by	
small	fraction	
− Reduce	government	
revenue	generating	assets,	
exacerbating	problem	
− Slow;	'fire-sale'	prices	
5.	Inflation		
				Surprise	
Unexpected	spike	in	
inflation,	triggered	by	
government	action,	
that	reduces	the	real	
debt	burden	and	
devalues	the	currency	
+ Quickly	reduces	the	real	
value	of	debt	
+ Can	be	implemented	at	
government’s	discretion	
+ Devaluation	can	improve	
exports,	attract	new	capital	
− May	trigger	capital	flight	
− Severe	political	instability	
− Only	reduces	debt	issued	in	
domestic	currency	
− Devaluation	leads	to	higher	
import	costs	
6.	Repudiation		
				(Default)	
				
Suspension	and/or	
cancelation	of	principal	
and	or	interest	owed	
to	creditors;	
restructuring	of	loan	
terms	may	also	
constitute	default	
+ Quickly	reduces	debt	
+ Debtor	can	target	
repudiation	of	certain	
creditors	(e.g.,	foreigners)	
+ Debate	over	the	degree	of	
negative	consequences	for	
debtor	
+ A	common	approach	
− Reduced	access	to	capital	
markets	
− Higher	interest	expense	
going	forward	
− Only	partial	repudiation	is	
typically	possible	
− Restructuring	can	constitute	
a	default	and	bring	negative	
consequences	
7.	Financial		
				Repression	
Financial	controls	and	
interest	rate	caps	that	
provide	government	
financing	on	below	
market	rates	of	
interest	
+ Can	deliver	a	steady	
reduction	in	the	real	value	
of	the	debt	over	time	
+ Historically	compatible	
with	economic	growth	
+ Low	transparency	
− Lower	economic	efficiency	
− Complex	implementation	
and	enforcement	
− Slower	than	alternatives	
− Can	trigger	malinvestment	
− Low	transparency	
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Financial	aid	to	sovereign	nations	can	provide	significant	debt	relief.	It	can	also	take	
many	different	forms.	One	not	uncommon	means	by	which	governments	attempt	to	address	
a	sovereign	debt	problem	is	by	securing	additional	funding,	often	in	the	form	of	a	loan,	for	
investment	or	consumption	to	stimulate	economic	growth.	Such	‘bridge’	financing	can	help	
countries	weather	temporary	economic	downturns.68	Since	the	Second	World	War	
international	lending	organizations,	such	as	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	have	
played	a	central	role	in	coordinating	foreign	credit	for	countries	in	debt	distress.	
Governments	also	lend	to	each	other	on	a	bilateral	(e.g.,	1946	Anglo-American	Loan)	and	
regional	basis	(2010	European	Financial	Stability	Fund).	Sovereign	funding	can	also	be	
provided	by	banks	and	other	private	or	quasi-private	institutions	(e.g.,	pension	funds).	
However,	the	practice	of	saddling	an	already	heavily-indebted	nation	with	even	more	debt	is	
controversial	and	may	prove	ineffective,	as	appears	to	have	been	the	case	recently	with	
Greece.		
	
Both	grants	and	debt	forgiveness	are,	not	surprisingly,	a	popular	alternative	amongst	
debtor	nations	as	opposed	to	becoming	further	encumbered	with	new	loans.69	The	concept	
of	‘odious’	debts	was	developed	over	a	century	ago	following	the	Spanish-American	war	and	
has	been	used	to	justify	loan	forgiveness	when	an	illegitimate	regime	loses	power.70	
Historical	examples	of	non-odious	debt	forgiveness	include	the	1947	decision	by	Australia	
and	New	Zealand	to	forgive	£38	million	of	British	Second	World	War	debt.71	An	agreement	by	
creditors	to	lengthen	the	repayment	schedule,	referred	to	sometimes	as	a	‘payment	holiday’,	
is	often	employed	as	a	form	of	financial	aid	and	can	provide	a	country	with	additional	time	to	
re-establish	debt	service.	For	example,	in	1956-57	the	UK	negotiated	an	amendment	to	the	
Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement	that	added	a	‘bisque’	clause,	meaning	the	UK	could	
elect	to	suspend	payments	of	principal	and	interest	in	any	year,	up	to	seven	times.72	
	
																																																						
68	(P.	Krugman,	1988)	
69	(Bulow	&	Rogoff,	1989;	Neumayer,	2002)	
70	(Kremer	&	Jayachandran,	2002)	
71	(Pressnell	1986,	p.	366)	
72	(Cosío-Pascal	&	Bankruptcy,	2006,	p.	7)	
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Financial	aid,	however,	often	comes	with	‘strings	attached’.	For	example,	IMF	loans	
are	typically	contingent	on	the	recipient	implementing	economic	and	political	reforms,	along	
with	regular	IMF	auditing	to	ensure	compliance.	While	IMF	programs	are	aimed	at	improving	
economic	efficiency	and	competitiveness,	which	in	turn	aid	the	repayment	of	debts,	they	
often	prove	unpopular	with	some	political	constituencies.73	Other	research	has	shown	a	
statistically	significant	relationship	between	debt	forgiveness	and	military	grants.74	In	
contrast	to	asset	sales	or	asset	exchange,	debt	forgiveness	and	other	forms	of	financial	aid	
have	received	significant	attention	in	the	literature.75	
	
Fiscal	consolidation	can	reduce	deficits	and	debt	levels	by	decreasing	government	
expenditure	and	or	increasing	tax	revenue.	Such	adjustments,	however,	can	be	very	
unpopular	amongst	those	affected	and	therefore	politically	difficult	to	implement.	Further,	
sovereign	debt	crises	often	strike	during	periods	of	economic	weakness,	or	precisely	when	
Keynesian	demand	management	theory	suggests	that	governments	should	be	stimulating	
the	economy	by	spending	more	or	reducing	taxes.76	However,	such	government	efforts	to	
stimulate	the	economy	may	run	up	against	resistance	from	creditors	who	view	the	sovereign	
as	overly-indebted.	A	loss	in	the	confidence	of	creditors	over	the	sovereign’s	commitment	
and	or	ability	to	service	its	debt	can	result	in	a	sudden	increase	in	debt	expense,	which	would	
only	further	exacerbate	a	debt	sustainability	problem.	
	
From	an	accounting	perspective	fiscal	consolidation	can	be	viewed	as	an	‘income	
statement’	debt	sustainability	mechanism,	whereby	a	nation’s	reoccurring	‘revenue’	is	
increased	by	raising	taxes,	and	its	reoccurring	‘expenses’	are	reduced	through	budget	cuts.	In	
contrast,	asset	exchanges	(or	asset	sales)	can	be	viewed	as	a	‘balance	sheet’	mechanism,	
where	the	sale	produces	a	one-time	cash	flow	effect.	Fiscal	consolidation	measures	can	often	
be	reversed	once	a	debt	crisis	has	abated.	In	contrast,	asset	sales	produce	a	one-time	cash	
																																																						
73	(Blustein,	2003,	2005;	Obstfeld	&	Taylor,	2004,	p.	162)	
74	(Neumayer,	2002)	
75	For	other	studies	of	debt	forgiveness	see	(William	Easterly,	2001;	Froot,	Scharfstein,	&	Stein,	1989;	
Hernandez	&	Katada,	1996;	Iyoha,	1999;	Paul	R	Krugman,	1989;	Rajan,	2005)	
76	(DeLong	&	Summers,	2012;	Keynes,	1936;	Paul	R.	Krugman,	2009)	
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flow	boost,	and	any	future	appreciation	or	reoccurring	income	generated	from	a	sovereign	
asset	is	lost	forever	unless	the	asset	is	later	reacquired.	
	
Asset	sales	have	received	significant	attention	in	the	privatization	literature,	which	
has	examined	the	impact	of	assets	sales	on	economic	growth.77	However,	when	considering	
options	for	achieving	debt	sustainability,	asset	sales	are	sometimes	overlooked.	This	is	
perhaps	due	to	the	potentially	erroneous	view	that	asset	sales	cannot	have	a	material	impact	
on	sovereign	debt	sustainability.	In	fact	many	governments	own	substantial	domestic	and	
foreign	assets.78	For	example,	as	of	2010	the	U.S.	Treasury	listed	total	federal	non-defence	
related	assets	at	a	book	value	of	$233	billion,	a	figure	which	may	in	fact	be	significantly	
understated;	other	estimates	of	the	total	value	of	all	U.S.	federal	government	assets	are	
upwards	of	$128	trillion	counting	oil	and	gas	resources.79		
	
Throughout	history	asset	sales	in	the	form	of	real	estate,	bullion,	and	even	warships	
have	been	sold	by	nations	to	pay	off	debts.80	However,	the	fact	that	government	assets	are	
sold	for	a	variety	of	reasons	makes	it	difficult	to	identify	episodes	in	history	when	assets	
were	sold	primarily	for	debt	sustainability	reasons.81	One	example	from	history	occurred	in	
1940	when,	as	a	prerequisite	imposed	by	the	U.S.	for	obtaining	crucial	Lend-Lease	support,	
the	UK	Treasury	sold	British	Imperial	Tobacco	shares	in	the	U.S.82	Looking	at	the	recent	
Eurozone	sovereign	debt	crisis	there	is	evidence	that	a	number	of	countries	are	selling	assets	
to	assist	with	debt	sustainability	(Table	2).	
	
	 	
																																																						
77	See	for	example	(Boycko,	Shleifer,	&	Vishny,	1996;	MacKenzie,	1998;	Megginson	&	Netter,	2001;	Shleifer,	
1998;	Shleifer	&	Vishny,	2002)	
78	(Ferguson,	2011)	
79	(IER,	2013)	
80	The	purchase	of	the	Louisiana	territory	by	the	U.S.	from	cash-strapped	Napoleonic	France	is	one	of	the	more	
famous	sovereign	asset	sales.	
81	(Megginson	&	Netter,	2001,	p.	324)	cite	six	different	reasons	for	why	governments	sell	assets	
82	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	75-76)	
	 	 Page	|	39	
	
Table	2:	Select	Eurozone	Government	Assets	Sales,	2010-2014	
Country	 Assets	sold	 Amount	raised	from	sales	
Greece	 Ports,	baseball	stadiums,	casinos,	airplanes,	
horse	racing	tracks,	islands	 $71	billion	
Italy	 Real	estate	 £425	million	
Slovenia	 Telecom	stakes	 Approximately	€556	million	
France	 Foreign	real	estate	 €391	million	in	2013	
			
Sources:	Press	accounts	taken	from	the	Wall	Street	Journal,	Bloomberg,	CNBC,	The	Telegraph	
	
It	has	been	argued	in	the	privatization	literature	that	the	sale	of	state-owned	
enterprises,	in	addition	to	helping	pay	down	debt,	may	also	boost	productivity	and	drive	
greater	economic	growth.83	However,	liquidating	national	treasure	to	pay-off	lenders	can	
spark	political	controversy,	particularly	when	a	nation’s	debts	are	held	by	external	creditors.	
Further,	national	assets	often	generate	reoccurring	fiscal	revenue	which	may	be	lost	in	the	
event	of	a	sale,	thereby	making	debt	service	even	more	difficult.	Selling	government	assets	
may	also	prove	a	cumbersome	and	relatively	slow	process,	and	a	rushed	‘fire	sale’	is	
unappealing	for	governments	seeking	to	maximize	proceeds.84	It	may	also	prove	difficult	to	
reacquire	–	either	through	trade	or	nationalization	–	any	assets	that	have	been	sold,	
particularly	when	those	assets	reside	(or	can	be	moved)	outside	a	country’s	borders.85	All	of	
these	factors	combine	to	make	the	sale	of	state	assets	perhaps	one	of	the	least	attractive	
options	for	policymakers	navigating	a	sovereign	debt	sustainability	crisis.	However,	asset	
sales	can	play	an	important	signalling	role	in	a	debt	sustainability	crisis;	precisely	because	
asset	sales	are	so	undesirable	they	send	a	clear	message	to	creditors	and	market	participants	
that	the	sovereign	is	committed	to	servicing	its	debt.	In	other	words,	even	relatively	modest	
asset	sales	can	reduce	default	fears	and	interest	expense.		
	
Sometimes	referred	to	as	the	government’s	‘trump	card’,	inflation	surprise	represents	
a	wilful	act	by	policymakers	to	generate	inflation	for	the	purpose	of	reducing	the	real	value	
																																																						
83	(Boycko	et	al.,	1996;	MacKenzie,	1998;	Megginson	&	Netter,	2001;	Shleifer,	1998;	Shleifer	&	Vishny,	2002)	
84	(Shleifer	&	Vishny,	1992)	
85	The	seizure	of	foreign	owned	assets,	in	isolation	or	combination	with	strategic	default,	have	been	referred	to	
as	‘sovereign	theft’	(Tomz	&	Wright,	2008)	
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of	public	debt.86	This	can	be	accomplished	over	a	relatively	short	timeframe	through	‘debt	
monetization’,	whereby	sovereign	debt	is	purchased	and	retired	by	the	central	bank.87	
Inflation	can	also	lower	a	nation’s	exchange	rate,	which	over	the	medium	to	longer-term	may	
have	a	positive	influence	on	debt	sustainability	through	greater	capital	inflows	and	more	
competitively	priced	exports.	However,	if	creditors	observe	(or	simply	suspect)	significant	
inflation	then	large-scale	capital	flight	may	commence,	thereby	negating	some	of	the	debt	
sustainability	benefits	of	inflation	(hence	the	need	for	‘surprise’).		
	
Political	instability	often	accompanies	high	inflation	regardless	of	whether	or	not	
capital	controls	are	in	place.	For	example,	Germany	in	1923	(annual	percentage	inflation	of	
2.22E	+10),	Argentina	in	1989	(annual	percentage	inflation	of	3,080),	and	Hungary	in	1946	
(annual	percentage	inflation	of	9.63E	+	26,	the	modern	record)	all	represent	cases	where	
hyperinflation	was	followed	by	significant	political	instability.88	More	modest	levels	of	
inflation	have	also	been	attributed	to	political	changes.	For	example,	low	double-digit	
inflation	in	the	late-1970s	is	viewed	as	a	factor	behind	U.S.	President	Jimmy	Carter’s	election	
defeat	to	Ronald	Reagan	in	1980.89	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	inflation	only	reduces	the	
real	burden	of	non-floating	rate	(non-indexed)	debt	that	has	been	issued	in	a	domestic	
currency	controlled	by	the	central	bank.	
	
Repudiation	(also	referred	to	as	‘default’)	is	a	commonly	employed	mechanism	for	
addressing	unsustainable	sovereign	debts.90	It	should	be	noted	that	a	precise,	generally	
agreed	upon	definition	of	sovereign	default	has	proven	elusive.	For	economic	analysis,	
Grossman	and	Vay	Huyck	(1988)	conceptually	define	default	as	“the	failure	to	meet	
contractually	agreed	upon	obligations	in	full”,	such	as	the	repudiation	of	debt	or	the	failure	
to	repay	the	loan	on	time.	The	authors	go	on	to	note	that	“window	dressing”	is	often	
																																																						
86	(Stella,	International	Monetary	Fund,	&	Exchange	Affairs,	1997,	p.	11)	
87	(Mishkin,	2007)	Seigniorage	can	also	generate	revenue	for	the	government,	which	can	reduce	the	real	value	
of	debt	burdens.	However,	Buiter	shows	that	“the	maximum	possible	yield	of	this	tax	is	also	small”	(Buiter,	
1985,	p.	26).	
88	For	a	further	discussion	of	the	history	of	inflation	and	hyperinflation	see	(Sargent,	1982)	
89	(Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009,	pp.	180-189)	
90	(Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009)	
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employed	to	avoid	legally	classifying	a	default	for	regulatory	purposes.91	As	is	discussed	in	
more	detail	in	Chapter	3.3,	further	complicating	the	determination	of	whether	a	credit	event	
has	taken	place	is	the	fact	that	credit	rating	agencies	and	other	market	facing	institutions	
may	employ	definitions	of	default	that	differ	from	the	definitions	used	by	economists.	For	
example,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2009,	2002)	suggest	that	annual	inflation	of	40%	or	more	is	
significant	enough	to	warrant	designating	a	country	as	in	default.	However,	this	definition	is	
not	officially	shared	by	credit	rating	agencies.	
	
While	repudiating	debts	is	antithetical	to	debt	sustainability,	a	partial	or	full	default	
can	aid	a	nation	seeking	a	return	to	a	sustainable	public	debt	trajectory.	Default,	however,	is	
not	without	negative	consequences	for	borrowers	and	lenders	alike.92	Countries	have	a	
number	of	incentives	to	avoid	default,	including	reduced	access	to	credit,	sudden	and	forced	
fiscal	spending	reductions,	reduced	international	trade	and	higher	tariffs,	higher	interest	
rates	for	both	the	public	and	private	sector,	commercial	penalties	and	seizures,	and	political	
instability.93	Default	also	often	leads	to	significant	losses	for	creditors.	However,	creditors	
often	wield	enough	leverage	to	enforce	some	level	of	repayment	even	if	considerable	time	
has	passed	since	the	default	episode.	For	example,	Russia,	following	the	Soviet	Union’s	
collapse,	was	only	able	to	return	to	international	capital	markets	after	a	portion	of	the	debt	
owed	from	its	Tsarist-era	default	from	eight	decades	prior	was	paid.94	A	common	alternative	
to	outright	debt	repudiation	is	the	amendment	of	loan	terms,	such	as	adjustments	to	the	
repayment	schedule	that	were	described	earlier	as	a	form	of	financial	aid.	However,	such	
‘restructurings’	or	‘partial’	defaults	can	still	result	in	some	of	the	negative	consequences	
noted	above.	
	
Financial	repression,	sometimes	referred	to	as	a	‘stealth’	tax,	can	encompass	a	
complex	and	wide	range	of	policies,	the	net	result	of	which	is	government	borrowing	at	
																																																						
91	(Grossman	&	Van	Huyck,	1988,	p.	1088)	
92	(Pitchford	&	Wright,	2007,	pp.	1-6;	C.	M.	Reinhart,	Rogoff,	&	Savastano,	2003)	
93	(Bordo	&	Oosterlinck,	2005;	Cole,	Dow,	&	English,	1995;	J.	Eaton	&	M.	Gersovitz,	1981;	Jonathan	Eaton	&	
Mark	Gersovitz,	1981;	Eaton,	Gersovitz,	&	Stiglitz,	1986;	Eichengreen,	1991pp.	155-156;	Esteves,	2012;	
Flandreau	&	Zumer,	2004,	p.	49;	Ozler,	1992;	Panizza	et	al.,	2009,	pp.	25-39;	Rose,	2005)	
94	(Panizza	et	al.,	2009,	pp.	5-9;	Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009,	pp.	61-63)	
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advantageous	(below	market)	rates	of	interest.	95	Financial	repression	can	play	a	significant	
role	in	reducing	a	government’s	debt	burden,	particularly	when	paired	with	inflation.96	
However,	the	advantages	conferred	to	a	government	by	financial	repression	are	not	
dependent	upon	achieving	negative	real	interest	rates;	government	can	benefit	from	
financial	repression	simply	through	the	ability	to	borrow	at	a	lower	rate	of	interest	than	
would	otherwise	be	possible	in	the	absence	of	financial	repression.		
	
Similar	to	the	challenge	of	identifying	generally	agreed	upon	sovereign	credit	events,	
a	precise	and	generally	agreed	upon	definition	of	financial	repression	is	a	source	of	ongoing	
debate.97	For	example,	‘prudential’	measures	aimed	at	increasing	the	stability	of	the	financial	
system	like	Basel	III	and	Solvency	II,	which	require	financial	institutions	to	hold	a	higher	
percentage	of	‘safe’	capital	(e.g.,	sovereign	debt),	have	also	been	characterized	as	financial	
repression.	Basel	III	and	Solvency	II	may	force	private	firms	to	own	more	government	debt	
than	they	would	otherwise	freely	choose	to	hold.	Efforts	aimed	at	restricting	the	actions	of	
credit	rating	agencies	have	also	been	described	as	financial	repression.98	Some	argue	that	
quantitative	easing	is	a	form	of	financial	repression	as	it	reduces	the	interest	paid	on	public	
debt.99	
	
Regulations	placed	on	the	financial	system	that	accompany	financial	repression,	such	
as	capital	controls,	are	often	politically	unpopular.	Prior	research	has	also	shown	that	
financial	repression	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	economic	performance	and	growth.100	For	
																																																						
95	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	19)	
96	(Agénor	&	Montiel,	2008;	Beim	&	Calomiris,	2001;	William	R.	Easterly,	1989;	William	Russell	Easterly	&	
Schmidt-Hebbel,	1994;	Giovannini	&	Demelo,	1993;	C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	Like	inflation	surprise,	the	
debt	reduction	benefits	of	financial	repression	only	work	for	debt	issued	in	the	domestic-currency		(K.	S.	Rogoff	
&	Reinhart,	2011).	
97	(Turner,	2011)	
98	(Evans-Pritchard,	7	July,	2011).	
99	(Treadway,	2012)	
100	(De	la	Torre,	Gozzi,	&	Schmukler,	2007;	W.	Easterly,	1993;	Galindo,	Micco,	Ordoñez,	Bris,	&	Repetto,	2002;	
Goldsmith,	1969;	Lanyi	&	Saracoglu,	1983;	McKinnon,	1973;	Roubini	&	Salaimartin,	1992;	Shaw,	1973;	Todaro	&	
Smith,	2003;	World	Bank,	1989)	
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example,	unnaturally	low	interest	rates	may	also	trigger	‘malinvestment’.101	However,	
financial	repression	can	prove	a	relatively	attractive	mechanism	for	policymakers	when	
compared	against	other	options.	First,	the	post-Second	World	War	period,	the	so-called	
“golden	age	of	financial	repression”,	was	also	the	“golden	age	of	economic	growth”	for	many	
advanced	economies,	meaning	financial	repression	may	be	compatible	with	robust	economic	
growth.	The	opaque	nature	of	of	financial	repression	also	offers	political	advantages	over	
other	more	visible,	politically	destabilizing	debt	sustainability	measures,	such	as	inflation,	
fiscal	consolidation,	asset	sales,	and	repudiation.	
	
2.4	Foreign	and	geopolitical	considerations	
	
At	the	onset	of	a	sovereign	debt	crisis,	tensions	can	emerge	between	foreign	and	
domestic	creditors,	whose	interests	are	often	pitted	against	each	other.	Historically,	it	is	
unclear	whether	it	is	foreign	or	domestic	creditors	who	more	frequently	prevail.102	However,	
the	popular	notion	that	‘all	politics	is	local’	is	arguably	the	driving	force	behind	the	
perception	that	foreign	creditor	interests	are	frequently	subjugated	to	domestic	priorities.	
Foreign	lenders,	however,	are	not	always	willing	to	quietly	accept	losses.	During	the	late-19th	
and	early	20th	centuries	‘gunboat	diplomacy’	was	employed	to	ensure	the	repayment	of	
foreign	debt.	Historical	examples	include	British	financial	control	over	Egypt	in	1883,	
European	control	over	the	finances	of	Turkey	(1881)	and	Greece	(1898)	and	the	1902	
blockade	and	bombardment	of	Venezuela,	and	the	establishment	by	the	U.S.	of	a	
‘protectorate’	in	Haiti	in	1915.103	Plundering	foreign	treasure	as	a	means	of	shoring	up	a	
nation’s	finances	extends	back	through	the	Viking	raids	to	at	least	early	Roman	times.	
	
																																																						
101	(Burton	&	Williams,	1907;	Mills,	1867)	Austrian	scholars	such	as	Hayek	and	von	Mises	are	often	given	credit	
for	developing	the	economic	concept	of	malinvestment	but	the	problem	of	low	interest	rates	leading	to	the	
misallocation	of	capital	may	have	been	articulated	as	early	as	John	Mills	1867	address	to	the	Manchester	
Statistical	Society	titled	On	Credit	Cycles	and	the	Origin	of	Commercial	Panics.	
102	One	finding	from	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2009)	is	the	limited	data	and	understanding	we	have	on	domestic	
debt.		
103	(Coggan,	2011,	p.	252;	Mitchener	&	Weidenmier,	2005,	pp.	14-18)	
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The	days	when	both	creditors	and	debtors	employed	direct	military	force	to	achieve	
debt	sustainability	objectives	appears	to	have	largely	passed.	However,	the	use	of	
geopolitical	leverage	vis-à-vis	debt	sustainability	has	continued	into	more	recent	times.	For	
example,	during	the	1956	Suez	Crisis	the	U.S.	informed	Britain	that	unless	its	military	forces	
were	withdrawn	from	Egypt	the	U.S.	would	withhold	crucial	financial	support	for	Britain	at	a	
time	when	its	financial	reserves	were	under	significant	pressure.	The	threat	of	withholding	
financial	support	posed	a	significant	enough	risk	that	the	UK	was	forced	to	ignominiously	
withdraw	its	forces	from	the	Sinai	theatre.104	The	Suez	Crisis	is	often	presented	by	historians	
as	illustrative	of	how	America’s	financial	leverage	over	Britain	helped	it	to	achieve	its	
geopolitical	objectives.	However,	from	a	debt-sustainability	perspective,	Britain’s	abandoned	
military	manoeuvres	were	not	a	complete	loss.	Indeed,	they	may	helped	facilitate	significant	
IMF	and	U.S.	Export-Import	Bank	financing	subsequently	provided	for	Britain,	and	they	also	
appear	to	have	played	some	role	in	Britain’s	successful	renegotiation	of	the	Anglo-American	
loan	to	allow	for	greater	repayment	flexibility.105	In	other	words,	Britain’s	Suez	expedition	
may	have	been	a	net	positive	for	Britain	from	a	debt	sustainability	perspective.		
	
How	often	does	geopolitics	influence	debt	sustainability,	as	in	the	Suez-case	
described	above?	The	financial	details	and	negotiations	surrounding	such	events	are	often	
closely	guarded	state	secrets,	leaving	contemporaries	to	speculate	until	official	records	are	
declassified	decades	after-the-fact.	For	example,	in	2012	there	was	speculation	over	a	U.S.-
European	deal	that	banned	Iranian	oil	imports	from	several	European	countries	facing	debt	
sustainability	challenges.	In	exchange,	the	U.S.	agreed	to	support	additional	IMF	funds	for	
those	same	European	governments.106	Limited	U.S.	weapon	sales	to	Taiwan	in	exchange	for	
China’s	on-going	support	of	the	U.S.	Treasuries	market	are	another	area	of	speculation.	
	
	
																																																						
104	(Kunz,	1991,	pp.	131-152)	
105	(Cosío-Pascal	&	Bankruptcy,	2006,	p.	7).	
106	(Talley,	2012)	
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2.5	Conclusion	
	
Ultimately,	sovereign	debt	sustainability	is	as	much	if	not	more	of	a	political	as	
economic	challenge.	In	order	to	achieve	sovereign	debt	sustainability	countries	will	often	
utilize	more	than	one	of	the	seven	mechanisms	described	in	this	paper.	While	overly	
indebted	countries	often	share	many	economic	similarities,	optimal	debt	sustainability	
solutions	must	be	tailored	to	a	nation’s	unique	political	and	economic	circumstances.	The	
degree	to	which	policy	can	influence	any	one	of	the	sovereign	debt	reduction	mechanisms	
described	in	this	paper	also	varies	from	one	nation	to	the	next.	The	ever-evolving	sovereign	
debt	landscape	will	likely	make	finding	a	‘one-size-fits-all’	debt	sustainability	formula	elusive.	
In	addition,	market-driven	debt	dynamics	often	outpace	the	capacity	of	officials	to	act.107	In	
considering	the	different	policy	alternatives	a	country	must	balance	what	is	economically	
achievable	against	what	is	politically	viable,	and	also	carefully	consider	the	time	available	to	
act	before	forces	outside	the	control	of	policymakers	determine	how	to	make	a	nation’s	
sovereign	debt	sustainable.	
	 	
																																																						
107	(Greenlaw,	Hamilton,	Hooper,	&	Mishkin,	2013)	
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3	Sovereign	Credit	Event	Classification:	British	Debt	Sustainability	
and	Default,	1939-56	
	
	
	
Abstract:	 Economists	 and	 credit	 rating	 agencies	 employ	 different	 definitions	 of	
sovereign	default.	This	paper	explores	the	challenges	around	classifying	sovereign	
credit	 events	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 UK,	 which	 in	 1946	 recorded	 the	
highest	 public	 debt-to-GDP	 ratio	 in	 the	 20th	 century.	 Britain	 ‘partially	 defaulted’	
multiple	 times	 in	 the	 decades	 following	 the	 Second	 World	 War.	 However,	 the	
conventional	historical	view	is	that	the	UK	avoided	a	sovereign	default,	along	with	
many	 other	 problems	 that	 often	 plague	 countries	 with	much	 lower	 debt	 levels.	
While	a	number	of	policies	that	fall	under	the	heading	of	financial	repression	were	
employed	by	Britain,	financial	repression	was	not	Britain’s	sole	or	necessarily	most	
important	debt	sustainability	mechanism.	The	British	case	 illustrates	the	complex	
policy	 dynamics	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 sustainability	 vis-à-vis	 other	 competing	 policy	
objectives,	such	as	geopolitical	priorities.		
	
JEL:	H63,	E58,	E61,	E62,	H12,	H27,	P24	
	
Keywords:	sovereign	debt,	debt	sustainability,	financial	repression,	inflation,	sovereign	
default,	repudiation,	British	economic	history,	geopolitics	
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3.1	Introduction	
	
Shortly	after	the	Second	World	War	ended	Britain	had	the	highest	recorded	level	of	
public	debt	relative	to	national	income	of	any	country	in	the	20th	century,	and	perhaps	also	in	
all	of	economic	history.	The	UK’s	financial	crisis	‘scorecard’	for	this	period	from	Reinhart	and	
Rogoff	(2009)	shows	that	Britain	did	not	escape	this	period	unscathed:	the	country	
experienced	three	currency	crises	and	three	stock	market	crashes,	all	of	which	took	place	in	
the	latter	half	of	the	1940s	(Table	3).	However,	no	British	sovereign	default	is	recorded	by	
either	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	or	the	literature	following	the	Second	World	War.	Further,	while	
UK	economic	growth	lagged	many	of	its	peers	in	the	decades	following	the	Second	World	
War,	the	UK	managed	to	avoid	many	other	severe	financial	problems	associated	with	large	
sovereign	debts	that	have	recently	afflicted	countries	possessing	significantly	lower	levels	of	
public	debt,	such	as	exorbitant	borrowing	costs	and	lost	access	to	public	debt	markets.	
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Table	3:	United	Kingdom	Financial	Crises	Summary,	1941-1966	
	
		 		 Stock		 Sovereign	 		 Yearly	
	
Currency	 Inflation	 market	 debt	crises	 Banking		 crisis	
	
crises	 crises	 crash	 domestic	 external	 crises	 tally	
1941	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1942	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1943	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1944	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1945	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1946	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	
1947	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 2	
1948	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	
1949	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 2	
1950	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1951	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1952	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1953	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1954	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1955	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1956	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1957	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1958	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1959	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1960	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1961	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1962	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1963	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1964	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1965	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
1966	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
	
Source:	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2010)	
	
The	performance	recorded	for	the	UK	here	raises	several	questions.	First,	how	did	
Britain	manage	to	avoid	default?	Or	is	the	conventional	historical	record	surrounding	
Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	battle	for	debt	sustainability	in	some	way	incomplete	or	
even	erroneous?	What	can	other	countries	learn	from	the	British	example?	Or	were	Britain’s	
circumstances	so	unique	that	any	lessons	lack	applicability	to	contemporary	sovereign	debt	
challenges?		
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This	paper	examines	the	case	of	British	post-Second	World	War	debt	sustainability	
through	the	framework	presented	in	the	preceding	chapter	and	whether	historical	evidence	
supports	a	recent	quantitative	argument	by	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	(2011)	that	financial	
repression	played	a	decisive	role	in	British	debt	sustainability.	The	evidence	presented	both	
in	this	paper	and	the	subsequent	chapter	suggest	that	a	number	of	policies	that	fall	under	
the	heading	of	financial	repression	were	employed	by	Britain.	However,	financial	repression	
was	not	Britain’s	sole	or	necessarily	most	important	debt	sustainability	mechanism.	As	has	
been	well	documented,	financial	aid,	both	in	the	form	of	grant	aid	and	debt	forgiveness,	
played	a	crucial	role	in	British	debt	sustainability.	What	has	not	been	previously	argued	is	
that	Britain	‘partially	defaulted’	several	times	on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement.	
Further,	these	instances	of	default	may	be	considered	‘excusable’	as	they	were	conducted	
with	the	support	of	the	executive	branch	of	the	U.S.	government.	
	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	section	3.2	presents	a	
historiography	of	the	years	and	economic	circumstances	leading	up	to	end	of	the	Second	
World	War,	which	was	the	period	when	the	intellectual	framework	for	British	debt	
sustainability,	as	well	as	several	important	financial	repression	policies,	were	first	developed	
and	implemented.	Section	3.3	examines	how	sovereign	default	is	defined,	and	more	
generally	the	classification	of	sovereign	credit	events.	Section	3.4	examines	the	question	of	
whether	Britain	did	in	fact	default	on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement,	a	$3.7	billion	
loan	from	the	U.S.	to	Britain	in	exchange	for	a	number	of	requirements	on	trade	and	financial	
openness	that	would	later	prove	problematic	for	a	still	war-torn	Britain.	Section	3.5	
concludes.		
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3.2	Literature	and	Historical	Overview	
	
The	period	following	the	Second	World	War	was	not	the	first	time	Britain	experienced	
high	levels	of	public	debt.	Following	the	Napoleonic	wars	in	1821	Britain’s	debt-to-national	
income	ratio	was	261%.108	Britain	then	saw	a	steady	decline	in	its	debt-to-GDP	ratio,	which	
was	under	50%	by	the	eve	of	the	First	World	War	(Figure	5).	Of	note,	the	nominal	level	of	
British	debt	remained	comparatively	constant	during	much	of	the	post-Napoleonic	period,	
meaning	most	of	the	improvement	in	Britain’s	debt-to-GDP	ratio	can	be	attributed	to	an	
increase	in	the	denominator	(GDP).	As	the	19th	century	was	the	period	of	the	classical	Gold	
Standard	and	very	little	inflation,	the	vast	majority	of	Britain’s	improved	debt	position	
following	the	Napoleonic	wars	can	be	attributed	to	real	economic	growth	generated	by	the	
Industrial	Revolution.109	
	
																																																						
108	(Buiter,	1985,	p.	16;	Mitchell,	1988;	Mitchell	&	Deane,	1962;	Mitchell	&	James,	1971;	Ritschl,	1996)	Note	for	
the	year	1822	(and	all	pre-1861	years)	Mitchell	and	Deane	calculated	income	as	Total	Gross	National	Income	for	
Great	Britain	as	opposed	to	the	UK.	They	also	omit	certain	services	and	therefore	may	understate	GDP,	which	
would	result	in	an	upward	bias	in	the	ratio	for	this	year	(Ritschl,	1996).	For	comparison,	Napoleonic	France	had	
a	debt-to-GDP	ratio	in	1815	of	only	20%,	a	testament	to	19th	century	Britain’s	superior	capacity	to	borrow	
(Ferguson,	2001).	
109	(Barry	J	Eichengreen,	1998)	
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Figure	5:	Net	Public	Debt/GDP	(%)	for	the	United	Kingdom,	1820	–	1910	
	
	
Sources:	(Mitchell	1988),	UK	Central	Statistical	Office	
	 	
As	the	19th	century	came	to	a	close	Britain	and	the	City	of	London	reigned	supreme	
over	the	global	financial	system.	It	has	been	said	that	prior	to	First	World	War	the	original	
‘Sterling	Area’	consisted	of	not	just	the	group	of	countries	of	lesser	economic	significance	
that	would	come	to	be	aligned	around	Britain	during	and	after	the	Second	World	War,	but	of	
the	entire	world.110		However,	as	the	20th	century	progressed,	and	rival	industrial	powers	like	
Germany	grew	in	power,	the	cost	of	maintaining	Britain's	far-flung	empire	grew.	Britain	
emerged	from	the	First	World	War	no	longer	the	world’s	number	one	creditor	nation	but	a	
significant	debtor,	with	large	balances	in	particular	owed	to	America’s	governmental	and	
private	sectors.111	Even	though	much	of	Britain’s	war	debt	was	owed	to	foreign	creditors,	
																																																						
110	(Strange	&	Royal	Institute	of	International	Affairs.,	1971,	pp.	55-61;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	484)	"The	Gold	
Standard	was	in	fact	a	Sterling	Standard"	
111	(Kunz,	1991,	pp.	35-48)	For	more	on	the	dramatic	economic	and	political	transition	experienced	by	Britain	
during	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century	see	(Brown	&	Louis,	1999)	
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some	of	the	debt	was	issued	under	British	domestic	law	rather	than	foreign	law,	a	testament	
to	London’s	continued	status	as	a	global	financial	capital.112	
	
Britain	defaulted	in	1932,	along	with	many	other	wartime	debtor	countries,	on	war	
debt	owed	to	the	U.S.113	The	1932	default	represents	the	most	recently	recorded	default	by	
Britain.114	Britain,	due	in	part	to	the	UK’s	departure	in	September	1931	from	the	Gold	
Standard,	managed	to	turn	the	economic	corner	more	quickly	than	other	countries	mired	in	
depression,	such	as	the	U.S.,	France	and	Germany.115	While	Britain	joined	other	countries	in	
returning	to	recession	starting	in	the	latter	half	of	1937,	the	UK’s	debt-to-GDP	ratio	declined	
from	171%	in	1931	to	121%	on	the	eve	of	the	Second	World	War	(Figure	6).116	
	
	 	
																																																						
112	(Cassis	&	Collier,	2006)	Most	of	Britain’s	debts	from	the	First	World	War	were	consolidated	into	a	3.5%	
perpetual	annuity.		
113	(Winkler,	1933)	The	UK	remained	in	technical	default	until	1939	when	war	broke	out	and	never	repaid	its	
First	World	War	debt	to	the	U.S.	
114		(B.	Eichengreen	&	Portes,	1986;	Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009;	C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	9)	
115	(Barry	J.	Eichengreen,	1992)	
116	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	4-5)	
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Figure	6:	United	Kingdom	Public	Debt-to-GDP	(%)	and	Selected	Economic	Events,	1913-
1951	
	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	
	
	
The	onset	of	the	Second	World	War	brought	an	abrupt	halt	to	the	decline	in	Britain’s	
debt-to-GDP	ratio.117	Approximately	15%	of	Britain’s	net	worth	was	lost	in	the	first	Great	War	
as	debt	expenses	mounted	and	foreign	assets	were	sold.	Second	World	War	expenditures	
were	significantly	greater	than	those	of	the	First	World	War	and	ultimately	led	to	a	loss	of	
28%	of	the	UK	national	book	value,	or	nearly	double	the	size	of	the	first	world	war.	To	put	
the	comparative	costs	of	the	two	great	conflicts	in	perspective,	Britain	was	alone	among	
advanced	economies	in	seeing	zero	increase	in	national	wealth	between	1913	and	1951.	In	
sum,	the	two	great	wars	of	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century	effectively	bankrupted	the	British	
Empire.118	
	
To	bridge	the	budget	gap	created	by	the	Second	World	War	Britain	relied	heavily	on	
internal	funding	sources,	such	as	the	Bank	of	England,	which	more	than	tripled	the	size	of	its	
																																																						
117	For	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	British	wartime	economy	see	(Chester,	1951)	(Sayers,	1956)	and	(Mills	&	
Rockoff,	1993)	
118	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	8)	
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holdings	of	British	government	debt	securities	from	£397.9	million	in	August	1939	to	£1,134	
billion	in	January	1943	(Table	4).119		
	
Table	4:	United	Kingdom	Public	Debt	Securities	Held	by	the	Bank	of	England,	1939-43	
Date	 Total	
August	1939	 £397.9	
January	1940	 683.4	
January	1941	 765.1	
January	1942	 924.0	
January	1943	 1,134.0	
	
Source:	C261,	A.I.	Bloomfield	to	R.	Sproul,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	13	January,	1943	
	
Funding	support	also	came	from	the	British	Empire,	particularly	India	and	Egypt.	Additional	
support	came	from	the	United	States	in	the	form	of	Lend-Lease,	initiated	in	December	1941.	
Lend-Lease	quickly	displaced	exports	as	Britain’s	dominant	source	of	external	finance,	and	
over	the	course	of	the	war	Lend-Lease	accounted	for	more	than	twice	the	funding	obtained	
from	the	Sterling	Area.120	Britain	experienced	a	dramatic	reduction	in	exports	during	the	war,	
and	Britain’s	longer-term	investments	in	the	U.S.	were	also	liquidated	prior	to	Lend-Lease.	
	
On	14	August,	1941	the	Atlantic	Charter	was	enacted,	with	Articles	IV	and	V	of	the	
Charter	declaring	support	for	open	trade	access	by	all	countries.121	Britain’s	agreement	to	
bind	itself	to	open	trade	and	to	offering	favourable	peacetime	concessions	would	later	
feature	prominently	in	the	1946	Anglo-American	loan	negotiations	and	subsequent	British	
financial	difficulties.	Britain	and	the	U.S.	later	enacted	the	Mutual	Aid	Agreement,	which	
included	in	Clause	7	an	element	that	came	to	be	known	as	the	‘Consideration’,	which	linked	
wartime	aid	with	later	peacetime	arrangements.	In	return	for	aid	Britain	should	render	
‘vague	but	appropriate’	benefits	to	the	U.S.	‘which	the	President	deems	satisfactory’.122		
																																																						
119	C261,	A.I.	Bloomfield	to	R.	Sproul,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	13	January,	1943	
120	(Ferguson,	2004;	Fforde,	1992)	
121	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	35)	The	exact	wording	from	the	agreement	states:	‘on	equal	terms,	to	the	trade	and	raw	
materials	of	the	world’	and	for	the	fullest	collaboration	with	the	‘object	of	securing	for	all	improved	labor	
standards,	economic	advancement,	and	social	security’.	
122	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	35;	Pressnell,	1986,	pp.	4-5)	
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While	Britain’s	debt-to-GDP	level	was	already	elevated	prior	to	the	war,	the	onset	of	
conflict	saw	it	quickly	rise	to	levels	not	seen	since	Waterloo.	Secretary	John	Simon’s	war	
budget	in	September	1939	called	for	£600M	in	additional	defence	spending,	leading	to	a	£1	
billion	annual	deficit	(or	25%	of	GDP).	Higher	taxes	only	covered	£107	million	of	the	gap,	and,	
similar	to	the	‘proto-war’	period	of	1937-1939,	excessive	taxation	would	negatively	impact	
both	employment	and	tax	collections.	Later	in	the	conflict	British	government	expenditures	
and	taxes	represented	60%	and	33%	of	the	total	economy,	respectively.123	Heavy	borrowing	
had	to	fill	the	gap.124	Total	wartime	borrowing	at	home	from	2	September,	1939	to	25	
August,	1945	totalled	£14.8	billion,	with	approximately	£2.2	billion	coming	in	the	form	of	
Treasury	Deposit	Receipts,	£2.1	billion	in	Treasury	Bills,	and	£770	million	in	newly	issued	
banknotes.125	By	1945	Britain’s	public	debt-to-GDP	stood	at	235%	(Table	5).		
	
	 	
																																																						
123	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	7)	Cairncross	(1985)	puts	the	government’s	share	of	the	economy	at	50%.	
124	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	52)	
125	(Sayers,	1956,	p.	223)	
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Table	5:	United	Kingdom	Public	Debt-to-GDP	Ratio	(%),	1940-1960	
	
	 Reinhart	&	
	Year	 Rogoff	(%)	 IMF (%)	
1940	 110.0	 121.1	
1941	 119.8	 133.7	
1942	 137.5	 153.2	
1943	 156.8	 174.0	
1944	 182.3	 200.6	
1945	 215.6	 234.7	
1946	 247.5	 269.8	
1947	 237.9	 264.1	
1948	 214.0	 239.6	
1949	 197.8	 220.3	
1950	 193.9	 216.9	
1951	 175.3	 196.8	
1952	 162.0	 180.9	
1953	 152.2	 169.8	
1954	 146.7	 163.2	
1955	 138.2	 154.2	
1956	 129.0	 143.8	
1957	 122.2	 135.7	
1958	 118.1	 131.1	
1959	 112.4	 124.9	
1960	 106.8	 117.9	
	
Source:	IMF	(2010),	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2010)126	
	
Many	wartime	policies	carried	over	into	peacetime,	due	in	part	to	the	unexpected	
quick	end	to	hostilities.	While	Germany’s	surrender	on	7	May,	1945	was	expected,	Japan’s	
early-August	surrender	came	as	a	surprise.	The	U.S.	terminated	Lend-Lease	just	one	week	
following	V-J	Day.127	Thus	ended	two-thirds	Britain’s	external	deficit	funding,	which	totalled	
£10	billion	over	six	years.128	The	net	negative	change	in	Britain’s	capital	account	during	the	
war	was	£4.7	billion,	prompting	Keynes	to	famously	warn	that	Britain	now	faced	a	‘financial	
																																																						
126	The	calculations	of	Britain’s	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio	differ	between	the	IMF	(Abbas	et	al,	2010)	and	Reinhart	
and	Rogoff	(2010).	For	example,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	calculate	peak	British	debt-to-GDP	of	248%	in	1946.	IMF	
calculations	are	based	on	nominal	GDP	at	factor	cost	for	scaling	and	debt	figures	are	used	for	fiscal	years,	which	
may	explain	some	of	this	difference.	
127	(Barnett,	1995)	
128	(Sayers,	1956,	pp.	478-485)	for	gold	and	dollar	reserves	see	Table	7	on	p.	496.	
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Dunkirk’.129	Sir	Stafford	Cripps	would	later	add	“the	war	has	been	won,	but	the	price	has	not	
yet	been	paid.”130		
	
Conflicts	promptly	arose	within	the	British	government	over	the	desire	to	maintain	
Britain’s	global	standing	and	the	reestablishment	of	a	liberal-trade	order,	and	the	costs	of	
funding	such	endeavours.131	Barnett	(1995)	comments	that	in	Britain	there	was	“habit	of	
mind	that	involved	thinking	in	terms	of	the	management	of	the	whole	global	system”.132	
Britain	thus	found	itself	trying	to	balance	three	very	different	and	complex	relationships:	the	
North	Atlantic	alliance	with	America,	post-war	Europe,	and	playing	the	central	node	in	the	
British	Empire	and	Commonwealth.133		
	
The	British	economy	had	been	pivoted	to	meet	the	needs	of	total	war,	leaving	a	large	
majority	of	economic	activity	under	government	control.	Imports,	capital	investment,	and	
prices	were	all	centrally	managed	during	the	war	by	the	government.	The	year	of	1941	saw	
what	was	referred	to	as	the	first	‘Keynesian	budget’,	authored	by	Sir	Kingsley	Wood,	and	a	
white	paper	titled	‘Employment	Policy’	represented	the	first	time	the	government	accepts	
‘as	one	of	their	primary	aims	and	responsibilities	the	maintenance	of	a	high	and	stable	level	
of	employment	after	the	war’,	followed	up	by	Beveridge’s	‘Full	Employment	in	a	Free	
Society’	in	1944,	which	set	a	goal	for	unemployment	of	3%.134	Many	felt	that	central	
planning,	which	was	the	wartime	modus	operandi,	would	also	be	the	most	effective	
approach	for	quickly	rebuilding.	As	noted	by	Cairncross:		
	
“The	war	hand	been	planned	and	planned	successfully,	so	it	appeared.	Why	then,	it	
was	asked,	should	planning	prove	any	less	successful	in	peace?	What	was	carried	over	
																																																						
129	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	7,	10)	Fforde	(1992)	states	that	gold	and	dollar	reserves	at	end	of	war	were	14%	of	
total	external	liabilities	versus	a	pre-war	level	of	125%.	
130	(Burgess,	1999,	p.	216)	
131	(George	&	Institute	of	Contemporary	British	History.,	1991,	p.	34)	
132	(Barnett,	1995;	Cairncross,	1985,	p.	11;	Geiger,	2004;	Leffler	&	Westad,	2010)	Britain,	no	longer	the	world’s	
dominant	industrial	and	political	power,	was	still	arguably	second	only	to	the	United	States	amongst	capitalist	
nation	states.	
133	See	(Owen,	1999)	for	a	discussion	of	Britain’s	post-war	trade	relations	and	priorities	with	the	empire,	
continental	Europe,	and	the	north	Atlantic.	
134	(Crafts,	Woodward,	&	Duckham,	1991,	p.	66)	
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from	wartime	was	fundamentally	the	practice	of	drawing	up	programmes	of	various	
kinds.	In	the	war	it	was	through	programmes	that	administrative	decisions	were	
expressed.”135	
	
Thus,	a	political	climate	that	was	highly	supportive	of	government	planning	played	a	factor	
behind	the	ensuing	financial	repression.136	
	
As	Labour	took	power	in	1945	the	British	financial	situation	was	precarious.	Pre-war	
external	liabilities	of	£0.5	billion	ballooned	by	572%	to	£3.36	billion	as	of	June	1945.	Of	this	
amount	£3	billion	were	‘quick’	(short-term)	liabilities,	which	in	theory	creditors	could	draw	
upon	at	short	notice.137	Britain	faced	a	substantial	external	deficit	even	if	the	hoped-for	
economic	“miracle”	occurred,	which	called	for	exports	growing	to	150%	of	their	1938	
volume,	no	net	capital	outflows,	and	no	substantial	build-up	of	stocks.138	Instead	of	a	miracle,	
Britain’s	1946-47	projected	fiscal	deficit	came	to	£1.7	billion,	double	what	had	been	
estimated	during	the	prior	year.	Further,	the	1946	trade	deficit	was	projected	to	be	£500-700	
million.	During	summer	1945	Keynes	calculated	that	the	foreign	aid	needed	would	total	£1.5	
billion.	In	sum,	the	dual	legacies	of	vast	war	debts	and	significant	government	control	over	
the	economy	created	a	fertile	environment	for	policies	associated	with	financial	repression	
to	take	root	in	post-war	Britain.	
	
The	first	several	years	following	the	end	of	the	war	were	particularly	challenging	for	
Britain’s	economy.	British	GDP	fell	in	the	first	two	years	after	the	war	and	government	
spending	declined	by	20%.139	Britain’s	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio	would	peak	in	1946	at	270%	
(Table	5).140	At	the	end	of	1945	over	80%	of	the	£3.6	billion	in	Britain’s	foreign	held	debt,	
																																																						
135	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	299,	311)	
136	For	more	historical	background	and	a	discussion	of	planning	in	Britain	in	the	1930s	see	(Ritschel,	1997)	and	
(Toye,	2003)	
137	(Pressnell,	1986,	p.	417,	Appendix	21)	
138	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	52)		
139	(Booth,	1989,	p.	129;	Cairncross,	1985,	p.	18)	GDP	went	on	to	grow	by	3%	on	avg.	per	year	from	1948-1951;	
industrial	production	grew	by	33%.		
140	(Abbas,	Belhocine,	ElGanainy,	&	Horton,	2010)	As	footnoted	earlier,	the	IMF	figure	is	higher	than	Reinhart	
and	Rogoff	(2010),	which	records	248%	for	1946.	In	correspondence	both	Abbas	and	Sbrancia	stated	that	this	
difference	may	be	explained	by	the	IMF’s	use	of	factor	costs	in	calculating	nominal	GDP.		
	 	 Page	|	68	
	
referred	to	as	the	‘Sterling	Balances’,	were	held	by	Sterling	Area	countries.	This	debt	
consisted	primarily	of	low-yielding	T-bills	and	other	short-term	maturities,	and	nearly	half	of	
the	balances	were	held	by	just	two	countries:	India	and	Egypt	(Table	6).141		
	
Table	6:	UK	Gross	External	Sterling	Liabilities	(‘Sterling	Balances’),	31	December,	1945	
	
(£s	Millions)	
	
	 	 Official	 Other	 Total	 %	Total	
Overseas	Sterling	Area	 	 	 	 	
	 Australia,	New	Zealand	 £265	 £40	 £305	 8.5%	
	 and	South	Africa	 	 	 	 0.0%	
	 India,	Pakistan	and	Ceylon	 1,313	 45	 1,358	 37.7%	
	 Middle	East*	 443	 147	 590	 16.4%	
	
East,	West	and	Central	
Africa	 128	 77	 205	 5.7%	
	 Other	 213	 264	 477	 13.3%	
	 Subtotal	 £2,362	 £573	 £2,935	 81.6%	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Non-Sterling	Area	 	 	 	 	
	 Western	Europe	 £183	 £152	 £335	 9.3%	
	 Latin	America	 159	 7	 166	 4.6%	
	 North	America	 14	 19	 33	 0.9%	
	 Other	 44	 86	 130	 3.6%	
	 Subtotal	 £400	 £264	 £664	 18.4%	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Total	 £2,762	 £837	 £3,599	 100.0%	
	
*Note:	includes	Egypt	and	Sudan,	Palestine	and	Transjordan,	and	Iraq.	The	breakdown	between	'Official'	and	
'Other'	is	approximate,	as	it	is	for	No-Sterling	Area	-	Other.	
	
Source:	Fforde	(1992,	p.	91)	
	
The	composition	of	the	UK’s	national	debt	had	undergone	a	transformation	(Table	7).	
Floating	debt	had	increased	significantly,	and	dated	stocks	were	dramatically	lower	than	in	
1919.	The	average	maturity	had	also	declined,	with	60%	of	the	debt	maturing	within	15	years	
																																																						
141	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	24)	
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versus	50%	in	1919.142	Financial	repression	can	be	employed	to	reduce	the	value	of	shorter	
duration	debts,	so	this	feature	of	the	British	debt	portfolio	was	perhaps	not	as	important	as	
it	may	first	appear	in	contemplating	the	ability	to	utilize	other	debt	sustainability	methods,	
such	as	inflation	surprise.143	
	
	
Table	7:	Composition	of	UK	National	Debt:	1919,	1939	and	1945	
	
Debt	Type	as	a	percentage	(%)	of	Total	Debt	
	
	
1919	 1939	 1945*	
Floating	Debt	 23%	 13%	 29%	
Dated	Stocks	 68%	 35%	 37%	
Funded	Debt	 5%	 46%	 16%	
Other	Debt**	 4%	 6%	 19%	
	
*Note:	Worswick	and	Ady's	1945	totals	to	101%,	presumably	due	to	a	rounding	error.	
**Note:	Savings	certificates,	Defence	Bonds,	Tax	Reserve	Certificates,	Terminable	Annuities.	
	
Source:	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952,	p.	192),	taken	from	Abstract	of	Statistics	
	
	
The	question	of	how	to	handle	the	Sterling	Balances	was	debated	at	length.	Keynes,	
like	Harry	Dexter	White	of	the	U.S.	Treasury,	was	always	in	favour	of	“conducting	major	
surgery”,	meaning	repudiation	of	Sterling	Balances.144	Archival	documents	indicate	that	
Sterling	Balances	were	not	just	seen	as	a	problem	for	Britain	and	the	country’s	creditors;	a	
New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	(NYFRB)	memorandum	comments	how:	
	
“the	existence	of	this	huge	dead-weight	debt	constitutes,	as	American	negotiators	
realized,	one	of	the	most	formidable	threats	to	their	realization	of	a	multilateral	
world	trading	system”.145	
																																																						
142	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	191)	
143	(Calvo,	1989)	“Debt	liquidation	is	possible	even	though	prices	are	sticky	and	government	bonds	are	short-
term.	A	policy	implication	is	that	short	bond	maturities	are	no	safeguard	against	surprise	devaluations	intended	
to	lower	the	burden	of	the	debt.”	
144	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	462)	
145	C261D	pp.	16-17,	NYFRB	Research	Memorandum	titled	‘Notes	on	the	Nationalization	of	the	Bank	of	
England’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	19	October,	1952	
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Any	material	reduction	in	Sterling	Balances	would	need	to	involve	India	and	Egypt.	
However,	Fforde	(1992)	notes	that	“the	ethical	case	for	cancellation	of	war	debts	to	India	
and	Egypt	was	not	accepted	by	local	opinion”.146	Sterling	Area	countries	were	encouraged	to	
accumulate	sterling	under	the	assurance	that	it	would	be	made	immediately	convertible	at	
war’s	end.	However,	this	promise	was	ultimately	not	kept	by	the	British.147	Here	we	can	see	
how	financial	repression,	which	is	typically	a	domestic	in	terms	of	its	orientation	and	impact,	
had	a	somewhat	unusual	international	dimension	in	Britain’s	case.	
	
On	10	December,	1945	a	report	issued	by	the	Bank	of	England	rejected	as	
‘impractible’	the	idea	that	private	balances	should	be	expropriated,	but	that	official	balances	
might	be	‘adjusted’	(repudiation)	by	20%.148	In	January	1946	Keynes	wrote	about	the	use	of	
‘compound	discounting’	and	unilaterally	blocking	all	Sterling	Balances	to	trigger	a	crisis	
leading	to	a	33%	currency	devaluation	for	all	Sterling	Area	countries,	a	suggestion	that	was	
rejected.149	Further	pressure	was	placed	on	Britain	by	America	to	“induce	the	various	
creditors	to	scale	down	the	size	of	these	balances	substantially”.150	However,	Britain	was	able	
to	keep	the	Anglo-American	loan	language	sufficiently	flexible	to	allow	the	Siepmann	
Committee	to	pursue	bilateral	negotiations	with	individual	countries	on	loan	forgiveness.		
	
In	the	spring	of	1946	the	Bank	of	England	and	Treasury	calculated	that	a	very	small	
fraction	of	the	Sterling	Balances,	representing	under	2%	of	the	total	(less	than	£60	million	of	
the	roughly	£3	billion	in	total	Sterling	Balances),	could	be	safely	released	per	year	over	the	
next	five	years	without	triggering	a	crisis.151	As	one	Bank	of	England	official	stated:		
	
																																																						
146	(Fforde	1992,	pp.	89-91)	
147	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	24)	
148	The	Report	pointed	out	that	a	number	of	Colonial	Governments	had	made	interest-free	loans	to	the	UK	
during	the	war,	which	could	be	written	down	as	part	of	a	post-war	settlement.	
149	(Fforde,	1992,	pp.	92-94)	
150	C261D	p.	17,	NYFRB	Research	Memorandum	titled	‘Notes	on	the	Nationalization	of	the	Bank	of	England’,	
New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	19	October,	1952	
151	(Fforde,	1992)	
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“our	strongest	argument	is	that	it	is	in	the	interest	of	all	countries	which	hold	
sterling	that	the	position	of	sterling	should	be	maintained.	Our	weapon	is	that	
we	can	completely	block	the	existing	Balances,	but	it	is	a	weapon	which	it	
would	greatly	damage	us	to	use,	and	the	other	countries	will	know	this	quite	
well.”152		
	
Foreshadowing	the	following	year’s	convertibility	crisis,	the	Bank’s	Sir	David	Waley	stated	in	
July	1946	that	“there	is	no	disguising	the	fact	that	the	next	twelve	months	will	be	a	very	
stormy	time”.153		
	
One	particularly	contentious	bilateral	Sterling	Balance	negotiation	was	the	1947	
spring-summer	discussions	with	Egypt.	These	negotiations	culminated	in	the	‘Dalton	
ultimatum’,	which	was	a	threat	to	block	all	of	Egypt’s	Sterling	Balances.	Egypt,	however,	
proceeded	to	leave	the	Sterling	Area	and	play	its	‘ace’,	which	was	to	insist	on	U.S.	dollar	
payments	of	almost	$80	million	in	1948	from	Britain’s	Egyptian-Suez	Canal	based	military	
forces,	causing	Britain	to	relent.154	While	efforts	in	Egypt	came	up	short,	forbearance	came	
from	New	Zealand,	which	forgave	£10	million	in	March	1947,	and	Australia,	which	forgave	
first	£20	million	in	March	1947	and	another	£8	million	in	August	1948.155	In	September	1946	
a	deal	was	also	struck	with	Argentina	where	0.5%	interest	was	negotiated	on	Argentina’s	
loan	to	Britain,	and	only	£5	million	per	year	of	sterling	allowed	to	be	released	per	year.156	
	
Exchange	control	on	foreign	balances	represents	a	perhaps	novel	form	of	financial	
repression,	which	typically	consists	of	domestic	controls.	Unlimited	use	of	sterling	was	
permitted	inside	the	Sterling	Area.	However,	prior	Bank	of	England	approval	was	required	for	
transfers	to	non-sterling	countries,	and	settlement	in	gold	was	provided	when	indebtedness	
exceeded	specified	amounts.	In	1949	a	multilateral	formula	designed	to	limit	dollar	
																																																						
152	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	108)	
153	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	108)	
154	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	117)	
155	(Pressnell	1986,	p.	366)	
156	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	117)	
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expenditure	replaced	these	bilateral	agreements	and	it	wasn’t	until	1961	that	full	current	
account	convertibility	was	established.157			
	
	
	 	
																																																						
157	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	2003,	pp.	24-26)		
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3.3	Classifying	Sovereign	Credit	Events	
	
Classification	of	sovereign	credit	evens	can	vary.	For	example,	economists	and	credit	
rating	agencies	employ	different	sovereign	credit	event	definitions.	Further	confusion	arises	
over	the	inconsistent	use	of	terms	to	describe	credit	events.	During	a	sovereign	credit	crisis	
and	event	many	different	terms	other	than	the	word	‘default’	are	often	employed,	including	
‘restructuring’,	‘reprofiling’,	‘soft	restructuring’,	and	‘rescheduling’,	to	characterize	sovereign	
credit	events.158	The	precise	definition	of	‘reprofiling’	vis-à-vis	default	is	also	often	unclear.		
	
Rather	than	being	a	simple	matter	of	style,	semantic	differences	can	have	significant	
implications.	Grossman	and	Vay	Huyck	(1988)	note	that	“window	dressing”	is	often	
employed	to	avoid	legally	classifying	debts	as	in	default	for	regulatory	purposes.159	Financial	
stability	is	another	justification	given	for	the	often	elaborate	effort	made	by	policymakers	
and	creditors	to	avoid	using	the	term	‘default’	in	conjunction	with	credit	events.	For	
example,	in	2010-2012	it	was	feared	a	Greek	default	would	trigger	costly	credit	default	
swaps	and	further	threaten	a	vulnerable	European	banking	system	to	contagion	risk,	
prompting	significant	efforts	to	avoid	a	technical	Greek	default	(and	referring	to	events	as	
such).160	
	
Economists	will	also	classify	sovereign	credit	events	differently.	For	economic	
analysis,	Grossman	and	Vay	Huyck	conceptually	define	default	as	“the	failure	to	meet	
contractually	agreed	upon	obligations	in	full”,	such	as	the	repudiation	of	debt	or	the	failure	
to	repay	the	loan	on	time.161	However,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2009,	2002)	also	suggest	that	
annual	inflation	of	40%	is	significant	enough	to	warrant	designating	a	country	as	in	default,	
though	they	acknowledge	the	40%	threshold	as	arbitrary.	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2010)	further	
																																																						
158	These	terms	were	all	used	at	various	times	during	Greece’s	sovereign	debt	crisis	from	2010-15	(Times,	2011)	
159	(Grossman	&	Van	Huyck,	1988,	p.	1088)		
160	(Bernanke,	2012;	Evans-Pritchard,	2012)	Federal	Reserve	Chairman	Ben	Bernanke,	commenting	on	Europe’s	
fragile	banking	system,	stated	that	as	of	March	2012	European	banks	had	a	loan-to-deposit	ratio	of	1.3,	which	is	
a	level	similar	to	Japanese	banks	following	the	late-1980s	Japanese	Nikkei	bubble	collapse,	whereas	the	level	
for	U.S.	banks	was	0.7,	in	line	with	the	historical	average.	
161	(Grossman	&	Van	Huyck,	1988,	p.	1088)	
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distinguish	between	external	and	domestic	sovereign	default,	the	former	of	which	they	
define	as	"the	failure	to	meet	a	principal	or	interest	payment	on	the	due	date	(or	within	the	
specified	grace	period).	The	episodes	also	include	instances	where	rescheduled	debt	is	
ultimately	extinguished	on	terms	less	favourable	than	the	original	obligation".162	They	go	on	
to	state	that	domestic	default	also	includes	the	"freezing	of	bank	deposits	and	or	forcible	
conversions	of	such	depositors	from	dollars	to	local	currency".163	
	
The	definition	used	by	economists	can	also	differ	from	market	facing	institutions,	
such	as	credit	rating	agencies,	as	the	recent	Greek	illustrates.	Standard	and	Poor’s	
determined	that	the	February	2012	Greek	debt	restructuring	constituted	a	‘selective	default’	
because	Greece	forced	debt	holders	who	were	'holding	out'	from	joining	in	a	revised	
agreement	to	join	alongside	‘voluntary’	creditors	in	a	Greek	debt	write-down.164	The	
International	Swaps	and	Derivatives	Association,	which	ultimately	determines	whether	a	
credit	event	has	occurred	for	the	purpose	of	determining	payment	on	financial	instruments	
such	as	credit	default	swaps,	concurred	with	Standard	and	Poor’s.	In	other	words,	had	
Greece	not	instituted	a	retroactive	collective	action	clause	on	a	relatively	small	number	of	
private	sector	hold-outs	then	Greece	would	not	have	been	judged	to	have	defaulted	on	its	
sovereign	debt	even	though	the	Greek-Troika	program	called	for	a	write-down	of	
approximately	75%	of	value	of	Greece’s	debt.		
	
The	Greek	case	highlights	the	often	complex	nature	and	lack	of	a	generally	agreed	
upon	framework	for	determining	sovereign	credit	events.	In	other	words,	a	very	significant	
sovereign	credit	event	for	Greece	would	go	unrecorded	if	economic	historians	were	to	follow	
the	lead	of	the	credit	rating	agencies.	In	short,	it	can	be	difficult	to	characterize	some	
sovereign	defaults	in	a	simple,	binary	fashion.	
	
																																																						
162	(Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2010)	
163	(Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2010)	
164	(BBC,	2012)	
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	 This	paper	argues	that	two	enhancements	to	how	we	determine	and	measure	
sovereign	credit	events	would	be	useful	and	provide	a	more	accurate,	nuanced,	and	
ultimately	complete	record	of	sovereign	credit	history.	First,	judgments	on	default	should	
also	take	non-financial	factors	into	consideration,	such	as	whether	there	has	been	a	failure	to	
meet	any	of	the	other	debt	covenants	or	other	forms	of	consideration	included	in	the	debt	
agreements.	Second,	it	would	also	be	useful	to	go	beyond	a	binary	yes-no	determination	of	
whether	a	country	has	defaulted	to	distinguish	between	different	types	of	default.	In	other	
words,	recognizing	that	a	‘default	spectrum’	exists	would	provide	a	more	accurate	and	useful	
historical	record	of	different	sovereign	credit	events.		
	
This	paper	suggests	a	default	classification	framework	that	would	distinguish	
between	four	different	sovereign	credit	event	scenarios:	no	default,	excusable	default,	
partial	default,	and	default	(Figure	7).	
Figure	7:	The	Sovereign	Default	Spectrum	
	
	
	
	 The	first	scenario,	no	default,	is	when	full	terms	of	the	original	loan	agreement	have	
been	fulfilled.	The	second	scenario,	excusable	default,	could	mean	that	some	form	of	
financial	aid	(e.g.,	bridge	financing)	or	debt	forgiveness	has	been	voluntarily	granted	by	the	
creditor(s)	and	agreed	to	by	the	debtor(s).	One	justification	for	debt	forgiveness	could	be	a	
determination	that	the	debts	are	'odious',	meaning	that	either	a	legal	or	moral	justification	is	
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provided	for	expunging	the	debt.	A	country	that	has	successfully	found	agreement	with	its	
creditors	but	has	still	made	significant	adjustments	to	the	originally	agreed	upon	terms	and	
or	debt	payments	can	therefore	be	classified	as	an	excusable	default.	Some	might	take	issue	
with	the	use	of	a	judgment-laden	term	like	'default'	given	the	mutually	agreed	upon	nature	
and	or	moral	circumstances	surrounding	the	extinguishment	of	odious	debts.	However,	it	is	
important	to	note	that	the	original	obligation	has	not	been	met	and	a	loss	has	been	incurred.	
In	other	words,	mutually	agreement	does	not	alter	the	fact	that	a	creditor	loss	has	been	
sustained,	and	it	is	therefore	useful	still	to	record	the	extinguishment	of	odious	or	similar	
debt.	
	
	 With	regards	to	the	definitions	for	partial	default	and	default,	there	is	value	in	adding	
a	‘partial	default’	designation	so	that	previously	overlooked	credit	events	can	be	identified	
and	recorded.	Specifically,	a	country	that	fails	to	meet	all	of	the	original	terms	of	its	debt	
agreement	and	has	not	successfully	renegotiated	with	creditors	has	in	effect	repudiated	
some	obligations,	and	this	event	should	be	recorded	as	a	form	of	default.		
	
How	is	a	partial	default	different	from	default?	Here	is	an	example	of	a	partial	
default:	a	country	that	delays	an	interest	or	principal	payment	but	then	subsequently	makes	
that	payment	and	future	payments.	A	second	example:	a	country	that	fail	to	adhere	to	the	
full	terms	of	the	loan	agreement	but	still	makes	good	on	all	interest	and	principal	payments.	
These	are	lesser	sovereign	credit	events	than	a	full	repudiation.	Other	scenarios	that	could	
trigger	a	partial	default	could	include	cases	where	a	significant	currency	devaluation	occurs	
where	debt	is	denominated	in	the	depreciated	currency.	Suggesting	precise	guidelines	for	
determining	when	all	sovereign	credit	events	would	be	classified	as	either	a	full	or	partial	
default	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	What	can	be	said	here	is	that	determination	would	
depend	upon	a	number	of	factors.	In	the	case	of	a	currency	devaluation,	these	factors	could	
include	the	causes	behind	the	devaluation	(e.g.,	was	it	deliberate),	how	much	debt	remained	
to	be	paid,	and	the	size	of	the	devaluation.	
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	 The	question	of	default	often	has	important	tangible	and	intangible	implications	that	
reach	beyond	the	realms	of	finance	and	economics.	Negative	financial	consequences	of	
default,	such	as	losses	to	creditors	and	higher	borrowing	costs	for	the	country	that	defaults,	
are	generally	well	understood.	However,	less	clear	is	why	creditor	and	debtor	countries	alike	
have	often	gone	to	such	great	lengths	to	avoid	the	consequences	and	stigma	associated	with	
being	labelled	as	a	‘defaulter’.	One	example	from	history	that	illustrates	these	points	is	the	
case	of	post-Second	World	War	Britain	and	the	Anglo-American	loan.	
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3.4	Britain’s	Default	on	the	1946	Anglo-American	Loan	
	
“The	financial	problems	of	the	war	have	been	surmounted	so	easily	and	so	silently	
that	the	average	man	sees	no	reason	to	suppose	that	the	financial	problems	of	the	
peace	will	be	any	more	difficult.”	
				-John	Maynard	Keynes,	1945165	
	
Before	examining	the	evidence	of	a	British	default	it	is	useful	to	review	what	Britain	
and	the	United	States	hoped	to	accomplish	during	their	financial	aid	negotiations,	which	
began	in	September	1945	in	Washington	D.C.	Sovereign	credit	event	determinations	involves	
judgment,	and	a	fuller	understanding	of	both	the	‘letter	and	the	spirit’	of	a	credit	agreement	
informs	judgment.	For	the	Americans,	the	two	initial	primary	post-war	economic	aims	with	
regard	to	Britain	were	covered	during	the	aforementioned	‘Consideration’	negotiations:	non-
discriminatory	(free)	trade	and	sterling	convertibility.	Britain	hoped	to	obtain	either	grant-aid	
from	the	U.S.	or	negotiate	a	loan	at	zero	percent	to	meet	its	immediate	post-war	financing	
needs.166		
	
Prior	to	successfully	negotiating	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement	other	
financing	options	were	considered.	For	example,	discussions	took	place	inside	the	Federal	
Reserve	and	externally	of	alternative	ways	of	financing	the	“Anglo-American	Problem”,	as	it	
was	characterized.	A	NYFRB	memorandum	dated	30	October,	1945	describes	a	‘monetary	
approach’	to	the	problem	of	British	liquidity,	which	was	favoured	by	NYFRB	head	Allan	
Sproul.167	Sproul	described	his	proposal	as	a	“monetary	arrangement	between	the	two	
countries	which	does	not	involve	a	loan	contract,	a	rate	of	interest,	or	a	repayment	date	or	
dates”.	The	details	of	the	proposal	would	have	the	Bank	of	England	entering	into	an	
agreement	with	the	NYFRB	and	other	branches	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	whereby:	
	
																																																						
165	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	10)	
166	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	338)	Keynes	and	Whitehall	felt	that	Britain	had	made	the	much	larger	sacrifice	for	the	
common	good	than	the	U.S.	and	that	this	should	be	accounted	for.	
167	C261,	‘Monetary	Approach	to	the	Anglo-American	Problem,	W.	Knoke	to	R.	Sproul,	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	Archive,	30	October,	1945	
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“the	latter	would	accumulate	pounds	sterling	the	next	3	to	5	years	in	an	amount	
sufficient	to	cover	the	British	balance	of	payments	deficit.	Presumably	this	proposal	is	
not	meant	to	cover	the	lend	lease	financing	so	that	the	sum	involved	according	to	our	
present	thinking	would	be	sterling	equivalent	to	$3.5	billion	dollars.	This	
accumulation	of	sterling	funds,	and	release	of	corresponding	amount	of	dollars	to	the	
British,	would	proceed	without	any	firm	agreement	as	to	how	the	operation	should	
be	liquidated”.168		
	
This	monetary	approach,	which	would	provide	Britain	with	credit	and	the	ability	to	defend	
sterling’s	exchange	rate,	had	the	advantage	of	being	“a	great	deal	more	flexible	than	the	
present	loan	scheme”	by	allowing	for	adjustments	as	necessary	“with	greater	ease	away	
from	the	glare	of	publicity”.	Ultimately,	this	alternative	funding	proposal	was	scrapped	as	
“the	magnitude	of	England’s	needs	today	($4	billion	to	$6	billion)	might	make	the	transaction	
too	enormous	even	for	the	Federal	Reserve	System	to	handle”.	In	addition,	there	was	
concern	over	the	Federal	Reserve	showing	favouritism	towards	the	UK:		
	
“Not	an	obstacle	exactly,	but	a	possible	source	of	future	embarrassment	that	we	
might	well	wish	to	avoid,	would	be	a	situation	where	the	System	after	making	an	
arrangement	with	the	British	declines	to	make	similar	arrangements	with	the	French	
or	Russians,	for	instance,	thus	inviting	the	reproach	of	discrimination,	or	political	
pressure	aiming	at	pushing	us	into	more	and	more	such	arrangements”.169		
	
In	light	of	subsequent	events,	specifically	the	incredible	financial	pressure	Britain	
came	under	following	the	loss	of	reserves,	the	above	monetary	approach	presents	an	
intriguing	counterfactual.	First,	the	lack	of	market	confidence	in	Britain’s	financial	
wherewithal	and	the	maintenance	of	sterling’s	exchange	rate	played	at	least	some	role	in	the	
subsequent	1947	convertibility	and	1949	devaluation	crises.	How	much	would	Britain	have	
benefitted	by	having	access	to	billions	in	U.S.	dollar	funding	via	the	NYFRB?		Would	such	a	
program	have	stemmed	the	collapse	in	confidence	that	occurred	in	the	lead-up	to	the	dual	
sterling	crises?	Further,	New	York	was	a	major	centre	for	discounted	‘free’	sterling	trade,	and	
the	very	visible	discounted	rate	at	which	free	sterling	traded	played	a	considerable	role	in	
																																																						
168	C261,	Office	Correspondence,	Mr.	Knapp	to	Chairman	Eccles,	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	
29	October,	1945	
169	C261,	‘Monetary	Approach	to	the	Anglo-American	Problem,	W.	Knoke	to	R.	Sproul,	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	Archive,	30	October,	1945	
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exacerbating	the	pressure	on	the	official	sterling	rate.	Archival	evidence	indicates	that	NYFRB	
authorities	did	not	condone	the	trade	of	free	sterling	in	New	York	and	may	have	even	sought	
to	tamp	it	down.	Nevertheless,	New	York	free	sterling	trade	continued.	Further	it	is	
reasonable	to	presume	that	the	NYFRB	would	have	moved	to	prohibit	free	sterling	trade	
more	aggressively	if	the	Federal	Reserve	System	was	holding	billions	in	sterling	at	risk	of	
devaluation.	
	
In	Washington	the	British	delegation	to	negotiate	an	American	loan	was	famously	led	
by	John	Maynard	Keynes.170	For	the	past	several	years	Keynes	had	played	a	central	role	in	
British	economic	policy	and	relations	with	the	United	States.	When	Keynes	would	passed	
away	on	21	April,	1946	his	colleague,	Otto	Clarke,	said	it:	
	
“leaves	the	Treasury	in	a	terrible	hole.	Keynes	has	been	The	Treasury	over	the	last	
few	years;	he	has	determined	policy,	spurred	on	the	other	officials	by	criticism	and	
help,	conducted	the	major	negotiations.	This	dependence	has	been	good	in	some	
respects;	it	has	been	bad	in	others	for	it	has	prevented	the	officials	from	developing	
an	individual	technique	of	thought.	He	has	been	the	brains	and	conscience.	Now	at	
the	beginning	of	a	period	of	far-reaching	negotiations,	the	controller	of	the	basic	
strategy	(and	of	75%	of	the	tactics)	has	gone.	A	frightful	gap	is	left	in	Bretton	Woods;	
another	in	the	Sterling	Balances.”171		
	
Given	the	country’s	financial	position	the	British	negotiating	position	was	relatively	
weak.	There	was	also	the	matter	of	securing	financing	in	the	face	of	a	less	than	enthusiastic	
American	public	and	U.S.	Congress.	In	contrast	to	other	recent	negotiating	delegations,	no	
Bank	of	England	officials	accompanied	Keynes.	In	fact,	the	Bank	of	England	had	clashed	with	
Keynes	over	his	plans.172	Describing	the	negotiations,	Skidelsky	(2000)	emphasizes	“the	
intensity	and	often	bitterness	of	the	struggle	between	Britain	and	America	for	post-war	
position	which	went	on	under	the	facade	of	the	Grand	Alliance”.173	As	noted	in	a	NYFRB	
memo	from	Mr.	Knapp	to	Chairman	Eccles:	
																																																						
170	(Mackenzie,	1996)	
171	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	472)		
172	(Fforde	1992,	pp.	32-34)	The	Bank	had	become	a	centre	for	alternatives	ideas	the	ones	proposed	by	Keynes.	
173	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	xx)	For	more	on	Anglo-American	relations	see	(G.	Kolko,	1969;	J.	Kolko	&	Kolko,	1972),	
(Thorne,	1979)	and	(Woods,	1990).	
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“Any	proposal,	however	well	meant,	which	would	in	effect	make	them	[Britain]	
entirely	dependent	on	American	good	graces,	will	leave	them	cold.	They	know	the	
present	American	attitude,	which	does	not	give	much	encouragement;	and	they	have	
to	reckon	with	American	attitudes	for	the	next	fifty	years”.174	
	
In	December	1945	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement	(commonly	referred	to	
as	the	‘American	Loan’)	was	finalized	at	terms	of	2%	for	$3.7	billion,	plus	$650	million	in	Lend	
Lease	balances.	175	The	loan	was	to	be	paid	over	50	years,	with	an	initial	delay	of	five	years,	
making	the	first	payment	due	in	1951.176	Keynes	ultimately	fell	short	of	meeting	his	hoped	for	
negotiating	goals	for	Britain,	protesting	that:	
	
“On	the	matter	of	interest,	I	shall	never	so	long	as	I	live	cease	to	regret	this	is	not	an	
interest-free	loan.	The	charging	of	interest	is	out	of	tune	with	the	underlying	
realities.”	177	
	
Scholars	such	as	Dobson	(1990)	report	widespread	“resentment”	over	the	terms	insisted	
upon	by	the	Americans.178	Cairncross	(1985)	reports	how	British	government	officials	viewed	
the	loan	terms	as	“commercial”	even	though	on	actuarial	basis	the	effective	interest	rate	on	
the	loan	worked	out	to	1.6%.179	
	
An	NYFRB	document	titled	‘Benefits	of	the	British	Loan	Agreement’	highlights	some	of	
the	intended	benefits	of	the	loan	for	both	parties.	One	of	the	key	elements	of	the	loan	was	
that	“Britain	was	not	permitted	to	use	any	part	of	the	American	line	of	credit	specifically	to	
pay	off	existing	eternal	debts”,	although	“the	line	of	credit	will	indirectly	make	possible	the	
early	repayment	of	some	of	this	debt	by	releasing	dollars	for	this	purpose	which	would	
																																																						
174	C261,	Office	Correspondence,	Mr.	Knapp	to	Chairman	Eccles,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	29	
October,	1945.	From	p.2	
175	See	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	446)	and	(Dobson,	1990).	Cairncross	(1985)	reports	how	British	government	officials	
viewed	the	loan	terms	as	“commercial”,	or	too	high,	even	though	on	actuarial	basis	the	effective	interest	rate	
on	the	loan	worked	out	to	1.6%	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	105).	
176	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	105;	Rosenson,	1947)	The	text	of	the	Financial	Agreement	is	presented	in	(Skidelsky,	
2000,	pp.	453-458)	
177	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	446)	
178	(Dobson,	1990)	
179	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	105)	
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otherwise	have	to	be	used	in	Britain’s	current	account	deficit”.180	The	document	claims	that	
Americans	stood	to	benefit	from	an	economically	healthier	Britain	in	a	number	of	ways,	
including	greater	importation	of	American	goods	and	Britain’s	support	of	multilateral	trade	
policies.	However,	many	of	the	benefits	the	Americans	were	expecting	would	not	come	to	
fruition.	
	
3.4.1	The	1947	Convertibility	Crisis	
	
Clause	10	of	the	Financial	Agreement	stated	that	pound	sterling	would	be	made	
convertible	for	current	but	not	capital	account	transactions	by	15	July,	1947.	181	Convertibility	
was	insisted	upon	to	eliminate	discrimination	against	U.S.	exports	into	the	Sterling	Area	via	
‘dollar	pooling’	arrangements.182	Dollar	pooling	reduced	dollars	available	throughout	Sterling	
Area	countries	to	pay	for	U.S.	goods.	Another	advertised	benefit	of	the	Agreement	for	the	
Americans	was	that	“any	sterling	acquired	by	Americans	as	a	result	of	their	current	
transactions	with	Britain	will	be	freely	convertible	into	any	currency	once	the	Agreement	
goes	into	effect”.183		
	
The	convertibility	clause	was	controversial.	First,	in	practice	it	was	difficult	to	
distinguish	between	current	and	capital	conversions.	There	were	also	some	in	Britain	who	
objected	at	the	time	of	the	negotiation	to	the	provision	of	sterling	convertibility.184	However,	
Keynes’	responded:		
	
“The	way	to	remain	an	international	banker	is	to	allow	cheques	to	be	drawn	
upon	you;	the	way	to	destroy	the	Sterling	Area	is	to	prey	on	it	and	try	to	live	
																																																						
180	C261,	Attachment	from	letter	from	R.	Sproul	to	W.	Knoke	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	
May,	1946	
181	(Newton,	1984,	p.	398,	note	27)	It	took	until	15	July,	1946,	over	six	months	from	the	completion	of	
negotiations,	for	the	U.S.	Congress	to	ratify	the	Financial	Agreement.	
182	C261,	Attachment	from	letter	from	R.	Sproul	to	W.	Knoke	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	
May,	1946	
183	C261,	Attachment	from	letter	from	R.	Sproul	to	W.	Knoke	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	
May,	1946	
184	The	Treasury’s	Sir	Hugh	Ellis	Rees	unpublished	memo	(1962)	states	that	there	was	never	any	chance	of	
successfully	making	sterling	convertible	within	the	agreed	timeframe.	
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on	it.	The	alternative	(to	the	loan)	is	to	build	up	a	separate	economic	block	
which	excludes	Canada	and	consists	of	countries	to	which	we	already	owe	
more	money	than	we	can	pay,	on	the	basis	of	their	agreeing	to	lend	us	money	
they	have	not	got	and	buy	from	us…goods	we	are	unable	to	supply.”185			
	
While	the	loan	was	intended	to	last	for	three	years,	over	half	of	the	loan	had	
been	drawn	down	in	twelve	months.	186	Large	capital	transfers	were	given	as	the	
reason,	although	as	Gardner	(1956)	notes	“the	available	evidence	on	this	latter	point	
is	only	circumstantial”.187	Cairncross’s	(1985)	analysis	pointed	out	that	even	with	the	
introduction	of	the	Exchange	Control	Act	there	was	a	capital	outflow	£643	million,	or	
a	staggering	8%	of	GDP,	in	the	same	year	as	the	1947	convertibility	crisis.	As	
Cairncross	states	this	“was	certainly	not	the	purpose	for	which	the	American	and	
Canadian	loans	were	produced”.188		Indeed,	in	a	briefing	document	prepared	for	
answering	U.S.	Congressional	questions	such	as	“What	will	England	do	with	the	
credit?”,	the	prepared	response	states	“The	purpose	of	the	line	of	credit	is…to	help	
the	United	Kingdom	to	maintain	adequate	reserves	of	gold	and	dollars”.189	
	
On	18	August,	1947,	Britain	announced	the	suspension	of	convertibility	due	to	
the	deterioration	in	Britain’s	reserves.	There	is	some	disagreement	in	the	literature	
as	to	the	exact	timing	and	speed	by	which	Britain’s	reserves	declined.190	However,	
Britain's	reserves	do	appear	to	have	precipitously	declined	in	the	months	prior	to	
August	1947	and	through	the	end	of	the	year	(Table	8).	
	
	 	
																																																						
185	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	446-447)	
186	(Pressnell,	1986)	
187	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	p.	317)	
188	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	153-154)	This	episode	also	illustrates	the	challenge	of	obtaining	accurate	statistical	
information	during	this	period:	the	1947	capital	drain	was	originally	calculated	in	1948	at	£349	million,	or	nearly	
half	of	the	actual	figure	of	£643	million.	
189	C261,	‘Questions	and	Answers	o	the	Financial	Agreement’	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	14	
February,	1946	
190	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	162;	Kennedy,	2011;	Peden,	2000,	p.	389;	Schenk,	2010,	p.	63)	
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Table	8:	UK	Gold	and	Dollar	Reserves,	Selected	Dates	1938	–	1947	
	
($s	millions)	
	
	 Current		 	
%	of	
1938	 Change	from	
Date	 Value*	 Value	 Reserves	 Previous	Date	
31	August,	1938	 $4,190	 $4,190	 100%	 	
	 	 	 	 	
31	December,	1946	 $2,696	 $1,409	 34%	 -$1,494	
	 	 	 	 	
31	March,	1947	 $2,380	 $1,259	 30%	 -$316	
30	June,	1947	 $2,410	 $1,223	 29%	 $30	
30	September,	1947	 $2,383	 $1,192	 28%	 -$27	
31	December,	1947	 $2,079	 $985	 23%	 -$304	
	
Note:	official	estimates	of	gold	and	U.S.	and	Canadian	dollars,	as	expressed	in	U.S.	dollars	at	
current	exchange	rates.	
	
Source:	Gardner	(1956,	p.	324),	from	Table	37,	E.C.A.	Special	Mission	to	the	UK,	The	Sterling	
Area,	1951,	p.	135	
	
	
3.4.2	Evidence	of	a	British	default	on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement	
	
Scholars	who	have	examined	mid-20th	century	British	economic	history,	or	the	history	
of	sovereign	defaults,	including	Gardner,	Newton,	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	et	al	have	either	
overlooked	or	not	interpreted	Britain’s	suspension	of	convertibility	in	1947	or	subsequent	
events	as	constituting	default.191	However,	the	evidence	from	archival	sources,	and	a	careful	
reading	of	the	Financial	Agreement,	show	that	this	view	is	difficult	to	defend.		
	
The	initial	response	from	U.S.	Treasury	Secretary	Snyder	to	the	suspension	of	sterling	
convertibility	was	that	this	constituted	a	default.	192	Snyder	requested	that	Britain	
acknowledge	in	writing	its	intention	to	unilaterally	suspend	convertibility,	which	would	be	
followed	by	the	U.S.	halting	the	balance	of	the	loan.	Snyder’s	interpretation	was	also	shared	
																																																						
191	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956;	Richard	Newton	Gardner,	1969;	Richard	N.	Gardner,	1980;	Newton,	1984;	C.	M.	
Reinhart,	2010;	Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009)	
192	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	p.	322)	
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by	British	negotiators	in	Washington.	According	to	a	cable	dated	18	August,	1947	to	Mr.	
Bridges	in	the	Foreign	Office,	Mr.	Eady	states:		
	
“We	made	no	bones	of	the	fact	that	although	this	was	not	a	repudiation	of	
the	principles	of	the	loan	agreement,	it	would	be	regarded	in	substance	as	a	
breach	of	the	agreement,	but	we	argued	that	it	was	a	breach	forced	upon	us	
by	circumstances	which	were	beyond	our	control”.193	
	
The	unilateral	declaration	by	Britain	that	sterling	convertibility	would	be	suspended	was	
messaged	from	the	Prime	Minister	to	Eady	in	Washington	at	8:55pm	on	19	August,	1947,	
stating:	
	
	“You	will	realize	how	reluctant	we	are	to	take	this	action	in	view	of	our	
financial	agreement	with	you…we	have	been	forced	to	act	without	the	
consultation	with	you	which	we	should	have	wished.	The	course	of	events	
leaves	us	no	option.”194	
	
In	sum,	the	decision	to	suspend	convertibility	was	clearly	taken	alone	by	Britain	without	the	
approval	of	the	United	States	government	and	it	was	in	violation	of	the	Financial	Agreement.	
This	was	the	first	instance	of	Britain	breaking	the	terms	of	the	Financial	Agreement.	
	
	 Convertibility	was	halted	on	20	August.195	Two	days	of	non-stop	negotiations,	
described	by	some	as	“a	search	for	legal	loop-holes	in	the	Agreement”,196	led	to	a	joint	
statement	that	the	suspension	was	“of	an	emergency	and	temporary	nature”	without	
defining	an	exact	date	at	which	convertibility	would	be	re-established.197	However,	there	was	
an	expectation	that	should	Britain	be	unable	to	restore	convertibility	in	the	near	term	then	a	
revised	Agreement	would	be	submitted	for	Congressional	approval,	or	the	remaining	$400	
million	would	not	be	disbursed.		
	
																																																						
193	OV31/101	No.	4528,	Eady,	Bank	of	England	Archive,18	August,	1947	
194	OV31/101	No.	8436,	Prime	Minister's	Office,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	19	August,	1947	
195	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	p.	323)	
196	OV31/101	No.	4570,	Lovett,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	20	August,	1947	
197	OV31/101	Cmd.	7210,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	20	August,	1947	
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There	was	significant	trepidation	amongst	British	officials	over	the	thought	of	again	
going	before	Congress	to	renegotiate	the	American	loan.	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	Hugh	
Dalton:	
	
“Of	Congressional	debate	on	our	affairs	we	had	had	enough	in	1946	when	
the	Loan	Agreement	was	under	discussion…Many	congressmen	had	
deployed	lengthy,	ill-informed,	unfriendly	and	even	spiteful	criticism	of	
Britain.	We	did	not	want	a	repetition	of	this,	which	would	have	been	
damaging	to	our	credibility	and	to	Anglo-American	co-operation	
generally.”198	
	
However,	the	view	from	inside	the	U.S.	Treasury	differed	from	Dalton’s.	As	expressed	by	U.S.	
Treasury	officials	Frank	Southard	and	Lowell	Pumphrey,	the	feeling	was	that	Article	XII	of	the	
Financial	Agreement,	which	requires	that	the	U.S.	Congress	be	presented	with	any	proposed	
modifications,	should	be	invoked.	In	a	candid	report	from	his	dinner	with	Pumphrey	of	the	
U.S.	Treasury,	the	Bank	of	England’s	Grafftey-Smith	stated:	
	
“He	(Pumphrey)	showed	me	a	personal	letter	from	Southard	indicating	that,	after	
much	discussion	within	the	U.S.	Treasury,	it	was	decided	that	the	most	honest	
method	of	presentation	would	be	for	H.M.G	to	invoke	Article	XII”.199		
	
The	relevant	section	of	Article	XII	states:	“Either	Government	shall	be	entitled	to	approach	
the	other	for	a	reconsideration	of	any	of	the	provisions	of	this	Agreement,	if	in	its	opinion	
the	prevailing	conditions	of	international	exchange	justify	such	a	reconsideration	with	a	view	
to	agreeing	upon	modifications	for	presentation	to	their	respective	Legislatures”.200	However,	
the	U.S.	Congress	was	never	officially	asked	to	approve	an	updated	Financial	Agreement,	and	
the	‘temporary’	suspension	of	sterling	convertibility	was	maintained	for	over	a	decade,	until	
1958.201	Meanwhile,	the	remaining	loan	funds	were	disbursed.202	In	sum,	even	if	the	
																																																						
198	(Dalton,	1962p.	255)	
199	OV31/102	No.	1,	Grafftey-Smith,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	2	October,	1947		
200	OV31/102	No.	1,	Grafftey-Smith,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	2	October,	1947	
201	(Graves,	1971)	
202	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	pp.	323-325)	From	correspondence	of	August	20,	1947,	Relating	to	Modification	
of	the	System	of	Transferable	Accounts,	Appendix	C	of	U.S.	National	Advisory	Council,	Report	on	Activities,	April	
1,	1947	to	Sept.	30,	1947.	
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suspension	fell	within	the	terms	of	the	original	Agreement,	the	revised	understanding	
negotiated	at	the	time	of	the	suspension	of	sterling’s	convertibility	was	not	fulfilled.		
	
Official	minutes	from	a	meeting	on	1	October,	1948	in	Washington	D.C.	between	the	
new	Chancellor,	Sir	Stafford	Cripps,	and	Snyder	confirm	Britain’s	default.	During	the	meeting	
the	subject	of	convertibility	was	revisited,	and	Cripps	stated	that	should	another	effort	to	
make	pound	sterling	convertible	be	undertaken	“we	(the	UK)	might	have	to	face	the	choice	
between	a	second	default	on	our	obligation”.203	
	
While	the	suspension	of	sterling	convertibility	and	the	aftermath	provide	clear	
evidence	that	Britain	defaulted,	this	was	not	the	lone	instance	of	default.	A	second	default	
occurred	in	December	1947	when	Britain,	which	was	still	suffering	from	a	decline	in	reserves,	
sought	the	remaining	$400	million	U.S.	credit	even	though	convertibility	had	not	been	re-
established.	As	Gardner	(1956)	remarks,	“but	how,	under	the	original	exchange	of	
notes…could	the	United	States	permit	withdrawal	of	the	$400	million	if	convertibility	were	
not	resumed?”	204	By	this	time,	however,	the	administration	and	Congress	were	absorbed	in	
Marshall	Aid	planning	amid	the	backdrop	of	Soviet	aggression.	A	second	set	of	notes	
between	Britain	and	the	U.S.	were	exchanged	and	Britain	was	allowed	to	access	the	$400	
million	without	reinstating	convertibility.		
	
There	is	evidence	of	a	further	two	additional	instances	of	British	default.	With	respect	
to	the	Sterling	Balances,	the	Agreement	called	for	Britain	to	make	'every	endeavour'	to	
negotiate	down	or	block	a	large	portion	of	the	balances;	the	U.S.	government	was	led	to	
believe	that	33%,	or	approximately	£1	billion,	would	be	written	off.205	Newton	(1984)	states	
“Britain	had	committed	herself	under	Clause	10	of	the	Financial	Agreement	to	"adjusting"	
(downward)	the	Sterling	Balances".206	However,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	'major	surgery'	
Keynes	envisioned	for	the	Sterling	Balances	never	occurred.	The	Bank	of	England	and,	to	a	
																																																						
203	OV31/102	No.	117,	Wilson-Smith,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	1	October,	1948	
204	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	pp.	324-325)	
205	(Gardner	1956,	p.	326)	
206	(Newton,	1984,	p.	399)	
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lesser	extent	the	Treasury,	considered	the	Sterling	Balances	to	be	“solemn	obligations”.	
There	was	also	a	view	that	the	Balances	could	be	helpful	to	British	foreign	trade	and	that	a	
drastic	reduction	could	negatively	impact	Indian	independence.207	Newton	states:	“the	
increase	of	(Sterling	Balances)	gave	Britain,	banker	to	the	Sterling	Area,	advantages	of	
importing	without	having	to	pay	in	the	now”.208	Regardless	of	the	rationale,	very	little	
downward	adjustment	of	the	Sterling	Balances	took	place	place	by	15	July,	1947.	If	not	an	
outright	violation,	the	lack	of	adjustment	certainly	violated	the	spirit	of	the	Agreement.		
	
The	fourth	instance	of	default	relates	to	Article	9	of	the	Financial	Agreement,	the	
non-discrimination	of	trade	clause,	which	Britain	violated	by	paying	more	for	non-U.S.	goods	
to	conserve	U.S.	dollars.	Treasury	Secretary	Snyder	publicly	denied	this	practice,	but	he	
privately	accommodated	Britain	by	supporting	discrimination	against	U.S.	goods.	British	
trade	discrimination,	however,	is	a	clear	violation	of	Article	9.209	The	decision	to	overlook	
Imperial	trade	preference,	made	by	Snyder	without	seeking	Congressional	approval	to	
amend	the	terms	of	the	Financial	Agreement,	was	within	British	policymaking	circles	referred	
to	as	the	‘Snyder	let-out’.210	Some	historians	have	viewed	Britain’s	trade	discrimination	as	
having	been	officially	“sanctioned	by	the	United	States”.211	However,	British	officials	appear	
to	have	been	well	aware	of	Snyder	violating	both	the	spirt	and	the	letter	of	the	agreement	by	
not	taking	this	before	Congress.	A	confidential	UK	Board	of	Trade	memo	dated	15	October,	
1948	states:	
	
“It	was	impossible...for	the	administration	formally	to	interpret	Article	9.	The	
agreement	(Anglo-American	Loan)	was	approved	by	Congress	and	only	an	Act	
by	Congress	could	be	effective	for	our	(British)	purposes.	If	the	administration	
did	issue	a	statement	there	would	certainly	be	counter-statements	by	
members	of	Congress	that	it	had	no	force,	with	the	result	that	the	
administration	have	put	itself	into	an	untenable	position	without	doing	us	any	
good.	Worse	still,	we	should	have	excited	congressional	opposition	to	the	
																																																						
207	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	p.	326)		
208	(Newton,	1984,	p.	399)	
209	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	p.	335)	
210	OV31/102,	Board	of	Trade	Memo,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	18	September,	1948	
211	(Krozewski,	2001,	p.	81)	“The	international	context,	sanctioned	by	the	United	States,	defined	the	feasibility	
of	Britain’s	discriminatory	management.”	
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matter	itself	by	the	unconstitutional	way	in	which	it	had	been	presented.	A	new	
administration	would	almost	certainly	inform	us	that	the	joint	statement	had	
no	validity.”212	
	
While	there	is	ample	evidence	that	Britain	did	not	adhere	to	the	full	terms	of	the	
Financial	Agreement,	often	with	the	encouragement	of	parts	of	the	U.S.	executive	branch,	
what	about	the	repayment	of	the	loan’s	interest	and	principal?	While	the	existing	literature	
makes	no	mention	of	missed	payments,	archival	sources	suggest	this	may	have	happened.	
For	example,	there	is	a	reference	to	Britain	having	trouble	beginning	payments	in	1951.	213	
Suggestions	for	addressing	this	problem	include	renegotiating	the	terms	of	the	agreement	to	
delay	repayment	of	principal	by	five	years	(the	1951	payment	would	be	$52	million,	rising	
annually	thereafter),	reduce	interest	expense,	or,	as	Christelow	suggests,	“transition	of	the	
Loan	into	a	free	gift”.214	The	Anglo-American	loan	was	later	renegotiated	in	1956-57	to	allow	
for	the	UK	to	‘take	a	bisque’,	meaning	suspend	payments	of	principal	and	interest	in	any	
year,	up	to	seven	times,	during	the	remaining	life	of	the	loan.215	This	modification	to	the	loan	
agreement	certainly	reduced	the	real	value	of	the	debt.	However,	it	was	mutually	agreed	and	
approved	by	the	U.S.	Congress.	In	sum,	a	review	of	the	archives	has	not	revealed	an	obvious	
'smoking	gun'	missed	or	skipped	payment.	
	
The	two	final	events	that	could	be	considered	defaults	are	the	two	sterling	
devaluations,	in	1949	and	1967.	Because	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement's	principal	
and	interest	payments	were	denominated	in	dollars	it	was	not	possible	for	Britain	'print'	
dollars	to	help	pay	off	the	loan.	However,	as	shown	previously,	much	of	Britain's	other	
sovereign	debt,	such	as	the	Sterling	Balances,	was	denominated	in	sterling.	Further,	not	all	of	
this	debt	could	be	easily	exchanged	by	Britain's	creditors.	Britain's	1949	and	1967	sterling	
																																																						
212	OV31/102	No.	119,	Franks,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	15	October,	1948.	The	memo	was	written	at	a	time	
when	it	was	unclear	who	would	win	the	1948	U.S.	Presidential	electoral	contest	between	Democratic	
incumbent	Harry	S.	Truman	and	Republican	challenger	Thomas	E.	Dewey	(Truman	prevailed	by	a	close	margin).	
213	OV31/102	No.	6,	Christelow,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	15	October,	1947;	OV31/102	No.	61,	Thompson-
McCausland,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	26	April,	1948	
214	OV31/102	No.	6,	Christelow,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	15	October,	1947;	OV31/102	No.	61,	Thompson-
McCausland,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	26	April,	1948	
215	(Cosío-Pascal	&	Bankruptcy,	2006,	p.	7)	
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devaluations,	which	reduced	the	real	value	of	sovereign	debt	denominated	in	sterling,	could	
also	therefore	be	viewed	as	a	partial	default.	
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3.5	Conclusion	
	
“We	are	reluctant	to	put	on	record,	if	we	can	avoid	it,	what	amounts	to	a	public	
confession	that	we	have	not	fulfilled	our	obligation.”	
	
-Draft	letter	from	H.M.	Treasury	to	U.S.	Treasury,	December,	1951216	
	
The	above	quotation	is	from	a	letter	prepared	at	the	end	of	1951	at	the	request	of	
U.S.	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	Snyder,	drafted	on	behalf	of	the	new	Conservative	Chancellor	
of	the	Exchequer,	R.A.	Butler,	by	Sir	Herbert	Britain	of	Treasury.	Great	reluctance	was	
expressed	inside	the	British	Treasury	to	sending	such	a	letter,	and	it	was	never	formally	
delivered	to	the	Americans.217	However,	from	these	and	other	statements	it	is	clear	that	
contemporary	actors	judged	that	Britain	had	defaulted	on	Anglo-American	Financial	
Agreement.	But	how	should	economic	historians	ultimately	judge	British	debt	sustainability	
during	this	period?		
	
Gardner	(1956)	concludes	his	own	assessment	of	the	convertibility	clause	and	the	
Financial	Agreement	as	follows:	
	
“Thus	did	the	letter	of	an	unwise	provision	give	way	before	the	obvious	
interest	of	Britain	and	the	United	States.	The	convertibility	provision	had	
been	tightly	drafted	to	ensure	that	an	important	step	toward	
multilateralism	would	be	achieved.	In	fact,	the	provision	advanced	
multilateralism	not	at	all.”218	
	
Gardner’s	interpretation	is	supported	by	Cairncross,	and	perhaps	is	correct	in	terms	of	
judging	the	broader	global	significance	of	the	economic	and	trade	picture	during	this	time.219	
However,	the	fact	that	the	original	Financial	Agreement	may	have	been	poorly	designed	does	
not	mean	Britain	avoided	default.220	Nowhere	in	either	Gardner's	or	Cairncross's	assessment	
																																																						
216	OV31/103	No.	177,	Brittain,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	10	December,	1951	
217	OV31/103	No.	182,	Butler,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	19	December,	1951	
218	(Richard	N.	Gardner,	1956,	p.	325)	
219	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	100-101)	
220	Gardner	also	either	missed	or	overlooks	some	factual	elements	of	the	story,	such	as	the	failure	of	the	British	
to	adhere	to	subsequent	arrangements,	first	negotiated	in	August	1947	and	then	again	in	December	1947.	
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is	the	word	'default'	used	in	conjunction	with	Britain	and	the	Anglo-American	Financial	
Agreement.	This	may	be	in	part	due	to	the	fact	that	the	concept	of	an	‘excusable	default’	had	
not	yet	been	developed.	The	term	excusable	default	is	defined	by	Grossman	and	Van	Huyck	
(1988)	as	a	credit	event	that	is	“justifiably	associated	with	implicitly	understood	
contingences”,	and	should	implicitly	be	considered	as	a	lesser	or	non-offense	by	the	debtor	
as	compared	to	outright	debt	repudiation.221	Gardner	and	Cairncross	argue	in	essence	that	
Britain’s	failure	to	meet	the	full	terms	of	the	Financial	Agreement	can	be	characterized	as	an	
excusable	default,	even	though	neither	use	this	term.	However,	U.S.	Treasury	Secretary	
Snyder	made	several	legal	and	constitutional	violations	by	not	seeking	U.S.	Congressional	
approval	for	the	so-called	‘Snyder	let-out’	on	Clause	9	of	the	Financial	Agreement.	In	other	
words,	Britain	was	only	‘partially	excused’	by	one	branch	of	the	U.S.	government	from	
fulfilling	its	obligations.	Further,	it	would	not	be	accurate	to	describe	the	Anglo-American	
Financial	Agreement	as	odious	debt,	which	as	discussed	earlier	also	falls	under	the	heading	
of	‘excusable	default’.	In	sum,	Britain’s	default	on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	Agreement	
resides	somewhere	between	the	‘excusable’	and	‘partial’	end	of	the	sovereign	default	
spectrum.	
	
Whether	or	not	there	was	an	attempt	to	downplay	or	even	cover-up	Britain’s	default	
on	loan	terms	to	mitigate	damage	to	Britain’s	reputation,	both	within	the	Sterling	Area	and	
abroad,	is	also	unclear.	A	very	public	British	default	would	certainly	have	resulted	in	reduced	
confidence	in	Britain’s	financial	fortitude	and	further	weakened	sterling,	a	still	important	
international	reserve	currency.	Starting	in	the	late-1940s	U.S.	policy	shifted,	and	financial	and	
economic	priorities	gave	way	to	concerns	over	the	spread	of	communism.	In	other	words,	
there	were	significant	incentives	for	both	Britain	and	the	U.S.	to	disguise	Britain’s	failure	to	
fully	complete	the	terms	of	the	Anglo-American	loan,	and	checking	communist	expansion	
appears	to	have	been	more	important	to	the	U.S.	(at	least	within	the	executive	branch)	than	
seeing	certain	elements	of	the	Anglo-American	loan	agreement	fulfilled.	The	British	case	
																																																						
221	(Grossman	&	Van	Huyck,	1988)	
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illustrates	the	considerable	lengths	policymakers	on	both	sides	of	a	credit	agreement	are	
often	willing	to	travel	to	avoid	branding	a	country	as	in	default.	
	
Ultimately,	sovereign-to-sovereign	lending	is	rarely	just	about	the	money.	The	Anglo-
American	loan	illustrates	how	non-financial	and	non-economic	priorities,	such	as	geopolitics,	
can	affect	sovereign	debt	sustainability.	The	public	record	and	archival	correspondence	make	
clear	the	many	political	aspects	of	the	loan,	including	Britain’s	support	for	the	International	
Trade	Organization,	Britain’s	“adherence	to	Bretton	Woods	organizations”,	and	“enabling	
[Britain]	to	assume	the	obligations	of	the	UNO	[United	Nations	Organization],	and	thereby	to	
contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	world	peace”.222	The	British	case	also	suggests	that	partial	
or	excusable	sovereign	defaults	are	far	from	unimportant	economic	events	and	are	worthy	of	
further	scholarship.		 	
																																																						
222	C261,	‘Benefits	of	British	Loan	Agreement’	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	14	February,	1946	
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4	Origins	and	Measurement	of	Financial	Repression:	The	British	
Case,	mid-20th	Century	
	
	
Abstract:	A	disagreement	has	emerged	over	whether	advanced	countries	such	as	
Britain	engaged	in	financial	repression	following	the	Second	World	War.	A	review	
of	 the	 historical	 literature	 and	 archival	 evidence	 show	 that	 financial	 repression	
played	an	important	role	in	sustaining	Britain's	record-setting	levels	of	public	debt.	
In	Britain,	eleven	pieces	of	 legislation	and	sixteen	polices/directives	are	identified	
that	 supported	 financial	 repression	 during	 this	 period.	 An	 examination	 of	 two	
leading	 quantitative	 methods	 for	 measuring	 financial	 repression	 highlights	 the	
need	 for	 alternative	 approaches,	 such	 as	 a	 proposed	 composite	 indicator.	 Using	
free	market	bond	 yield	data,	British	 government	 savings	 attributable	 to	 financial	
repression	are	calculated	at	over	8%	of	GDP	in	1948.	The	paper	discusses	various	
aspects	of	British	financial	repression,	such	as	interest	rate	policy,	capital	controls,	
directed	lending,	and	the	conscription	of	the	British	banking	system.	
	
	
JEL:	H63,	E58,	E61,	E62,	H12,	H27,	P24	
	
Keywords:	financial	repression,	capital	controls,	sovereign	debt,	debt	sustainability,	inflation,	
British	economic	history,	British	banking	system,	interest	rates,	financial	regulation,	
macroprudential	regulation	
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4.1	Introduction	
	
Financial	repression	has	received	renewed	academic	and	public	attention	in	recent	
years	as	part	of	the	ongoing	economic	and	policy	debate	over	how	best	to	achieve	economic	
growth	while	sustaining	public	debts.	The	renewed	interest	in	financial	repression	has	been	
prompted	in	part	by	the	highest	levels	of	public	and	private	sector	debts	in	advanced	
economies	since	the	Second	World	War,	the	period	which	some	scholars	argue	was	the	last	
time	advanced	countries	practiced	financial	repression	on	a	wide	scale.	
	
Until	recently	problems	posed	by	unsustainable	levels	of	sovereign	debt	were	nearly	
exclusive	to	developing	economies.	Over	the	last	four	decades,	much	of	the	sovereign	debt	
research	and	policy	focus	has	therefore	been	directed	towards	emerging	markets.	However,	
debt	sustainability	measures	that	are	typically	employed	by	developing	countries,	such	as	
repudiation	and	inflation,	are	viewed	as	impractical,	undesirable,	or	even	impossible	for	
many	advanced	economies	to	implement.	At	the	same	time,	outstanding	debts	and	deficits	
are	large	enough	that	other	traditional	mechanisms	for	achieving	fiscal	balance,	such	as	
reductions	in	government	expenditures	or	asset	sales,	are	viewed	by	many	as	insufficient	to	
make	a	material	impact	on	sovereign	debt	sustainability.	If	advanced	economies	are	
ultimately	unable	to	achieve	sufficient	economic	growth	to	make	their	debts	sustainable	
then	financial	repression	may	be	the	most	compelling	policy	option.	
	
A	disagreement	exists	between	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	(2011)	and	Taylor	(2011)	over	
the	evidence	of	widespread	financial	repression	in	the	post-Second	World	War	period.223	The	
disagreement	is	explored	in	more	depth	later	in	the	paper	but	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	state	that	the	decline	in	the	real	value	of	public	debt	is	prima	facie	
evidence	of	financial	repression,	while	Taylor	counters	that	the	specific	reasons	for	why	the	
real	yields	on	government	debt	may	turn	negative	are	not	always	clear.	
	
																																																						
223	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011;	Taylor,	2011)	
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This	paper	makes	three	contributions	to	the	current	discussion:	first,	existing	
methods	for	measuring	the	effects	of	financial	repression	are	critically	examined,	revealing	a	
number	of	methodological	issues	and	limitations	that	can	be	addressed	in	part	through	by	a	
proposed	composite	indicator	(composite	index)	of	financial	repression.	Second,	the	
disagreement	over	the	existence	of	financial	repression	in	post-Second	World	War	period	is	
explored	by	examining	the	British	case	in-depth,	and	a	wide	range	of	financial	repression	
policies	employed	by	Britain	are	identified.		Last,	an	alternative	measure	of	British	financial	
repression	is	presented	using	free	market	bond	yield	data;	British	financial	repression	
‘savings’	are	calculated	at	over	8%	of	GDP	in	1948,	which	is	significantly	greater	than	savings	
estimates	for	other	countries	during	the	post-Second	World	War	period.	
	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	section	4.2	covers	the	definition	
and	history	of	financial	repression.	Section	4.3	compares	two	leading	methods	for	measuring	
financial	repression.	Section	4.4	explores	the	case	of	British	post-Second	War	financial	
repression.	Section	4.5	concludes.	
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4.2	Literature	survey	
	
	 Before	any	study	can	be	undertaken	it	is	useful	to	have	a	precise	definition	of	the	
topic	to	be	studied.	However,	arriving	at	both	a	clear	and	generally	agreed	upon	definition	of	
the	term	financial	repression	is	problematic;	a	wide	range	of	policies	and	practices	can	be,	
and	often	are,	placed	under	its	banner.	The	term	financial	repression	is	frequently	employed	
as	a	pejorative	to	criticize	particular	policies,	evoking	strong	reactions	in	academic	and	policy	
discussions.	Adding	further	trouble	is	the	interchangeable	use	by	some	scholars	of	terms	like	
fiscal	repression	with	financial	repression,	sometimes	in	the	same	paper.224	Overlap	can	also	
be	found	between	policies	associated	with	financial	repression	and	the	policies	that	fall	
under	the	more	agreeably	termed	macroprudential	regulation.225	For	example,	increased	
reserve	requirements	and	holding	more	‘safe’	government	debt	in	lieu	of	other	capital	is	
considered	both	prudent	orthodoxy	for	achieving	financial	stability	as	well	as	a	core	
component	of	financial	repression.	
	
Financial	repression	can	be	defined	as	any	measure	taken	by	central	authorities	that	
directs	lendable	funds	towards	the	sovereign’s	publicly	issued	debt,	often	on	attractive	terms	
(below	market).	In	other	words,	in	the	absence	of	financial	repression	the	government	would	
have	to	pay	a	higher	rate	of	interest	to	entice	lenders;	otherwise	the	government	would	risk	
losing	significant	investor	funds	to	other	free	market	investments	that	generate	higher	rates	
of	return.	Here	we	see	one	of	the	difficulties	in	identifying	financial	repression,	which	is	the	
reliance	on	the	counterfactual	that	economic	actors	would	behave	differently	if	certain	
policies	were	not	in	place.	
	
The	core	policy	elements	of	financial	repression	can	perhaps	be	best	grouped	into	
two	categories226	–	capital	controls	and	domestic	financial	regulation:	
	
																																																						
224	(Drelichman	&	Voth,	2008)	
225	For	further	discussion	see	(C.		Reinhart,	Kirkegaard,	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	
226	Framework	adapted	from	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	6)	
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1. Captive	domestic	credit	providers,	which	typically	include	the	banking	system,	
pension	funds,	insurance	companies	and	other	institutions	(e.g.,	government	
agencies).	Such	entities	can	be	owned	or	directly	operated	by	the	government	under	
a	regime	of	financial	repression.	Alternatively,	firms	can	also	be	regulated	or	nudged	
through	moral	suasion.	Public	debt	financing	from	these	entities	is	often	directed	by	
the	government	via	the	following	mechanisms:	
	
a. Reserve	requirements	that	govern	both	the	percentage	and	type	of	capital	
(e.g.,	government	debt)	and	must	be	retained	by	the	banking	system	in	
reserve	against	deposits.	
	
b. Exchange	and	capital	controls	that	restrict	both	institutions	and	individuals	to	
domestic	savings	and	investment	vehicles,	thereby	preventing	them	from	
taking	advantage	of	potentially	more	attractive	offshore	returns.	
	
c. Preferential	tax	treatment	for	government	debt	over	other	competing	
financial	instruments,	such	as	equities.227	
	
d. Restrictions	on	holding	certain	assets	(i.e.,	foreign	currency,	gold),	including	
prohibiting	the	ownership	of	gold,	or	limitations	on	the	sale	or	transfer	of	gold	
within	or	beyond	the	domestic	market.	
	
2. Interest	rate	caps	in	the	form	of	rate	ceilings,	or	other	indirect	measures	that	help	
maintain	low	interest	rates.	Low	rates	can	both	reduce	government	debt	expense	and	
influence	the	demand	for	government	debt.	For	example,	savings	deposits	that	are	
regulated	to	pay	a	lower	rate	of	interest	than	government	debt	will	incentivize	the	
migration	of	capital	into	government	debt.	
	
The	above	definition	of	financial	repression	is	by	no	means	comprehensive.	Indeed,	a	
myriad	of	measures	are	often	suggested	as	a	form	financial	repression.	For	example,	
government	restrictions	on	the	actions	of	credit	ratings	agencies	has	been	characterized	as	
financial	repression.228	In	sum,	while	the	broad	concept	of	financial	repression	is	generally	
																																																						
227	For	more	on	this	specific	area	see	(Campbell	&	Froot,	1994)	
228	(Evans-Pritchard,	7	July,	2011)	
	 	 Page	|	105	
	
well	established,	there	is	room	for	debate	over	precisely	which	policies	or	actions	should	and	
should	not	be	considered	financial	repression.	
	
4.2.1	Historical	overview	of	financial	repression	
	
	To	more	clearly	define	and	understand	financial	repression	it	is	helpful	to	examine	its	
origins.	Some	policies	associated	with	what	came	to	be	called	financial	repression	in	the	
latter-half	of	the	20th	century	have	existed	long	before	the	term	was	invented.	Restrictions	
on	interest	and	usury	date	back	to	at	least	1800	B.C.	and	the	Babylonian	Code	of	
Hammurabi.229	Lending	with	interest,	or	interest	rates	considered	usurious,	have	often	been	
framed	in	moral	and	religious	terms	and	are	chastised	in	both	the	Koran	and	Old	Testament.	
For	example,	Jews,	like	Christians,	were	in	general	not	supposed	to	lend	money	at	usurious	
rates	of	interest,	but	the	Old	Testament	book	of	Deuteronomy	contained	a	‘get-out	clause’	
for	Jews	lending	to	gentiles.230	
	
More	recently	a	system	of	compulsory	government	finance	called	prestiti	was	in	
operation	in	14th	and	15th	century	Venice	and	Florence.	231	Restrictions	on	the	free	
movement	of	capital,	such	as	the	export	of	specie,	are	seen	as	early	as	16th	century	Spain	and	
the	Napoleonic	period.232	However,	exchange	controls,	as	they	are	commonly	understood	
and	practiced	today,	arguably	first	came	into	wider	existence	during	the	First	World	War	
when	Germany	introduced	exchange	regulations	shortly	after	hostilities	commenced.	233	On	3	
April,	1918	France	followed	suit	and	enacted	exchange	controls	to	limit	capital	flight.	Britain,	
under	the	guidance	of	a	then	young	employee	of	the	Exchequer	named	John	Maynard	
Keynes,	practiced	a	lighter	version	of	capital	controls,	which	included	licensing	imports	and	
placing	restrictions	on	the	way	in	which	war	loans	could	be	spent.234	Later,	in	his	1936	
																																																						
229	(Lane,	1937)		
230	(Ferguson,	2008,	pp.	35-36)	‘Unto	a	stranger	thou	mayest	lend	upon	usury;	but	unto	thy	brother	thou	shalt	
not	lend	upon	usury’	
231	(Blitz	&	Long,	1965)	
232	(Cooper,	Tarullo,	&	Williamson,	1999,	pp.	6-7)	
233	(Dulles,	1929,	p.	223;	Moulton	&	Mcguire,	1923,	p.	166)	
234	(R.	F.	Harrod,	1951,	pp.	204-205)	
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General	Theory,	Keynes	expressed	himself	to	be	at	least	a	sometime	proponent	of	interest	
rate	caps,	stating:		
	
“…the	rate	of	interest	is	not	self-adjusting	at	a	level	best	suited	to	the	social	
advantage	but	constantly	tends	to	rise	too	high,	so	that	a	wise	government	is	
concerned	to	curb	it	by	statue	and	custom	and	even	by	invoking	the	sanctions	of	
moral	law.”235		
	
While	caps	on	interest	can	prevent	monopolist	or	oligopolistic	lenders	from	abusing	their	
pricing	power,	caps	also	bring	down	the	cost	of	borrowing	for	government.	
	
Gurley	and	Shaw	(1955,	1960)	were	the	first	to	articulate	the	broader	economic	
system	of	financial	repression.236	In	1973	Shaw	and	McKinnon	simultaneously	coined	the	
term	‘financial	repression’	in	their	respective	books	on	the	role	of	the	financial	sector	in	
economic	development.237	McKinnon	and	Shaw	focused	on	two	channels	for	transmitting	
financial	repression:	first,	the	reduction	in	the	efficiency	of	the	banking	sector	in	allocating	
savings,	meaning	bankers	operating	in	a	financially	repressed	environment	are	unable	to	
manage	credit	according	to	market	rates	and	prices.	Second,	maintaining	artificially	low	
interest	rates	reduces	the	savings	level,	which	in	turn	can	reduce	capital	accumulation.238	
	
	 The	term	financial	repression	became	somewhat	of	a	catch-all	description	for	
excessive	financial	regulation	in	developing	economies	by	promoters	of	the	‘Washington	
consensus’,	which	was	a	set	of	policies	associated	with	the	push	for	market	liberalization	in	
the	1970s-1980s.	McKinnon,	Shaw	and	subsequent	scholars	focused	their	research	on	the	
economic	development	barriers	created	by	financial	repression	for	less	developed	
economies.	
	
																																																						
235	(Keynes,	1936,	p.	351)		
236	(J.	G.	Gurley	&	Shaw,	1955;	John	G.	Gurley,	Shaw,	Enthoven,	&	Brookings	Institution.,	1960)	
237	(McKinnon,	1973;	Shaw,	1973)	
238	(Shaw,	1973,	Ch.	2	and	3)	
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4.2.2	Economic	impact	of	financial	repression	
	
	 Since	Gurley	and	Shaw's	ground	breaking	work	in	the	mid-1950s,	a	number	of	
research	studies	have	found	that	financial	repression	has	a	negative	impact	on	economic	
growth.239	A	more	specific	criticism	of	financial	repression	is	the	negative	impact	it	has	on	
the	marginal	productivity	of	capital;	controls	suppressing	interest	rates	below	their	
equilibrium	level	cause	projects	with	otherwise	positive	returns	on	investment	to	go	
unfinanced.	240	Financial	development	is	likely	to	suffer	under	such	conditions	as	the	low	
return	on	financial	assets	reduces	the	incentive	for	savings	to	be	allocated	to	the	financial	
system	for	intermediation.241	The	resulting	drag	on	capital	accumulation	undercuts	
entrepreneurship	and	economic	development.		
	
	 Capital	mobility,	which	is	restricted	by	financial	repression,	helps	channel	resources	
to	their	most	productive	uses	both	locally	and	worldwide.	Capie	and	Wood	(2002)	studied	
the	effects	of	British	capital	controls	and	found	that	they	result	in	‘deadweight	losses’,	
meaning	higher	prices,	reduced	production,	and	increased	bureaucratic	and	administrative	
costs.242		Capital	controls	can	also	be	difficult	to	abandon	once	they	are	in	place,	and	they	
can	negatively	impact	a	country’s	attractiveness	as	a	destination	for	foreign	capital	by	
reducing	the	‘free	market’	credibility	of	the	nations	that	implement	capital	controls.	
Exchange	controls	can	also	create	what	amounts	to	a	quota	on	imports,	thus	triggering	an	
increase	in	relative	domestic	prices.243	Foreign	exchange	rationing	has	also	been	shown	to	
have	a	negative	impact	on	output	and	employment.244	
	
	 Both	the	empirical	and	theoretical	literature	clearly	support	the	case	that	financial	
repression	can	negatively	impact	economic	growth.	However,	it	must	be	noted	that	robust	
																																																						
239	See	for	example	(Easterly,	1993;	Galindo,	Micco,	Ordoñez,	Bris,	&	Repetto,	2002;	Lanyi	&	Saracoglu,	1983;	
Roubini	&	Salaimartin,	1992;	World	Bank,	1989)	
240	(Goldsmith,	1969)	
241	(De	la	Torre,	Gozzi,	&	Schmukler,	2007)	
242	(Capie	&	Wood,	2002)	
243	(Agénor,	1992,	p.	11;	Bhagwati,	1978;	Greenwood	&	Kimbrough,	1987)	
244	(Austin,	1989)	
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economic	growth	and	financial	repression	may	not	be	mutually	exclusive.	For	example,	many	
of	the	countries	that	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	argue	as	having	actively	engaged	in	financial	
repression	following	the	Second	World	War	also	managed	to	generate	outsized	economic	
growth.	From	1948	to	1973	the	real	GDP	of	Western	Europe	grew	twice	as	fast	as	during	any	
other	period	of	comparable	length,	before	or	since.245	In	other	words,	if	Reinhart	and	
Sbrancia	are	correct	in	their	assessment,	the	‘era	of	financial	repression’	following	the	
Second	World	War	coincided	with	the	‘golden	age	of	economic	growth’.		
	
Also	of	note	is	the	fact	that	from	1945	through	1980	there	was	not	a	single	major	
systemic	international	banking	crisis.	This	fact	stands	in	stark	contrast	with	repeated	banking	
crises	that	occurred	both	before	and	following	the	‘era	of	financial	repression’.246	One	
possible	explanation	for	this	phenomenon	is	that,	in	contrast	to	the	growing	international	
trade	integration	following	the	Second	World	War,	financial	integration	across	borders	was	
prevented	through	a	number	of	restrictions.247	As	noted	earlier,	financial	repression	policies	
share	some	common	features	with	prudential	measures,	such	as	bank	reserve	requirements	
that	mandate	an	increase	in	government	debt	holdings.	Research	has	shown	that	banking	
crises	often	foreshadow	sovereign	debt	defaults.248	
	
	 Arguably	one	of	the	most	important	elements	of	financial	repression	is	its	impact	on	
public	debt.	Governments	are	often	forced	to	pay	a	higher	rate	of	debt	interest,	or	in	
extreme	cases	can	be	entirely	shutout	of	debt	markets,	as	the	ratio	of	public	debt-to-national	
income	(debt-to-GDP)	climbs.	Inflation,	which	often	accompanies	financial	repression,	is	
captured	in	nominal	GDP	and	can	help	reduce	the	debt-to-GDP	ratio.	However,	significant	
inflation,	or	negative	real	interest	rates,	need	not	accompany	financial	repression	to	have	a	
positive	debt	sustainability	effect;	any	below-market	interest	rate	reduces	the	servicing	cost	
of	government	debt.	However,	like	inflation,	financial	repression	is	only	effective	against	
government	debts	that	are	denominated	in	the	domestic	currency.	
																																																						
245	(B.	Eichengreen,	1996)	
246	(Bordo	&	Landon-Lane,	2010;	Carmen	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2009)	
247	(Obstfeld	&	Taylor,	2004)	
248	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2011)	
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4.3	Measurement	of	financial	repression	
	
	 Giovannini	and	de	Melo	(1993)	and	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	(2011)	developed	methods	
for	quantifying	and	measuring	the	impact	of	financial	repression.	This	section	of	contains	a	
discussion	of	these	methods,	their	results,	and	suggested	alternative	approaches.	
	
4.3.1	Giovannini	and	de	Melo	
	
	 Giovannini’s	and	de	Melo	assemble	data	for	a	sample	of	twenty-four	emerging	
market	countries	for	the	period	of	1972	through	1987.249	Giovannini	and	de	Melo	calculate	
government	revenue	from	financial	repression	as	the	difference	between	the	government’s	
foreign	and	domestic	cost	of	funds,	multiplied	by	the	public	debt	of	the	central	government:	
	
FR	=	(if	–	id)	*	PD	
	
where	government	revenue	from	financial	repression	(FR)	is	calculated	by	subtracting	the	
artificially	low	domestic	interest	rate	(id)	from	the	foreign	market	interest	rate	(if),	and	then	
multiplying	by	government	public	debt	(PD).		
	
	 Their	results	estimate	the	'government	revenue’	from	financial	repression	ranged	as	
high	as	5.8%	of	GDP	in	Mexico,	or	40%	of	the	Mexican	government’s	tax	levies.	To	determine	
their	‘market’	rate	the	authors	utilize	data	from	the	World	Bank	Debtor	Reporting	System,	
which	is	based	on	foreign	‘commercial’	debt	interest	from	financial	institutions	that	have	
floated	LIBOR-based	borrowings	on	international	markets,	such	as	New	York	and	London.			
	
	 One	problem	with	this	method,	which	the	authors	do	not	discuss,	is	that	commercial	
rates	of	interest	are	nearly	always	higher	than	government	rates,	often	by	a	significant	
margin.	Accordingly,	commercial	rates	may	not	be	representative	of	foreign	sovereign	rates,	
																																																						
249	(Giovannini	&	Demelo,	1993,	p.	957)	Some	data	is	missing	for	some	years,	and	the	authors	acknowledge	the	
debatable	decision	of	including	Greece	and	Portugal	in	their	sample,	both	of	which	are	generally	considered	as	
‘advanced’	countries.	
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leading	to	an	upward	bias	in	their	financial	repression	calculations.	A	second	issue	with	their	
method	is	that	rates	of	interest	can	significantly	vary	by	type	of	financial	institution.	Many	
different	types	of	financial	operating	entities	besides	depositories,	such	as	insurance	
companies,	investment	banks,	specialty	finance	lenders,	and	auto	finance	companies,	can	be	
classified	as	a	‘financial	institution’.	In	defence	of	the	authors,	it	was	a	not	uncommon	
practice	during	the	period	studied	for	governments	to	own,	or	exercise	some	degree	of	
control,	over	domestic	financial	institutions.	It	could	therefore	be	reasonable	to	argue	that	
financial	institutions	serves	are	a	reasonable	proxy	for	the	market	interest	rate	that	foreign	
investors	would	require	to	hold	government's	debt.	However,	the	authors	fail	to	make	this	
case.	
	
	 A	perhaps	significant	conceptual	problem	with	representing	an	interest	rate	from	the	
period	under	study	as	a	‘market’	rate	is	the	pervasiveness	of	financial	repression	during	the	
period.250	The	loosening	of	capital	controls	and	financial	deregulation	took	place	over	the	
course	of	the	sample	period,	not	before	the	period	of	study.251	One	possible	way	of	
addressing	this	issue	would	be	to	segment	and	compare	data	between	different	sub	periods.	
However,	such	an	approach	was	not	undertaken	or	discussed	by	the	authors.	
	
	 The	authors	exclude	debt	held	by	the	central	bank	in	their	final	calculation,	as	the	
interest	is	returned	to	the	government.	However,	the	debt	holdings	of	monetary	authorities	
are	included	in	their	effective	domestic	interest	rate	calculations	“because	the	treasury	
normally	remunerates	the	central	bank	for	its	holdings	of	interest-bearing	treasury	debt”.252	
While	the	explanation	for	excluding	central	bank	holdings	in	the	first	instance	seems	
reasonable,	the	inconsistent	treatment	of	central	bank	holdings	is	not	sufficiently	justified	by	
the	authors.	
	
																																																						
250	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	
251	(Obstfeld	&	Taylor,	2004;	D.	Quinn,	1997)	
252	(Giovannini	&	Demelo,	1993,	pp.	956-957)	
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	 Last,	the	authors	use	of	the	term	‘government	revenue’	to	describe	the	effects	of	
financial	repression	is	problematic.	The	government	does	not	in	fact	collect	any	tax	revenue	
from	financial	repression.	The	benefits	government’s	realize	from	financial	repression,	such	
as	reduced	interest	expense,	are	in	fact	more	akin	to	‘savings’	than	revenue.	
	
4.3.2	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	
	
Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	reference	Giovannini's	and	de	Melo's	methods	and	take	a	
similar	‘bottom	line’	approach	to	calculate	the	‘liquidation	effect’,	which	they	also	refer	to	as	
‘financial	repression	tax’,	through	an	examination	of	real	interest	rates	of	government	
debt.253	They	assemble	data	for	a	ten-country	sample	of	advanced	and	developing	
economies,	including	the	United	Kingdom	for	1945-1980.	Their	results	show	that	negative	
real	interest	rates	had	a	significant	impact	on	reducing	the	real	cost	of	public	debt.	Reinhart	
and	Sbrancia	acknowledge	the	similarity	between	theirs	and	Giovannini	and	de	Melo’s	
method.	They	do	not,	however,	consider	the	Giovannini	and	de	Melo	method	appropriate	for	
the	post-Bretton	Woods	era	because	many	countries	did	not	have	much	if	any	external	debt	
denominated	in	a	foreign	currency.		
	
	 Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	construct	a	‘synthetic’	debt	portfolio	for	each	sample	country	
to	determine	the	appropriate	domestic	interest	rate.	Next,	they	calculate	the	real	interest	
rate	(rt)	for	each	country	as	follows:	
	
	 	 	 	 	 										 	 	 							 		
	
Where	 and	i	are	CPI	inflation	and	nominal	interest	rates,	respectively.	Savings	to	
government	occur	any	year	in	which	the	real	interest	rate	(rt)	is	negative.	The	‘liquidation	
																																																						
253	(Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	35)	The	authors	also	state	they	have	also	chosen	to	remain	“silent	about	the	optimality	or	
desirability	of	relying	on	this	mechanism	to	reduce	debts”.	
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effect’,	or	‘financial	repression	tax’	in	any	given	year,	is	simply	calculated	by	multiplying	the	
negative	real	interest	rate	(rt)	by	the	outstanding	public	debt.		
	
Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	also	propose	a	“supplementary”	method	for	calculating	debt	
liquidation	that	takes	into	account	capital	losses,	or	declines	in	bond	prices,	on	government	
debt.	This	method	could	be	important	for	governments	(or	central	banks)	that	purchase	their	
country’s	debt	in	significant	quantity	when	it	is	advantageous	to	do	so.	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	
calculate	a	holding	period	return	(HPR)	for	each	debt	instrument	as	follows:	
	
	
	
Where	Pt	and	Pt-1	are	bond	prices	at	time	t	and	t	-1,	respectively,	and	Ct	is	the	yearly	interest	
payment.	Similar	to	their	previous	method	presented	above,	a	government	debt	liquidation	
year	is	determined	as	any	year	in	which	the	real	return	of	the	debt	portfolio	is	negative.	The	
authors	do	note	several	problems	with	this	second	approach,	such	as	how	to	factor	in	non-
marketable	debt	(for	which	there	is	no	price	data),	as	well	as	the	general	difficulty	of	
obtaining	historical	bond	price	data	for	some	countries.		
	
With	the	first	method,	Reinhart’s	and	Sbrancia’s	findings	for	the	United	Kingdom	
suggest	that	nearly	one-half	of	the	years	from	1945-1980	(including	1948-1953)	were	debt	
liquidation	years,	with	an	average	negative	real	interest	rate	of	3.8%.254	Their	results	for	the	
UK	using	the	second	measure	were	slightly	lower	than	their	first,	with	liquidation	as	a	
percentage	of	GDP	of	2.4%	versus	3.2%,	respectively.	However,	they	only	utilize	bond	price	
data	for	the	UK	from	the	1960	onwards.		
	
	 One	of	the	first	questions	to	emerge	from	Reinhart’s	and	Sbrancia’s	work	is	why	the	
years	1945-1947	were	found	to	be	non-debt	liquidation	years	for	the	United	Kingdom?	As	
																																																						
254	At	the	time	of	writing	their	full	database	has	not	yet	been	made	available	for	a	more	detailed	review	of	
methods	and	results	(i.e.,	individual	years	or	isolated	periods).	
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shown	later,	significant	inflation	continued	after	the	end	of	the	war.	Further,	while	debt	
levels	peaked	in	1946,	the	UK’s	overall	debt	position	was	roughly	similar	in	1948	as	it	was	in	
1945,	the	first	post-war	year	that	authors	identity	as	a	debt	liquidation	year.	Part	of	the	
explanation	is	that	their	methodology	may	be	overly	conservative.	They	consider	a	debt	
liquidation	year	as	one	in	which	real	interest	rates	are	negative	as	opposed	to	when	real	
interest	rates	are	simply	below	market	rates.	The	authors	justify	their	higher	threshold	due	
to	the	difficulty	and	conceptual	challenges	associated	with	determining	a	true	‘market’	rate	
during	a	period	of	widespread	financial	repression.	True,	negative	real	returns	on	deposits	
and	bonds	were	a	near	universal	phenomenon	during	much	of	the	post-war	period.	Further,	
even	if	there	were	no	restrictions	on	interest	rates	in	a	relatively	free	market	like	
Switzerland,	it	is	reasonable	to	believe	that	global	rates	had	some	downward	influence	on	
Swiss	rates.		
	
While	it	is	unclear	how	to	best	to	adjust	for	the	effect	of	‘world	interest	rates’	in	any	
use	of	market	rates	in	calculating	the	effects	of	financial	repression,	acknowledgement	of	
this	problem	is	insufficient	justification	for	altogether	disregarding	market	rates.255	During	
and	after	the	Second	World	War	sophisticated	free	markets	developed	in	lightly	regulated	
venues.256	In	Switzerland,	for	example,	foreign	securities	and	currencies	were	traded	at	
significant	discounts	to	their	official	rates.257	The	Bank	of	England	“obsessed”	with	overseas	
trading	of	‘free’	sterling,	and	approximately	$300	million	of	free	sterling	was	traded	during	
one	year	year	in	New	York	alone.258	Further,	currency	black	markets	undermine	the	efficacy	
of	capital	controls,	which	typically	play	a	crucial	role	in	financial	repression.	The	existence	of	
sizable	currency	black	markets	could	conceivably	negate	the	effectiveness	of	financial	
repression,	particularly	for	economic	actors	that	have	access	to	such	markets.	These	free	
markets	are	not	mentioned	by	the	authors.	
	
																																																						
255	For	further	discussion	of	a	‘world	interest	rate’	see	(Barro	&	Salaimartin,	1990;	Blanchard	&	Summers,	1984;	
Chinn	&	Frankel,	2005;	Koedijk,	Kool,	&	Kroes,	1994;	Lucas,	1990;	Yi,	Blankenau,	&	Kose,	2001)	
256	See	for	example	(Frey	&	Waldenström,	2004)	
257	(The	Economist,	22	May,	1948)	
258	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	258,	263)	
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	 A	second	way	in	which	the	author's	calculations	may	prove	conservative	relates	to	
their	use	of	official	inflation	data	sources.259		For	example,	the	inflation	statistics	reflected	in	
Richards	(2002)	show	consistently	lower	levels	of	inflation	than	other	estimates	for	the	same	
period	that	are	shown	later	in	this	paper.	The	authors	do	make	note	of	this	issue,	but	for	
reasons	that	are	unclear	they	do	not	utilize	arguably	more	realistic	inflation	figures.		
	
There	is,	however,	a	perhaps	more	fundamental	issue	in	Reinhart’s	and	Sbrancia’s	
second	method	that	is	not	discussed	by	the	authors.260	It	is	true	that	a	government,	following	
a	decline	in	the	prices	of	its	bonds,	can	retire	debt	at	an	advantageous	cost	to	the	
government.	However,	the	interest	expense	incurred	by	that	government	on	subsequent	
debt	issuance	may	increase	as	the	price	investors	are	willing	to	pay	on	any	newly	issued	debt	
is	determined	by	the	current	yield	on	already	issued	bonds.	Bond	yields	are	inversely	related	
to	bond	prices:	 !"##$%&	()$*+ = 	-%%"-*	!."/.%0-#1$&	/#)!$ 	
	
In	other	words,	for	fixed	coupon	government	bonds,	as	bond	prices	decline	yields	increase,	
and	higher	yields	equate	to	higher	nominal	interest	expense	born	by	the	issuing	government	
on	any	newly	issued	government	debt.	In	sum,	any	economic	gain	a	government	realizes	by	
retiring	any	of	its	bonds	that	have	declined	in	value	may	be	offset	or	exceeded	by	higher	
interest	costs	associated	with	new	debt	issuance.	A	simple	hypothetical	illustration	of	the	
above	point	is	presented	in	Table	9,	which	shows	the	impact	of	debt	retirement	and	new	
sovereign	bond	issuance	on	a	government	balance	sheet.	
	
	 	
																																																						
259	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	28)	
260	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	pp.	30-31)	
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Table	9:	Illustration	of	Intertemporal	Changes	in	Public	Debt	Interest	Expense	Due	to	
Capital	Gains	(Losses)	
	
Hypothetical	Treasury	Bond	Issuance	and	Treasury	Balance	Sheet	
Treasury	Bond	Issuance	 1950	 1951	 1952	 1953	 1954	
Bond(1)	principal	 £100	 	 	 	 	
Coupon	payment	(fixed)	 £2.50	 £2.50	 £2.50	 	 	
Coupon	yield	(fixed)	 2.50%	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Market	price	of	Bond(1)	 £100	 £100	 £75.00	 	 	
Current	Yield	 2.50%	 2.50%	 3.33%	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Bond(2)	-	principal	 	 	 	 £100	 	
Coupon	payment	(fixed)	 	 	 	 £3.33	 £3.33	
Coupon	yield	(fixed)	 	 	 	 3.33%	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Market	price	of	Bond(2)	 	 	 	 £100	 £100	
Current	Yield	 	 	 	 3.33%	 3.33%	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Treasury	Balance	Sheet	 1950	 1951	 1952	 1953	 1954	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Beginning	of	Year	Cash	 £0.00	 £100.00	 £97.50	 £10.00	 £10.00	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Annual	Surplus	/	Deficit	 £0.00	 £0.00	 -£10.00	 -£100.00	 £0.00	
Interest	expense	 £0.00	 £2.50	 £2.50	 	 £3.33	
Debt	Issued	-	Deficit	-	Interest	=	Cash	 £100.00	 £97.50	 £85.00	 £10.00	 £6.67	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Bond	Repurchases	 	 	 £75.00	 £0.00	 £0.00	
Gain	(Loss)	on	Bond	Repurchase	(one	time)	 	 	 £25.00	 	 	
Gain	(Loss)	on	interest	refinancing	(reoccurring)	 	 	 	 	 -£0.83	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Cash	-	Bond	Repurchases	 £100.00	 £97.50	 £10.00	 £10.00	 £6.67	
	
	 	
	
The	above	illustration	demonstrates	how	a	beneficial	one-time	capital	gain	realized	by	a	
government	through	a	decline	in	the	market	value	of	its	bonds	can	be	partially,	if	not	wholly,	
offset	by	modestly	higher	reoccurring	interest	expense	the	government	will	incur	on	
subsequent	debt	issuance.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	a	decline	in	bond	prices	results	in	
	 	 Page	|	116	
	
higher	yields	on	outstanding	debt,	and	it	is	these	ex	post	yields	that	guide	the	pricing	of	
newly	issued	debt.	
	
Last,	the	authors	acknowledge	that	in	the	reduction	of	post-Second	World	War	debts	
that	“other	factors,	such	as	real	growth,	may	have	been	relevant	as	well.”	261	As	noted	in	
Chapter	2,	popular	narratives	as	well	as	academic	analysis	by	Buiter	(1985)	and	others	on	
how	post-Second	World	War	debts	were	reduced	through	economic	growth	are	incomplete	
at	best,	and	possibly	misleading.	However,	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	do	not	attempt	to	compare	
or	quantify	the	relative	contribution	of	real	growth	and	financial	repression.	Such	a	
comparison	could	be	helpful	for	understanding	the	relative	impact	of	each	on	post-Second	
World	War	debt	reduction.		
	
4.3.3	Alternatives	measures	of	financial	repression	
	
	 This	section	presents	an	alternative	calculation	of	government	savings	from	financial	
repression	for	Britain	during	the	post-Second	World	War	period.	This	alternative	calculation	
can	be	characterized	as	a	hybrid	of	the	previously	described	methods	developed	by	
Giovannini	and	de	Melo	and	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	and	addresses	some	of	the	issues	
identified	earlier.	Specifically,	the	alternative	calculation	presented	below	does	away	with	
the	commercial	rate	of	interest	used	by	Giovannini	and	de	Melo	and	instead	utilizes	a	free	
market	rate.262	
	
In	addition	to	‘free’	sterling,	there	is	evidence	of	a	market	for	‘free’	British	sovereign	
debt.	In	America,	New	York-traded	UK	bearer	bonds	were	yielding	7%,	which	was	more	than	
																																																						
261	(Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	35)	
262	Another	supplementary	approach	to	the	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	method	not	performed	here	that	could	be	
useful	would	be	to	allow	for	a	lower	threshold	of	what	constitutes	a	debt	liquidation	year,	such	as	whenever	
real	interest	rates	are	below	market	rates.	
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double	the	approximately	3%	yield	that	British	2.5%	coupon	Consols	were	paying	in	London	
during	this	time	(Table	10).263		
Table	10:	Prices	and	Yields	of	Long-Term	British	Government	Securities,	1935-1961	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Yield	Range	of	All	Issues	30-years	or	
Longer	
		 Annual		 		 		 Max	Current	Yield	
of	Premium	Issues	Year	 Avg.	 Yield	%	 High	 Yield	 	Low	 	Yield	 Low	 High	
1935	 86.500	 2.89%	 94.3750	 2.65%	 80.000	 3.13%	 2.88%	 3.13%	 3.48%	
1936	 85.000	 2.94%	 87.2400	 2.87%	 82.250	 3.04%	 2.96%	 3.17%	 3.54%	
1937	 76.250	 2.28%	 84.8125	 2.95%	 73.125	 3.42%	 3.37%	 3.43%	 3.64%	
1938	 74.000	 3.38%	 79.3750	 3.16%	 64.000	 3.91%	 3.56%	 3.62%	 3.87%	
1939	 67.250	 3.72%	 71.1250	 3.51%	 61.000	 4.10%	 3.65%	 3.77%	 3.62%	
1940	 73.500	 3.40%	 77.0000	 3.25%	 68.125	 3.67%	 3.25%	 3.44%	 3.58%	
1941	 79.875	 3.13%	 82.8750	 3.02%	 76.750	 3.26%	 3.03%	 3.19%	 3.62%	
1942	 82.500	 3.03%	 83.6250	 2.99%	 81.000	 3.09%	 3.03%	 3.18%	 3.62%	
1943	 80.625	 3.10%	 83.2500	 3.00%	 78.250	 3.19%	 3.14%	 3.23%	 3.62%	
1944	 79.625	 3.14%	 82.2500	 3.04%	 78.688	 3.18%	 3.07%	 3.18%	 3.62%	
1945	 85.625	 2.92%	 92.8125	 2.69%	 91.563	 3.06%	 2.74%	 2.91%	 3.44%	
1946	 96.188	 2.60%	 99.6250	 2.51%	 81.125	 3.08%	 2.53%	 2.67%	 3.69%	
1947	 90.500	 2.76%	 99.1250	 2.52%	 80.000	 3.12%	 3.00%	 3.05%	 3.65%	
1948	 77.875	 3.21%	 83.3750	 3.01%	 74.500	 3.36%	 3.13%	 3.19%	 3.94%	
1949	 75.750	 3.30%	 81.9375	 3.05%	 65.128	 3.84%	 3.56%	 3.81%	 3.90%	
1950	 70.375	 3.55%	 74.6875	 3.35%	 68.125	 3.67%	 3.53%	 3.73%	 		
1951	 66.000	 3.79%	 71.5000	 3.50%	 60.125	 4.16%	 4.06%	 4.44%	 		
1952	 59.125	 4.23%	 62.0000	 4.03%	 55.000	 4.55%	 4.27%	 4.61%	 		
1953	 61.240	 4.08%	 65.2500	 3.83%	 58.375	 4.28%	 3.89%	 4.27%	 		
1954	 66.500	 3.76%	 69.7500	 3.58%	 58.375	 4.28%	 3.81%	 4.15%	 		
1955	 60.000	 4.17%	 66.5000	 3.76%	 54.875	 4.56%	 4.39%	 4.50%	 		
1956	 52.750	 4.74%	 56.7500	 4.41%	 49.875	 5.01%	 4.90%	 5.08%	 		
1957	 50.250	 4.98%	 55.6875	 4.49%	 45.000	 5.56%	 5.41%	 5.62%	 		
1958	 50.250	 4.98%	 52.8125	 4.73%	 46.750	 5.35%	 4.89%	 5.20%	 		
1959	 51.875	 4.82%	 53.6250	 4.66%	 48.625	 5.14%	 4.99%	 5.40%	 		
1960	 46.375	 5.40%	 49.7500	 5.02%	 43.875	 5.71%	 5.68%	 6.07%	 		
1961	 40.375	 6.20%	 44.0000	 5.70%	 36.250	 6.90%	 6.45%	 6.85%	 		
	
		 		
	 	 	 	
		 		 		
	
Source:	Homer	(1963)264	
																																																						
263	('Free	Sterling	in	Europe',	The	Economist,	22	May,	1948)	At	present	only	a	single	free	yield	data	point	has	
been	located.	
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The	New	York	‘free’	yield	can	be	employed	to	calculate	government	savings	from	
financial	repression	through	a	slightly	modified	version	of	Giovannini	and	de	Melo’s	method:	
	
(1) 																																						FRS	=	(im	–	id)	*	PD	
	
where	government	savings	from	financial	repression	(FRS)	is	calculated	by	subtracting	the	
artificially	low	domestic	interest	rate	(id)	from	the	free	market	interest	rate	(im),	and	then	
multiplying	by	government	public	debt	(PD).	The	results	of	such	a	calculation	for	the	years	
1945-1951	are	presented	in	Table	11.	 	
																																																																																																																																																																									
264	(Homer,	1963,	p.	16)	
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Table	11:	UK	Financial	Repression	Savings	Estimate,	Constant	Free	Market	Interest	Rate,	
1946-60	
Year	
UK	Net	
Public	Debt	
(£bs)	
Free	market	
interest	
rate*	
Avg.	Yield	of	
Long-Term	
UK	Debt	
Financial	
Repression	
Savings	(£bs)	
Financial	
Repression	Savings	
%	of	GDP	
1946	 23.64	 7.00%	 2.60%	 1.04	 10.9%	
1947	 25.63	 7.00%	 2.76%	 1.09	 10.1%	
1948	 25.62	 7.00%	 3.21%	 0.97	 8.1%	
1949	 25.17	 7.00%	 3.30%	 0.93	 7.3%	
1950	 25.80	 7.00%	 3.55%	 0.89	 6.7%	
1951	 25.92	 7.00%	 3.79%	 0.83	 5.6%	
1952	 25.89	 7.00%	 4.23%	 0.72	 4.5%	
1953	 26.05	 7.00%	 4.08%	 0.76	 4.4%	
1954	 26.58	 7.00%	 3.76%	 0.86	 4.8%	
1955	 26.93	 7.00%	 4.17%	 0.76	 3.9%	
1956	 27.04	 7.00%	 4.74%	 0.61	 2.9%	
1957	 27.01	 7.00%	 4.98%	 0.55	 2.5%	
1958	 27.23	 7.00%	 4.98%	 0.55	 2.4%	
1959	 27.38	 7.00%	 4.82%	 0.60	 2.5%	
1960	 27.73	 7.00%	 5.40%	 0.44	 1.7%	
	
*Note:	At	present	only	a	single	free	yield	data	point	has	been	sourced	('Free	Sterling	in	Europe',	The	Economist	
22	May,	1948)	
	
Sources:	HM	Treasury,	The	Economist,	Homer	(1963),	IMF,	UK	ONS	
	 	
The	results	indicate	that	the	effects	of	UK	financial	repression	were	likely	largest	(as	a	
percentage	of	GDP)	in	the	years	immediately	following	the	Second	World	War,	but	then	
steadily	diminished.	In	1948,	savings	attributable	to	financial	repression	were	over	8%	of	
GDP,	or	significantly	larger	than	Giovannini	and	de	Melo’s	largest	finding	of	5.8%	of	GDP	for	
Mexico.	However,	as	time	progresses	the	average	yield	of	long-term	UK	debt	nearly	doubles	
while	the	net	public	debt	only	increases	from	£23.6	billion	in	1946	to	£27.7	billion	in	1960,	or	
by	17%.	However,	the	above	estimation	assumes	no	change	over	time	in	the	7%	free	market	
yield	on	UK	debt	sourced	from	the	1948	The	Economist	article.	The	results	from	adjusting	the	
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free	market	yield	proportionally	to	the	adjustment	in	official	market	yields	are	found	in	Table	
12.	
	
Table	12:	UK	Financial	Repression	Savings	Estimate,	Adjusted	Free	Market	Interest	Rate,	
1946-60	
Year	
UK	Net	
Public	Debt	
(£bs)	
Free	market	
interest	
rate*	
Avg.	Yield	of	
Long-Term	
UK	Debt	
Financial	
Repression	
Savings	(£bs)	
Financial	
Repression	Savings	
%	of	GDP	
1946	 23.64	 5.50%	 2.60%	 0.69	 7.2%	
1947	 25.63	 5.86%	 2.76%	 0.79	 7.4%	
1948	 25.62	 7.00%	 3.21%	 0.97	 8.1%	
1949	 25.17	 7.20%	 3.30%	 0.98	 7.7%	
1950	 25.80	 7.74%	 3.55%	 1.08	 8.1%	
1951	 25.92	 8.26%	 3.79%	 1.16	 7.8%	
1952	 25.89	 9.22%	 4.23%	 1.29	 8.1%	
1953	 26.05	 8.90%	 4.08%	 1.25	 7.3%	
1954	 26.58	 8.20%	 3.76%	 1.18	 6.5%	
1955	 26.93	 9.09%	 4.17%	 1.33	 6.8%	
1956	 27.04	 10.34%	 4.74%	 1.51	 7.2%	
1957	 27.01	 10.86%	 4.98%	 1.59	 7.2%	
1958	 27.23	 10.86%	 4.98%	 1.60	 6.9%	
1959	 27.38	 10.51%	 4.82%	 1.56	 6.4%	
1960	 27.73	 11.78%	 5.40%	 1.77	 6.8%	
	
*Note:	Adjusted	proportionally	based	on	changes	in	the	yield	of	long-term	British	government	debt.	At	present	
only	a	single	free	yield	data	point	has	been	sourced	('Free	Sterling	in	Europe',	The	Economist	22	May,	1948)	
	
Sources:	HM	Treasury,	The	Economist,	Homer	(1963),	IMF,	UK	ONS	
	 	
One	untested	method	for	calculating	financial	repression	savings	that	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	paper	involves	the	creation	of	synthetic	market	yield.	As	noted	earlier,	the	lack	
of	a	market	interest	rate	would	address	one	the	most	significant	issues	with	the	Giovannini	
and	de	Melo	method,	which	is	the	determination	of	a	suitable	free	market	rate	of	interest	(if)	
to	compare	with	the	financially	repressed	rate	of	interest	(id).	‘Free’	currency	exchange	rate	
data	could	be	used	to	construct	a	synthetic	market	yield	for	bonds	by	employing	a	modified	
version	of	the	uncovered	interest	rate	parity	equation:	
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(2)																																																														(1 + )£) = 7898 (1 + ):)											
	
where	Ft	is	the	current	‘free’	exchange	rate	(which	substitutes	in	the	classic	version	of	the	
equation	for	the	expected	future	spot	exchange	rate,	given	that	free	currency	was	often	
trading	at	a	devalued	free	rate	that	anticipated	future	official	devaluations),	St	is	the	current	
fixed	official	exchange	rate	at	time	t,	i£	is	the	interest	rate	in	the	the	free	currency	issuing	
country,	and	if	is	the	synthetic	market	yield.		
	
Further	study	is	necessary	to	determine	the	feasibility	of	the	above	approach,	but	
research	suggests	a	statistically	significant,	negatively	lagged	influence	of	currencies	on	
debt.265	Further,	Flandreau	&	Oosterlinck	(2011)	imputed	currency	values	from	government	
debt	yields,	and	it	could	be	worth	exploring	whether	such	a	transformation	can	be	reversed	
to	calculate	a	synthetic	market	yield.266	
	
4.3.4	The	Financial	Repression	Index	
	
	 Both	Giovannini	and	de	Melo	and	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	use	the	results	from	their	
quantitative	methods	to	compare	the	degree	of	financial	repression	across	different	
countries.	However,	with	regards	to	the	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	method,	Taylor	(2011)	notes	
that	the	actual	reason(s)	behind	negative	real	yields	on	government	debt	are	not	always	
clear.	For	example,	in	May	2012	the	German	government	successfully	floated	two-year	
bonds	with	a	zero	coupon,	and	in	2015	the	Swiss	government	issued	new	debt	with	a	
negative	nominal	yield.	These	events	occurred	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	positive	inflation	
existed	in	both	Germany	and	Switzerland	at	the	time	of	debt	issuance,	and	future	
expectations	of	inflation	were	also	positive.	Investors	appear	to	be	paying	the	German	and	
Swiss	government	in	real	and	nominal	terms,	respectively,	for	the	opportunity	to	lend	money	
to	the	government.	If	the	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	method	were	employed	in	these	cases	the	
																																																						
265	(Dreher,	Herz,	&	Karb,	2006)	
266	(Flandreau	&	Oosterlinck,	2011)	
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results	would	suggest	that	both	Germany	and	Switzerland	were	engaged	in	financial	
repression.	However,	the	notion	that	financial	repression	in	either	country	is	responsible	for	
the	observed	negative	yields	is	dubious.	Instead,	a	flight	to	higher	credit	quality	in	response	
to	the	European	sovereign	debt	crises	is	the	likely	explanation	behind	the	German	and	Swiss	
rates.		
	
In	sum,	‘bottom’s-up’	approaches	to	identifying	financial	repression	can	produce	
incomplete	or	misleading	results.	Further	insights	can	be	gained	by	comparing	countries	
across	qualitative	measures	of	financial	repression	such	as	a	composite	indicator	(composite	
index),	which	allows	for	cross-country	comparisons	of	financial	repression	over	a	series	of	
standardized	measures	and	different	time	periods.	Sample	variables	that	could	be	utilized	for	
the	construction	of	an	index	taken	from	existing	data	sources	such	as	the	IMF,	BIS,	World	
Bank,	and	OECD	are	summarized	in	Appendix	1.267		
	
	
	
	 	
																																																						
267	Unfortunately,	for	the	time	period	under	study	in	this	thesis	much	of	the	data	required	to	create	a	financial	
repression	composite	index	was	either	never	collected	or	has	not	yet	been	located.	
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4.4	British	financial	repression	
	
This	section	of	the	paper	addresses	the	disagreement	in	the	literature	over	what	role	
financial	repression	may	have	played	in	sustaining	Britain’s	record-setting	levels	of	public	
debt	following	the	Second	World	War.	Largely	missing	is	a	detailed	historical	account	of	the	
policies	and	practices	that	may	or	may	not	have	facilitated	financial	repression	in	countries	
such	as	Britain.	In	other	words,	does	the	historical	record	support	or	contradict	Reinhart	and	
Sbrancia’s	quantitative	argument	of	financial	repression?	The	short	answer	to	the	above	
question	is	that	yes,	Britain	did	in	fact	enact	numerous	policies	and	legislation	that	can	be	
characterized	as	financial	repression.	Further,	these	policies	played	a	useful	role	in	sustaining	
British	sovereign	debt.	However,	it	is	far	too	simplistic	to	refer	to	financial	repression	is	a	
simple	binary,	yes	or	no,	fashion.	Different	degrees	and	types	of	financial	repression	exist.		
	
The	remainder	of	this	paper	describes	the	nuanced,	multi-faceted	nature	of	British	
financial	repression	by	first	exploring	the	origins	of	British	financial	repression,	then	
examining	the	various	aspects	of	British	financial	repression,	and	concludes	with	the	impact	
financial	repression	had	on	select	areas	of	the	British	economy.	
	
4.4.1	The	origins	of	British	financial	repression	
	
The	growing	threat	posed	by	an	ever	more	assertive	Nazi	Germany	led	the	British	to	
rearm	in	the	latter-half	of	the	1930s.	While	this	brought	full	employment	it	also	triggered	
concerns	over	inflation	and	imbalances	in	Britain’s	national	accounts.268	It	was	during	this	
time	that	John	Maynard	Keynes’	theories	on	wartime	and	post-war	finance,	which	would	
prove	highly	influential	to	British	financial	repression,	took	shape.	In	April	and	July	1939	
Keynes	wrote	several	articles	in	the	Times	outlining	a	dual	policy	of	low	interest	rates	and	
capital	controls,	which	went	on	to	be	partially	adopted	in	April	1941.269	Keynes	also	
																																																						
268	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	20)	
269	Keynes’	ideas	were	first	publicized	via	two	editorials	in	the	Times	on	the	14th	and	15th	November	1939.	A	
booklet	version	titled	How	to	Pay	for	the	War	followed	on	27	February	in	1940.	However,	an	earlier	lecture	on	
this	topic	was	given	by	Keynes	at	Cambridge’s	Marshall	Society	on	20	October,	1939	titled	‘War	Potential	and	
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advocated	for	deferred	deposits,	which	were	to	be	blocked	and	have	an	open-ended	release	
date	to	be	determined	at	the	discretion	of	the	Treasury.270	Originally	called	‘compulsory	
savings’,	the	program	was	later	rebranded	as	‘deferred	pay’	for	marketing	purposes.271	The	
plan	called	for	the	government	to	set	long-term	interest	rates	at	2.5%,	which	represented	a	
17%	reduction	on	the	approximately	3%	yields	of	longer-term	British	debt	instruments	at	
that	time.272		
	
Lord	Keynes	professed	himself	to	be	a	proponent	of	interest	rate	caps	in	his	General	
Theory273,	and	in	a	12	January,	1937	Times	editorial	Keynes	stated	“we	must	avoid	[dear	
money]…as	we	would	hell-fire”.274	The	doctrine	of	‘permanently	cheap	money’	would	go	on	
to	reign	over	British	monetary	policy	until	1951.	Keynes	advocated	that	the	British	Chancellor	
of	the	Exchequer	should	announce	that	he	would	borrow	at	no	more	than	2.5%	so	creditors	
have	zero	doubt	that	these	are	the	best	terms	available	for	long-dated	British	debt.	Keynes	
had	‘an	appreciation	that	the	social	and	political	climate	would	not	permit	a	repeat	of	the	
rentier-friendly	policy	of	First	World	War’,	although	Keynes	later	revised	upwards	his	
suggested	interest	rate	to	3%.275	To	be	effective	Keynes	felt	the	Chancellor’s	statement	would	
need	to	be	buttressed	by	control	over	domestic	capital	issues	and	an	embargo	on	foreign	
lending,	meaning	capital	controls	would	need	to	be	instituted.276	Low	interest	rates,	one	of	
the	hallmarks	of	financial	repression,	were	facilitated	by	the	Bank	of	England	(where	Keynes	
was	a	Court	member),	which	kept	the	short-term	Treasury	bill	rate	at	1%	from	1939-1945.		
	
It	is	here	with	these	late-1930s	proposals	that	we	see	Keynes	laying	some,	but	not	all,	
of	the	theoretical	and	policy	foundations	for	post-war	British	financial	repression.	However,	
																																																																																																																																																																									
War	Finance’	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	43).	Coincidentally,	the	Labour	party	also	published	at	this	time	an	identically	
titled	book	on	war	finance	(Durbin,	1939).	The	reason	Keynes’	ideas	ultimately	won	out	was	because,	as	
Skidelsky	put	it,	he	had	the	“only	theory	on	offer	which	promised	both	guns,	butter	and	low	interest	rates”	
(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	20).	
270	(Keynes,	1940,	p.	47)	
271	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	59)	
272	(Keynes,	1940,	p.	44)	
273	(Keynes,	1936,	p.	351)	
274	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.22)	
275	(Kynaston,	1999,	p.	464)		
276	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	24-25)	
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Keynes’	crucial	contributions	to	British	financial	repression	go	entirely	unacknowledged	by	
Keynes’	biographers	and	other	economic	historians.277		
	
Evidence	of	British	financial	repression	prior	to	the	1940s	also	exists.	After	Britain	
abandoned	the	gold	standard	for	a	second	and	final	time	in	1931,	a	prohibition	on	loans	to	
overseas	borrowers	was	imposed.	In	1933	the	purchase	of	foreign	securities	was	also	
prohibited,	although	direct	investments	abroad	were	treated	more	leniently.278	It	is	unclear	
what	role	if	any	Keynes	had	on	shaping	these	policies.	One	difference	between	this	period	
and	with	the	following	decade	appears	to	be	the	reliance	of	the	Bank	of	England	and	
Whitehall	on	the	use	of	moral	suasion,	as	opposed	to	regulations	or	law,	to	execute	1930s	
policy	changes.	This	approach	may	have	also	played	at	least	some	role	in	the	relatively	
speedy	reversal	of	some	policies,	such	as	the	relaxation	of	loan	restrictions	to	
Commonwealth	borrowers	in	1933.	These	examples	illustrate	how	financial	repression	can	
take	both	explicit	and	implicit	form.	
	
As	early	as	September	1941	British	officials	were	contemplating	the	post-war	financial	
and	economic	order.279	In	December	1941,	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic,	Treasury	
Secretary	Morgenthau	asked	Harry	Dexter	White	to	begin	work	on	what	was	to	become	the	
Bretton	Woods	agreement.280	It	was	during	this	time	that	groundwork	was	laid	in	both	Britain	
and	the	U.S.	for	the	post-war	international	framework	that	would	prove	so	conducive	to	
financial	repression.	Stringent	capital	controls,	imposed	at	the	beginning	of	the	Second	
World	War	in	September	1939,	provided	the	necessary	condition	for	the	creation	of	the	
Sterling	Area,	which	would	play	a	supporting	role	in	enforcing	international	financial	
repression.281	Under	the	new	rules	all	purchases	of	foreign	exchange	required	prior	approval	
of	British	officials,	and	countries	that	did	not	participate	in	the	war	ceased	to	be	a	part	of	the	
Sterling	Bloc	(e.g.,	Sweden).	The	outbreak	of	war	led	Britain	to	impose	exchange	control	on	
																																																						
277	(R.	F.	Harrod,	1951;	Skidelsky,	2000)	
278	(Cairncross	and	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	22)	
279	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	36)	
280	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	256-263)	
281	(Capie,	2010,	p.	146)	
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payments	outside	the	Sterling	Bloc,	while	relatively	free	movement	of	capital,	coordinated	by	
the	Bank	of	England,	was	permitted	within.282	The	regulations	and	rules	governing	the	
Sterling	Area	were	complex;	varying	degrees	of	freedom	existed	on	the	transferability	of	
currency,	dependent	upon	location	and	purpose.	Import	restrictions	also	existed	so	that	
“while	there	might	be	freedom	to	make	a	payment,	there	was	not	always	freedom	to	make	a	
purchase”.283	During	the	war	a	‘Dollar	Pool’	was	established	among	Sterling	Area	countries	
that	would	remain	in	place	after	hostilities	ended.	Its	purpose	was	to	conserve	U.S.	dollars	
amongst	Sterling	Area	members	by	imposing	licensing	restrictions	on	dollar	imports,	and	
members	were	required	to	deposit	excess	dollars	and	gold	at	the	Bank	of	England.284	
	
Keynes,	in	addition	to	providing	the	intellectual	foundations	for	much	of	British	
financial	repression,	would	also	go	on	to	play	a	leading	role	in	implementing	financial	
repression	policies	during	and	after	the	war	from	inside	Treasury.	However,	it	is	important	to	
note	that	not	all	facets	of	post-war	British	financial	repression	were	prescribed	by	Keynes.	
Further,	Keynes	was	not	alone	in	advocating	for	British	financial	repression.	For	example,	the	
Bank	of	England	was	at	least	willing	to	go	along	with,	if	not	play	the	role	of	accomplice,	in	the	
maintenance	of	low	interest	rates.	
	
	
While	other	economic	historians	have	indirectly	covered	various	aspects	of	British	
financial	repression	without	labelling	it	as	such,	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	(2011)	are	the	first	to	
explicitly	make	the	case	that	financial	repression	was	practiced	in	post-Second	World	War	
Britain	and	other	advanced	countries.	One	of	the	first	questions	which	emerges	after	
reviewing	Reinhart’s	and	Sbrancia’s	research	that	prompted	Taylor’s	critique	is	what	policies	
and	outcomes	should	constitute	sufficient	evidence,	or	proof,	of	financial	repression?	In	
other	words,	is	financial	repression	akin	to	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court’s	definition	of	
pornography,	which	basically	amounts	to	‘we	know	it	when	we	see	it’?	Or	can	the	‘financial	
repression’	label	be	assigned	in	a	more	rigorous,	systematic	fashion?	Debt	liquidation	does	
																																																						
282	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	24).	
283	(Capie,	2010,	p.	146;	Catherine	Ruth	Schenk,	1994)	
284	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	25)	
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not	require	financial	repression	as	it	can	be	due	solely	to	the	effects	of	inflation	in	excess	of	
nominal	interest	rates.	In	other	words,	demonstrating	that	debt	liquidation	occurred	in	any	
given	year,	or	over	an	extended	period	due	to	negative	real	interest	rates,	is	insufficient	
proof	of	financial	repression.285		
	
Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	support	their	quantitative	evidence	by	identifying	several	
financial	repression	measures	in	each	sample	country.286	For	the	UK,	they	highlight	the	
following	three	Domestic	Financial	Regulations	measures:	
	
1. The	Gold	market	closed	in	early	Second	World	War,	reopened	only	in	1954.287		
2. The	Bank	of	England	stopped	publishing	the	Minimum	Lending	Rate	in	1981.		
3. In	1986,	the	government	withdrew	its	guidance	on	mortgage	lending.	
	
The	following	two	measures	are	listed	for	Capital	Account-Exchange	Restrictions	in	the	UK:	
	
1. All	restrictions	on	outward	Foreign	Direct	Investment	abolished,	and	outward	
portfolio	investment	liberalized.		
2. Exchange	Control	Act	of	1947	suspended	in	October	1979;	all	remaining	barriers	to	
inward	and	outward	flows	of	capital	removed.	
	
The	above	measures	are	perhaps	some	of	the	more	significant	financial	repression	
policies	in	Britain	following	the	Second	World	War.	However,	the	authors	do	not	make	any	
reference	to	the	relative	importance	of	these	polices,	or	explain	why	these	were	highlighted	
over	other	policies	that	could	constitute	financial	repression.	Further,	they	overlook	a	
number	of	other	British	financial	repression	policies.	For	example,	Chancellor	Dalton	directed	
																																																						
285	Sbrancia	(2011)	develops	a	conceptual	framework	utilizing	inflation	expectation	estimates	to	distinguish	
between	debt	liquidation	related	to	unanticipated	inflation	and	financial	repression.	
286	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	17)	
287	(Bank	for	International	Settlements.,	1941)	
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government	departments	to	support	Treasury	debt	auctions	by	making	purchases	that	
helped	finance	government	debt	at	low	rates	of	interest.288		
	
British	financial	repression	during	this	period,	in	the	form	of	legislation	and	
directives/policies,	are	summarized	in	Table	13	and	Table	14,	respectively.	In	total,	eleven	
pieces	of	legislation	and	sixteen	polices/directives	that	supported	British	financial	repression	
were	found	either	in	archival	evidence	or	the	literature.	These	legislative	and	policy	acts	
highlight	the	intricate	and	comprehensive	nature	of	British	financial	repression	during	this	
period.	
	 	
																																																						
288	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	432-433;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	196-198).		
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Table	13:	UK	Financial	Repression	Legislation,	1936	–	1998	
	
Legislation	 Date	Enacted	
Repealed/	
Reduced	 Description	
Tripartite	
Agreement	
1936	 1973	 Beginning	with	the	1936	Tripartite	agreement	between	the	
U.K.,	France	and	the	U.S.	and	subsequent	bilateral	and	
multilateral	agreements	though	Second	World	War	and	the	
1944	Bretton	Woods	agreement,	exchange	rates	were	
managed	so	that	foreign	exchange	could	only	be	legally	
converted	at	official	exchange	
	
Capital	Issues	
Committee	
	
1936	
	
Late-1950s	
	
Formal	government	application	process	for	controlling	capital	
flows	to	foreign	and	domestic	applicants;	only	£31	million	
exported	annually	from	1932-36289;	also	reviewed	all	domestic	
issues	over	£50,000,	and	the	Bank	of	England	reviewed	
anything	over	£100,000290	
	
Deferred	Pay	
	
April	1941	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Originally	called	‘compulsory	savings’,	deposits	were	to	be	
blocked	and	have	an	open-ended	release	date,	to	be	
determined	at	the	whim	of	the	Treasury.	An	interest	rate	of	
only	2.5%	a	year,	which	was	17%	cut	on	the	roughly	3%	yielded	
by	longer-term	instruments	at	that	time.	
	
Capital	
Controls	
	
Sept.	1939	
	
post-WWII	
	
Permission	from	authorities	required	prior	to	making	any	forex	
purchases;	restrictions	on	foreign	exchange	on	payments	made	
outside	the	Sterling	Area.	Limits	on	sterling	banknotes	
travellers	can	take	out	of	the	UK	of	£20	and	£10,	respectively,	
and	“no	sterling	can	be	sent	out	of	the	United	Kingdom	
without	permission”.291	
	
Treasury	
Deposit	
Receipt	
(TDRs)	
	
WWII	
	
post-WWII	
	
New	security	which	allowed	the	Treasury	to	bypass	the	London	
money	market	and	borrow	directly	from	banks	through	the	
issuance	of	non-marketable	TDRs	
	 	 	 	
Closure	of	
London	Gold	
Market	
WWII	 1945	 Closure	of	London	gold	market,	trading	and	ownership	of	gold,	
and	restrictions	on	imports/exports	of	gold	
																																																						
289	(Ingham,	1984,	pp.	195-197;	Wilson,	1995,	p.	183)	
290	(Morgan	&	Thomas,	1962,	p.	210;	Wilson,	1995,	p.	189)	
291	C261,	Letter	from	Bank	of	England	to	Manager	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	Archive,	17	October,	1946	
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Legislation	 Date	Enacted	
Repealed/	
Reduced	 Description	
	
Bank	of	
England	Act	
	
Aug.	1946	
	
1998	
	
Bank	of	England	nationalized	by	the	UK	government;	clause	
4(3)	gave	the	Bank,	with	Treasury	approval,	explicit	power	to	
govern	the	proportion	of	commercial	bank	assets	
	
Exchange	
Control	Act		
	
1947	
	
Oct.	1979	
	
Restricted	some	external	loans	as	well	as	inward	capital	flows;	
repeal	in	1979	led	to	the	removal	of	all	remaining	barriers	on	
inward	and	outward	capital	flows	
	
Minimum	
Lending	Rate	
post-	WWII	 							1981	 Published	by	the	Bank	of	England	
	
Tax	Increase	
on	Dividends	
	
post-	WWII	
	
N/A	
	
Increase	in	the	dividends	tax	from	5%	to	12.5%	made	Britain’s	
sovereign	debt	a	more	attractive	investment	vis-à-vis	equities	
	
Mortgage	
Lending	
Guidance	
	
post-	WWII	
	
1986	
	
Government	guidance	on	UK	mortgage	lending	
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Table	14:	UK	Financial	Repression	Policies	and	Directives,	1931	–	1973	
	
Policy	 Date	Enacted	
Repealed/	
Reduced	 Description	
Low	Interest	
Rates	(‘Cheap	
Money’)	
1931	 1951	 Except	for	a	brief	fluctuation	at	the	beginning	
of	the	war,	Bank	Rate	was	maintained	at	2%;	
short-term	Treasury	bill	rate	at	1%	from	1939-
1945	
	 	 	 	
Foreign	loan	
embargo	
1932	 1934	for	Sterling	bloc	 The	ban	on	foreign	loans	partially	removed	
for	other	countries	in	Feb.	1938	but	then	
reinstated	in	Dec.	1938292	
	 	 	 	
Withdrawal	of	
large	sterling	
notes	
1943	 post-	WWII	 Retirement	of	all	notes	of	£10	an	up	to	
“provide	an	additional	handicap	for	those	
who	may	contemplate	breaches	of	Exchange	
Control”293	
	
Bank	Advances	
Restrictions	
	
	
1945,	1947,	1949	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Restrictions	on	bank	advances	were	issued	
three	times	by	the	Capital	Issues	Committee	
(CIC)294	
	
Issuing	Houses	
Association	
	
1945	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Organization	of	52	British	merchant	banks	
which	facilitated	the	monitoring	and	control	
of	lending295	
	
Bank	Lending	
Restrictions	
	
Mid-1950s	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Enactment	of	the	first	quantitative	limits	on	
loans	from	banks.	296	
Special	
Deposits	
Mid-1950s	 post-	WWII	 “a	(relatively	small)	call	for	‘special	deposits’	
made	by	CIC297	
																																																						
292	C261,	‘British	and	Canadian	Conversion	Policies.	Appendix:	British	Treasury	Control	over	the	Price	of	Gilt-
Edged	Securities,	1932-39’,	Correspondence	between	L.	M.	Pumphrey	to	Mr.	House,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	
Bank	Archive,	23	October,	1941	
293	From	C261	p.	1,	‘Withdrawal	of	Large	Bank	Notes:	The	British	Experience’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	
Archive,	4	December,	1944:	“The	real	purposes	were	to	make	more	difficult	the	illegal	operation	of	note	
smugglers	desirous	of	evading	exchange	control	regulations,	of	black	market	operators,	and	of	tax	evaders—all	
of	whom	predominantly	use	large	denomination	notes	in	order	to	cover	up	their	tracks”.	Bank	of	England	notes	
in	circulation	during	this	time	consisted	of	£1,	£5,	£10,	£20,	£50,	£100,	£200,	£500	and	£1000.		
294	(Capie,	Collins,	&	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs.,	1992,	p.	68)	
295	(Wilson,	1995,	p.	189)	
296	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	68)	
297	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	68)	
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Policy	 Date	Enacted	
Repealed/	
Reduced	 Description	
Export	Lending	 1964	 post-Second	World	War	 Bank	of	England	established	loan	priorities	
which	gave	preference	to	exports	and	
discouraged	speculation298	
	 	 	 	
Stamp	Duty	on	
Transfers	of	
Financial	
Securities		
post-	WWII	 1963	 Cut	securities	transfer	tax	from	2%	to	1%	to	
encourage	international	financial	activity	in	
the	City	of	London299	
	 	 	 	
Restrictions	on	
Lending	in	
Foreign	
Currency	
post-	WWII	 Oct.	1963	 Chancellor	announces	that	foreign	currency	
loans	‘allowed	almost	without	restriction’300	
	 	 	 	
Taxes	on	
Bearer	
Securities	
post-WWII	 1963	 Reduced	from	6%	of	nominal	value	to	3%	and	
2%	of	the	market	value	for	residents	and	non-
residents,	respectively301	
	 	 	 	
Registered	
Securities	Tax	
post-	WWII	 1963	 Rate	reduced	from	2%	to	1%302	
	
Dollar	Pool	
	
WWII	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Required	that	members	deposit	their	excess	
U.S.	dollars	and	gold	at	Bank	of	England	
	
Bank	
advances-to-
government	
debt	ratio	
	
WWII	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Reduction	in	bank	advances-to-government	
debt	ratio	so	that	banks	could	hold	more	
government	debt	
	
Restrictions	on	
forward	
exchange	
(forex	options)	
	
WWII	
	
post-	WWII	
	
Restrictions	on	UK	Banks	dealing	in	forward	
exchange	included:	i)	a	“genuine	commercial	
contract	is	in	existence”;	ii)	“it	is	not	a	swap”	
but	an	“outright	purchase	or	sale	of	
exchange”;	iii)	“the	maturity	date	must	not	be	
more	than	four	months	ahead”.	Some	
exceptions	were	allowed	by	the	Bank	of	
England	“when	such	a	practice	is	a	normal	
and	necessary	facility	of	the	trade	in	
question”.303	
																																																						
298	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	68)	
299	(Quennouëlle-Corre	&	Cassis,	2011,	p.	225)	
300	(Quennouëlle-Corre	&	Cassis,	2011,	p.	225)	
301	(Quennouëlle-Corre	&	Cassis,	2011,	p.	226)	
302	(Quennouëlle-Corre	&	Cassis,	2011,	p.	226)	
303	C260.3	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	9	October,	1945	
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Policy	 Date	Enacted	
Repealed/	
Reduced	 Description	
	
Fixed	Exchange	
Rates	
	
1936	
	
1973	
	
Beginning	with	the	1936	Tripartite	agreement	
between	the	U.K.,	France	and	the	U.S.	and	
subsequent	bilateral	and	multilateral	
agreements	though	Second	World	War	and	
the	1944	Bretton	Woods	agreement,	
exchange	rates	were	managed	so	that	foreign	
exchange	could	only	be	legally	converted	at	
official	exchange.	
	 	
Regarding	the	efficacy	of	the	policies	highlighted	by	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia,	even	with	
exchange	restrictions	Britain	experienced	significant	capital	outflows	to	the	Sterling	Area,	
which	calls	into	question	just	how	effective	capital	restrictions	were	during	this	time.	Dow	
(1964)	claims	that	20%	of	capital	outflows	were	due	to	the	looseness	of	controls.304	There	are	
also	frequent	reports	in	archival	documents	of	gold	trade	occurring	despite	of	restrictions	in	
the	London	market.	For	example,	in	a	letter	dated	30	January,	1947	from	Mr.	Werner	Knoke	
at	the	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	(NYFRB)	to	his	counterpart	and	frequent	
correspondent	at	the	Bank	of	England,	Mr.	George	Bolton,	Knoke	inquires	about	the	London	
gold	transactions	that	are:	
	
“carried	on	a	very	substantial	scale	we	are	told,	for	instance	by	Samuel	Montagu,	who	
purchases	the	gold	all	over	the	world,	shipping	it	directly	or	via	London	for	sale	in	
markets	like	China,	the	Near	East,	etc.?”305	
	
Samuel	Montagu	was	the	proprietor	for	Samuel	Montagu	&	Co,	which	was	one	of	the	six	
‘Authorised	Dealers’	in	gold	other	than	the	Bank	of	England.306	In	a	reply	dated	13	February,	
1947,	Bolton	informs	Knoke	that	“before	the	war	London	was	an	international	centre	for	
gold	arbitrage	and	we	are	therefore	under	great	pressure	to	allow	London	firms	to	
																																																						
304	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	24;	Catherine	R.	Schenk,	2010)	For	
further	discussion	on	the	effects	and	effectiveness	of	capital	controls	see	(Dulles,	1929,	pp.	226-227;	Edwards,	
1999;	B.	J.	Eichengreen,	1998;	Montiel	&	Reinhart,	1999)		
305	C261,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	30	January,	1947	
306	The	other	authorized	London	bullion	banks	at	this	time	were	Johnson	Matthey	&	Co.	Ltd,	Mocatta	&	
Goldsmid,	Pixley	&	Abbell,	N.M.	Rothschild	&	Sons,	and	Sharps	&	Wilkins.	C261	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	
Bank	Archive,	10	February,	1947	
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participate	in	the	business”.307	He	goes	on	to	say	that	there	are	exceptions	to	the	UK	rules	
against	gold	ownership,	including:		
	
“any	person	not	resident	in	the	United	Kingdom	or	those	parts	of	the	Sterling	Area	
which	prohibit	the	holding	of	gold	by	residents,	may	own	gold	in	the	United	Kingdom”	
and	claim	that	any	trade	in	the	various	“free	markets”	of	gold	at	premium	to	the	
official	“does	not	necessarily	damage	the	major	currencies”.	308	
	
While	the	UK	officially	posed	restrictions	on	the	export	of	gold,	importation	was	
encouraged	as	it	served	to	enhance	London’s	status	as	a	financial	capital	and	increased	the	
likelihood	that	it	may	be	offered	for	sale	(or	otherwise	made	available)	to	a	gold-strapped	
Bank	of	England.	Bolton	also	speaks	of	the	“handsome	profit”	that	can	be	earned	in	the	gold	
arbitrage	trade,	where	gold	is	purchased	at	$43	per	ounce,	claiming	that:		
	
“no	irreparable	harm	results	from	the	sale	of	the	relatively	small	gold	production	of	
Latin	America	in	the	various	‘free	markets’	at	a	substantial	premium.	It	feeds	a	
hoarding	demand	causes	a	minor	wave	of	disturbance	and	many	consequential	
reactions	but,	while	it	underlies	the	weakness	of	certain	paper	currencies.”309		
	
However,	this	trade	may	have	also	increased	the	opportunity	for	speculation	and	
profiteering	at	black	market	rates.	In	a	memo	dated	2	July,	1947,	the	NYFRB	confronted	the	
Bank	of	England	about	how	“Franck	of	Samuel	Montagu	and	Goldsmid	of	Mocatta	&	
Goldsmid	seemed	the	most	active	factors	in	the	premium	gold	market”.	Bolton,	in	his	reply	
to	Knoke,	said	he	“would	try	to	keep	them	in	line”.310		
	
This	above	exchange	between	Bolton	and	Knoke	on	the	subject	of	free	market	gold	
trade	is	one	of	several	found	in	both	the	NYFRB	and	Bank	of	England	archival	records	on	this	
subject.	While	the	correspondence	generally	implies	a	close	relationship	between	officials,	
differences	of	both	opinion	and	facts	frequently	emerge.	For	example,	Knoke	takes	issue	
																																																						
307	C261	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	February,	1947	
308	C261	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	February,	1947	
309	C261	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	February,	1947	
310	C261	p.	2,	Peter	Lang	record	of	telephone	conversation	with	Mr.	Bolton,	Bank	of	England,	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	Archive,	2	July,	1947	
	 	 Page	|	135	
	
with	Bolton’s	claim	that	gold	is	selling	in	New	York	at	$43	an	ounce,	stating	“we	have	not	
sunk	so	low	as	to	have	(black)	market	at	this	country	at	$43!!!”311	Per	a	NYFRB	memo,	a	claim	
made	by	Lord	Catto	of	the	Bank	of	England	that	Britain	“disapproves	of	the	sales	of	gold	on	
the	black	markets	in	Greece”	is	doubted	inside	the	Federal	Reserve.	NYFRB	head	Sproul	
conveys	to	Knoke	that	“it	has	always	been	my	understanding	that	in	Greece	the	British	had	
been	the	ones	anxious	to	make	sovereigns	available	for	sale	there”.312		
	
At	other	times,	typically	on	the	eve	of	a	crisis,	a	palpable	tension	emerges	between	
the	Bank	of	England	and	NYFRB.	For	example,	on	17	June,	1947,	shortly	before	the	sterling	
convertibility	crisis,	Knoke	spoke	with	an	“audibly	disturbed”	Bolton	who	complained	that	
the	NYFRB	was	being	“unnecessarily	legalistic”	on	a	“question	concerning	the	whole	
constitutional	position	between	the	British	Treasury	and	Bank	of	England”	with	regard	to	a	
request	by	the	Bank	of	England	for	an	uncollateralized	loan.	The	prior	custom	at	the	NYFRB	
had	been	to	secure	loans	with	gold	on	hand	in	the	basement	safe,	and	the	British	
government	had	previously	informed	the	NYFRB	that	all	gold	on	hand	was	the	property	of	
the	government,	not	the	Bank	of	England.313	
	
Knoke	also	emphasizes	the	“serious	monetary	consequences	if	dealings	in	gold	at	
unofficial	and	varying	prices	should	become	widespread”.314	Free	markets	in	gold	and	
currencies	were	a	serious	concern	on	both	sides	of	the	North	Atlantic,	and	there	appears	to	
be	a	quid	pro	quo,	where	Mr.	Bolton	of	the	Bank	of	England	would	“appreciate	keeping	him	
informed	of	any	unusual	developments	in	the	sterling	market	here	(New	York)”,	and	vice	
versa	on	the	Federal	Reserve’s	interest	in	London	free	gold	activity.	Overall,	ample	archival	
evidence	indicates	that	significant	gold	trade	was	occurring	in	London,	and	that	this	trade	
would	have	undercut	the	impact	of	British	financial	repression.	London	played	a	critical	role	
in	managing	the	global	gold	market,	through	locally-headquartered	South	African	mining	
interests,	as	well	through	the	relationship	with	the	South	African	government	that	purchased	
																																																						
311	C261	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	February,	1947	
312	C261	p.	1,	Letter	from	Sproul	to	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	6	March,	1947	
313	C261	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	17	June,	1947	
314	C261	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	February,	1947	
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all	locally	mined	gold	at	parity.315	However,	in	contrast	to	Britain’s	focus	on	free	sterling	trade	
in	New	York,	the	Americans	were	the	ones	who	were	primarily	concerned	about	free	trade	in	
gold.	The	NYFRB	wanted	Britain’s	help	to	“smash	the	premium	between	free	market	
transactions	between	gold	and	the	dollar”,	but	the	Fed	also	recognized	that	“it	might	be	
much	more	difficult	to	smash	the	premium	in	transactions	between	gold	and	the	pound	
sterling”.316	Per	the	Bretton	Woods	agreements,	the	U.S.	dollar	was	the	one	currency	tied	at	a	
fixed	rate	to	the	value	of	gold.	Bolton	and	the	Bank	of	England’s	partial	assurances	
notwithstanding,	any	trade	in	gold	at	a	premium	over	$35	per	ounce	official	parity	was	
clearly	of	significant	concern	to	the	U.S.	government	as	it	suggested	that	the	U.S.	dollar	was	
overvalued,	fanning	unwanted	speculation	of	official	devaluation.		
	
As	noted	by	Cairncross	(1985),	capital	exports	to	the	Sterling	Area	were	not	fully	
blocked	until	1972.317	As	Cairncross’	analysis	highlights,	even	with	the	introduction	of	the	
1947	Exchange	Control	Act	there	were	capital	outflows	of	£643	million,	or	a	staggering	8%	of	
GDP.318	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	are	silent	on	the	actual	effect	of	such	controls.	
	
Financial	repression	is	comprised	of	many	interrelated	components	and	cannot	be	
fully	appreciated	or	understood	through	just	the	measurement	of	debt	liquidation	and	the	
listing	of	a	handful	of	policies	of	uncertain	effect.	In	sum,	while	Reinhart	and	Sbrancia	are	the	
only	authors	to	date	to	attempt	to	quantify	the	effects	on	debt	of	British	financial	repression	
in	the	post-Second	World	War	period,	their	argument	that	Britain	engaged	in	financial	
repression	is	no	sufficiently	supported.	Questions	remain	over	whether	financial	repression	
was	a	conscious	policy	choice,	and	what	if	any	alternatives	to	financial	repression	did	
countries	such	as	Britain	possess.	And	with	respect	to	the	role	of	British	banks,	was	moral	
suasion	sufficient	to	enlist	firms	into	aiding	government?	Or	with	the	changing	political	
climate	and	the	departure	after	twenty-four	years	of	the	powerful	central	bank	personality	
																																																						
315	C261	p.	4,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	February,	1947	
316	C261	p.	2,	Letter	from	J.	Burk	Knapp	of	the	Fed	Board	of	Governors	to	Werner	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	Archive,	4	March,	1947	
317	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	119)		
318	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	153-154)	
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of	Montagu	Norman,	did	corralling	the	City	now	require	the	imposition	of	new	formalized	
edicts?		
	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	structured	around	several	of	the	core	areas	of	the	
economy	which	play	a	role	in	debt	sustainability	and	financial	repression,	including	interest	
rates,	capital	controls,	and	institutions	such	as	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	British	banking	
system.	
	
4.4.2	Interest	rates	
	
Low	nominal	and	negative	real	interest	rates	are	generally	considered	to	be	a	
hallmark	of	financial	repression.	However,	the	question	of	what	precisely	constitute	a	‘low’	
interest	rate	is	unclear.319	While	there	is	considerable	room	for	argument	over	what	is	and	is	
not	an	artificially	low	interest	rate	there	is	less	debate	on	the	policies	and	forces	that	might	
contribute	to	low	rates	of	interest	paid	by	governments	on	public	debt.	
	
In	the	1940s	the	UK	government	sought	and	secured	what	it	at	least	considered	to	be	
low	rates	of	interest	on	public	debt.	Known	as	‘cheap	money’,	low	interest	rates	had	been	
advocated	by	Keynes	as	early	as	1937	and	was	adopted	as	a	cornerstone	of	wartime	credit	
policy.320	Britain’s	funding	strategy	during	and	after	the	war	has	been	characterized	as	‘heavy	
government	borrowing	at	a	fixed	rate	of	interest’.321	Except	for	a	brief	fluctuation	at	the	
beginning	of	the	war,	the	Bank	of	England’s	Bank	Rate	was	maintained	at	2%	through	1951.322	
The	long	end	of	the	yield	curve	was	managed	towards	the	goal	of	running	‘a	3	percent	
war’.323		
	
																																																						
319	For	a	discussion	of	the	‘world	interest	rate’	concept	see	(Barro	&	Salaimartin,	1990;	Blanchard	&	Summers,	
1984;	Chinn	&	Frankel,	2005;	Koedijk	et	al.,	1994;	Lucas,	1990;	Yi	et	al.,	2001)	
320	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	22,	88)	Keynes	pushed	for	“permanently	cheap	money”,	saying	“we	must	avoid	(dear	
money)…as	we	would	hell-fire”	The	Times,	12	January,	1937	
321	(Cairncross,	1985)	
322	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	92;	R.S.	Sayers,	1981)	Bank	Rate	had	been	lowered	to	the	2%	level	in	1931.	
323	(R.	S.	Sayers,	1956)	
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The	First	and	Second	World	Wars	were	financed	at	five	and	three	percent	rates	of	
interest,	respectively,	and	the	Second	World	War’s	lower	rate	“prevented	a	threefold	
increase	in	the	internal	National	Debt”	from	First	World	War	levels	while	leaving	the	interest	
burden	in	1945	comparable	to	what	it	was	in	1919.324	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952)	explain	this	
low	rate	of	interest	in	financial	repression	terms	by	stating	“so	long	as	the	expenditure	of	the	
private	sector	was	limited	by	rationing	and	other	controls,	income	recipients	would	have	
little	else	to	do	with	a	large	part	of	their	earnings	but	to	lend	it	to	the	Government”.	325	Debt	
service	expense-to-GDP	was	roughly	8%	and	6%	following	First	and	Second	World	Wars,	
respectively.326	
	
Forces	that	caused	“the	‘natural’	rate	of	interest	to	be	relatively	high”	in	Britain	
included	inflationary	pressures,	a	low	natural	savings	rate,	and	the	need	for	capital	
expenditures.327	Internal	documents	from	the	Bank	of	England	support	the	view	of	scholars	
on	the	goal	of	low	interest	rates.	For	example,	a	Bank	of	England	survey	marked	confidential	
and	titled	‘Developments	in	the	Control	of	Credit	in	the	United	Kingdom’	shared	with	the	
NYFRB	on	25	September,	1952	describes	how:	
	
“low	and	stable	levels	of	short-term	interest	rates,	with	consequently	easy	credit	
conditions,	had	its	origin	in	the	needs	of	war	finance	and	was	continued,	and	even	
increased,	in	the	post-war	period	with	the	dual	object	of	keeping	down	the	cost	of	
that	national	debt	and	of	maintaining	full	employment	by	facilitating	borrowing	by	
industry	and	public	bodies	alike.”	(italics	denote	emphasis	added)328	
	
Post-war	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	Hugh	Dalton,	who	has	been	characterized	
simultaneously	as	the	enemy	of	rentier	and	the	friend	of	the	speculator,	was	not	content	
with	the	already	historically	low	rates	of	interest.329	Dalton	sought	a	policy	of	even	cheaper	
money	from	late-1945	through	1947,	openly	stating	his	objective	to	“bring	down	the	long-
																																																						
324	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	191-192)		
325	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	191-192)		
326	(Buiter	1985,	p.	17	Figure	2)	
327	CV61	p.2,	Mr.	Klopstock	to	Mr.	Sproul,	‘The	Cheaper	–Money	Policy	in	Britain	–	A	Lesson	for	the	United	
States”’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	September,	1948	
328	C261A	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
329	(Paish,	1947,	1950)	
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term	rate	of	interest”.330	In	July	1947	Dalton	told	the	House	of	Commons	that	“cheap	money	
is	to	continue”.331	One	financial	instrument	that	played	a	key	role	in	Dalton’s	effort	to	deliver	
lower	interest	rates	was	the	Treasury	Deposit	Receipt	(TDRs),	a	new	wartime	invention	that	
allowed	the	Treasury	to	bypass	the	London	money	market	and	borrow	directly	from	banks.332	
TDRs	were	very	unpopular	with	bankers	as	they	were	non-marketable	instruments,	meaning	
they	could	not	be	sold	on	the	open	market	but	instead	only	exchanged	for	a	loss	with	the	
Bank	of	England’s	discount	window.	As	noted	by	Worswick	and	Ady,	"bankers	would	have	
welcomed	a	reduction	in	the	volume	of	government	indebtedness,	especially	of	TDRs."333		
	
Rates	on	TDRs	were	originally	1-1/8	percent,	a	rate	that	Dalton	in	September	1945	
slashed	down	by	nearly	in	half	to	just	5/8	of	a	percent.	334	At	the	same	time	Dalton	also	cut	
the	rate	on	T-Bills	by	a	similar	amount	to	1/2	a	percent.	These	two	changes	reduced	the	
nominal	interest	burden	on	floating	debt	by	approximately	half.	Dalton	then	moved	to	cut	
longer-term	rates	through	a	number	of	conversions	and	the	floatation	of	several	issues	at	a	
rate	of	2.5%,	including	the	Treasury	Stock	1975	securities,	which	thereafter	came	to	be	non-
affectionately	referred	to	in	banking	circles	as	‘Daltons’.335		
	
The	intellectual	inspiration	behind	the	Daltons,	including	the	original	suggestion	of	
the	2.5%	rate,	appears	to	be	Keynes.	In	his	General	Theory	Keynes	stated	that	that	a	
government	could	achieve	its	interest	rate	targets	if	it	let	the	market	determine	the	term	
structure.336	Keynes	originally	advocated	that	the	Chancellor	should	announce	that	in	no	
circumstance	will	he	borrow	at	more	than	2.5%	so	lenders	have	zero	doubts	that	these	are	
																																																						
330	C261D	p.2,	NYFRB	Research	Memorandum	titled	‘Notes	on	the	Nationalization	of	the	Bank	of	England’,	New	
York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	19	October,	1952	
331	CV61	p.	6,	Mr.	Klopstock	to	Mr.	Sproul,	‘The	Cheaper	–Money	Policy	in	Britain	–	A	Lesson	for	the	United	
States”’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	September,	1948	
332	(Howson,	1988;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	212-213)	
333	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952,	p.198,	214)	
334	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952)	The	authors	provide	two	different	rates	for	TDRs	on	pp.	198	and	214	of	5/8	and	7/8,	
respectively	
335	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	199)	
336	(Booth,	1989,	p.	157)	In	The	General	Theory	Keynes	also	states	“The	remedy	for	the	boom	is	not	a	higher	rate	
of	interest	but	a	lower	rate	of	interest!	For	that	may	enable	the	so-called	boom	to	last.	The	right	remedy	for	the	
so-called	trade	cycle	is	not	to	be	found	in	abolishing	booms	and	thus	keeping	us	permanently	in	a	semi-slump;	
but	in	abolishing	slumps	and	thus	keeping	us	in	a	permanent	boom.”	(Keynes,	1936,	p.	322)	
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the	best	terms	available	for	long-dated	bonds.	Skidelsky	summarizes	Keynes’	position	on	
how	to	achieve	this	interest	rate	as	follows:		
	
“In	order	to	enforce	this	rate	the	market	should	be	given	‘an	increased	amount	of	
liquidity’	to	prevent	the	‘congestion	of	credit’,	which	Keynes	had	warned	in	1938.	To	
be	effective	these	techniques	would	need	to	be	buttressed	by	the	following	three	
elements:	1)	Control	of	domestic	capital	issues,	2)	Prioritizing	the	use	of	physical	
resources	(rationing),	and	3)	an	embargo	on	foreign	lending	(capital	controls).”337	
	
Keynes,	however,	later	expressed	that	3%	was	the	appropriate	rate	at	which	the	government	
should	borrow	to	ensure	demand	and	he	personally	opposed	the	issuance	of	Daltons.338	As	
the	Daltons	were	floated	on	the	market	the	value	of	longer-dated	gilt	issues	began	to	soften.	
By	the	time	Cripps	replaced	Dalton	in	November	1947	yields	on	Consols	had	climbed	back	up	
to	3%,	and	would	climb	further	to	3.5%	during	1949.339	Archival	documents	state	that	this	
climb	in	yields	was	“permitted”	by	the	UK	Treasury,	which	had	“rigged”	the	Treasury	bond	
market	through	the	use	of	public	departments	to	purchase	UK	public	debt.340		
	
The	use	of	interest	rate	policy,	through	changes	in	the	Bank	of	England’s	Bank	Rate,	
was	almost	non-existent	during	the	twenty	years	preceding	the	Tories	return	to	power	in	
1951.	Previously,	Bank	Rate	had	been	raised	at	times	when	Britain’s	reserves	were	declining.	
Upon	the	mentioning	of	this	idea	as	a	possible	means	of	addressing	the	1949	devaluation	
crisis,	Dalton	stated	“I	say	Montagu	Norman	walks	again.	I	thought	we	had	buried	all	this	
stuff	about	Bank	Rate”.341	Keynes	agreed	with	Dalton,	adding	that	the	“social	and	political	
climate	would	not	permit	a	repeat	of	the	rentier-friendly	policy	of	the	First	World	War”.342	
Skidelsky	describes	Keynes’	“hatred	of	the	rentier”,	which	“was	proof	against	economic	
arguments,	because	at	bottom	it	was	theological,	not	scientific.	The	bondholder	is	his	mind	
																																																						
337	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	24-25)		
338	(Booth,	1989,	p.	157)	
339	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	202)	An	increase	in	bond	yields	reflects	a	decline	the	market	value	of	the	bonds.	
340	CV61	p.1,	Mr.	Klopstock	to	Mr.	Sproul,	‘The	Cheaper	–Money	Policy	in	Britain	–	A	Lesson	for	the	United	
States”’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	September,	1948	
341	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	176)	Douglas	Jay,	Economic	Secretary	to	the	Treasury,	is	also	quoted	to	the	same	effect.	
Dalton	couldn’t	see	the	point	of	higher	interest	rates	because	capital	expenses	“is	not	now	determined	by	what	
people	want	but	by	what	the	government	permits”.	
342	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	69)	
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was	nothing	but	the	medieval	usurer,	or	Shylock,	someone	who	sought	to	make	a	profit	out	
of	lending	money.”343	
	
November	1951	saw	the	first	sustained	increase	in	the	Bank	Rate,	which	was	
increased	from	2%	to	2-1/2%.	What	followed	was	a	fairly	dramatic	increase	in	yields	across	
UK	government	debt,	particularly	short-dated	issues,	as	well	as	private	sector	securities	
(Table	15).	The	effects	of	the	increase	on	Bank	Rate	were	seen	most	dramatically	on	the	
short-end	of	the	government	yield	curve,	with	yields	on	UK	short-dated	debt	more	than	
doubling	from	1.70%	to	3.48%	from	October	1951	to	July	1952.	Yields	on	medium-term	and	
the	longer-term	war	loan	did	not	see	nearly	as	large	a	jump,	increasing	by	21%	and	18%,	
respectively,	which	was	approximately	in-line	with	the	rise	seen	in	private	sector	securities.	
	
	 	
																																																						
343	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	69)	
	 	 Page	|	142	
	
Table	15:	Average	Yield	of	UK	Securities,	1950-52	
	 Government	Debt	Securities	 Industrial	Securities	
	
Short	
dated	
	
Medium	
dated	
	
3-1/2%	
War	Loan	
	
	
Debentures	
	
Ordinary	
Shares	
1950	Avg.	 2.03%	 2.99%	 3.77%	 4.07%	 5.48%	
1951	YTD	Avg.	 1.84	 3.59	 3.98	 4.28	 5.35	
Oct.	1951	 1.70	 3.66	 4.06	 4.33	 5.26	
Nov.		 1.97	 3.78	 4.18	 4.50	 5.76	
Dec.		 2.29	 4.08	 4.35	 4.70	 5.90	
Jan.	1952	 2.36	 4.14	 4.37	 4.71	 6.35	
Feb.	 2.41	 4.17	 4.42	 4.77	 6.43	
Mar.	 2.92	 4.31	 4.54	 4.92	 6.64	
April	 3.15	 4.24	 4.50	 4.84	 6.37	
May	 3.26	 4.27	 4.56	 4.85	 6.95	
June	 3.51	 4.45	 4.75	 4.94	 7.28	
July	 3.48	 4.42	 4.78	 4.96	 6.78	
	
1952	YTD	Avg.	
	
3.01%	 4.29%	 4.56%	 4.86%	 6.69%	
%	Δ	Oct	1951		
to	July	1952	
105%	 21%	 18%	 15%	 29%	
	
Source:	CV261A	p.	4,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September	1952	
	
The	‘Daltons’	episode	and	other	evidence	appears	to	have	demonstrated,	to	at	least	
some	degree,	the	existence	of	a	‘market	floor’.	In	other	words,	if	the	British	government	
offered	debt	at	a	nominal	interest	rate	deemed	too	low	by	market	participants,	then	the	
market	was	free	to	sell-off	British	debt	in	sufficient	quantities	to	compel	authorities	to	offer	a	
higher	yield	on	new	bond	issues.	For	example,	the	archival	records	go	on	to	state	that:	
	
“Soon	after	the	decline	of	gilt-edged	prices	early	in	1947,	the	market	became	thin,	
nervous,	and	anemic.	Any	large	offering	that	in	previous	years	could	have	been	easily	
absorbed	caused	digestive	troubles	and	jumpy	reactions”.344		
	
																																																						
344	CV61	p.	4,	Mr.	Klopstock	to	Mr.	Sproul,	‘The	Cheaper	–Money	Policy	in	Britain	–	A	Lesson	for	the	United	
States”’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	September,	1948	
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In	October	1947	Dalton	remarked	that	“the	establishment	of	an	effective	3	per	cent	gilt-edge	
yield	is	no	more	than	a	temporary	lapse	from	the	2	½	per	cent	objective”.	However,	Dalton	
would	be	proven	wrong.345	
	
The	effects	of	market	forces	on	public	debt	markets	also	existed	in	the	1960s.	A	
NYFRB	study	highlights	how	“the	margin	between	(UK)	Treasury	Bill	rates	and	other	short-
term	rates	is	greater	here	than	in	the	United	States”	(Table	16).	This	fact	suggests	that	if	
financial	repression	was	impacting	interest	rates	in	both	countries	the	impact	was	less	
dramatic	in	the	UK	by	the	early	1960s.346		
	
Table	16:	Comparison	of	UK	and	U.S.	Interest	Rates,	September	1964	
	
Instrument	 United	Kingdom	 United	States	
Treasury	Bills	 5.50%	 4.00%	
Local	Authority	Deposits	(UK)	/	Finance	Paper	(U.S.)	 6.50%	 4.25%	
Finance	House	Deposits	(UK)	/	CDs	(U.S.)	 7.00%	 4.38%	
	
Source:	CV61A	p.	8,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
	
The	NYFRB	study	goes	on	to	comment	that	in	the	UK	the	“market	in	local	authority	
temporary	money	has	provided	foreigners,	as	well	as	domestic	holders,	with	an	attractive	
alternative	to	the	Treasury	bill”,	and	that	“the	local	authorities	are	competing	for	
institutional	and	private	funds	not	only	against	the	Government	(with	its	higher	credit	
rating),	but	also	against	the	finance	houses	and	each	other”.347	Those	looking	to	put	cash	to	
work	earning	interest	in	London	had	“many	more	attractive	outlets”	than	in	the	U.S.348	By	the	
late-1950s	the	London	Eurodollar	market	generally	offered	banks	the	ability	to	earn	interest	
at	4%.349	The	fact	that	rates	in	the	UK	private	sector	remained	competitive	and	above	public	
sector	rates	of	interest	on	offer,	and	the	lack	of	compression	between	the	different	UK	
																																																						
345	CV61	p.	6,	Mr.	Klopstock	to	Mr.	Sproul,	‘The	Cheaper	–Money	Policy	in	Britain	–	A	Lesson	for	the	United	
States”’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	September,	1948	
346	CV61A	p.	8,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
347	CV61A	pp.	11,	8.	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
348	CV61A	p.	16,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
349	CV61A	p.	17,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
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instruments	compared	to	the	U.S.	marketplace,	undermines	claims	that	the	UK	interest	rates	
operated	under	a	regime	of	strict	financial	repression.	
	
In	sum,	these	findings	are	somewhat	at	odds	with	the	portrayal	of	post-war	British	
financial	repression	as	a	regime	with	absolute	control	over	interest	rates,	or	an	era	where	
investors	had	few	investment	options.	Indeed,	there	was	a	significant	spread	in	yields	across	
a	variety	of	different	debt	securities	available	for	investment	purposes.	This	evidence	
highlights	the	importance	of	distinguishing	between	different	types	and	degrees	of	financial	
repression.	In	other	words,	while	moral	suasion	and	qualitative	techniques	may	have	
encouraged	banks	to	hold	longer-term	British	debt,	other	economic	actors	in	the	UK	had	a	
variety	of	investment	options	outside	low-yielding	government	securities.	
	
4.4.3	Capital	and	exchange	controls	
	
Alongside	low	interest	rates,	capital	controls	are	typically	considered	a	cornerstone	of	
financial	repression.350	As	noted	by	internal	archival	discussions	between	the	Bank	of	England	
and	Federal	Reserve,	“the	war	has	diminished	confidence	in	paper	currencies”	and	controls	
were	seen	as	one	means	to	“avoid	the	real	danger	of	a	breakdown	or	collapse	of	social	
institutions	and	political	structure”.351	The	stringent	controls	imposed	at	the	beginning	of	
Second	World	War	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	Sterling	Area.352	
	
An	example	of	one	policy	designed	to	control	the	movement	of	capital	was	the	
requirement	that	permission	from	authorities	be	obtained	prior	to	making	any	forex	
purchases.353	Keynes	argued	against	closing	down	the	stock	exchange	stating	that,	with	
																																																						
350	See	(Aizenman,	Gavin,	&	Hausmann;	Alesina,	Grilli,	&	Milesi-Ferrett,	1993;	Alexander,	Enoch,	Baliño,	&	
International	Monetary	Fund.,	1995;	Wyplosz,	1986,	2001)	In	recent	times	it	has	been	suggested	that	low	
interest	rates	are	the	only	requirement	of	financial	repression	as	other	mechanisms,	such	as	quantitative	
easing,	have	replaced	the	need	for	stringent	capital	controls.	
351	C261	p.	1,	Letter	from	Sproul	to	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	6	March,	1947	
352	(Capie,	2010,	p.	146;	De	Vegh	&	Scudder	Stevens	&	Clark.,	1939)	For	a	further	description	of	the	Sterling	Area	
see	(R.	Harrod	&	Princeton	University.	Department	of	Economics	and	Sociology.	International	Finance	Section.,	
1952)	
353	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	24)	
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foreign	exchange	controls	and	a	prohibition	on	new	securities	issuance,	all	savings	would	be	
accessible	by	the	Treasury,	thereby	“making	cheap	borrowing	easy”	for	the	government.	354	
Indeed,	in	1913	domestic	industry	only	comprised	8%	of	issues	quoted	on	the	London	Stock	
Exchange.	However,	the	figure	would	rise	to	and	remain	over	90%	from	the	late	1940s	
onward	as	capital	exports	“remain(ed)	in	the	doldrums”.355	Another	element	of	British	capital	
controls	were	the	restrictions	on	foreign	exchange	on	payments	made	outside	the	Sterling	
Area,	which	were	imposed	at	the	outbreak	of	war	and	maintained	well	into	peacetime.		
	
Following	the	conclusion	of	the	war	Keynes	felt	that	“nothing	is	more	certain	than	
that	the	movement	of	capital	funds	must	be	regulated”.356	The	Bank	of	England	initially	
sought	to	trace	how	so	much	sterling	had	wound	up	in	foreign	markets	such	as	New	York,	
and	complex	rules	were	established	on	how	and	by	whom	sterling	could	be	exchanged	for	
dollars.357	The	Exchange	Control	Act	was	passed	in	1947,	which	had	the	effect	of	restricting	
some	external	loans	as	well	as	inward	capital	flows.358	This	act	was	not	repealed	until	October	
1979.359	However,	persistent	capital	leakages	were	an	ongoing	concern	for	policymakers	in	
spite	of	controls.	By	April	1940	Keynes	estimated	leakages	of	£100M	since	the	start	of	the	
war.	U.S.	dollars,	which	the	Treasury	was	seeking	to	raise,	were	leaking	through	London’s	
allowance	for	non-residents	to	sell	British	securities	for	dollars.	This	caused	Keynes	to	‘go	on	
the	warpath’	to	enforce	capital	controls;	others	in	the	Treasury	were	not	in	favour	of	action	
due	to	concern	about	the	losses	of	foreign	balances	held	in	London.360		
	
As	noted	earlier	in	the	paper	during	the	discussion	of	the	free	gold	market,	there	is	
some	question	as	to	the	overall	effectiveness	of	capital	controls.	Further,	in	certain	areas	the	
export	of	capital	was	not	prohibited	at	all.	For	example,	Sophisticated	markets	for	‘free’	
sterling	blossomed	in	New	York	and	Switzerland.	In	addition,	capital	exports	were	allowed	
																																																						
354	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	79)		
355	(Wilson,	1995,	p.	188)	
356	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	205)	The	Bank	of	England	also	favoured	capital	controls	(p.	210)	
357	C261	p.	1,	Bank	of	England	letter	to	NYFRB’s	Mr.	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	
December,	1945	
358	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	22)	
359	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011,	p.	17)	
360	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	75-76)		
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within	the	Sterling	Area	up	until	1972	at	which	point	exchange	control	was	applied.361	Dow	
(1964)	estimates	that	20%	of	capital	outflows	were	due	to	the	‘looseness’	of	controls	
(leakages).362	The	regulations	and	rules	governing	the	Sterling	Area	and	the	movement	of	
capital	were,	put	simply,	complex.	Varying	degrees	of	transferability	of	currency	and	
different	forms	of	sterling,	many	of	which	had	unique	exchange	rates	and	separate	rules	
about	how	the	currency	could	be	used,	made	for	a	confusing	regulatory	environment.363	As	
noted	by	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	of	Governors,	sterling’s	status	varied	from	place	to	
place,	serving	“as	a	hard	currency	for	the	Belgians	but	a	soft	currency	for	the	Indians”.364		
	
The	British	gold	market	was	closed	in	the	early	stages	of	Second	World	War	and	did	
not	officially	reopen	until	1954.365	Regulation	governed	the	export	of	gold,	and	British	citizens	
residing	permanently	in	Britain	were	prohibited	from	owning	gold	not	made	into	jewellery.	
However,	British	citizens	residing	permanently	in	a	country	which	does	permit	personal	gold	
ownership	(e.g.,	France)	could	own	gold.	During	this	period	several	London	gold	dealers	
established	subsidiaries	in	Canada,	Beirut,	Hong	Kong	and	South	Africa	while	the	London	
market	was	closed.366	What	is	not	entirely	clear	from	a	review	of	the	literature	and	archival	
materials	is	what	effect	in	practice	the	closure	of	the	London	gold	market	actually	had	on	
flows.	In	other	words,	if	the	British	bullion	banks	–	Rothschild,	Mocatta	and	Goldsmid,	et	al	–	
were	still	largely	able	to	operate,	as	the	NYFRB	claimed,	did	the	closure	of	the	London	gold	
market	help	achieve	the	British	objective	of	minimizing	the	drain	of	gold	reserves?	These	and	
related	questions	may	warrant	further	research.367	
	
																																																						
361	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	119)	
362	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	24)	
363	(Pick,	1953)	Some	of	the	many	names	given	to	the	different	versions	of	sterling	include:	cheap,	free,	
overseas,	external,	black	market,	Handpayments,	etc.	
364	C261	p.	2,	Letter	from	J.	Burk	Knapp	of	the	Fed	Board	of	Governors	to	Werner	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	Archive,	4	March,	1947	
365	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	
366	(Green,	1968,	p.	115)	See	also	(Green,	1973,	1981)	
367	Unfortunately,	a	warehouse	fire	destroyed	much	of	the	archival	material	that	was	held	by	Rothschild	about	
the	London	gold	market	during	this	period,	so	it	is	not	clear	what	archival	materials	may	exist.	
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Britain	was	not	alone	in	establishing	greater	control	over	capital	and	foreign	
exchange.	Following	the	Second	World	War	an	elaborate	set	of	financial	restrictions,	interest	
rate	caps,	and	capital	controls	remained	in	effect	in	advanced	economies	until	the	1970s-
1980s,	at	which	point	widespread	financial	liberalization	was	pursued	across	much	of	the	
non-communist	world.	The	UK	had	a	higher	degree	of	controls	in	place	on	its	current	account	
from	1950-1980	(Figure	8).	Britain’s	degree	of	capital	account	openness	fluctuated	both	
above	and	below	the	sample	average	during	this	time	(Figure	9).368		 	
																																																						
368	(Obstfeld	&	Taylor,	2004,	pp.	160-171;	D.	Quinn,	1997;	D.	P.	Quinn	&	Toyoda,	2008)	
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Figure	8:	Current-account	openness,	1950-2004	
(100	=	more	open)	
	
	
Figure	9:	Capital-account	openness,	1950-2004	
(100	=	more	open)	
	
Note:	sample	countries	includes:	Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Denmark,	Ireland,	Italy,	Finland,	Germany,	Greece,	
France,	Japan,	New	Zealand,	Netherlands,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden,	and	Switzerland.	
	
Sources:	Quinn	(1997),	Quinn	and	Toyoda	(2008)	
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4.4.4	Banking	system		
	
“The	commercial	banking	system	is	to	be	fitted,	as	an	integral	part,	into	what	
promises	to	be	a	greater	degree	of	central	organization	of	the	British	economy	than	
has	ever	existed	in	the	past”.	
-Anonymous,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive369	
	
Before	exploring	the	particulars	of	the	role	played	by	British	banking	in	post-Second	
World	War	financial	repression	it	useful	to	discuss	the	history	and	structure	of	the	British	
financial	system.	On	the	whole,	the	British	banking	and	financial	system	has	proven	
comparatively	stable.370	While	not	immune	from	problems	(e.g.,	the	1890	Baring’s	crisis)	the	
buoyancy	of	British	banks	compares	favourably	with	other	countries	during	periods	of	
economic	distress.	For	examples,	in	the	1930s	U.S.	banks	failed	en	masse	(thousands)	while	
far	fewer	British	banks	failed	(both	in	absolute	total	number	and	as	a	percentage	of	the	
number	of	banks	in	existence	at	the	time).371			
	
Since	the	Barings	crisis,	the	Bank	of	England	had	accepted	financial	responsibility	for	
the	principal	merchant	banks.	The	Bank	was	willing	to	buy	merchant	bank	acceptances	in	the	
market	without	formal	limit.	Principal	merchant	banks	held	accounts	at	the	Bank	and	were	
members	of	the	Accepting	Houses	Committee	(AHC),	formed	in	1914.	All	AHC	members	were	
a	liability	of	the	Bank	of	England,	which	assisted	merchant	banks	in	1939	(as	in	1931	and	
1914)	when	standstills	occurred.	One	further	reason	for	the	relative	stability	of	British	banks	
during	this	period	was	due	to	the	structure	of	the	British	financial	system,	particularly	the	
clear	lines	of	demarcation	between	institutions	that	could	engage	in	different	financial	
functions.	Restrictions	kept	discount,	merchant	and	clearing	banks	out	of	each	other’s	lines	
of	business.372	It	took	the	1933	U.S.	Glass-Steagall	Act,	which	required	that	separate	
companies	perform	the	function	of	managing	deposits,	investment	banking,	and	insurance,	
to	create	what	already	informally	existed	in	Britain.		
																																																						
369	CV61A	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	1946	
370	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	749)	
371	(Bemanke	&	James,	1991,	pp.	51-55;	Grossman,	1994;	Wicker,	2001)	
372	(Capie	&	City	University.	Centre	for	Banking	and	International	Finance	.	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Monetary	
History.,	1987;	D.	T.	Llewellyn,	1985;	David	T.	Llewellyn,	1985,	p.	10)	See	also	(Fforde	1992,	p.	758)	
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Did	the	greater	relative	financial	stability	enjoyed	by	the	British	banking	system	go	
hand-in-hand	with	having	an	oligopolistic	banking	industry?	The	British	banking	‘cartel’,	as	it	
has	been	sometimes	referred,	formed	in	the	late	19th	century	and	has	further	consolidated	
through	the	present	day.373	While	the	Bank	of	England	stepped	in	to	arrange	mergers	(e.g.,	
Governor	Norman’s	coordination	of	the	merger	between	the	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	and	
Williams	Deacons	Bank),	mergers	and	further	industry	consolidation	by	London’s	Big	Five	
cleaning	banks	was	eschewed	by	the	Bank	of	England	given	the	oligopolistic	nature	of	British	
banking.374	The	Bank	of	England	certainly	took	the	view	that	low	competition,	while	reducing	
efficiency,	led	to	higher	stability.		
	
The	Bank	of	England	also	found	it	easier	to	deal	with	a	relatively	small	number	of	
banks,	which	may	have	played	an	important	role	in	the	state’s	ability	to	influence	the	
composition	of	bank	balance	sheets.	Indeed,	an	archival	document	from	an	NYFRB	study	
shows	how	a	much	greater	share	of	UK	Treasury	Bills	are	held	by	the	UK	banking	system	as	
compared	to	the	United	States	banking	system.375	The	study	goes	on	to	discuss	how	by	this	
time	UK	Treasury	bills	“now	fulfil	the	function	once	performed	by	commercial	bills”	as	a	
means	for	British	banks	to	convert	liquid	assets	into	cash,	underscoring	the	importance	in	the	
shift	from	private	instruments	of	credit	to	public	credit	in	bank	operations	and	the	London	
bill	market.	However,	there	was	arguably	a	trade-off	between	stability	and	lower	efficiency,	
which	can	be	seen	in	the	relatively	high	cash/deposit	and	liquidity	ratios	of	8%	and	28-30%,	
respectively.376	
	
																																																						
373	(Strange	&	Royal	Institute	of	International	Affairs.,	1971,	p.	162)	
374	(Capie,	2010,	p.	327)	The	Big	Five	London	Clearing	banks	during	this	time	were:	Midlands,	Barclays,	Lloyds,	
National	Provincial	and	Westminster.	
375	This	was	true	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	UK	and	U.S.	Treasury	bills	“fundamentally	alike”	in	structure	CV61A	
p.	1,	18	October	1965,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive		
376	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	69)	
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The	‘special	relationship’	between	the	Bank	of	England	and	London’s	clearing	banks	
allowed	their	profits	and	losses	to	be	kept	from	the	public	(as	well	as	the	Bank	of	England).377	
As	noted	by	Fforde	(1992):	
	
“The	special	relationship	with	the	bank	was	far	more	than	that	of	supervisor	and	
supervised.	It	is	unlikely	that	those	words	were	ever	used.	It	was	more	like	a	
relationship	between	partners,	each	possessing	some	degree	of	control	over	the	
other.	It	was	all	very	informal.”	378	
	
British	banks	were	given	a	special	degree	of	latitude	by	their	regulator,	the	Bank	of	England,	
in	the	form	of	practices	such	as	the	maintenance	of	hidden	reserves.	379		The	hidden	reserves	
of	British	banks	cloud	the	question	of	what	precisely	were	bank	profits	during	this	period,	
and	some	questionable	claims	are	found	in	the	literature	regarding	British	bank	profitability.	
For	example,	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952)	describe	bond	dealings	for	banks	as	“highly	
profitable”.380	However,	they	do	not	provide	sufficient	details	on	how	the	effects	of	inflation	
may	have	eroded	the	real	value	the	bonds	held	by	British	banks.		
	
Flexible	arrangements	on	disclosure	and	liquidity,	along	with	restrictions	on	
competition	and	somewhat	guaranteed	market	share,	could	help	explain	why	banks	
acquiesced	to	the	substantial	reduction	seen	in	the	value	of	their	public	debt	holdings.	For	
example,	in	the	post-war	period	the	deposit	reserve	ratio	for	UK	banks	was	relaxed	from	10%	
of	deposits	required	to	be	kept	in	notes	and	coin	in	reserve	to	just	8%.381	British	banks	did	not	
closely	adhere	to	the	defined	minimum	requirement	that	30%	of	British	bank	liabilities	be	
held	in	‘liquid’	assets	such	as	Treasury	bills,	commercial	bills,	and	Treasury	deposit	receipts.382	
Further	examination	of	rates	on	deposits	at	British	banks	could	be	useful.	As	noted	by	
Reinhart	and	Reinhart	(1999),	“banks	pass	the	reserve	requirements	component	of	the	
financial	repression	tax	on	to	depositors	via	lower	deposit	rates	and/or	non-government	
																																																						
377	(R.	S.	Sayers,	1976,	pp.	552-560)	
378	(Fforde	1992)	
379	(Capie,	2010,	pp.	445,	591;	Capie	et	al.,	1992,	pp.	68-69)	
380	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	215)	
381	C261A	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
382	C261A	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
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borrowers	via	higher	lending	rates.	This	mix	between	the	two	depends	upon	which	has	
access	to	more	alternatives”.383	
	
Significant	change	came	to	the	Bank	of	England	in	the	mid-1940s.	First,	in	1944,	after	
serving	for	24	years,	Governor	Montagu	Norman	stepped	down	at	age	72.	Then	in	August	
1946,	the	era	of	bank	regulation	referred	to	as	the	"the	world	of	the	'Governor's	eyebrows”,	
came	to	an	end	when	the	‘Old	Lady	of	Threadneedle	Street’	was	nationalized	under	the	Bank	
of	England	Act.384	As	noted	by	Fforde	(1992),	the	Bank’s:	
		
“relations	with	Whitehall	and	the	City	were	clear	enough	in	broad	outline,	but	
often	informal,	unmodified,	and	uncertain	on	the	margins.	Maintenance	of	the	
authority	of	the	Bank,	together	with	control	over	the	direction	in	which	it	
moved,	therefore	depended	unusually	on	the	supremacy	of	the	Governor.”385		
	
This	informal	arrangement	changed	when	controversial	clauses	4(3)	and	4(4)	of	the	
nationalization	act	were	adopted,	which	formalized	the	Bank’s	relationship	with	Treasury.	
Where	previously	the	Bank	had	employed	moral	suasion,	clause	4(3)	gave	the	Bank,	with	the	
approval	of	the	Treasury,	explicit	power	to	govern	the	proportion	of	commercial	bank	assets.	
386	The	formalization	of	this	power	and	the	addition	of	the	Treasury	in	the	decision	making	
framework	on	the	mix	of	assets	banks	would	hold	can	be	viewed	as	a	significant	
advancement	of	financial	repression.	One	of	the	core	elements	of	financial	repression	is	the	
ability	for	government	to	mandate	the	composition	of	firm	balance	sheets	to	ensure	the	
government	debt	is	held,	and	clause	4(3)	and	4(4)	formalized	the	government’s	authority	in	
this	regard.	These	sections	allowed	the	Treasury	to:		
	
“request	information	from	and	make	recommendations	to	bankers,	and	may,	if	so	
authorized	by	the	Treasury,	issue	directions	to	any	banker	for	the	purpose	of	securing	
that	effect	is	given	to	any	such	request	or	recommendation.”387	
																																																						
383	(C.	Reinhart	&	Reinhart,	1999)	
384	(Capie,	2010,	p.	590)	
385	(Fforde,	1992)		
386	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	7)	
387	C261D	pp.	19,	NYFRB	Research	Memorandum	titled	‘Notes	on	the	Nationalization	of	the	Bank	of	England’,	
New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	19	October,	1952	
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Indeed,	statements	from	both	the	Midlands	and	Westminster	bank	chairmen	condemned	
the	adoption	of	clause	4(3)	and	represent	one	of	the	only	instances	found	in	the	literature	of	
an	objection	to	British	financial	repression	policies	by	bankers.388	However,	it	was	stated	that	
“certain	safeguards	to	bankers	and	customers	are	provided	for”,	such	as	the	“right	of	
bankers	to	make	prior	representations	with	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	Treasury	before	the	
‘directions’	are	issued	to	them”.389	A	note	in	the	New	York	Federal	Reserve	archives	records	a	
quote	summarizing	Dalton’s	view	on	the	new	power	hierarchy	between	British	banks	and	the	
government:	“in	the	last	resort…as	a	matter	of	principle,	if	there	be	a	serious	case	of	conflict	
or	challenge,	the	Bank	of	England	must	be	master	and	the	leader	of	the	clearing	banks”.390	As	
noted	by	Worswick	and	Ady,	“thus	the	banking	system	was	a	useful	instrument	in	the	hands	
of	a	determined	Chancellor.”391	
	
What	ultimately	was	the	impact	of	the	new	Bank	of	England	control	clauses	and	
nationalization?	There	are	references	to	the	government’s	share	of	the	overall	business	
handled	by	banks	increasing	significantly	following	the	war.392	It	is	unclear	how	much	the	
establishment	of	this	clause	impacted	bank	assets.393	The	literature	only	addresses	the	
process	which	led	to	the	Act’s	passage,	and	Worwisck	and	Ady	state	“no	instance	of	its	use	
has	been	publicized”.394	In	contrast,	archival	evidence	points	to	significant	influence	by	the	
UK	Treasury	on	bank	balance	sheets.	For	example,	the	previously	cited	1952	Bank	of	England	
study	on	credit	control	states	that	the	banks:		
	
“made	every	effort	to	comply	with	the	requests	of	successive	Chancellors	of	the	
Exchequer	that	credit	should,	as	in	war-time,	be	granted	only	for	essential	purposes,	
which	in	the	post-war	period,	were	to	be	judged	in	the	light	of	the	criteria	laid	down	
from	time	to	time	for	the	guidance	of	the	Capital	Issues	Committee.	Thus,	though	the	
																																																						
388	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	7)	
389	C261D	pp.	19,	NYFRB	Research	Memorandum	titled	‘Notes	on	the	Nationalization	of	the	Bank	of	England’,	
New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	19	October,	1952	
390	CV61A	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	1946	
391	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	217)	
392	(Institute	of	Bankers.,	1949)	
393	(Fforde,	1992)	See	Ch.	1	(pp.	1-30)	
394	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	218)	
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weapons	of	quantitative	control	of	bank	credit	could	not	be	used,	a	broad	qualitative	
control	was	maintained.”395	
	
This	qualitative	control	on	bank	lending	was	supplemented	with	the	reintroduction	of	
quantitative	measures	in	November	1951,	namely	the	first	sustained	increase	in	Bank	Rate	in	
nearly	20	years	(from	2%	to	2-1/2%).396	The	return	to	quantitative	measures	was	in	part	
driven	by	the	fact	that	the	“efficacy”	of	qualitative	means	of	controlling	bank	balance	sheets	
“was	limited,	in	spite	of	the	cooperative	attitudes	of	the	banks”.397		
	
From	the	literature	there	is	also	a	discussion	of	pressure	on	banks	to	support	
government	bonds.	For	example,	new	discount	houses	appear	to	have	been	forced	to	take	
on	a	new	role	of	holding	government	debt.398	The	aforementioned	Treasury	Deposit	Receipts	
(TDRs)	were	also	unpopular	among	bankers.399	UK	banks	were	required	to	maintain	a	certain	
ratio	of	liquid	assets	that	included	Treasury	bills,	which	contrasted	with	U.S.	banks	that	only	
had	to	keep	cash	and	deposits	(but	not	government	debt)	with	the	Federal	Reserve.400	
	
How	much	of	this	represented	a	change	from	the	past	is	not	entirely	clear.	For	some	
time	prior	to	nationalization	the	Bank	of	England	was	described	by	some	as	“little	more	than	
a	handmaiden	of	the	Treasury”.401	During	the	Second	World	War	British	banks	took	on	all	
government	debt	not	purchased	by	the	public.	British	banks’	advance	ratio	(the	%	of	assets	
allotted	to	loans	and	overdrafts)	dropped	from	the	peacetime	level	of	50%	to	15%,	indicating	
a	large	shift	away	from	private	sector	loans	in	favour	of	government	debt.	The	advance	ratio	
did	not	return	to	the	peacetime	level	as	quickly	as	it	had	after	First	World	War,	taking	until	
																																																						
395	C261A	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
396	C261A	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
397	C261A	p.	2,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952.	The	memorandum	goes	on	to	
note	that	“the	generous	compensation	to	be	given	to	private	owners	of	present	(Bank	of	England)	stock,	have	
also	done	much	to	dampen	opposition	of	the	Bill”.	
398	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	215)	"It	was	made	clear	that	as	long	as	they	were	prepared	to	act	as	genuine	
jobbers	-	that	is,	to	buy	to	capacity	on	falling	markets	-	the	authorities	would	support	their	liquidity."	
399	(R.	S.	Sayers,	1953)	
400	Source:	CV61A	p.	20,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
401	Source:	CV61	p.	1,	Research	Memorandum	on	the	‘Pros	and	Cons	of	Bank	of	England	Nationalization’,	New	
York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	22	December	1945	
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the	1960s	for	the	ratio	to	return	to	40%.402		A	shift	by	banks	away	from	private	sector	loans	in	
favour	of	government	debt	is	a	common	feature	financial	repression	policy.	The	banks	could	
discount	their	T-bills	with	the	Bank	of	England	for	any	cash	that	was	needed,	and	by	war’s	
end	Britain’s	money	supply	had	doubled.403		
	
After	the	war	British	banks	were	swimming	in	liquidity	with	large	deposit	bases	and	
liquid	assets,	and	the	comparatively	high	level	of	liquidity	possessed	by	the	banks	persisted	
well	into	the	1950s.404The	Dalton	policy	of	‘cheap	money’	initially	led	to	a	rise	in	the	value	of	
stocks	and	gilts.405	However,	bond	prices	did	decline	later	by	a	significant	margin	following	
the	introduction	of	the	2.5%	‘Daltons’.	The	clearing	banks	in	particular	were	required	to	keep	
on	their	balance	sheets	a	large	percentage	of	government	securities	due	to	the	“subjugation	
of	bank	behaviour	to	the	perceived	greater	needs	of	government	finance”.406	After	the	war,	
banks	were	trying	to	rebuild	their	advances-government	debt	ratio.	At	the	same	time	
authorities	were	trying	to	sell	more	debt	and	cap	and	or	slow	growth	in	bank	advances.407	For	
example,	archival	documents	describe	a	UK	government	“funding	operation”	in	November	
1951,	supported	by	the	banks	and	“important	overseas	holders	of	Treasury	Bills”,	whereby	
£1	billion	in	UK	Treasury	Bills	were	exchanged	for	1-3/4%	Serial	Funding	Stock	maturing	in	
1952,	1953,	and	1954.408	The	effect	of	this	funding	operation	was	to	“sharply”	reduce	the	
liquid	assets	of	the	clearing	banks	so	that	“should	the	need	arise”	the	banks	clearing	banks	
“would	be	relatively	susceptible	to	pressure”	by	the	Bank	of	England	on	the	composition	of	
their	balance	sheet.	
	
There	is	a	large	academic	literature	on	London’s	banks.	However,	there	is	very	little	to	
no	discussion	of	the	policies	or	sentiments	often	associated	with	financial	repression	in	the	
banking	literature	covering	this	period.	For	example,	Burk’s	(1989)	history	of	Morgan	
																																																						
402	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	64)	Ratio	of	advances	to	total	assets	at	commercial	banks	in	the	late	19th	century	were	
60%,	50%	in	the	interwar	period,	and	16%	in	1944.	
403	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	7)	
404	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	64)	
405	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	194)		
406	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	pp.	67-68)	
407	(Capie,	2010,	pp.	80-81)	
408	C261A	p.	5,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
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Grenfell,	a	leading	Anglo-American	merchant	bank,	focuses	on	personalities	and	
transactions,	but	does	not	reference	financial	repression.409		The	same	is	true	of	Sayers’	
(1968)	study	of	Gillets,	which	includes	the	years	1945-51.410	While	this	absence	of	financial	
repression	from	the	literature	may	in	part	be	due	to	the	fact	that	many	of	the	histories	on	
British	banks	were	‘official’,	the	private	diaries	of	British	merchant	banker	Siegmund	
Warburg	also	do	not	mention	financial	repression.411	One	notable	exception	to	the	silence	
from	bankers	occurred	in	January	1947,	when	the	chairmen	of	the	Big	Five	clearing	banks	
urged	in	their	annual	letters	an	end	to	Dalton’s	policy	of	‘cheap	money’.	412	However,	the	
general	absence	of	discord	raises	questions.	British	banks	would	hold	large	quantities	of	
British	bonds	well	into	the	post-war	period	(Table	17),	and	in	the	UK	“a	much	higher	
proportion	of	the	total	outstanding	[Treasury	bills]	is	in	the	hands	of	the	banking	system	
(including	discount	houses)	than	it	is	in	the	United	States”.413	
	
Table	17:	Institutional	Comparison	of	UK	and	U.S.	Treasury	Bill	Holdings,	30	September	
1964	
	
Sector	 United	Kingdom	 United	States	
Commercial	banks	and	discount	houses	 50%	 27%	
Foreign	holders	 42%	 19%	
Other	holders		 8%	 54%	
Total	 100%	 100%	
	
Source:	CV61A	p.	10,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
	
As	noted	earlier,	the	real	value	of	British	bonds	experienced	a	steady	and	substantial	
decline	following	Second	World	War.	One	would	expect	that	the	post-Second	World	War	
liquidation	of	the	value	of	British	debt	of	perhaps	unprecedented	proportions	to	generate	at	
least	a	mention	in	passing	from	bankers,	which	in	turn	would	be	picked	up	in	the	historical	
																																																						
409	(Burk,	1989)	
410	(R.	S.	Sayers,	1968)	
411	(Ferguson,	2010)	
412	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	201)	Another	example	of	protest	was	the	earlier	noted	comments	by	the	
chairmen	of	Midlands	and	Westminster	condemning	clause	4(3)	in	the	Bank	of	England	Act	(Fforde,	1992,	p.	
27).			
413	CV61A	p.	10,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
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literature.	How	can	this	apparent	paradox	be	explained?	It	is	hard	to	imagine	that	British	
banks	were	not	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	real	value	of	their	British	debt	holdings	was	being	
eroded.		
	
There	are	at	least	four	possibilities	that	could	explain	the	paradox	behind	the	
existence	of	British	financial	repression	and	the	absence	of	mention	in	the	literature	and	and	
by	financiers:	a)	historical	research	to	date	has	simply	overlooked	this	aspect	of	British	
financial	history;	b)	British	banks	found	a	way	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	financial	repression;	
c)	a	financial	repression	bargain,	so	to	speak,	existed	between	the	banks	and	the	authorities;	
d)	financial	repression’s	effects	were	small	enough,	and	stretched	out	over	sufficient	time,	to	
escape	protest.	It	is	tempting	to	speculate	that	the	latter	two	explanations	are	correct	based	
what	later	happened	to	British	banking.	The	merchant	banks	were	considered	to	be	the	
crème	de	la	crème	of	the	London	banks.	However,	once	London’s	financial	deregulatory	‘Big	
Bang’	occurred	most	of	London’s	merchant	banks	ceased	to	exist	as	independent	going	
concerns	over	the	next	several	years.	Of	the	original	merchants	banks	only	Rothschild	has	
remained	an	independent	entity.414	Merchant	banks	had	been	sheltered	and	simply	found	
they	were	no	longer	competitive	in	a	globalized	financial	market.	
	
4.4.5	Directed	lending	
	
Directed	lending	is	a	common	feature	of	financial	repression,	and	British	government	
departments	such	as	the	National	Debt	Commissioners	and	the	Post	Office	Savings	Bank	
were	directed	to	support	Treasury	bond	auctions	and	the	overall	government	bond	market.	
Other	agencies	that	supported	government	debt	markets	included	the	trustee	savings	banks,	
the	social	insurance	funds,	the	Exchange	Equalization	Account	and	the	Issues	Department	of	
the	Bank	of	England.415	These	departments	were	often	used	to	support	conversions	through	
																																																						
414	Kleinwort	was	bought	by	Dresdner.	S.G.	Warburg	was	purchased	by	Swiss	Bank	Corp.	(now	Credit	Suisse).	
Morgan	Grenfell	was	bought	by	Deutsche	Bank.	Schroeder's	was	purchased	by	Citibank.	Hambros	was	sold	to	
Société	Générale	in	1998.	Barings	failed	in	1995.	
415	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	197)	
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advance	buying	of	the	security	to	be	converted,	thereby	helping	to	ensure	a	successful	
conversion.		
	
Dalton	orchestrated	directed	lending	operations	with	the	goal	of	managing	interest	
rates.	Low	interest	rates	were	effected	by	swapping	higher	interest	rate	long-term	term	debt	
with	lower	interest	rate	short-term	debt,	as	well	by	underwriting	new	lower-interest	rate	
issues.416	Both	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952)	and	Cairncross	(1985)	briefly	discuss	these	
operations.	However,	Cairncross	described	them	as	“rumour”,	while	Worswick	and	Ady	refer	
to	the	departments	as	the	“Treasury’s	creatures”	that	were	“taking	up	the	slack	on	those	
issues	which	the	public	would	not	take”.417	While	these	operations	were	originally	concealed	
from	the	public	archival	documents	reveal	the	extent	of	these	operations.418	A	New	York	
Federal	Reserve	report	cites	another	report	by	a	Mr.	Bloomfield	titled	“Interest	Rate	Policy	in	
Great	Britain-	1945-48”	that	describes	the	effects	of	British	directed	lending	as	follows:	
	
“2	½	per	cent	Consols	under	the	impact	of	vigorous	buying	by	the	public	departments	
had	risen	by	November	1946	to	within	a	point	of	parity,	the	highest	level	in	44	years,	
and	the	market	had	been	sufficiently	‘rigged’	to	permit	the	issue	at	part	of	a	2	½	per	
cent	Treasury	stock	redeemable	after	1975	at	the	Treasury’s	discretion”	(the	
‘Daltons’).419	
	
Comparing	non-bank	private	sector	institutions	in	the	U.S.	and	UK,	we	see	that	in	1963	that	
U.S.	non-bank	private	sector	institutions	held	a	much	larger	portion	of	their	short-term	
assets	in	Treasury	Bills	than	in	the	UK	(	 	
																																																						
416	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	p.	197)	
417	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	432-433;	Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	196-198,	215)	
418	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	197,	202)	Worswick	and	Ady	also	stated	that	it	is	possible	to	make	a	back-door	
calculation	by	monitoring	credit	creation,	particularly	the	increase	of	deposits.	They	also	note	that	the	activities	
of	the	departments	declined	under	the	Cripps	Chancellorship.	
419	CV61	p.1,	Mr.	Klopstock	to	Mr.	Sproul,	‘The	Cheaper	–Money	Policy	in	Britain	–	A	Lesson	for	the	United	
States”’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	September,	1948	
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Table	18).	
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Table	18:	Private	Sector	Institutional	Comparison	of	UK	and	U.S.	Treasury	Bill	Holdings,	%	
of	Total	Short-term	Assets	held	in	Treasury	Bills,	1963	
Sector	 United	Kingdom	 United	States	
Insurance	companies	 2%	 10%	
Corporate	pension	funds	 1%	 40%	
Mutual	banks	 0%	 18%	
Savings	banks	 0%	 12%	
	
Source:	CV61A	p.	8,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
	
U.S.	companies	were	generally	considered	to	be	much	more	‘liquid’	than	their	UK	
counterparts,	with	current	assets	of	40%	and	22%,	respectively.	UK	private	sectors	insurance	
companies,	when	asked	by	the	Radcliffe	Committee	to	explain	this	preference	for	longer-
term	securities,	stated:	
	
“We	do	not	want	to	have	securities	that	turn	over	too	rapidly	or	too	frequently,	such	
as	bills	or	short-dated	investments;	we	would	rather	have	something	which	is	going	
to	be	there	for	a	reasonable	period	of	time,	for	purely	administrative	reasons”.420	
	
How	should	we	interpret	the	preference	on	the	part	of	British	insurance	and	pension	
organizations	for	not	holding	UK	Treasury	bills,	even	though	as	the	NYFRB	study	puts	it	“it	
might	have	paid	them	to	do	so”?	The	NYFRB	ascribes	a	partial	explanation	to	“habit”	on	the	
part	of	British	insurance	and	pension	schemes.	Perhaps	this	and	the	previous	explanation	
evidenced	in	the	above	quote	from	the	insurance	sector	do	explain	in	part	the	peculiar	
preference	for	preferring	to	earn	a	lower	yield.	However,	given	the	active	role	of	government	
in	the	management	of	UK	economic	affairs	in	the	post-war	period,	questions	abound	over	
whether	some	degree	of	moral	suasion	on	the	part	of	the	authorities	could	play	a	role	in	
these	preferences.		
	
Other	significant	differences	can	be	seen	between	the	UK	and	U.S.	Treasury	bill	
holdings	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy	(Table	19	and	Table	20).	UK	non-financial	
																																																						
420	Committee	on	the	Working	of	the	Monetary	System	(Radcliffe	Committee),	Question	7092.	UK	National	
Archives,	1957-59	
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corporations	held	just	8%	of	the	UK	Treasury	bill	market	compared	to	the	18%	held	by	
equivalent	U.S.	firms.	However,	UK	local	authorities	held	just	0.1%	of	the	UK	Treasury	bill	
market	and	so	would	not	appear,	at	least	as	of	1964,	to	have	been	a	party	to	directed	lending	
schemes.	
	
Table	19:	UK	%	of	Total	Treasury	Bill	Market	Held	by	Sector,	30	September	1964	
Sector	 £s	millions	 %	of	T-bill	market	
Local	authorities	 £3	 0.1%	
Insurance	 3	 -	
Trustee	savings	 2	 -	
Private	sector	pension	funds	 -	 0.1%	
Other	non-bank	financial	institutions	 3	 0.2%	
Non-corporate	bodies	(Public	Trustee)	 5	 0.1%	
Non-financial	corporations	 4	 7.7%	
Total	 £229	 8.3%	
	
Source:	CV61A	p.	12,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
	
	
Table	20:	U.S.	%	of	Total	Treasury	Bill	Market	Held	by	Sector,	30	September	1964	
Sector	 £s	millions	 %	of	T-bill	market	
State	and	local	governments	 £1,940	 12%	
Insurance	 200	 1%	
Mutual	savings	banks	 120	 1%	
Savings	&	loans	 240	 1%	
Corporate	pension	trust	funds	 290	 2%	
Non-financial	corporations	 2,830	 18%	
Misc.	(including	non-bank	security	dealers)	 3,017	 19%	
Total	 £229	 54%	
	
Source:	CV61A	p.	12,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
	
The	1964	NYFRB	study	remarks	on	how	the	institutional	holdings	of	UK	(and	U.S.)	Treasury	
bills	has	remained	consistent	“over	the	last	four	years,	even	though	there	has	been	an	
increase	in	alternative	outlets	(for	earning	interest)	outside	the	public	sector”,	particularly	
the	time	certificate	of	deposit.421	
																																																						
421	CV61A	p.	17,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	18	October	1965	
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4.4.6	Inflation	
	
Financial	repression	can	be	effective	without	inflation	by	simply	reducing	the	level	of	
nominal	interest	expense	on	public	debt.422	However,	inflation	often	accompanies	financial	
repression,	and	it	need	not	be	significant	to	have	a	material	impact	on	debt	sustainability	
over	an	extended	period	of	time.	Further,	small	differences	in	the	rate	of	inflation	can	have	a	
significant	impact	over	time	on	the	value	of	public	debt,	as	well	as	determining	the	number	
of	years	or	periods	which	can	be	labelled	as	periods	of	‘debt	liquidation’.		
	
Other	than	the	World	Wars	and	their	immediate	aftermath,	the	first	half	of	the	20th	
century	in	Britain	was	marked	by	very	little	inflation.423	As	the	Second	World	War	
commenced	Keynes	argued	against	what	he	called	the	‘old-fashioned	laissez-faire	solution	of	
inflation’	as	a	means	of	paying	for	the	war.424	In	a	section	of	How	to	Pay	for	the	War	covering	
inflation	during	the	period	surrounding	first	great	conflict	of	the	20th	century,	Keynes	wrote:		
	
“But	what	a	ridiculous	system	with	wages	and	prices	chasing	one	another	
upwards	in	this	manner!	No	one	benefited	except	the	profiteer.	The	seeds	of	
much	subsequent	trouble	were	sown.	And	we	ended	up	with	a	National	Debt	
vastly	greater	in	terms	of	money	than	was	necessary	and	very	ill	distributed	
through	the	community.”425	
	
Much	of	Keynes’	pre-	and	early-war	policy	efforts	were	spent	advocating	against	the	
government’s	use	of	inflation	as	a	means	of	financing	the	war.426	Whether	or	not	Keynes	
intended	to	remain	staunchly	anti-inflationary	after	the	war	is	unclear	as	he	was	often	
criticized	during	this	period	for	‘making	up	theory	on	the	hoof’.427	
	
																																																						
422	(C.	M.	Reinhart	&	Sbrancia,	2011)	
423	(Capie	et	al.,	1992,	p.	63)	In	fact	much	of	the	interwar	period	was	marked	by	deflation.	
424	(Keynes,	1940,	p.	70;	Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	63)	Keynes:	“An	individual	by	saving	more	cannot	protect	himself	
from	the	consequences	of	inflation	if	others	do	not	follow	his	example.”		
425	(Keynes,	1940,	p.	73)	Also,	in	the	chapter	titled	‘Can	the	Rich	Pay	for	the	War?’,	Keynes	argues	that	the	rich	
would	be	the	relative	beneficiaries	of	inflation.	(p.	21)	
426	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	55)		
427	(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	23)	
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Somewhat	surprisingly,	deflation	was	reported	by	some	to	be	as	great	a	concern	as	
inflation	both	during	the	war	and	the	post-war	period.428	However,	as	with	many	other	wars	
inflation	climbed	during	the	Second	World	War,	with	retail	prices	increasing	on	average	by	
6.3%	annually.429	There	is	some	dispute	in	the	literature	on	the	level	of	inflation	during	the	
war	(and	afterward)	with	Cairncross’	estimating	50%	inflation	during	the	Second	World	
War.430	Inflation	in	the	Second	World	War	was	approximately	half	that	of	the	First,	with	
Woodward	(1991)	claiming	that	this	“relative	success”	was	achieved	through	“much	less	
dependence	on	borrowing	and	more	concerted	effort	to	reduce	consumption	through	
increased	taxation”.431	Rationing	was	deemed	crucial	to	making	price	controls	effective.432	A	
variety	of	measures	were	employed	to	manage	demand,	prices,	costs,	and	overall	inflation	
pressure,	including	price	controls,	subsidies,	standardization	schemes,	and	quality	controls.	
Such	measures	could	perhaps	be	considered	as	elements	that	supported	financial	repression,	
but	they	generally	fall	outside	of	the	definition	of	financial	repression.	
	
Another	hallmark	of	financial	repression	is	a	relatively	high	savings	rate	in	spite	of	low	
interest	rates	and	or	inflation	due	to	few	(if	any)	investment	or	spending	alternatives.433	
Average	weekly	wages	from	1940-1945	increased	by	a	rate	of	5%	per	year,	lagging	slightly	
behind	price	increases.	Woodward	(1991)	speculates	that	trade	unions,	which	had	a	strong	
wage	bargaining	position	due	to	low	unemployment,	exercised	wage	restraint	due	to	both	
sympathies	for	the	war	effort	and	their	inclusion	in	war	administration.	Paradoxically,	the	
savings	rate	also	grew	during	this	inflationary	period	of	declining	real	wages	to	15%.434	
However,	this	is	revealed	to	be	less	surprising	given	rationing	and	other	restrictions	on	
purchases	both	during	and	after	the	war.435		
																																																						
428	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	10)	The	White	Paper	on	Employment	
Policy	(Cmd.	6527,	1944)	warned	of	deflation.		
429	(Cairncross,	1985;	Crafts,	Woodward,	&	Duckham,	1991,	p.	189;	Mitchell,	1975)	Wholesale	prices	during	this	
period	rose	by	8.8%	annually.	
430	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	14-15)	
431	(Crafts	et	al.,	1991,	p.	190)	
432	(Capie,	Pradhan,	Wood,	&	City	University.	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Monetary,	1986;	Capie	&	Wood,	2002)	
433	(McKinnon,	1973;	Shaw,	1973)	
434	(Cairncross,	1985,	pp.	13-14)	
435	(Zweiniger-Bargielowska,	2000)	
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Woodward	(1991)	claims	that	post-Second	World	War	(1945-1950)	inflation	averaged	
4.3%	per	year,	ranging	between	3-7%	annually.436	Real	wages	were	unchanged	through	1951	
but	real	earnings	increased	by	10%.437	In	1948,	30%	of	consumption	was	rationed;	by	1950	
only	11%.	In	1947	83%	of	UK	raw	materials	were	under	some	degree	of	official	control;	by	
1950	the	figure	had	declined	to	47%.438	Woodward	also	states	that	for	this	period	“at	no	time	
was	there	a	return	to	the	excess	of	1919-20”,	when	annual	inflation	ran	at	21.5%	and	24.8%,	
respectively.439	However,	other	research	suggests	that	actual	post-war	inflation	was	
significantly	higher	than	nationally	reported	figures	used	by	Woodward	and	Richard	(2002),	
particularly	if	one	adds	the	early	1950s	into	the	analysis	when	inflation	approached	post-First	
World	War	levels.440		
	
Cairncross	(1985)	notes	that	the	official	Cost-of-Living	index,	based	on	pre-First	World	
War	estimates,	was	“far	from	being	a	true	measure	of	the	change	in	the	value	of	money”.441	
Woodward	also	stated	“in	the	early	post-war	years	controls	were	deliberately	used	to	
contain	demand	pressures	and	to	prevent	the	prices	of	a	number	of	key	commodities	from	
rising	rapidly.	However,	from	1947	onwards	the	controls	were	gradually	relaxed,	and	had	
more	or	less	disappeared	with	the	change	in	government	in	1951”.442	While	it	is	true	that	
price	and	demand	controls	were	largely	removed	by	the	early	1950s,	Woodward	says	
nothing	of	financial	controls,	such	as	those	on	foreign	exchange	conversion	and	other	
restrictions,	which	may	have	played	a	significant	role	in	suppressing	inflation	during	this	
time.443	The	growing	conflict	on	the	Korean	peninsula	in	1950-51	is	largely	credited	with	the	
spike	in	inflation	during	this	period.	The	cost	of	rubber	tripled,	wool	and	cotton	doubled,	and	
																																																						
436	These	figures	are	in-line	with	Richards	(2002)	more	recent	numbers.			
437	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	18)	
438	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	23)	
439	(Richards,	2002,	p.	15)	
440	(Díaz,	Lüders,	&	Wagner,	2003;	Feinstein,	1972;	Friedman	&	Schwartz,	1982;	Price,	1988;	Wiles,	1952)	
441	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	39)	
442	(Crafts	et	al.,	1991,	p.	191)	
443	(Crafts	et	al.,	1991,	p.	191)	Woodward	argues	the	post	war	Labour	Government	used	it	close	relationship	
with	the	trade	union	movement	to	exercise	wage	restraint;	1948	was	the	year	of	the	first	voluntary	income	
policy,	which	insured	wage	increases	were	kept	well	below	inflation.	
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numerous	other	commodities	went	up	in	price	by	50%.444	The	various	inflation	series	found	in	
the	literature	are	presented	in	Figure	10	and	Table	21.	
	
Figure	10:	UK	Inflation	(Retail	Prices),	Annual	Percentage	Change,	1941-1960	
	
	
Sources:	Diaz,	Luders	and	Wagner	(2005)	Richards	(2002),	Friedman	and	Schwartz	(1982),	Price	and	Bain	(1988)	
	
	
The	smallest	and	largest	variance	in	the	range	of	values	for	any	given	year	during	this	
period	are	1.6%	and	10.5%	for	the	years	1946	and	1949,	respectively.	Overall,	given	the	wide	
variation	in	inflation	estimates	for	this	period	it	may	be	more	accurate	to	utilize	a	range	of	
inflation	estimates	for	calculating	debt	liquidation.	
	
	 	
																																																						
444	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	55)	
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Table	21:	UK	Inflation	(Retail	Prices),	Annual	Percentage	Change,	1945-1951	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Richards	 Diaz	
Bain	&	
Price	
Friedman	&		
Schwartz	
Sample	
Average	
Range	High-
Low*	
1945	 3.2%	 3.0%	 5.1%	 0.5%	 2.9%	 4.6%	
1946	 3.5%	 3.6%	 5.1%	 3.8%	 4.0%	 1.6%	
1947	 7.4%	 9.1%	 8.2%	 8.5%	 8.3%	 1.7%	
1948	 6.6%	 7.8%	 10.8%	 12.3%	 9.4%	 5.7%	
1949	 2.6%	 13.1%	 5.1%	 5.2%	 6.5%	 10.5%	
1950	 2.8%	 0.3%	 5.6%	 1.7%	 2.6%	 5.3%	
1951	 9.5%	 15.9%	 16.6%	 12.9%	 13.7%	 7.1%	
Annual	
Average	 5.1%	 7.5%	 8.1%	 6.4%	 6.8%	 5.2%	
	
*Note:	the	difference	between	the	highest	and	lowest	estimate	each	year.	
	
Sources:	Diaz,	Luders	and	Wagner	(2005)	Richards	(2002),	Friedman	and	Schwartz	(1982),	Price	and	Bain	(1988)	 	
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4.5	Conclusion	
	
This	paper	has	shown	that	opportunities	exist	for	improving	both	our	quantitative	
and	qualitative	understanding	of	financial	repression	through	an	in-depth	examination	of	
British	mid-20th	century	financial	repression.	Further	research	is	necessary	on	who	were	the	
winners	and	losers	of	low	interest	rates.	Worswick	and	Ady	(1952)	state	that	low	interest	
rates	in	the	UK	may	have	caused	a	"redistribution	from	the	smaller	to	the	larger	rentier”.445	
However,	little	to	no	quantitative	evidence	is	presented	to	support	this	claim.	There	is	also	
the	question	of	the	knock-on	effects	of	low	interest	rates	on	the	British	economy	and	
financial	system.	During	the	post-war	years	“an	unduly	large	proportion	of	world	trade	had	
come	to	be	financed	in	London	in	order	to	take	advantage	of	the	low	interest	rates”.446	But	
how	much	did	this	inflow	of	funds	for	trade	finance	further	destabilize	the	fragile	balance	in	
Britain,	with	its	high-debt	and	overvalued	currency?	
	
Further	research	is	also	necessary	to	understand	the	trade-offs	between	the	negative	
consequences	of	financial	repression,	such	as	its	impact	on	economic	growth,	and	its	
potentially	positive	features,	such	as	buttressing	the	financial	system.	In	addition	to	
promoting	financial	stability,	financial	repression	can	help	achieve	debt	sustainability.	
Contrary	to	what	its	name	implies,	financial	repression	may	on	occasion	be	an	appropriate	
policy.	It	may	therefore	be	appropriate	to	determine	a	more	neutral	name	for	financial	
repression,	which	is	often	used	as	pejorative	for	scoring	rhetorical	points	in	policy	debates.	
	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																						
445	(Worswick	&	Ady,	1952,	pp.	204-205)	
446	C261A	p.	5,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	25	September,	1952	
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Appendix	1	Financial	Repression	Composite	Indicator	Variables	and	Data	
Sources	
	
	 Variables	 Description	 Source	
	 	 	 		 Capital	movement	 Outflows	(and	inflows)	 IMF	
AREAER	
	 Exchange	control	 Restrictions	on	foreign	exchange	movements,	including	
adjustments	in	the	rate	
BIS	
	 Financial	soundness	indicators	 Various	measures	of	financial	soundness	for	countries,	such	
as	reserves	
IMF	
	 Public	Pension	Reserve	Funds'	
Asset	allocation	
Institutional	investors'	asset	allocation	 OECD	
	 Funded	Pensions	Indicators:	
Asset	allocation	
Bills	and	bonds	issued	by	public	and	private	sector	 OECD	
	 Cross-border	lending	and	
borrowing		
Lending	and	borrowing	of	internationally	active	banks	in	key	
financial	centres,	including	offshore	centres	
BIS	
	 Deposit	interest	rate	(%)	 Interest	rate	paid	on	bank	deposits	 World	
Bank	
	 Interest	rate	spread	(%)	 Lending	rate	minus	deposit	rate	 World	
Bank	
	 Real	interest	rate	(%)	 Real	rate	of	interest	when	taking	into	account	inflation	 World	
Bank	
	 Risk	premium	on	lending	(prime	
rate	minus	treasury	bill	rate,	%)	
Risk	premium	on	lending	is	the	interest	rate	charged	by	banks	
on	loans	to	prime	private	sector	customers	minus	the	"risk	
free"	treasury	bill	interest	rate	at	which	short-term	
government	securities	are	issued	or	traded	in	the	market.	In	
some	countries	this	spread	may	be	negative,	indicating	that	
the	market	considers	its	best	corporate	clients	to	be	lower	
risk	than	the	government	
World	
Bank	
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	 Variables	 Description	 Source	
	 Portfolio	equity,	net	inflows	
(BoP,	current	US$)	
Portfolio	equity	includes	net	inflows	from	equity	securities	
other	than	those	recorded	as	direct	investment	and	including	
shares,	stocks,	depository	receipts	(American	or	global),	and	
direct	purchases	of	shares	in	local	stock	markets	by	foreign	
investors.	Data	are	in	current	U.S.	dollars	
World	
Bank	
	 Private	credit	bureau	coverage	
(%	of	adults)	
Private	credit	bureau	coverage	reports	the	number	of	
individuals	or	firms	listed	by	a	private	credit	bureau	with	
current	information	on	repayment	history,	unpaid	debts,	or	
credit	outstanding.	The	number	is	expressed	as	a	percentage	
of	the	adult	population	
World	
Bank	
	 Public	credit	registry	coverage	
(%	of	adults)	
Public	credit	registry	coverage	reports	the	number	of	
individuals	and	firms	listed	in	a	public	credit	registry	with	
current	information	on	repayment	history,	unpaid	debts,	or	
credit	outstanding	
World	
Bank	
	 Domestic	credit	provided	by	
banking	sector	(%	of	GDP)	
Domestic	credit	provided	by	the	banking	sector	includes	all	
credit	to	various	sectors	on	a	gross	basis,	with	the	exception	
of	credit	to	the	central	government,	which	is	net	
World	
Bank	
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5	Currency	Black	Markets	and	Historical	Turning	Points:	‘Free’	
Sterling	in	New	York	and	Switzerland	in	the	1940s	
	
	
Abstract:	During	and	after	the	Second	World	War,	a	period	of	fixed	exchange	rates,	
sophisticated	markets	for	currencies	trading	at	free-market	rates	developed	in	a	number	of	
financial	centres.	This	paper	presents	new	daily	time	series	data	from	currency	black	markets	
in	Switzerland	and	New	York	for	British	pound	sterling	(or	‘free’	sterling,	as	it	was	often	
referred),	the	U.S.	dollar,	and	Swiss	franc.	Archival	evidence	shows	that	during	the	1940s	
many	of	the	largest	and	most	sophisticated	financial	firms	were	active	in	these	markets,	and	
that	these	markets	saw	significant	trading	volume.	A	narrative	account	of	the	substantial	
communication	about	free	currency	markets	between	Bank	of	England	and	New	York	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	officials	is	presented.	Statistical	breakdate	tests	on	the	new	data	give	a	market	
perspective	on	key	turning	points	during	and	after	the	Second	World	War.	Contrary	to	the	
existing	literature,	free	sterling’s	exchange	rate	appears	to	have	reflected	the	currency’s	
fundamental	market	value	around	the	time	of	the	1949	devaluation.	The	data	also	suggest	
that	British	officials	used	recent	free	market	quotes	to	fix	sterling’s	new	official	exchange	
rate	at	$2.80.	
	
	
	
JEL:	F31,	N24,	N44	
	
Keywords:	currency	black	markets,	black	markets,	sterling,	dollar,	Swiss	franc,	free	sterling,	
Second	World	War,	exchange	rates,	New	York,	Zurich	
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5.1	Introduction	
	
Black	markets,	also	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘informal’	or	‘free’	markets,	can	provide	
insights	into	financial	and	economic	preferences	during	times	of	significant	regulation,	such	
as	periods	of	war	or	financial	repression.	One	period	where	black	markets	can	make	such	a	
contribution	is	the	1940s.	During	this	decade	many	currencies	could	only	be	legally	
exchanged	at	official	rates	or	in	limited	quantities.	In	response,	sophisticated	markets	for	
'free’	currencies	blossomed	in	financial	centres	in	Switzerland	and	in	New	York,	and	these	
markets	facilitated	the	exchange	of	currencies	at	a	discount	(or	premium)	to	their	‘official’,	
meaning	policymaker-established,	exchange	rates	with	other	currencies.		
	
This	paper	presents	the	first	study	of	currency	black	markets	in	advanced	economies.	
In	this	paper	a	currency	black	market	is	defined	as	any	prohibited	currency	exchange,	
meaning	an	exchange	operating	outside	legal	or	regulated	parameters.	This	paper	also	
represents	the	first	currency	black	market	study	to	utilize	high-frequency	exchange	rate	data.	
New	daily	time	series	data	is	presented	for	several	currencies,	including	British	pound	
sterling	(often	referred	to	as	‘free’	or	‘cheap’	sterling),	the	U.S.	dollar,	and	the	Swiss	franc.	
Archival	material	from	the	Bank	of	England	and	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	is	used	to	
present	a	policy	narrative	on	these	markets	and	to	compliments	the	data	analysis.	
		
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	Section	5.2	present	an	overview	
of	the	currency	black	market	literature;	Section	5.3	presents	a	historical	overview	of	the	
1940s	currency	black	markets	in	New	York	and	Switzerland;	Section	5.4	describe	the	data	set	
and	presents	descriptive	statistics;	Section	5.5	presents	a	structural	break	analysis	of	the	
Swiss	franc-free	sterling	and	U.S.	dollar-free	sterling	exchange	rates	during	and	after	the	
Second	World	War,	respectively,	to	show	how	currency	black	markets	responded	to	1940s	
events;	Section	5.6	concludes	and	outlines	possible	future	research	questions.	
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5.2	Literature	Review	
	
Described	by	some	as	the	inevitable	consequence	of	state	intervention,	black	markets	
typically	develop	when	some	service	or	item	of	value	that	is	regulated	experiences	excess	(or	
insufficient)	demand.	447	Scholars	have	long	been	interested	in	black	markets	given	the	often	
unique	market	information	and	insights	they	can	provide,	and	a	number	of	research	studies	
have	examined	the	operational	mechanics	and	structure	of	specific	types	of	black	markets,	
such	as	those	for	currencies.448		There	are	a	wide	number	of	possible	explanations	behind	the	
emergence	of	individual	foreign	exchange	black	markets,	some	of	which	are	summarized	in	
Table	22.	
	
Table	22:	Summary	of	Forces	that	give	Rise	to	Currency	Black	Markets	
1	 Government	restrictions	on	trading	in	goods	and	or	services	
2	 Illegal	trade	(e.g.,	drugs)	can	lead	to	demand	or	supply	of	illegal	currency	
3	 Tourism	or	migration	
4	 Imposition	of	exchange	controls	
5	 Capital	flight	
6	 A	hedge	against	political	uncertainty	
7	 Inflation	tax	avoidance	
8	 Financial	repression	tax	avoidance	
	
Sources:	Agenor	(1992),	Bhagwati	(1978)	
	
The	structure	of	currency	black	markets	depends	on	a	number	of	factors	including	the	
degree	of	tolerance	shown	by	officials	towards	illegal	markets,	the	degree	of	awareness	of	
such	markets,	and	transaction	costs	and	other	frictions	(e.g.,	perceived	risk	or	penalties	for	
participation).449	The	public	sector,	when	confronted	with	a	prominent	black	market,	will	
often	expend	considerable	effort	combating	its	existence	given	the	perceived	deleterious	
economic	effects	(Table	23).	
																																																						
447	(Von	Mises,	1929,	p.	83)	see	also	(Agénor,	1992,	pp.	5-6)	
448	See	for	example	(Bevan,	Collier,	&	Willem	Gunning,	1989;	Browning	&	Culbertson	Jr,	1974;	Davidson,	Martin,	
&	Wilson,	2007;	Gutmann,	1977;	McLaren,	1996,	1998;	Stahl	II	&	Alexeev,	1985;	Thomadakis,	1981)	The	
question	of	how	economic	actors	first	become	aware	of	black	markets	is	a	subject	of	network	theory.	
449	(Jones	&	Roemer,	1987;	Pitt,	1984)	
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Table	23:	Negative	Public	Sector	Externalities	Created	by	Currency	Black	Markets	
1	 Enforcement	costs	associated	with	deterring	illegal	activity	and	
punishment	
2	 Loss	of	tariff	and	tax	income	
3	 Reductions	in	the	flow	of	foreign	exchange	to	the	central	bank	
4	 Black	markets	encourage	rent	seeking	activities	(e.g.,	corruption)	
5	 Reduction	in	government	seigniorage	
	
Source:	Agenor	(1992)	
		
Black	markets	can	prove	a	challenging	research	topic	due	to	difficulties	in	obtaining	
both	reliable	and	complete	data.	By	definition,	a	black	market	is	a	non-state	sanctioned	
activity,	and	any	participation	may	carry	some	form	of	punishment.	This	creates	disincentives	
for	participants	to	record	or	preserve	detailed	and	or	accurate	records.	Scholars	who	have	
studied	black	markets	have	noted	concerns	over	both	the	availability	and	reliability	of	black	
market	data.450	
	
Previous	research	on	foreign	exchange	black	markets	can	be	broadly	grouped	into	
two	categories:	general-theoretical	and	empirical.	General-theoretical	research,	which	
comprises	the	majority	of	the	research	published	on	currency	black	markets	to	date,	has	
emphasized	the	applicability	of	different	economic	frameworks	and	models	across	space	and	
time	as	a	means	to	better	understand	the	fundamental	dynamics	and	forces	that	motivate	
black	markets.451	Less	common	are	empirical	studies,	which	focus	on	individual	currencies	or	
foreign	exchange	markets	over	a	given	period	of	time.452	This	paper,	which	focuses	primarily	
on	the	operation	of	currency	black	markets	in	two	countries,	the	United	States	and	
Switzerland,	and	for	three	currencies	(British	pound	sterling,	U.S.	dollar,	Swiss	franc),	most	
closely	resembles	the	latter	empirical	body	of	work.	However,	one	difference	between	this	
																																																						
450	(Agénor,	1992,	p.	2)	
451	See	for	example	(Agénor,	1991,	1992;	Bhagwati	&	Hansen,	1973;	Culbertson,	1975;	Gupta,	1981;	Kamin,	
1993;	Koveos	&	Seifert,	1985;	Lehmann,	1980;	Luintel,	2000;	McDermott,	1989;	Nowak,	1985;	Phylaktis,	1996;	
Pinto,	1991;	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2004;	Roberts,	1989;	Sarwar,	1997;	Shachmurove,	1999;	Sheikh,	1976)	
452	See	for	example	(Baghestani,	1997;	Bahmani-Oskooee,	1996;	Dornbusch,	Dantas,	Pechman,	de	Rezende	
Rocha,	&	Simōes,	1983;	Goldberg,	1992;	Kamin,	1991;	Kharas	&	Pinto,	1989;	Phillips,	1988;	Thomas,	1989)	
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paper	and	prior	empirical	research	is	that	this	is	the	first	paper	to	study	currency	black	
markets	in	advanced	economies.	In	contrast	to	the	daily	data	employed	in	this	paper,	
previous	currency	black	market	research	has	also	been	limited	to	employing	low	frequency	
data	that	is	either	annual453,	quarterly454,	monthly455,	or	bi-weekly456.	Further,	currency	data	
from	prior	studies	is	often	an	average	over	some	period	of	time,	or	end	of	period	data	(e.g.,	
last	day	of	the	month).	Using	such	data	may	hinder	the	ability	to	observe	how	currency	black	
markets	responded	during	fast	moving	or	discrete	events,	such	as	an	official	currency	
devaluation	or	the	outcome	of	a	wartime	battle.457	
	
	 For	understanding	market	views	on	a	nation’s	overall	macroeconomic	and	political	
prospects,	freely	traded	national	currencies	can	provide	several	advantages	over	other	asset	
prices.	For	example,	currencies	are	free	from	company	or	industry-specific	idiosyncrasies	
found	in	an	individual	company’s	stock	price.458	However,	a	perfectly	independent	price	
measure	of	a	nation’s	overall	macroeconomic	and	political	prospects	does	not	exist,	and	
currency	exchange	rates	contain	their	own	idiosyncrasies.	For	example,	the	value	of	any	
particular	national	currency	is	always	relative;	exchange	rates	are	influenced	by	the	
economic	circumstances	of	the	two	countries	whose	currencies	are	being	exchanged,	or	the	
peculiarities	of	the	service	or	good	(e.g.,	gold)	that	is	being	exchanged	for	a	national	
currency.	Exchange	rates	from	an	individual	market	may	also	be	influenced	by	regulations	or	
other	factors	specific	to	that	particular	market.	
	
	 While	a	full	discussion	of	the	myriad	of	influences	on	national	currency	exchange	
rates	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	some	causes	behind	the	rise	and	fall	of	exchange	
rates	are	generally	understood.	For	example,	a	national	currency	will	often	decrease	in	value	
in	response	to	a	negative	real	or	perceived	change	in	national	factors,	including	lower	
																																																						
453	(Bahmani-Oskooee,	1996;	Thomas,	1989)	
454	(Baghestani,	1997)	
455	(Agénor,	1992;	Dornbusch	et	al.,	1983;	Kharas	&	Pinto,	1989;	Reinhart	&	Rogoff,	2004;	Roberts,	1989;	
Thomas,	1989).	Reinhart	(2004),	Roberts	(1989)	utilize	monthly	figures	from	the	IMF	and	Franz	Pick’s	World	
Currency	Yearbook	(formerly	titled	Pick’s	Currency	Yearbook)		
456	(Goldberg,	1992)	
457	For	a	discussion	of	these	limitations	see	(Weidenmier,	2002)	
458	(Willard,	Guinnane,	&	Rosen,	1996,	p.	3)	
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economic	growth	rates,	declining	international	trade,	inflation,	lower	interest	rates,	military	
outcomes,	an	increase	in	sovereign	default	risk,	political	regime	stability,	financial	system	
instability;	a	national	currency	may	increase	in	value	vice-versa.	Often	a	combination	of	
factors	may	explain	the	rise	and	fall	of	a	currency’s	value.	However,	these	cause	and	effect	
relationships	do	no	always	hold,	and	the	timing	of	any	change	in	exchange	rates	for	the	
above	reasons	can	vary	significantly.	In	sum,	caution	should	be	exercised	in	any	discussion	of	
the	timing	and	causes	behind	the	rise	and	fall	in	the	value	of	freely	traded	national	
currencies.	 	
	 	 Page	|	185	
	
5.3	Historical	Overview	of	1940s	Currency	Black	Markets	
	
“People	here	are	very	grim	and	determined.	It	is	going	to	be	a	terrible	business	but	I	
think	we	shall	pull	through.	We	are	fully	prepared	to	be	bombed	to	smithereens	in	
London	but	it	won’t	make	any	difference.”	
	
–Comment	by	Mr.	M.	Bolton,	Bank	of	England,	as	recorded	by	
Mr.	W.	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank,	24	May,	1940459	
	
As	noted	by	Aldcroft	and	Oliver	(1998),	British	sterling	was	the	anchor	currency	in	one	
several	‘currency	blocs’	that	emerged	in	the	1930s	following	Britain's	suspension	of	the	gold	
standard	in	1931,	the	devaluation	of	sterling,	and	the	move	to	a	floating	exchange	rate	
regime.460	In	the	case	of	the	Sterling	Bloc,	as	it	was	referred,	various	efforts	were	made	to	
reduce	exchange	rate	volatility,	including	the	introduction	of	the	Exchange	Equalisation	Fund	
in	1932	and	the	September	1936	exchange	stabilisation	agreement	reached	between	the	UK,	
France	and	the	United	States.461	However,	these	measures	achieved	mixed	results	as	
currencies	continued	to	fluctuate	in	value,	particularly	in	response	to	pre-wartime	events	
such	as	Germany’s	1938	annexation	of	Austria.462		
	
A	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	(NYFRB)	memorandum	prepared	by	Charles	P.	
Kindleberger	dated	30	September,	1937	titled	‘Economic	Position	and	Prospects	of	Great	
Britain’,	laid	out	the	Britain’s	desire	to	knowingly	maintain	an	artificially	high	value	for	
sterling:		
	
“there	seems	to	be	little	doubt	that	sterling	is	too	high	in	relation	to	the	dollar	at	
present	quotations	($4.95)	as	a	long-run	proposition,	yet	it	is	likely	that	a	high	sterling	
rate	will	suit	Great	Britain	for	the	duration	of	her	armament	boom.	High	sterling	
enables	the	British	to	buy	desired	raw	materials	from	outside	the	Sterling	Area	more	
cheaply,	and	to	prevent	certain	of	their	resources	from	being	diverted	to	production	
for	export	markets”.463		
																																																						
459	C261	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	24	May,	1940	
460	(Aldcroft	&	Oliver,	1998)	
461	(Aldcroft	&	Oliver,	1998,	p.	83)	
462	(Kanago	&	McCormick,	2013)	
463	C261,	p.	3,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	30	September,	1937	
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Volatility	in	sterling’s	exchange	rate	was	an	issue	in	the	lead-up	to	the	Second	World	War,	
with	Kindleberger	noting	on	13	November,	1937	that:		
	
“the	lack	of	stability	of	the	foreign	exchange	market…calls	into	question	the	
perfection	of	the	technical	arrangements	made	under	the	Tripartite	Agreement.	
Fluctuations	of	more	than	2	cents	a	day	in	the	sterling	rate,	and	similar	or	even	
greater	variations	in	other	European	currencies	seem	to	require	an	explanation	on	
the	part	of	the	Stabilization	Fund	authorities	presumably	charged	with	the	
elimination	of	day-to-day	changes	of	this	magnitude.	The	sterling	rate	may	be	taken	
as	the	basis	of	discussion	since	the	variations	in	other	exchange	rates	were	in	large	
part	due	to	the	fluctuations	of	this	currency.”464	
	
Despite	significant	efforts	by	Britain’s	Exchange	Equalisation	Fund	to	enforce	the	Tripartite	
Agreement,	sterling	fell	over	7%	from	its	February	1938	value	of	$5.04	to	$4.68	in	late-
August	1939,	a	little	over	a	year	following	the	Anschluss.465		
	
As	discussed	by	Kanago	and	McCormick	(2013),	at	the	onset	of	the	Second	World	War	
a	large	free	market	for	sterling	operated	in	New	York	until	the	introduction	of	significantly	
enhanced	exchange	controls	in	June	1940.	However,	as	the	Second	World	War	progressed,	
currency	black	markets	(or	‘free’	markets	as	they	were	often	referred	to	by	contemporaries)	
developed	in	a	variety	of	locations,	including	the	Swiss	cities	of	Berne	and	Zurich.466	As	noted	
by	Frey	and	Waldenstrom	(2004),	neutral	Switzerland	and	Sweden	were	host	to	the	only	two	
financial	markets	in	Europe	where	the	domestic	government	did	not	heavily	intervene	during	
the	vast	majority	of	the	war.467	
	
Kanago	and	McCormick’s	study	daily	free	sterling	in	the	New	York	market	for	a	14-
month	period,	from	May	1939	until	July	1940.	Starting	on	5	September,	1939,	British	sterling	
																																																						
464	C261,	p.	1,	Letter	from	C.	P.	Kindleberger	to	W.	Knoke	titled	‘British	Stabilization	Fund	Technique’,	New	York	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	13	November,	1937	
465	(Kanago	&	McCormick,	2013)	
466	(Kanago	&	McCormick,	2013,	p.	389)	In	the	post	war	period	other	important	markets	for	‘free”	sterling	
included	Paris,	Milan,	Hong	Kong,	Beirut,	Bombay,	Macao,	Casablanca,	Tangier	and	Alexandria		28-Oct.	1951	
(463)	NY	Times	article.	
467	(Frey	&	Waldenström,	2004,	p.	56)		
	 	 Page	|	187	
	
had	an	official	(fixed)	exchange	rate	against	other	currencies	such	as	the	U.S.	dollar	and	Swiss	
franc.468	However,	Kanago	and	McCormick	state	that	after	the	5	September,	1939,	that:		
	
“there	was	substantial	trading	of	free	sterling	in	New	York	and	Switzerland.	It	wasn’t	
until	June	1940	that	the	British	government	took	decisive	steps	to	limit	the	free	
exchange	of	dollars	and	pounds”.	
	
Fixed	rates	had	come	to	be	seen	by	many	policymakers	as	preferable	to	floating	rates	and	
the	accompanying	currency	speculation,	which	during	the	interwar	period	in	Keynes’	words	
had	“caused	so	much	trouble”.469	During	the	Second	World	War	and	beyond,	policymakers	
simultaneously	viewed	black	markets	as	both	an	important	source	of	information	as	well	as	a	
threat	to	state	goals.	
	
Despite	the	British	crackdown,	data	found	in	the	Swiss	National	Bank	archives	
indicate	that	free	sterling	trade	continued	through	at	least	September	1944	in	Switzerland.	
As	late	as	1943	black	market	currency	smugglers	were	still	a	significant	concern	to	British	
policymakers.	On	22	April,	1943,	the	Chancellor	announced	that	the	Bank	of	England	would	
cease	issuance	of	all	£10	notes	and	withdraw	large	denominations	of	sterling	to:	
	
“provide	an	additional	handicap	for	those	who	may	contemplate	breaches	of	
Exchange	Control.	The	real	purposes	were	to	make	more	difficult	the	illegal	operation	
of	note	smugglers	desirous	of	evading	exchange	control	regulations,	of	black	market	
operators,	and	of	tax	evaders—all	of	whom	predominantly	use	large	denomination	
notes	in	order	to	cover	up	their	tracks.	Bank	of	England	notes	in	circulation	during	
this	time	consisted	of	£1,	£5,	£10,	£20,	£50,	£100,	£200,	£500	and	£1000.”470	
	
Later,	on	24	January,	1945,	a	confidential	memo	was	sent	from	the	Bank	of	England	to	the	
NYFRB	stating	that	“it	has	now	been	decided	to	seek	powers	whereby	the	Bank	of	England	
																																																						
468	(Kanago	&	McCormick,	2013,	p.	392)	
469		(Skidelsky,	2000,	p.	250)		
470C261,	p.	1,	‘Withdrawal	of	Large	Bank	Notes:	The	British	Experience’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	
4	December,	1944	
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notes	of	£5	and	upwards	may	be	called	in”	with	only	one	month’s	notice,	after	which	these	
notes	would	cease	to	be	legal	tender.471	
	
During	the	war	the	Bank	of	England	was	concerned	about	sterling’s	exchange	rate	in	
not	just	free	but	also	official	markets.	Maintaining	confidence	in	sterling	was	deemed	
important	to	maintaining	confidence	in	Britain’s	war	prospects,	and	according	to	archival	
documents	there	was	at	least	one	instance	where	the	Bank	of	England	orchestrated	an	
intervention	in	an	official	currency	market	to	protect	sterling.	On	13	June,	1941,	the	Bank	of	
England’s	Montagu	Norman	wrote	to	his	counterpart	at	the	Bank	of	Canada,	Graham	
Towers,	requesting	that	that	the	Bank	of	Canada	intervene	on	the	Bank	of	England’s	behalf	in	
the	New	York	market	to	support	sterling’s	official	exchange	rate	range	of	$4.025-4.035.472	
Norman	to	Towers:	
	
“Would	you	be	willing	to	arrange	to	intervene	on	our	behalf	through	third	parties	at	
any	time	the	free	market	rate	tends	to	move	beyond	the	limits	of	our	official	rates.	I	
should	much	appreciate	your	comments	particularly	as	to	whether	you	think	origin	of	
operations	could	be	disguised.”473		
	
Towers,	in	a	cable	sent	the	next	day,	agreed	to	act	through	the	Royal	Bank	of	Canada,	a	
Canadian	commercial	bank,	which	he	felt	would	help	disguise	the	origin	of	the	transaction.	
Towers	to	Norman:	
	
“It	might	well	be	thought	that	their	operations	were	conducted	for	private	clients.	
However,	if	they	had	occasion	to	be	frequently	in	the	market	on	both	sides,	it	might	
be	suspected	that	the	transactions	had	an	official	flavor.”474	
	
Some	movement	in	sterling’s	exchange	rate	against	the	dollar	was	allowed	in	the	
official	(regulated)	New	York	foreign	exchange	market.	However,	very	little	movement	in	
sterling’s	value	against	the	dollar	occurred	in	the	official	New	York	market.	For	the	nine-year	
																																																						
471	C261,	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	24	January,	1945	
472	EC4/168,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	13	June,	1941	
473	EC4/168,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	13	June,	1941	
474	EC4/168,	Bank	of	England	Archive,	13	June,	1941	
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period	from	August	1940	up	until	sterling’s	devaluation	on	19	September,	1949,	trading	in	
the	official	sterling	market	was	range-bound	between	a	high	$4.04	and	a	low	of	just	above	$4	
per	pound,	or	just	$0.04	(1%)	in	range	during	almost	the	entire	1940s	(Figure	11).	Further,	for	
the	vast	majority	of	this	period,	sterling	traded	within	$0.01	of	its	official	rate	of	exchange	of	
$4.03.	
	
	 	
	
	
Figure	11:	Official	U.S.	$/£	Exchange	Rate	vs.	'Free'	Rate,	Dec.	1939	–	Dec.	1950	
	
Note:	No	data	was	found	for	the	18-month	period	from	19	September,	1944	through	3	May,	1946,	which	was	likely	due	to	the	enactment	of	a	resolution	by	
the	Swiss	Bankers	Association	on	18	September,	1944	banning	trade	in	British	sterling	and	US	dollar	notes.	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
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As	of	July	1940,	Bank	of	England	officials	were	still	proclaiming	confidence	in	their	
ability	to	maintain	sterling’s	official	rate.	For	example,	when	Knoke	asked	Bolton	whether	
two	American	banks,	Guaranty	Trust	and	National	City	Bank,	could	buy	and	sell	sterling	
with	each	other,	Bolton	dared	the	banks	to	trade	outside	sterling’s	official	range,	stating	
that	“if	somebody	wanted	to	take	a	loss	by	selling	lower	or	buying	higher	(than	the	official	
rate)	that	was	his	funeral”.475	In	contrast	to	sterling’s	stability	against	the	dollar	in	the	
official	market,	free	markets	in	New	York,	Zurich,	Stockholm	and	Lisbon	were	quoting	
British	sterling	as	low	as	$1.60	–	less	than	half	the	sterling’s	official	value	–	during	the	
height	of	the	Battle	of	Britain.476	In	a	telephone	conversation	between	the	Bank	of	
England’s	Mr.	Bolton	and	the	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank’s	Mr.	Knoke,	Bolton	
remarked	that,	with	regards	to	the	New	York	sterling	quotations	reaching	London,	“all	
press	reports	seem	to	refer	to	the	free	market	rate	as	though	that	were	the	only	rate”.477	
The	Bank	of	England	made	arrangements	with	“the	London	branches	of	the	American	
banks	to	ensure	a	quotation	of	sterling	at	the	official	rate	in	New	York”,	although	noting	
that	“it	will	be	difficult	to	prevent	some	abuse	of	the	facilities	of	this	nature”.478		
	
In	the	post-war	period	free	sterling	often	traded	at	a	discount	of	30%	or	more	to	its	
official	exchange	rate.	Both	the	Bank	of	England	and	NYFRB	archives	contain	a	voluminous	
correspondence	on	the	problem	of	‘free’	sterling,	or	‘cheap’	sterling	as	it	was	often	
referred.	During	and	after	the	war	the	Bank	of	England	received	detailed	updates	from	the	
NYFRB	on	the	price	and	market	action	for	sterling	in	the	New	York	market,	as	well	as	the	
names	of	financial	houses	actively	dealing	in	sterling	(Table	24).	
	
	 	
																																																						
475	C261,	p.	4	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	1	July,	1940	
476	No.	75	28-Oct.	1951	(463)	From	a	New	York	Times	article	quoting	Franz	Pick.		
477	C261,	p.	2	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	9	August,	1940	
478	C261,	p.	3,	Incoming	Cablegram	Serial	No.	3899	from	Mr.	Bolton	of	the	Bank	of	England,	New	York	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	7	June,	1940	
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Table	24:	Quarterly	Sterling	Volume,	New	York-Based	Financial	Firms,	Sept.-Dec.	1941	
	
Qtr.	Ending	
Name	 Dec.	1941	
Royal	Bank	of	Canada	 £26,500	
Bank	of	London	&	South	America	 25,000	
Guaranty	Trust	Company	 16,000	
National	City	Bank	 15,500	
Manufacturers	Trust	Company	 10,500	
First	National	Bank	of	Boston	 10,200	
Barclays	Bank	(D.C.	&	O.)	 9,000	
Philadelphia	National	Bank	 8,000	
Corn	Exchange	Bank	 6,500	
Central	Hanover	 6,100	
Bank	of	the	Manhattan	Company	 5,000	
Chemical	Bank	&	Trust	Company	 4,500	
American	Trust	Company,	San	Francisco	 4,000	
Security	First	National,	Los	Angeles	 3,900	
Public	National	Bank	 3,400	
Irving	Trust	Company	 2,000	
American	Metal	Company	 750	
J.P.	Morgan	Bank	 500	
Lazard	Frères	 200	
Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	 100	
Total	 £157,650	
Source:	Bank	of	England	Archive	
	
As	noted	from	a	July	1940	recorded	phone	conversation	between	Bolton	and	Knoke,	the	
volume	in	the	New	York	free	sterling	market	“did	not	tell	the	whole	story”:	
	
“What	the	total	was	of	uncovered	commercial	commitments	of	the	nature	which	
we	discussed	at	the	beginning	nobody	knew.	Rubber	wasn’t	the	only	commodity	
bought	on	a	sterling	basis.	There	were	many	others	such	as	wool	from	South	
American,	leather,	bristles,	essential	oils,	cocoa	beans,	coffee,	etc.	With	regard	to	
all	of	them	our	importers	had	claimed	that	their	business	was	legitimate,	they	
acted	in	good	faith	and	were	now	asking	that	they	be	allowed	to	cover	at	the	free	
sterling	rate”.479	
	
	 During	and	particularly	after	the	Second	World	War	the	number	of	different	
currency	regulations	employed	by	many	nations	began	to	multiply,	with	unique	rules,	
legalities	and	exchange	rates	based	on	the	trading	partner	and	use	case.	Here	Britain	was	
																																																						
479	C261,	p.	3	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	1	July,	1940	
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perhaps	the	leader	with	by	one	count	over	60	different	‘varietals’	of	sterling.480	Many	of	
the	different	forms	of	sterling	arose	out	of	bilaterally	negotiated	foreign	trade	and	
exchange	agreements	with	different	countries,	and	they	were	consequently	named	after	
that	particular	country.		Selected	examples	of	these	different	accounts,	and	their	end	of	
month	rates	for	the	period	of	December	1948	through	August	1949,	can	be	found	in	Table	
25.	
	
	 	
																																																						
480	(Pick,	1951)		
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Table	25:	Monthly	Exchange	Rates	for	Selected	British	Sterling	Accounts,	1948-49	
	
$/£	Account	
Variety	 Dec.	 Jan.	 Feb.	 Mar.	 April	 May	 June	 July	 Aug.	
Handpayments	
London	
N/A	 £2.98	 £3.06	 £3.09	 £3.06	 £3.04	 £2.70	 £2.80	 £2.83	
Scheduled	
Territory	 £3.05	 £2.95	 £3.03	 £3.10	 £3.03	 £2.65	 £2.60	 £2.66	 £2.87	
Dutch	
Accounts	 £3.25	 £3.18	 £3.32	 £3.30	 £3.28	 £3.28	 £3.20	 £3.14	 £3.26	
Egyptian	
Accounts	 £3.30	 £3.25	 £3.10	 £3.15	 £3.18	 £3.20	 £3.00	 £2.85	 £2.90	
Italian	
Accounts	 £3.85	 £3.45	 £3.40	 £3.45	 £3.40	 £3.45	 £3.28	 £3.18	 £3.16	
French	
Accounts	No.	1	 £3.55	 £3.25	 £3.25	 £3.30	 £3.30	 £3.35	 £3.18	 £3.20	 £3.18	
	
Source:	Pick’s	Monthly	Currency	Report,	1948-49	
	
In	addition	to	the	country	specific	forms	of	sterling,	other	legal	and	illegal	varieties	
of	sterling	in	existence	are	summarized	in	Table	26.	
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Table	26:	Legal	and	Black	Market	Forms	of	British	Pound	Sterling	as	of	1951	
Type	 Legality	
1951	Daily	
Volume	
Markets		
Traded	 Description	
‘Free’	(‘Cheap’)	
Sterling	
Illegal	 (See	Table	
31)	
New	York,	Zurich,	
Hong	Kong,	Beirut,	
Paris,	
Johannesburg,	
Cairo,	etc.	
Loosely	used	term	for	sterling	
exchanged	for	the	U.S.	dollar,	and	
other	currencies,	at	less	than	the	
official	exchange	rate	
Security	sterling	
(or	Switch	
pound)	
Legal	 	£30,000	-	
50,000	
New	York	 Used	for	the	acquisition	of	
securities	by	foreigners	
Transferable	
accounts	
(Commercial	
sterling)	
Legal	 	£200,000	
-	400,000	
New	York	 Legal	variety	of	sterling	arising	
from	trade	balances	with	the	UK	
Residential	
sterling	
Grey	 	£500,000	
-	
1,000,000	
New	York,	Hong	
Kong,	
Johannesburg,	
Beirut,	Kuwait	
Blocked	sterling	balances	
belonging	to	British	citizens	
Handpayments	
London	
(Diamond	
sterling)	
Illegal	 	£15,000	-	
25,000	
London,	New	York	 Sterling	and	dollar	bank	accounts	
which	were	exchanged	in	London	
and	New	York,	and	were	
purported	to	pay	for	illegal	
diamond	and	fur	imports	from	
Britain,	purported	to	represent	
the	“biggest	part	of	the	black	
market";	transfers	between	New	
York	to	London	could	take	
anywhere	from	3-8	days.	
Sterling	
banknotes	
Illegal	 	£10,000	
for	New	
York	
Asia,	Near	Orient,	
North	Africa,	
lesser	extent	in	
New	York	
Sterling	notes	traded	to	meet	
tourism	and	other	demand	
Sources:	Pick’s	Monthly	Currency	Report,	1951,	1955,	1953	
	 	
	
Like	British	sterling,	the	currencies	of	other	countries	also	traded	at	free	exchange	
rates,	including	the	U.S.	dollar	and	Swiss	franc.	There	was	an	active	market	for	U.S.	dollars	
in	Switzerland	both	during	and	after	the	Second	World	War	(Figure	12).	In	terms	of	the	
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size	of	the	free	U.S.	dollar	market,	no	volume	data	has	been	located	to	date.	However,	a	
NYFRB	archival	memorandum	dated	10	May,	1950	references	the	“billions	of	dollars	in	
United	States	currency	hoarded	abroad”.481	
	
Figure	12:	Swiss	Fr./’Free’	U.S.	Dollar,	Jan.	1942	-	Dec.	1950,	Switzerland	
	
Note:	No	data	exists	for	the	18-month	period	from	19	September,	1944	through	3	May,	1946,	which	was	
likely	due	to	the	enactment	of	a	resolution	by	the	Swiss	Bankers	Association	on	18	September,	1944	banning	
trade	in	British	sterling	and	US	dollar	notes.	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
Trading	of	Swiss	francs	was	split	into	both	an	official	market	and	a	market	for	what	was	
called	‘finanzdollars’.	The	market	for	‘finanzdollars’	was	initially	restricted	to	New	York,	
then	later	expanded	to	Switzerland.	Finanzdollar	Swiss	francs	were	typically	convertible	
into	U.S.	dollars	at	a	higher	exchange	rate	than	the	official	rate.	
	
																																																						
481	C261,	p.	1,	Conversation	between	Jay	E.	Crane	and	W.	Knoke,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	10	
May,	1950	
Fr.	2.00
Fr.	2.50
Fr.	3.00
Fr.	3.50
Fr.	4.00
Fr.	4.50
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Concern	over	the	trading	of	free	sterling	continued	to	be	expressed	by	officials	
throughout	the	post-war	period.	Bank	officials	deemed	these	markets,	and	the	heavily	
discounted	price	at	which	sterling	could	be	exchanged,	as	having	a	negative	impact	on	
confidence	in	both	Britain’s	war	prospects	and	its	ability	to	meet	its	financial	obligations	in	
the	post-war	period.	For	example,	alarms	sounded	inside	the	Bank	of	England	when	public	
advertisements	were	placed	to	sell	blocks	of	sterling,	such	one	posted	in	the	New	York	
Herald	Tribune	on	20	June,	1947	by	a	Mr.	C.	Y.	Wang	to	“sell	£67,500	at	a	discount	of	10	
percent	or	more	from	the	official	rate”.482	However,	as	reported	in	media	publications	
such	as	The	Economist	(Table	27),	the	state	of	Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	finances	
and	other	issues	raised	concerns	over	whether	sterling	would	maintain	its	value.	Britain’s	
debt-to-GDP	ratio	in	the	1940s	peaked	in	1946	at	270%,	or	over	twice	the	level	of	the	
U.S.’s	debt-to-GDP	ratio.	483	Overall,	diminished	confidence	in	sterling	was	perceived	by	
contemporaries	as	an	existential	threat	to	the	The	City’s	status	as	a	global	financial	and	
banking	centre.		
	 	
																																																						
482	C261,	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	20	June,	1947	
483	(Abbas,	Belhocine,	ElGanainy,	&	Horton,	2010)	
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Table	27:	Article	References	in	The	Economist	to	‘Free’	Sterling,	1946-49	
Article	Title	 Date	 Summary	
Swiss	Sterling	
Control	
23-Mar-46	 Describes	on-demand	Swiss	convertibility	of	sterling	and	desire	to	
prevent	too	much	sterling	accumulation	in	Switzerland	
Switzerland's	
Sterling		
16-Nov-46	 Mention	of	currency	arbitrage	and	Swiss	banks	'illegal'	public	
advertisements	offering	to	purchase	sterling		
Banking	with	
Inconvertible	
Sterling	
15-Nov-47	 Convertibility	crisis	hits	demand	for	London	banking	services	
Strength	of	
Sterling	
29-Nov-47	 Reference	to	'free	sterling	rates'	in	New	York;	price	of	4.03	and	1/8-1/4,	
which	is	butting	up	against	official	band	of	4.02	3/4	and	4.03	and	1/4.	
References	short	sales	in	July-August	and	subsequent	covering	due	to	
sterling	being	'oversold'.	
Sterling	in	New	
York	(letter	to	
the	editor)	
14-Feb-48	 Reference	to	recent	front	page	stories	about	large	sterling	banknote	
transactions	in	New	York;	only	£10-20K	per	week	representing	90%	of	the	
activity;	reference	to	heavy	trading	from	Switzerland	and	Tangier	with	a	
bottom	reached	of	$2.45.	Reference	made	to	sterling	appreciating	
following	the	war.	
Sterling	
Devaluation	
22-May-48	 First	mention	in	The	Economist	of	the	subsequent	sterling	devaluation;	
describes	New	York	rate	for	sterling	as	"low"	and	based	solely	on	the	
"prohibition	of	importing	pound	notes	into	Great	Britain"	
Free	Sterling	in	
Europe	
22-May-48	 Reference	to	growing	trade	priced	in	sterling	at	below	official	rate	of	
£4.03;	quotes	price	of	10.55	Swiss	Francs	to	the	pound	vs.	official	rate	of	
17.34,	a	38.5%	discount.	Mentions	that	Portugal,	in	addition	to	
Switzerland	and	U.S.,	places	no	restrictions	on	pound	note	movement.	
Most	of	this	"considerable"	offshore	pound	note	trade	occurring	not	with	
Britain	but	other	countries.	Bearer	bonds	now	purchasable	for	$1.80	to	
the	pound	vs.	$2.50	a	few	months	ago,	which	"reflects	a	growing	
disinclination	in	the	U.S.	to	invest	in	British	securities".	Gilts	can	be	
purchased	at	a	7%	yield.	
Sterling	for	
Export	
22-May-48	 Sterling	balances	held	in	London	on	Italian,	French,	Belgian	and	Dutch	
accounts	may	be	purchased	at	$3.35	and	sold	for	$3.25.	Transfers	
between	foreign	accounts	prohibited	by	Bank	of	England.	Describes	
import/re-export	arbitrage	scheme	('shunting'	through	triangular	and	
more	complex	commodity	ops).	Also	describes	'so-called	Swiss	controlled	
pound';	Swiss	cross-rate	for	the	pound	is	$3.52-3.60	
Switching	in	
Sterling	
Securities		
24-Jul-48	 Financial	repression:	prohibition	on	non-residents	taking	money	out	by	
BoE	into	13	different	account	classifications.	Expectation	of	a	large	
decline	in	American	trading	on	the	London	Stock	Exchange;	pound	
recently	trading	at	$2	in	New	York	and	immediately	fell	upon	this	
announcement	to	$1.85.	
No	Black	Sterling	
for	Vatican		
11-Dec-48	 Reference	to	sterling	black	market	in	Vatican	City	and	Italy	
Harder	Sterling		 18-Dec-48	 Notes	sterling's	overseas	appreciation	in	the	past	year,	in	the	U.S.	from	
$3.20-$3.50;	in	Zurich	from	9.50-12.25	Swiss	francs;	Honk	Kong	free	
market	rate	of	$2.80-$3.10;	Paris	from	876-1500	francs	(vs.	official	rate	of	
1062).	Notes	the	creation	of	technical	strength	for	sterling	after	the	large	
sterling	short	position	pre-convertibility	crisis	which	needed	to	be	
covered.	
199	|	P a g e 	
	
Article	Title	 Date	 Summary	
Free	Sterling	
Hardens	
16-Apr-49	 Free	sterling	rates	from	around	the	world	quoted,	from	$3.35	in	France	to	
$3.80	in	Argentina;	in	Switzerland	'B'	account	sterling	goes	for	$3.90.	
"This	maze	of	official	and	free	rates	is	an	international	cobweb	in	which	
the	most	noisome	spiders	lurk	and	fatten.	How	long	will	it	be	before	a	
breath	of	fresh	air	sweeps	it	all	away."	
Sterling	since	
Devaluation	
26-Nov-49	 Post	devaluation	sterling	trading	at	a	discount	in	NY,	Zurich,	etc.	Shunting	
becomes	profitable	when	sterling	trades	at	a	discount	of	5%,	accelerates	
at	10%.	Tax	free	rewards	offered	to	exchange	control	informers.	
Source:	The	Economist	
	
	
Just	how	‘black’,	meaning	illegal,	were	the	New	York	and	Swiss	free	currency	
markets?	During	the	1940s,	policy	sentiment	regarding	the	prohibition,	or	minimization,	of	
black	markets	varied.	For	example,	many	in	British	policymaking	circles,	particularly	at	the	
Bank	of	England,	were	deeply	concerned	about	the	advent	and	growth	of	free	sterling	
markets.	Contrasting	with	the	Bank’s	view	was	the	opinion	of	arguably	the	most	influential	
economic	policy	figure	in	Britain	of	the	time,	John	Maynard	Keynes,	who	at	the	outset	of	
the	Second	World	War	wrote	in	favour	of	allowing	currency	black	markets	to	exist	because	
they	could	prove	a	useful	source	of	information	during	times	of	significant	regulation.484	In	
a	memo	to	Treasury	dated	24	September,	1939,	Keynes	argued:	
	
“…there	is	much	to	be	said	against	blocking	up	all	the	loopholes	and	crevices.	Not	
all	the	money	which	slips	through	is	‘lost’.	There	is	a	good	deal	business	which	
does	us	no	harm	and	is	better	allowed,	which,	nevertheless,	one	cannot	make	into	
a	precedent	by	giving	it	official	approval.”485		
	
Matters	on	free	currency	exchange	rates	were	made	somewhat	clearer	following	
Bretton	Woods	with	the	introduction	of	IMF	Clause	IV-4-(b),	which	provided	that	“each	
member	undertakes	to	outlaw	exchange	dealings	in	its	market	at	rates	outside	those	
established	by	the	Fund.”486	A	NYFRB	policy	document	addresses	the	challenges	presented	
by	free	sterling	trade	vis-à-vis	Clause	IV-4-(b):	
																																																						
484	(Skidelsky,	2000,	pp.	47-48)	
485	(Keynes	&	Moggridge,	1983,	pp.	12-13)	How	important	Keynes’	views	were	to	the	formation	of	the	1940s	
markets	is	unclear.	
486	The	language	from	the	IMF	Article	states	“Each	member	undertakes,	through	appropriate	measure	
consistent	with	this	Agreement,	to	permit	within	its	territories	exchange	transactions	between	its	currency	
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“it	was	up	to	the	United	States	to	prevent	such	dealings,	which	could	be	done	
either	by	supporting	sterling	at	our	own	expense	at	the	legal	rate	or	by	rigid	
exchange	control.	The	former	is	obviously	out	of	the	question,	the	second	would	
be	a	tremendous	nuisance	quite	out	of	proportion	to	the	advantages	to	be	
gained.”487	
	
With	regards	to	the	legality	of	Swiss	free	markets,	from	the	British	perspective	
these	markets	were	certainly	thought	to	be	illegal	as	their	currency	was	traded	at	a	rate	
other	than	the	official	rate.	However,	from	the	Swiss	perspective,	these	markets	appear	to	
have	been	legal	under	Swiss	law	during	most	(if	not	all)	of	the	1940s,	and	Switzerland	did	
not	join	the	IMF	until	1992.	While	a	resolution	enacted	by	the	Swiss	Bankers	Association	
on	18	September,	1944	banned	trading	in	sterling	and	dollar	notes	for	an	18-month	
period,	the	trading	of	banknotes	of	other	currencies,	including	those	of	France,	Germany,	
Italy,	Belgium,	the	Netherlands,	and	Spain,	continued	in	Switzerland	for	approximately	
another	seven	months	through	3	March,	1945	(Figure	13).488	It	is	unclear	whether	the	18	
September,	1944	resolution	enacted	by	the	Swiss	Bankers	Association	was	precipitated	by	
a	Swiss	regulatory	or	a	legal	change.	Pressure	from	Allied	countries	may	have	led	to	the	
change,	or	it	could	have	been	a	response	to	Nazi	economic	warfare	efforts	under	the	
codename	‘Operation	Bernhard’	to	devalue	the	U.S.	dollar	and	British	sterling	by	flooding	
the	market	with	massive	quantities	of	counterfeit	banknotes,	or	altogether	other	reasons.	
	
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																				
and	the	currency	of	other	members	only	within	the	limits	prescribed	in	Section	3	of	this	Article”	and	
continues	“exchange	contracts	which	involve	the	currency	of	any	member	and	which	are	contrary	to	the	
exchange	control	regulations	of	that	member	maintained	or	imposed	consistently	with	this	Agreement	shall	
be	unenforceable	in	the	territories	of	any	member.”	C261,	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	
1945	
487	C261,	p.	1,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	1945	
488	Devisen	Mittelkurse	9.6/9070,	1939-1950,	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive.	A	note	found	in	the	Swiss	
archives	states:	“According	to	the	Federal	Council	decision	of	2	March	1945,	the	imports	and	exports,	as	well	
as	the	delivery	and	the	receipt	of	foreign	banknotes	are	prohibited.	For	the	travel	demand	and	the	small	
border	traffic	will	be	taken	in	view	of	specific	provisions”.	
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Figure	13:	Swiss	Fr./’Free’	German	Mark	exchange	rate,	Sep.	1941	-	Mar.	1945,	
Switzerland	
	
	
Note:	exchange	rate	based	on	the	market	for	100er/50er	German	banknotes	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
	 	
Fr.	0.00
Fr.	5.00
Fr.	10.00
Fr.	15.00
Fr.	20.00
Fr.	25.00
Fr.	30.00
Fr.	35.00
Fr.	40.00
Fr.	45.00
Fr.	50.00
31
-A
ug
-1
93
7
31
-O
ct
-1
93
7
31
-D
ec
-1
93
7
28
-F
eb
-1
93
8
30
-A
pr
-1
93
8
30
-Ju
n-
19
38
31
-A
ug
-1
93
8
31
-O
ct
-1
93
8
31
-D
ec
-1
93
8
28
-F
eb
-1
93
9
30
-A
pr
-1
93
9
30
-Ju
n-
19
39
31
-A
ug
-1
93
9
31
-O
ct
-1
93
9
31
-D
ec
-1
93
9
29
-F
eb
-1
94
0
30
-A
pr
-1
94
0
30
-Ju
n-
19
40
31
-A
ug
-1
94
0
31
-O
ct
-1
94
0
31
-D
ec
-1
94
0
28
-F
eb
-1
94
1
202	|	P a g e 	
	
5.4	Data	and	Sources	
	
5.4.1	Introduction	and	data	accuracy	tests	
	
"You	only	have	to	cough	in	Zurich	and	the	echo	is	heard	in	New	York."	
-	Anonymous	Swiss	banker489	
	
Prior	research	that	has	included	free	sterling	market	data	have	utilized	end-of-
month	data	sourced	from	Franz	Pick,	publisher	of	Pick’s	Currency	Yearbook.490		This	paper	
introduces	new	archival	daily	time	series	data	from	the	New	York	and	Swiss	free	currency	
markets.	The	new	daily	New	York	data	for	the	Swiss	franc-U.S.	dollar	exchange	rate	begins	
in	August	1947	and	continues	through	September	1949.	Significantly	more	new	data	was	
found	for	the	Swiss	market,	and	the	new	data	set	includes	daily	Swiss	franc-pound	sterling	
and	Swiss	franc-U.S.	Dollar	exchange	rates	for	most	of	the	period	from	1939	through	the	
end	of	1951.	No	Swiss	market	data	for	the	Swiss	franc-British	sterling	and	Swiss	franc-U.S.	
Dollar	exchange	rates	was	found	for	the	18-month	period	from	19	September,	1944	
through	3	May,	1946,	likely	due	to	the	enactment	of	a	resolution	by	the	Swiss	Bankers	
Association	on	18	September,	1944	banning	trade	in	British	sterling	and	US	dollar	
banknotes.	
	
The	exact	location	of	trading	within	Switzerland	was	not	obtained,	but	archival	
evidence	and	contemporary	sources	indicate	that	Zurich	and	Berne	both	had	active	
markets	for	free	currency	trading	during	this	period.	References	from	other	non-archival	
sources	such	as	Cairncross	and	Pick	reference	Zurich	as	the	centre	for	free	market	
currency	trading	in	Switzerland.	Trading	typically	took	place	six	days	per	week	(Monday	
through	Saturday),	and	gaps	in	the	series	appear	to	primarily	coincide	with	official	
holidays.	Summary	statistics	for	the	Swiss	market	are	presented	in	Table	28,	and	all	data	
																																																						
489	(Green,	1968,	p.	112)	The	banker	was	commenting	on	the	informational	symmetry	between	these	two	
financial	markets	during	the	post-Second	World	War	period.	
490		(Pick,	1951,	1953,	1955)	For	example,	Pick’s	data	was	previously	used	by	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	
1983,	2003)	
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and	sources	employed	in	this	chapter	are	summarized	in	Table	29	(including	both	new	
archival	sources	as	well	as	existing	sources).	
	
Table	28:	Summary	Statistics	of	Free	Sterling	and	Free	Dollar	Exchange	Rates,	
Switzerland,	1939-50	
  
Total 
 
Sub-Periods 
Swiss Fr./British £ '39-'44 - '46-'50   '39-'44 '46-'50 
 
Observations (n) 2,933  1,486 1,447 
 
Max Rate Fr. 17.75  Fr. 17.75 Fr. 12.80 
 
Min Rate Fr. 5.10  Fr. 5.10 Fr. 8.75 
 
Mean Fr. 10.17  Fr. 9.59 Fr. 10.76 
 
Median Fr. 10.33  Fr. 8.68 Fr. 10.80 
 
Standard Deviation Fr. 2.36  Fr. 3.10 Fr. 0.85 
     
U.S. $/British £*         
 
Observations (n) 2932  1486 1446 
 
Max Rate $3.85   $3.85  $3.22  
 
Min Rate $1.42   $1.42  $2.30  
 
Mean $2.69   $2.67  $2.72  
 
Median $2.74   $2.77  $2.73  
 
SD Rate $0.48   $0.63  $0.23  
  
    
Correlation of Exchange Rates         
 
Fr./$ - Fr./£ 0.58  0.58 0.36 
 
Fr./$ - $/£ 0.10  -0.08 -0.54 
 
Fr./£ - $/£ 0.73  0.76 0.59 	
*Note:	a	daily	U.S.	dollar-pound	sterling	exchange	rate	is	derived	using	the	U.S.	dollar-Swiss	franc	and	pound	
sterling-Swiss	franc	exchange	rates	from	the	Swiss	market.	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
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Table	29:	Summary	of	Data	Sources	-	Free	Currency	Exchange	Rates		
	
	
													Some	scepticism	is	in	order	when	working	with	black	market	data,	whether	from	
professionally	published	volumes	such	as	the	Pick	Currency	Yearbook,	or	in	central	bank	
archival	documents.	Attribution	and	provenance	are	often	missing,	and	some	of	the	
archival	data	that	has	been	collected	and	used	in	this	chapter	is	not	free	from	this	
problem.	The	Swiss	National	Bank	archivists	were	unable	to	verify	the	provenance	of	some	
of	archival	data	used	in	this	chapter,	including	the	handwritten	banknote	exchange	data	
(e.g.,	Banknotenkurse)	as	well	as	some	exchange	rate	data	found	on	printed	documents	
(e.g.,	Devisen	Mittelkurse).		
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To	address	concerns	over	data	accuracy	and	legitimacy,	new	archival	data	
presented	in	this	paper	was	compared	against	several	other	sources,	including	
independently	published	contemporary	sources,	data	presented	in	the	media,	and	other	
central	bank	archival	sources	(e.g.,	wire	reports),	and	a	high	correlation	was	found	when	
comparing	data	from	different	sources	and	different	markets.	For	example,	a	correlation	
of	0.982	for	the	period	of	1946-1950	was	found	when	comparing	Pick’s	end-of-month	data	
for	the	Swiss	franc-U.S.	dollar	rate	traded	in	Switzerland	and	end-of-month	data	recorded	
by	the	Swiss	National	Bank’s	for	the	Swiss	franc-U.S.	dollar	rate	in	the	New	York	‘Freir	
Markt’	(Figure	14).	
	
Figure	14:	Comparison	of	Data	Sources	for	Swiss	Fr./U.S.	Dollar	Exchange	Rates	-	New	
Archival	Swiss	Data	from	New	York	‘Freir	Markt’	vs.	Pick	Currency	Yearbook	Data	for	
Zurich	
	
Source:	Pick’s	Currency	Yearbook	(1951),	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
Further,	a	near	perfect	identity	exists	between	New	York	and	Swiss	markets	during	August	
1947-	September	1949	for	the	free	U.S.	dollar-Swiss	franc	exchange	rates	in	both	New	
York	and	Switzerland	(Figure	15	and	Figure	16).	Overall,	comparisons	of	the	new	archival	
data	presented	in	this	chapter	with	others	sources	across	different	markets	and	time	
periods	support	the	legitimacy	of	the	new	data.	
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Figure	15:	Swiss	Fr./Free	U.S.	Dollar	Exchange	Rate,	Switzerland	and	New	York,	1947-49	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
Figure	16:	‘Free'	U.S.	Dollar	Discount	Against	Swiss	Fr.,	Switzerland	and	New	York,	1947-
49	
	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
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Unlike	the	daily	exchange	rate	data	found	for	the	Swiss	free	market,	a	contiguous	
1940s	daily	time	series	for	the	U.S.	dollar-free	sterling	market	in	New	York	was	not	
located.	The	absence	of	such	a	series	during	the	war	is	likely	explained	by	the	fact	that,	as	
The	Economist	noted	on	20	July,	1940,	“the	free	market	(in	New	York)	has	now	been	
virtually	closed”.491	While	the	New	York	free	sterling	market	may	have	been	dormant	for	
the	remainder	of	the	Second	World	War,	a	study	of	central	bank	archival	evidence	
indicates	that	at	some	point	following	the	end	of	hostilities	the	New	York	free	sterling	
market	both	reopened	and	saw	significant	trading	volume.	Because	a	U.S.	dollar-pound	
sterling	rate	was	not	located	in	the	Swiss	market	(perhaps	because	these	two	currencies	
were	not	actively	traded	directly	for	each	other	in	Switzerland),	for	statistical	analysis	a	
daily	U.S.	dollar-pound	sterling	exchange	rate	is	derived	using	the	U.S.	dollar-Swiss	franc	
and	pound	sterling-Swiss	franc	exchange	rates	from	the	Swiss	market.	 	
																																																						
491	(Kanago	&	McCormick,	2013,	p.	403)	
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5.4.2	Market	trading	volume	and	significance	
	
Having	established	the	accuracy	and	legitimacy	of	the	new	data	we	now	turn	to	
the	question	of	the	significance	of	the	new	data.	The	analytical	utility	of	accurate,	high-
frequency	free	market	exchange	rate	data	may	suffer	if	the	exchange	rates	arise	from	a	
relatively	small	number	of	traders,	low	trading	volumes,	or	both.	An	important	question	
that	must	therefore	be	addressed	before	proceeding	with	any	analysis	is	just	how	
significant	were	1940s	currency	black	markets.	While	a	detailed	list	of	all	traders	and	
complete	trading	volume	records	would	be	the	preferred	means	of	answering	this	
question,	these	are	not	the	only	measure	by	which	market	significance	can	be	assessed.	
	
With	regard	to	who	was	trading	in	the	Swiss	and	New	York	free	markets,	archival	
records	suggest	that,	in	addition	to	wirehouses	and	small	brokers,	many	of	the	largest	
New	York	and	international	banks	were	actively	dealing	in	free	sterling.	For	example,	the	
list	of	international	firms	that	are	listed	or	mentioned	in	archival	records	as	participants	in	
the	late-1940s	New	York	free	sterling	market	includes	some	of	the	biggest	and	most	
sophisticated	American,	British	and	Swiss	banks	of	that	time,	including	National	City,	
Chase,	Schroders,	Guaranty	Trust,	and	Swiss	Bank	(Table	30).	The	fact	that	these	banks	
were	active	in	free	markets	suggests	either	that	trading	volumes	were	significant	or	that	
important	bank	customers	traded	free	sterling.	If	neither	of	these	two	conditions	were	
met,	then	it	is	unlikely	that	so	many	of	the	most	prestigious	firms	would	have	participated	
in	a	market	that	attracted	such	regulatory	scrutiny.	
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Table	30:	Private	Firms	Reported	to	Have	Traded	in	‘Free’	Sterling	
	
	
Source:	Bank	of	England	Archive	
	
Dealings	by	such	banks	at	unofficial	banknote	rates	was	at	one	point	in	time	not	as	
great	a	concern	to	central	bankers	as	compared	to	the	non-official	rate	dealings	in	
national	sterling	accounts	(e.g.,	the	Belgian	sterling	account	receives	frequent	mention	for	
problematic	sterling	dealings	in	central	bank	archives).	For	example,	when	Bank	of	
England	and	NYFRB	officials	discussed	charges	raised	in	Parliament	in	1947	that	the	Chase	
bank	was	dealing	in	the	New	York	sterling	black	market,	the	Bank	of	England’s	Mr.	Bolton	
dismissed	Parliament’s	concerns	as	he	understood	Chase’s	activities	“to	be	dealings	in	
banknotes	and	therefore	nothing	to	be	excited	about”.492	However,	given	the	prominent	
mention	later	by	Mr.	Bolton	and	other	officials	in	the	lead-up	to	the	1949	sterling	
devaluation	of	discounted	free	sterling	rates	for	banknotes	in	Switzerland	and	other	free	
markets,	and	the	impact	these	discounted	rates	appear	to	have	had	on	confidence	in	
sterling’s	official	value,	it	appears	policymakers	underestimated	the	impact	of	the	
activities	of	Chase	and	other	major	banks.	
																																																						
492	C261,	p.	3,	Peter	Lang	record	of	telephone	conversation	with	Mr.	Bolton,	Bank	of	England,	New	York	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	Archive,	2	July,	1947	
No.	of	
	Date	 Firm	Name mentions Firm	Type HQ Source Reference Comments
28/01/1949 Guaranty	Trust 1 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/1	No.	56 Guaranty's	London	offices	were	located	on	
Lombard	St.
04-Feb-49 Chase	National	Bank 1 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/1	No.	64
04-Feb-49 Schroders 1 Merchant	Bank London BOE EC5/1	No.	64 New	York	branch?
04-Feb-49 Guaranty	Trust 2 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/1	No.	64 Provided	the	BoE	with	NY	rates,	volume,	
other	firm	and	trend	info	on	12	Feb.	1949
07-May-49 Albert	de	Jong	&	Co. 1 Unknown New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	5a
Offices	located	at		37	Wall	St.	NY,	NY;	
quoting	$3.25/£	for	French	account	sterling.
17-Jun-49 Swiss	Bank 1 Universal	Bank? Switzerland BOE EC5/2	No.	23
The	New	York	branch	of	Swiss	Bank	named	
as	a	dealer	of	cheap	sterling.
17-Jun-49 Chase	National	Bank 2 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	23
17-Jun-49 Guaranty	Trust 3 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	23
19-Jul-49 Chase	National	Bank 3 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39
19-Jul-49 Guaranty	Trust 4 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39
19-Jul-49 National	City	Bank 1 Commercial	Bank New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39
19-Jul-49 White 1 Wirehouse New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
19-Jul-49 Weld 1 Wirehouse New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
19-Jul-49 Hayden-Stone 1 Wirehouse New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
19-Jul-49 Sutro 1 Wirehouse	 New	York BOE EC5/2	No.	39 One	of	the	larger	wirehouses
14-Nov-49 Hayden,	Stone	&	Co.
1
Broker New	York BOE EC5/3	No.	27
The	most	active	NY	broker	in	NY	cheap	
sterling	and	that	it	would	be	useful	to	get	
daily	quotes	from	them.
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Unlike	exchange	rate	data,	no	contiguous	or	high-frequency	volume	data	were	
found	for	either	the	Swiss	or	New	York	currency	black	markets.	However,	intermittent	
volume	data	has	been	collected	from	a	variety	of	sources	found	in	the	Bank	of	England	
Archive,	including	investment	reports,	media	articles,	and	various	archival	sources,	and	
this	volume	data	is	summarized	in	Table	31.	From	these	trading	volume	figures,	and	given	
the	considerable	attention	directed	towards	these	markets	on	the	part	of	Bank	of	England	
and	Federal	Reserve	officials,	free	sterling	trading	volumes	were	often	significant	both	
during	the	war	and	especially	in	the	latter	part	of	the	1940s	in	the	lead-up	to	sterling’s	19	
September,	1949	devaluation.	At	peak	volume	in	the	summer	and	autumn	of	1949	there	
was	approximately	£1,000,000	to	1,500,000	in	weekly	free	sterling	turnover.		
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Table	31:	Summary	of	New	York	‘Free’	Sterling	Trading	Volume	Data,	1941-50	
		
Date		
	
Volume	
	
Frequency	
	
Source	
BoE	Archive	
Reference	
	
Notes	
13-
Jun-41	
Negligible	 N/A	 	 EC4/168		 BoE's	Norman	asks	Bank	of	
Canada's	Towers	to	intervene	on	
free	market	rate	in	New	York.	
Keep	free	market	rate	at	$4.025-
4.035.	
24-Jul-
40	
£335,000	 Weekly	 	 EC4/168		 Peak	volume	week.	See	next	
comment.	
29-
Sep-41	
	£15,000-5,000	 Weekly	 Guaranty	
Trust	
EC4/168		 Dropped	to	£15,000	by	March	
1941,	and	weekly	range	was	£5-
15K	through	date	of	memo.	
12-
Feb-49	
£100,000-
£150,000	
Daily	 	 EC5/1	No.	
69	
Memo	from	Guaranty	to	BoE:	
“Subsequent	correspondence	has	
indicated	that	the	volume	is	
increasing”.	“Another	things	
which	leads	me	to	believe	that	
the	volume	is	substantial	is	that	
even	the	very	reputable	firms	are	
inquiring	about	it.”	
23-
Jun-49	
£200,000	 Daily	 	 EC5/2	No.	
27B	
Volume	estimate	of	£200K	a	day	
(including	note	transactions).	
Hong	Kong	exchange	controlled	
considered	“loose”.	
06-Jul-
49	
£1,500,000	 Weekly	 Ullman	&	
Co.	
EC5/2	No.	
24	
Letter	from	Isner,	H.J.	of	Ullman	
&	Co	of	London	to	Hamilton	at	
BoE:	NY	“although	the	biggest,	is	
not	the	only	market	for	such	
transactions.	I	hear	it	even	said	–	
although	I	am	reluctant	to	believe	
it	–	that	quite	a	turnover,	almost	
amounting	to	a	regular	market	–	
is	taking	place	in	London.”		
14-
Nov-
49	
£1,000,000	 Weekly	 Financial	
Times,	
New	York	
Times	
EC5/3	No.	
26	
FT	reference	to	a	NY	Times	article	
of	the	same	day:	“The	revival	of	
the	international	market	for	
transferable	sterling	was	causing	
concern	in	British	Government	
circles,	the	newspaper	said.”	
29-
Nov-
49	
£250,000	 Weekly	 	 EC5/3	No.	
47	
Reference	to	demand	driven	by	
meeting	invisible	payments	due	
to	the	Sterling	Area.	
02-
Dec-49	
£125,000-
£140,000	
Daily	 	 EC5/3	No.	
48	
Pre-devaluation	daily	turnover	
averaged	£250,000	daily.	
Reference	to	debt	overhang	as	
source	of	cheap	sterling;	
skepticism	about	convertibility	
expressed.	
03-
Dec-49	
£500,000	 Weekly	 NY	
Bankers	
Meeting	
EC5/3	No.	
40	
Cheap	Sterling	Meeting	with	NY	
Bankers	
212	|	P a g e 	
	
		
Date		
	
Volume	
	
Frequency	
	
Source	
BoE	Archive	
Reference	
	
Notes	
08-
Dec-49	
£125,000-
£140,000	
Weekly	 Financial	
Times	
	 Article	in	FT	also	references	pre-
devaluation	daily	turnover	
averaged	£250,000	daily.		
12-Jul-
50	
N/A	 N/A	 BOE	 OV31/109	
No.	35	
Report	(apparently	from	
Australia)	about	cheap	sterling	
volume	returning	to	pre-
devaluation	level.	Danger	of	black	
market	for	Australian	£	
developing	in	NY.	
02-
Nov-
50	
£160,000	-	
£310,000	
Weekly	 Bank	of	
England	
EC5/5	No.	
65a		
BoE	report	concludes	NY	is	the	
“most	important”	market	for	
cheap	sterling	as	“the	U.S.A.	is	
the	source	of	dollars	and	dollar	
goods	and	the	destination	of	
most	non-dollar	commodities	
sold	on	a	cheap	sterling	basis”	
29-
Nov-
50	
£400,000	-	
£600,000	
Weekly	 NY	Fed	 EC5/5	No.	
75a		
Also	a	reference	to	
£190,000/week	since	Korea.	
	
Source:	Bank	of	England	Archive	
	
	
	 The	evidence	of	rising	free	currency	trading	volume	in	the	latter	part	of	the	1940s	
is	supported	by	changes	in	international	arbitrage	opportunities,	which	steadily	eroded	as	
the	decade	progressed.	Ceteris	paribus,	arbitrage	profits	should	decline	as	trading	volume	
increases.	Increased	trading	volume	is	typically	accompanied	by	improved	liquidity	and	
market	depth,	both	of	which	should	in	theory	have	a	negative	impact	on	arbitrage	profits.	
To	test	this	theory	a	hypothetical	multi-market	arbitrage	profit	calculation	is	performed	
across	free	markets	in	Switzerland,	New	York,	and	London	through	the	following	
reoccurring,	end-of-month	series	of	currency	transactions:	1)	one	pound	sterling	is	
converted	to	free	U.S.	dollars	in	London;	b)	the	U.S.	dollars	are	next	converted	to	Swiss	
francs	in	New	York;	3)	the	Swiss	francs	are	then	converted	back	into	free	sterling	in	
Switzerland.493	The	percentage	gain	between	the	beginning	and	ending	amount	of	sterling	
is	calculated	and	depicted	in	Figure	17.	
																																																						
493	Calculations	do	not	include	any	estimation	of	transaction	costs	or	other	fees,	which	are	unknown	for	
these	markets.	
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Figure	17:	Free	Market	Arbitrage	Profit	Opportunity	(as	%	of	free	F/X	rate),	1946-50	
	
	
Note:	end	of	month	data	used;	calculations	do	not	include	any	estimation	of	transaction	costs	or	other	fees,	
which	are	unknown	for	these	markets.	
	
Sources:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive,	Pick	Currency	Yearbook	(1951)	
	
The	results	of	the	hypothetical	arbitrage	profit	calculation	show	that	by	1949	the	double-
digit	and	even	high-single	percentage	arbitrage	returns	that	were	available	shortly	after	
the	Second	World	War	have	effectively	vanished.	While	these	hypothetical	arbitrage	test	
results	agree	with	the	the	evidence	of	rising	free	market	trading	volume,	it	should	be	
noted	that	rising	volumes	and	improved	liquidity	may	not	be	the	only	explanation	for	the	
erosion	of	arbitrage	profits	as	the	1940s	progressed.	Other	explanations	may	include	
looser	capital	controls,	fewer	information	asymmetries	across	markets	and	participants,	
and	lower	transactions	costs.	
	
	
5.4.3	Denomination	exchange	rate	dispersion	and	time	series	construction	
	
Time	series	data	from	multiple	archival	sources	have	been	obtained	for	some	
currency	pairs.	For	example,	during	the	period	of	2	January,	1942	through	31	December,	
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1943	three	different	sources	of	data	exist	for	the	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate:	
the	Devisenmittelkurse	1er	(for	the	£1	note),	the	Devisenmittelkurse	50er/100er	(for	£50	
and	£100	notes),	and	the	Banknotenkurse	(denomination	not	stated).	Data	from	these	
different	series	are	depicted	in	Figure	18.	
	
Figure	18:	Price	Dispersion	across	Different	Sources	and	Denominations,	Swiss	Fr./Free	
£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1942-1943	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	18	there	is	a	very	high	correlation	across	the	three	time	series,	
and	the	correlation	coefficients	for	each	series	pair	are	all	greater	than	0.98	(Table	32).	It	
is	noteworthy	that	the	highest	correlation	coefficient	(0.9987)	exists	for	data	from	two	
different	data	sources	(Banknotenkurse	and	the	Devisenmittelkurse	50er/100er).	This	
consistency	across	different	sources	provides	further	confidence	in	the	accuracy	of	the	
archival	data.	
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Table	32:	Correlations	across	Different	Sources	and	Denominations,	Swiss	Fr./Free	
£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1942-1943	
 
Source 
Banknotenkurse: 
Devisenmittelkurse 
1er 
Banknotenkurse: 
Devisenmittelkurse 
50er/100er 
Devisenmittelkurse 1er: 
Devisenmittelkurse 
50er/100er 
Correlation 0.9867 0.9987 0.9880 
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
While	there	is	a	high	correlation	between	the	different	time	series,	one	striking	
finding	from	the	data	is	the	significant	exchange	rate	dispersion	that	is	often	observed	
across	different	banknote	denominations	(Figure	19).	Exchange	rate	dispersion	for	several	
periods	is	also	often	persistent,	meaning	the	relative	premium	(or	discount)	for	a	
particular	denomination,	lasts	for	as	long	as	six	months	before	market	sentiment	reverses.	
It	is	unknown	whether	the	Banknotenkurse	figures	represents	an	exchange	rate	for	a	
particular	denomination	of	sterling,	but	there	is	relatively	little	dispersion	observed	
between	the	Banknotenkurse	series	and	the	Devisenmittelkurse	50er/100er	series,	
suggesting	that	the	Banknotenkurse	series	reflects	exchange	rates	for	£50	and	£100	notes.	
In	contrast,	even	though	the	Devisenmittelkurse	1er	data	series	is	from	the	same	archival	
document	as	the	Devisenmittelkurse	50er/100er	series	(£50	and	£100	notes),	significantly	
greater	dispersion	is	observed	between	the	Devisenmittelkurse	1er	(£1	note)	series	and	
the	other	two	series.		
	
	
	
216	|	P a g e 	
	
Figure	19:	Banknote	Denomination	Exchange	Rate	Dispersion,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£,	
Switzerland,	1942-1943	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
For	the	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate	there	are	three	major	periods	of	
exchange	rate	dispersion:	from	July	1942-January	1943,	January	1943-June	1943,	and	June	
1943-August	1943.	An	unusually	higher	degree	of	preference	for	£1	notes	is	observed	
from	10	September	through	7	October,	1942,	when	as	much	as	a	1.20CHF	difference	is	
observed	between	the	exchange	rate	recorded	for	£1	notes	and	£50/£100	notes.	To	put	
this	1.20CHF	exchange	rate	difference	in	perspective,	the	average	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	
exchange	rate	from	10	September	through	7	October	1942	for	£1	notes	and	£50/£100	
notes	was	7.6313	and	6.6063,	respectively,	making	a	1.20CHF	difference	equal	to	a	15.7%	
and	18.2%	of	each	series’	respective	average	for	these	dates.	The	fact	that	nearly	20%	
more	Swiss	francs	were	required	to	acquire	a	£1	note	over	a	£50	or	£100	note	indicates	a	
significant	preference	for	£1	notes	during	late	summer-early	Autumn	1942.		
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The	£1	note,	however,	did	not	always	command	a	premium	over	a	£50	or	£100	
note	in	the	Swiss	market.	For	example,	starting	in	March	1943	through	May	1943,	the	£1	
note	appears	to	have	suffered	a	reversal	of	fortune.	On	29	April,	1943	as	much	as	1.05CHF	
more	was	required	to	purchase	£50/£100	notes	over	a	£1	note.	However,	this	reversal	
was	short	lived.	From	June	1943	through	August	1943	the	£1	note	again	commanded	a	
premium	over	£50/£100	notes,	although	this	time	the	premium	peaked	at	just	0.60CHF	on	
4	June,	1943,	or	just	5.7%	of	the	average	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate	for	£1	
notes	from	June	through	August,	1943.	For	the	remainder	of	1943	relatively	little	
dispersion	is	observed	across	different	denominations.	
	
What	accounts	for	the	observed	variation	in	preferences	for	one	denomination	of	
sterling	over	another	in	the	Swiss	market?	Supply	shocks	for	a	particular	denomination	
could	explain	the	often	sudden	and	dramatic	shifts	observed	in	the	preferences	of	market	
participants.	Another	possible	explanation	for	denomination	dispersion	is	found	in	
archival	evidence:	in	1943	the	UK	Treasury	and	Bank	of	England	sought	to	reduce	and	
even	eliminate	from	circulation	large	pound	sterling	denominations,	as	these	notes	“were	
used	to	feed	black	market	operations,	tax	evasion,	and	note	smuggling”.494	Bank	of	
England	notes	in	circulation	during	this	time	consisted	of	£1,	£5,	£10,	£20,	£50,	£100,	
£200,	£500	and	£1000	notes.	A	NYFRB	memo	titled	the	‘Withdrawal	of	Large	Bank	Notes:	
The	British	Experience’	notes	that	British	authorities	sought:	
	
“to	make	more	difficult	the	illegal	operation	of	note	smugglers	desirous	of	evading	
exchange	control	regulations,	of	black	market	operators,	and	of	tax	evaders—all	of	
whom	predominantly	use	large	denomination	notes	in	order	to	cover	up	their	
tracks”.495			
	
There	appears	to	have	been	a	market	response	to	Britain	seeking	to	eliminate	large	notes	
from	circulation:	
	
																																																						
494	C261,	p.	1,	‘Withdrawal	of	Large	Bank	Notes:	The	British	Experience’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	
Archive,	4	December,	1944	
495	C261,	p.	5,	‘Withdrawal	of	Large	Bank	Notes:	The	British	Experience’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	
Archive,	4	December,	1944	
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“According	to	newspaper	dispatches,	the	announcement	of	the	new	policy	
temporarily	caused	a	minor	“panic”	among	holders	of	large	notes	in	general,	
particularly	those	engaged	in	illegal	activities,	since	it	was	widely	believed	that	the	
government	would	follow	up	its	move	with	stringent	measures	to	track	down	the	
holders	of	large	notes	and	to	make	the	holding	of	such	notes	presumptive	
evidence	of	illegal	operations.	As	a	result	of	this	belief,	many	holders	of	large	notes	
hastened	to	get	rid	of	them	through	bookmakers	or	others	who	were	in	the	
position	to	pay	them	into	banks	without	arousing	suspicion.	There	were	in	reports	
in	the	London	newspapers	at	the	time	that	large	notes	were	sold	at	heavy	
discounts	for	several	weeks	after	the	announcement”.496	
	
The	observed	dispersion	could	be	explained	by	black	market	trade	flows	and	the	changing	
supply	and	demand	of	larger	banknotes,	which	underpinned	this	trade.	Another	factor	
could	be	the	move	by	British	authorities	starting	in	1943	to	cease	issuing	and	remove	from	
circulation	all	notes	with	higher	denominations	than	£10.	However,	without	further	
supporting	evidence,	such	as	comments	from	market	participants	in	Switzerland,	we	can	
only	speculate	on	the	exact	causes	for	why	particular	denominations	fell	in	and	out	of	
relative	favour.	
	
With	regards	to	the	construction	of	the	time	series	used	in	the	subsequent	
econometric	analysis,	given	both	the	variety	and	quality	of	the	archival	data	sources,	a	
decision	was	made	to	maintain	series	continuity	whenever	possible.	For	example,	the	
earliest	time	series	data	for	the	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate	exists	in	the	
Devisenmittelkurse	1er	series,	which	begins	on	1	December,	1939.	This	series	continues	
until	30	August,	1941,	at	which	point	the	Devisenmittelkurse	50er/100er	series	begins.	
Therefore,	the	time	series	used	for	analysis	incorporates	both	the	Devisenmittelkurse	1er	
series	and	the	Devisenmittelkurse	50er/100er	until	a	gap	in	the	Devisenmittelkurse	
50er/100er	series	appears	on	31	December,	1943,	at	which	point	the	Banknotenkurse	
series	is	employed	until	this	series	terminates	for	the	remainder	of	the	war	on	19	
September,	1944.	Thus,	three	separate	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	time	series	are	used	to	
construct	the	exchange	rate	series	covering	the	period	1	December,	1939	through	19	
September,	1944	that	is	used	in	the	subsequent	econometric	analysis.	
																																																						
496	C261,	p.	5,	‘Withdrawal	of	Large	Bank	Notes:	The	British	Experience’,	New	York	Federal	Reserve	Bank	
Archive,	4	December,	1944	
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In	cases	where	two	separate	time	series	exist	for	the	same	period	of	time,	such	as	
the	post-war	period	from	May	1946	through	December	1949,	preference	was	given	to	the	
professionally	typeset	Devisenmittelkurse	over	the	handwritten	Banknotenkurse	
document	for	two	reasons.	First,	while	the	legibility	of	the	handwritten	Banknotenkurse	
documents	is	generally	excellent,	there	is	a	greater	risk	of	misinterpreting	handwritten	
figures	than	typed	figures	during	digitization.	Second,	while	the	precise	provenance	of	
both	sources	is	unknown,	the	more	professional	appearing	Devisenmittelkurse	lends	it	
added	credibility	as	typed	data	suggests	a	more	significant	production	investment	and	
wider	circulation	than	a	handwritten	document.	However,	other	than	a	few	days,	the	
dispersion	observed	between	these	two	series	for	the	period	from	May	1946	through	
December	1949	is	quite	small,	and	their	correlation	is	0.9979.	
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5.5	Structural	Break	Model	and	Results	
	
5.5.1	Literature	overview	
	
	 This	section	of	the	chapter	presents	a	structural	break	analysis	of	currency	black	
market	exchange	rates	during	and	after	the	Second	World	War.	Exchange	rates	in	
currency	markets	can	shift	during	periods	of	significant	political	or	economic	uncertainty	
to	account	for	changes	to	perceptions	of	economic	and	political	prospects,	and	long	
lasting	shifts	may	mark	important	historical	turning	points.497	The	two	principle	methods	
by	which	such	exchange	rate	shifts	have	been	previously	analysed	by	economic	historians	
can	be	characterized	as	the	‘narrative-descriptive’	and	‘statistical’	approaches.		
	
An	example	of	a	narrative-descriptive	approach	is	Mitchell’s	(1903)	study	of	the	
U.S.	civil	war	greenback	market,	in	which	the	author	presents	his	data	in	a	chart	and	then	
proceeds	to	discuss	exchange	rate	fluctuations	in	the	exchange	rate	that	correspond	with	
news	and	events.	However,	there	are	several	limitations	created	by	relying	exclusively	on	
such	an	approach,	including	the	risk	of	focussing	only	on	well-known	historical	events,	and	
the	risk	of	misinterpretations	based	on	how	data	is	visualized.498	A	further	issue	identified	
with	Mitchell’s	particular	narrative	approach,	as	noted	in	a	1996	American	Economic	
Review	paper	by	Willard,	Guinnane,	and	Rosen	(hereafter	referred	to	as	WGR),	is	the	“lack	
of	an	a	priori	definition	of	what	constitutes	a	significant	change	in	prices”.499	In	other	
words,	an	entirely	narrative	approach	runs	the	risk	of	not	distinguishing	in	a	robust	and	
consistent	manner	between	what	WGR	describe	as	‘blips’,	which	are	smaller	or	shorter-
lived	exchange	rate	changes,	and	more	significant	and	long-lasting	‘breaks’	in	time	series	
data.500	
	
																																																						
497	(Agénor,	1992,	p.	3)	
498	(Calomiris,	1988,	p.	213,	note	21)	
499	(Willard	et	al.,	1996,	p.	1006)	
500	(Willard	et	al.,	1996,	p.	1006)	Blips	may	signify	a	“wild	market	reaction	to	early	news	that	later	turned	out	
to	be	false;	or	simply	market	nervousness	over	an	event	for	which	there	was	little	information.	Blips	of	this	
sort	are	not	uncommon	even	in	contemporary	securities	markets.”	
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New	statistical	methods	have	been	developed	in	recent	decades	to	identify,	in	a	
consistent	manner,	a	long-lasting	shift	in	time	series	data.	A	long-lasting	shift	in	the	data,	
or	‘structural	break’,	can	mark	a	historical	turning	point.	One	of	the	principal	advantages	
of	employing	statistical	techniques	to	analyse	historical	data	is	the	identification	of	
significant	historical	events	free	from	existing	historical	bias,	thereby	introducing	the	
possibility	of	identifying	new	historical	dates	of	significance.	For	example,	statistical	
analysis	by	WGR	identified	dates	and	events	that	had	been	previously	overlooked	or	
underemphasized.501	In	addition,	events	previously	considered	important	by	historians	
may	have	no	significant	or	long-lasting	impact	on	market	prices,	highlighting	possible	
differences	between	what	was	deemed	important	by	contemporary	market	participants	
as	compared	to	historians.	While	modern	statistical	techniques	have	enriched	historical	
data	analysis	they	have	not	entirely	replaced	the	narrative-historical	approach.	Modern	
statistical	techniques	can	be	complimentary	with	historical	and	archival	analysis,	and	they	
are	often	employed	alongside	each	other	to	strengthen	the	analysis.	
	
WGR	analyse	daily	data	from	the	U.S.	Civil	War	Greenback	market	to	locate	
structural	breaks,	which	represent	a	significant	change	in	the	intercept,	or	mean	value,	
over	a	determined	period	of	time.	The	Banerjee	et	al	(1992)	method	employed	by	WGR	
includes	the	selection	of	a	predefined	‘window’	(a	length	of	time)	that	is	then	used	to	
sequentially	compute	successive	multiple,	lagged	regressions,	each	time	advancing	by	one	
point	in	the	series.502	Structural	breaks	are	detected	by	shifts	in	the	mean	predicted	value	
over	the	window.	Subsequent	techniques	developed	by	Bai	and	Perron	(1998,	2003)	
(hereafter	referred	to	as	Bai-Perron)	take	a	more	dynamic	approach	towards	the	
identification	of	multiple	structural	breaks.503	The	Bai-Perron	method	grows	windows	of	
different	sizes	from	a	minimum	width	(h)	while	looking	for	a	partitioning	that	minimizes	
the	discrepancy	between	the	data	and	model	by	measuring	a	reduction	in	the	residual	
sum	of	squared	residuals	(RSS,	also	referred	as	SSR).	A	number	of	subsequent	economic	
																																																						
501	(Willard	et	al.,	1996,	p.	1006)	
502	(Banerjee,	Lumsdaine,	&	Stock,	1992)	
503	(J.	Bai	&	Perron,	2003;	J.	S.	Bai	&	Perron,	1998)	
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history	studies	have	employed	both	of	these	methods	to	examine	financial	prices	during	
periods	of	war.504		
	
5.5.2	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	breakdates,	1939-44	
		
All	exchange	rate	data	used	in	the	following	analysis	are	from	Switzerland.		In	
contrast	to	the	warring	countries,	the	Swiss	government	did	not	intervene	in	a	significant	
way	in	financial	markets	during	the	Second	World	War,	so	this	data	reflects	market	
sentiments.505	Switzerland	also	actively	traded	with	both	the	Allies	and	Axis	powers	
through	nearly	the	entire	duration	of	the	war.506	Thus,	sterling’s	exchange	rate	against	the	
neutral	Swiss	franc	presents	an	attractive	currency	pair	for	isolating	how	events	impacting	
Britain	may	have	impacted	sterling.	However,	as	discussed	earlier,	it	is	unrealistic	to	think	
that	events	only	related	to	Britain	impacted	sterling’s	value	against	the	Swiss	franc	during	
the	Second	World	War.	Events	in	Switzerland,	or	in	Anglo-Swiss	relations,	may	have	also	
played	a	role	in	changes	to	the	exchange	rate.	For	example,	as	will	be	shown	later,	one	of	
the	breakdates	occurs	very	close	to	when	the	Swiss	military	mobilized.	In	addition,	strains	
in	Anglo-Swiss	relations,	such	as	when	the	British	Admiralty	held	Swiss	goods	at	British	
ports,	may	have	impacted	the	exchange	rate.507	There	is	also	the	fact	that,	in	contrast	to	
Britain,	Switzerland	did	not	suffer	any	significant	economic	debts	or	damage	from	the	war,	
which	may	have	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	value	of	the	Swiss	franc.	
	
The	first	analysis	period	runs	from	1	December,	1939	through	19	September,	1944.	
The	series	includes	1,486	data	points	and	spans	a	total	of	1,752	days	(Figure	20).	The	time	
series	expresses	the	number	of	Swiss	francs	per	pound	sterling,	with	a	maximum	and	
minimum	values	of	17.75	(31	January,	1940)	and	5.10	(6	May,	1942),	respectively;	mean	
and	median	values	are	9.59	and	8.67,	respectively.	
	
																																																						
504	See	for	example	(Brown	&	Burdekin,	2000;	Frey	&	Kucher,	2000;	Frey	&	Waldenström,	2004;	Oosterlinck,	
2003;	Smith	&	Smith,	1997;	Weidenmier,	2002)	
505	(Frey	&	Kucher,	2000,	p.	52)	
506	(Golson,	2011,	pp.	247-251)	In	response	to	export	bans	and	agreements	with	Allied	governments,	as	well	
as	a	decline	in	German	exports,	Swiss	trade	with	the	Axis	powers	tailed	off	towards	the	end	of	1944.	
507	(Golson,	2011,	p.	250)	
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Figure	20:	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rate,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
Note:	y-axis	depicts	number	of	Swiss	francs	per	one	unit	of	pound	sterling	(£1)	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
5.5.2a	Step	1	–	interpolation	and	data	transformation	
	
For	days	when	no	trading	data	is	available	(typically	Sundays	and	holidays)	the	
previous	day’s	price	is	utilized,	which	enables	testing	for	auto	correlation.	The	first	two	
data	points	are	omitted	to	enable	lagged	variables.	A	log	transformation	of	the	exchange	
rate	data	was	applied	to	reduce	skew	and	heteroscedasticity	(Figure	21).	
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Figure	21:	Frequency	Distribution	of	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rate,	Switzerland,	1939-
1944	
	
Note:	x-axis	depicts	number	of	Swiss	francs	per	pound	sterling.		
	
5.5.2b	Step	2	–	test	for	autocorrelation	
	
To	identify	structural	breaks	in	the	Swiss	free	sterling	market	this	paper	employs	
methods	developed	by	Bai-Perron	that	are	coded	in	the	R	Project	statistical	package	called	
strucchange	created	by	Zeileis	et	al	(2002,	2003).508	Bai-Perron	employs	a	standard	linear	
regression	model	to	determine	breaks	that	minimize	the	sum	of	squared	residuals:	
	
(1) 					 	 !"#	(&') = * + ,'											 - = 1,… , 1 ,	
	
where	&' 	is	the	dependent	variable	(exchange	rate)	at	time	i,	the	independent	variable	u	is	
the	mean	exchange	rate,	and	,' 	is	the	error	term	at	time	i.		
	
Autocorrelation	(serial	correlation),	which	is	when	observation	order	is	important	
(e.g.,	there	is	a	relationship	between	the	error	value	from	one	period	and	another	period),	
is	a	common	issue	with	time	series	data	and	must	be	tested.	Autocorrelation	can	result	in	
a	number	of	problems	i.e.,	biased	coefficients,	and	error	terms	and	OLS	estimators	not	
																																																						
508	(Zeileis,	Kleiber,	Krämer,	&	Hornik,	2003;	Zeileis,	Leisch,	Hornik,	&	Kleiber,	2001)	
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achieving	the	smallest	variance.509	Standard	tests	for	detection	of	auto-correlation	were	
performed,	including	the	Durbin-Watson	statistic	(0.0038,	p-value	<	2.2e-16),	which	is	very	
close	to	zero	and	therefore	suggests	the	presence	of	positive	autocorrelation.	The	Ljung-
Box	test	(X-squared	=	1484.9,	df	=	1,	p-value	<	2.2e-16),	and	Breusch-Godfrey	statistics	
(LM	test	=	1474,	df	=	1,	p-value	<	2.2e-16)	also	refute	a	null	hypothesis	of	no	auto-
correlation.	
	
To	address	autocorrelation,	the	data	was	examined	to	determine	the	appropriate	
lag	variable	order.	Figure	22	shows	partial	auto	correlation	and	auto	correlation	plots	for	
the	series.	A	strong	correlation	exists	for	lag	1	(yesterday’s	exchange	rate)	and	smaller	but	
significant	correlation	for	lag	2	(two-days	ago	exchange	rate).	These	results	were	
confirmed	with	the	VARselect	procedure	for	vector	auto-regressive	analysis.	Both	the	
Hannan-Quinn	and	Schwartz	criteria	tests	favoured	a	model	with	two	lag	variables	as	
showing	the	fewest	residuals.	
	
Figure	22:	Auto	Correlation	and	Partial	Auto	Correlation	Plots,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	
Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
The	revised	linear	regression	AR(2)	model	that	incorporates	two	lag	variables	to	
minimize	the	sum	of	squared	residuals	in	determining	structural	breaks	is:	
	
																																																						
509	For	further	discussion	see	(Greene,	2008)		
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2 																				log	(&') = 67 + 68!"#(&'98) +	6:!"#(&'9:) +	*'							 - = 1,… , 1 ,	
	
where	&' 	is	the	dependent	variable	(exchange	rate)	at	time	i,	and	67	is	the	mean	exchange	
rate,	68	and	6:	are	the	two	lagged	variables	at	time	i	-	1	and	i	-2	(the	two	prior	days’	
exchange	rates),	respectively,	and	*' 	is	the	error	term	at	time	i.		
	
The	results	of	a	Breusch-Pagan	test	for	heteroscedasticity	was	3.2727	(2	degrees	of	
freedom,	p-value	of	0.1947),	which	confirms	that	the	assumption	of	constant	variance	is	
tenable.	The	Durbin-Watson	statistic	(2.0033	p-value	0.5141)	supports	the	use	of	an	AR(2)	
model.	
	
Figure	23:	Partial	Auto	Correlation	of	Residuals	of	AR(2)	model,	Swiss	Fr./Free	
£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
5.5.2c	Step	3	–	test	for	evidence	of	structural	breaks	
	
The	next	step	in	the	process	is	to	determine	whether	the	observed	price	deviations	
in	the	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate	represent	random	error	or	exceed	normal	
variation,	thereby	indicating	the	possible	presence	of	structural	breaks.	Two	tests	for	
change	point	analysis	were	applied	to	determine	whether	the	variation	observed	in	the	
data	is	consistent	with	a	null	hypothesis	of	constant	parameter	values.	The	results	of	the	
Chow-Quandt	statistical	test	are	shown	in	Figure	24.	A	high	F-statistic	means	that	the	null	
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hypothesis	of	no	structural	breaks	can	be	rejected.	None	of	the	peaks	in	the	F-statistic	
reach	significance,	and	the	empirical	fluctuation	process	(EFP)	of	an	OLS-CUSUM	statistic	
also	fails	to	cross	the	significance	threshold.	However,	the	Nyblom-Hansen	test	(2.0333,	p-
value	of	0.005)	indicates	the	hypothesis	of	no	structural	breaks	in	the	AR(2)	model	of	
exchange	rate	data	can	be	rejected	for	now.	
	
Figure	24:	AR(2)	Model	SupF	and	EFP	Tests	of	an	OLS-CUSUM	statistic	for	Structural	
Change,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
It	is	useful	to	compare	changes	between	the	AR(2)	model	in	equation	(2)	and	the	
model	in	equation	(1).		As	shown	in	Figure	25,	the	variation	in	the	rolling	F	statistics	and	
the	EFP	process	far	exceed	the	critical	values	(red	horizontal	lines).	The	mean-only	model	
shows	auto	correlation.	However,	Bai-Perron	suggest	that	abrupt	breaks	may	be	more	
readily	detected	by	a	mean-only	approach	and	so	therefore	a	comparison	of	mean-only	
and	AR(2)	breakpoint	dating	is	performed.	
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Figure	25:	Mean-Only	Model	SupF	and	EFP	Tests	of	an	OLS-CUSUM	statistic	for	
Structural	Change,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
5.5.2d	Step	4	–	determine	window	size	
	
With	the	prior	steps	having	established	the	appropriate	regression	model	and	the	
likely	presence	of	structural	breaks,	the	next	step	is	to	determine	the	dates	of	any	
potential	structural	breaks.	As	outlined	by	Bai-Perron,	a	critical	decision	must	now	be	
made	about	the	size	of	the	window	(h),	or	number	of	data	points	to	be	included	in	each	
time	segment,	to	calculate	a	break	point.	For	example,	the	fit	of	the	structural	break	test	
would	be	perfect	and	therefore	meaningless	if	h	were	set	to	1.	It	is	useful	here	to	briefly	
compare	the	different	choices	of	window	sizes	in	the	literature.		
	
Some	studies	employing	later-developed	advances	in	break	test	methods	than	
those	available	to	WGR,	such	as	Kanago	and	McCormick	(2013),	employ	relatively	short	
windows	for	determining	breaks.	Kanago	and	McCormick	re-run	their	analysis	with	
progressively	narrower	windows	of	as	few	as	five	days.	During	periods	where	events	are	
moving	very	quickly,	such	as	the	beginning	of	the	Second	World	War,	then	perhaps	a	
narrow	window	is	appropriate	given	the	frequency	of	shifts	and	high-impact	events.	
However,	a	narrow	window	can	be	expected	to	yield	models	with	a	high	number	of	
breaks,	as	well	as	blips	of	doubtful	significance.	Further,	as	noted	in	their	2003	paper,	Bai	
and	Perron	state	that	there	is	a	risk	that	a	small	h	could	lead	to	distorted	sizes	in	F-tests	if	
autocorrelation	is	present	or	error	distribution	varies	across	segments.	As	already	noted,	
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the	Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate	time	series	data	tested	positive	for	auto	
correlation,	and	so	this	supports	creating	a	longer	window	than	the	5-day	window	
employed	by	Kanago	and	McCormick.510	
	
In	contrast	to	shorter-term	events	and	shifts	is	the	search	for	historical	turning	
points,	which	are	signalled	by	a	long	lasting	shift	in	the	mean	value	of	the	time	series.	
Turning	points	can	be	distinguished	from	shorter-term	‘blips’,	which	do	not	signify	any	
long-lasting	changes	in	the	data	trend.	As	WGR	and	others	discuss	there	is	some	
arbitrariness	involved	in	determining	what	constitutes	a	‘long	lasting’	shift	in	the	mean	
value	of	time	series	data.	WGR	start	by	looking	for	“means	shifts	that	last	for	periods	of	
time	that	are	shorter	than	the	rest	of	the	war”.511	From	here	the	authors	note	the	trade-
off	between	choosing	a	shorter	time	period,	which	makes	it	easier	for	shifts	to	be	
described	as	long	lasting,	and	looking	at	a	larger	period,	which	could	lead	to	false	
negatives	or	overlooking	important	events.	WGR	settle	on	100	days	as	the	period	for	
which	a	directional	shift	in	price	must	last	for	it	to	be	considered	long	lived.512	The	conflict	
that	WGR	study,	the	American	Civil	War,	had	a	similar	duration	to	the	Second	World	War	
and	therefore	serves	as	useful	precedent	for	guiding	window	size	selection	in	this	study.	A	
trimming	value	of	6.7%	applied	against	1,486	observations	results	in	a	window	size	of	100.	
In	addition	to	utilizing	a	100-day	window,	structural	breaks	were	computed	with	window	
sizes	of	20,	40,	60,	and	80	days,	respectively.	
	
5.5.2e	Step	5	–	determine	the	number	of	structural	breaks	
	
As	noted	by	Bai	and	Perron,	“selecting	the	break	points	using	the	Bayes	
Information	Criteria	(BIC)	works	well	when	breaks	are	present”.513	However,	the	optimal	
number	of	breakpoints	indicated	by	the	BIC	is	not	definitive,	and	break	dates	that	surface	
																																																						
510	Kanago	and	McCormick	do	not	discuss	any	tests	for	auto	correlation	on	their	data,	nor	do	they	discuss	
the	introduction	of	any	lags	into	their	regression	model	to	account	for	auto	correlation.	
511	(Willard	et	al.,	1996,	p.	1008)	
512	(Willard	et	al.,	1996,	p.	1008)	WGR	also	test	for	an	8-day	period	and	find	that	this	“did	not	change	the	
basic	location	of	significant	break	dates”	(note	13)	
513	(J.	Bai	&	Perron,	2003,	p.	18)	
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from	more	than	one	test	can	be	considered	as	more	robust.	514		The	BIC	and	RSS	reduction	
results	from	strucchange	are	shown	for	the	various	window	sizes	in	Figure	26.	For	the	
shortest	window	(20-days)	up	to	four	breakpoints	are	identified	before	a	BIC	penalty	is	
introduced;	wider	windows	suggest	as	few	as	three	then	two	breakpoints.	RSS	is	
decreasing	linearly	at	seven	breakpoints,	which	justifies	making	seven	breakpoints	an	
upper	bound.	
	 	
	 	
																																																						
514	The	Zeileis	strucchange	packages	does	not	implement	the	Liu	et	al	modification	of	the	Schwartz	Criteria	
(LWZ)	or	the	supF(l/l+1)	test,	that	compares	l	breaks	in	one	model	with	another	model	featuring	l+1	breaks	
that	is	included	in	Bai	Perron’s	Gauss	implementation.	
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Figure	26:	Mean-only	Model:	BIC	and	RSS	Results	for	Alternate	Sized	Windows	(h),	Swiss	
Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
	
The	BIC	and	RSS	test	from	the	mean-only	model	show	that	more	breakpoints	are	
required	before	the	BIC	shows	an	upward	trend	(e.g.,	21	breakpoints	for	a	window	size	of	
60).	Shorter	windows	do	not	show	an	upturn	in	BIC	prior	to	the	computational	limit	of	26	
structural	breaks.	The	BIC	results	from	windows	of	60	and	80	days	suggest	13	breakpoints.	
However,	there	is	a	more	than	two	order	of	magnitude	difference	between	the	RSS	values	
in	the	mean-only	model	as	compared	to	the	AR(2)	model	(Figure	27).	
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Figure	27:	AR(2)	Model:	BIC	and	RSS	Results	for	Alternate	Sized	Windows	(h),	Swiss	
Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
	
	
Figure	28	depicts	the	confidence	intervals	selected	by	strucchange	for	between	two	and	
seven	breakdates	at	window	sizes	of	20,	40,	60,	80,	and	100	days.	Each	segment	covers	
the	95%	confidence	interval	for	a	break	date	determined	by	the	Bai-Perron	algorithm	run	
with	the	window	size	and	number	of	breakpoints	shown	in	the	left	margin.	A	red	segment	
indicates	a	decrease	in	the	mean	value	of	sterling	against	the	Swiss	franc;	a	green	segment	
indicates	an	increase	in	the	mean	value	of	sterling	against	the	Swiss	franc.	Given	freedom	
to	place	five	breakpoints	with	a	window	of	20	days,	the	optimal	partition	determined	by	
the	algorithm	obtains	the	greatest	RSS	reduction	by	dating	all	of	the	breaks	early	in	the	
war,	during	the	Battle	of	Britain.	Three	are	associated	with	decreases,	emphasizing	that	
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the	sharp	reduction	in	exchange	rate	over	that	time	is	the	period	least	well	fit	by	a	
constant	parameter	model.	
	
Figure	28:	AR(2)	Model:	Breakpoints	and	Confidence	Bands	for	Alternate	Sized	Windows	
(h),	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	29	depicts	the	break	dates	and	segment	lengths	of	the	mean-only	model.	In	
most	cases,	break	dates	persist,	albeit	with	minor	shifts,	as	the	number	of	available	
breakpoints	is	increased.	The	confidence	intervals	are	narrower	than	for	the	AR(2)	model,	
though	exceptions	with	broad,	and	in	some	cases	overlapping,	intervals	occur	in	
segmentations	with	wider	windows.	This	result	is	consistent	with	Bai-Perron’s	observation	
that	a	segmented	model	without	lagged	variables	can	better	account	for	abrupt	shifts	in	
mean	value.	
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Figure	29:	Mean-only	Model:	Breakpoints	and	Confidence	Bands	for	Alternate	Sized	
Windows	(h),	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
	
	 	
Ultimately,	the	selection	of	which	change	point	model	and	the	number	of	
breakpoints	is	somewhat	arbitrary.	Too	many	breaks	and	there	is	a	risk	of	over-fitting;	too	
few	breaks	and	important	turning	points	are	overlooked.	For	example,	the	data	and	
analysis	support	the	conclusion	that	there	were	at	least	two	structural	breaks,	with	the	
first	during	the	Battle	of	Britain	and	a	second	around	the	time	of	the	Battle	of	Stalingrad.	A	
visual	inspection	suggests	that	a	plausible	model	is	represented	by	the	AR(2)	80-day	
window	model	with	five	structural	breakpoints	(Figure	30).	
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Figure	30:	Breakpoints,	AR(2)	Model	80-day	window,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates	
Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
	
	
5.5.2f	Discussion	of	events	around	breakdates	
	
	 Decreases	in	sterling’s	value	against	the	Swiss	Franc	are	observed	during	the	early	
part	of	the	war	around	the	time	of	the	Battle	of	Britain,	which	ran	from	summer	to	
autumn	in	1940.	From	18	May	to	6	June	free	sterling’s	value	against	the	Swiss	franc	
dropped	from	15	to	13.5	francs	per	pound,	a	10%	decline.		
	
	 The	first	breakdate	in	the	80-day	window	AR(2)	model	is	18	May,	1940,	a	date	
around	which	a	number	of	significant	events	occur.515	On	19	May	German	General	
Guederian	cut-off	Allied	troops	in	Belgium,	and	the	order	was	given	for	British	
expeditionary	forces	to	retreat	to	Dunkirk	and	other	port	cities.	The	British	Royal	Air	
Force,	which	had	been	suffering	heavy	losses	on	the	continent,	also	ordered	a	recall	of	
squadrons	to	Britain	on	19	May.	Several	important	events	also	precede	the	breakdate,	
																																																						
515	Bryce	and	Kanago	(2013)	show	two	breakdates	in	the	dollar-sterling	exchange	around	this	time,	on	the	
2nd	and	9th	of	May,	respectively.	
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including	Germany’s	invasion	of	France	and	the	Low	Countries	and	British	Prime	Minister	
Neville	Chamberlain’s	resignation,	both	of	which	occurred	on	10	May.	An	example	of	a	
Swiss	event	that	may	have	had	some	bearing	on	the	Swiss	franc	side	of	the	exchange	rate	
with	sterling	occurred	on	11	May,	the	date	Switzerland	mobilized	its	military	forces.		
	
	 The	occurrence	of	so	many	significant	events	around	the	18	May	breakdate,	
combined	with	the	earlier	noted	need	for	caution	when	attempting	to	link	changes	in	
market	prices	to	discrete	events,	seed	doubt	over	which	event	(or	combination	of	events)	
is	primarily	responsible	for	the	sustained	decline	in	value	observed	for	sterling.	
Furthermore,	the	directional	impact	that	some	events	had	on	sterling’s	value	is	difficult	to	
assess.	For	example,	did	the	market	view	Chamberlain’s	resignation	as	a	positive	or	
negative	development	for	sterling?	Finally,	while	breakdates	as	shown	will	often	cluster	
for	various	window	sizes,	the	discretion	involved	in	model	selection	can	also	influence	the	
exact	breakdate.	In	sum,	a	significant	negative	shift	in	sterling’s	trajectory	occurred	
around	18	May,	but	the	precise	event(s)	that	triggered	the	change	cannot	be	pinpointed.	
	
Table	33:	Breakpoints	and	confidence	intervals,	AR(2)	Model	80-day	window,	Swiss	
Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
Break	 2.5%	Confidence		 Breakpoint	date	 97.5%	Confidence		
1	 28-Mar-1940	 18-May-1940	 20-May-1940	
2	 10-Aug-1940	 20-Aug-1940	 24-Aug-1940	
3	 26-Dec-1940	 31-Dec-1940	 1-Mar-1941	
4	 10-Sep-1942	 30-Oct-1942	 3-Nov-1942	
5	 25-Mar-1943	 9-Apr-1943	 9-Jul-1943	
	
	 There	was	a	sudden	but	brief	reversal	in	sterling’s	trajectory	as	one	pound	climbed	
in	value	to	15	francs	on	7	June	and	to	16	francs	on	8	June,	perhaps	in	response	to	the	
successful	Dunkirk	evacuation	that	took	place	between	27	May	and	4	June,	referred	to	as	
a	“miracle”	by	new	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill.516	However,	sterling	resumed	
its	downward	slide	on	9	June,	and	on	18	June	Churchill	delivered	a	speech	to	the	House	of	
																																																						
516	(Churchill,	1951,	Volume	2,	Ch.	12)	
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Commons	stating	“the	Battle	of	France	is	over,	I	expect	the	Battle	of	Britain	is	about	to	
begin”.517	Sterling	proceeded	to	hit	a	new	low	of	10	francs	on	27	June,	before	swinging	to	a	
high	of	13.1	francs	on	29	July,	a	31%	increase.	These	dramatic	exchange	rate	shifts	
underscore	the	volatile	nature	of	the	free	market	during	a	period	of	fast	moving	events.	
	
Table	34:	Exchange	Rate	on	Structural	Break	Dates,	AR(2)	80-day	window,	Swiss	Fr./Free	
£	Exchange	Rates	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
Break	
	
Breakpoint	date	
Fr./£	on	
break	date	
Fr./£	next	
trading	date	
Nominal	
change	
	
%	Change	
1	 18-May-1940	 15.0000	 14.4000	 -0.60	 -4.00	
2	 20-Aug-1940	 12.2500	 12.3000	 0.05	 0.41	
3	 31-Dec-1940	 8.2500	 8.1000	 0.15	 -1.82	
4	 30-Oct-1942	 7.3000	 7.2000	 0.10	 -1.37	
5	 9-Apr-1943	 12.4500	 12.6000	 0.15	 1.20	
	
	 The	second	breakdate	is	20	August,	1940,	during	the	heart	of	the	Battle	of	
Britain.518	On	this	date	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	spoke	before	the	House	of	
Commons,	stating	"never	in	the	field	of	human	conflict	was	so	much	owed	by	so	many	to	
so	few".519	Churchill’s	comment	was	a	reference	to	the	events	of	18	August,	“The	Hardest	
Day”	of	the	Battle	of	Britain,	which	featured	the	greatest	combined	casualties	on	both	
sides.	Sterling	fell	from	12.25	Swiss	francs	on	20	August	into	single	digits	for	the	first	time	
during	the	war	on	26	August.	Following	a	brief	turn	above	10	francs,	the	free	sterling	rate	
in	Switzerland	would	remain	in	single	digits	for	over	two	years	until	November	1942.		
	
	 The	date	of	15	September,	known	as	“Battle	of	Britain	Day”,	is	generally	
considered	by	historians	to	be	a	key	turning	point	in	the	war.	On	this	day	German	forces	
made	their	largest	bombing	raid,	but	the	Germans	suffered	significant	causalities.	
However,	sterling’s	value	continued	sliding,	dropping	from	8.25	Swiss	francs	on	16	
																																																						
517	(Churchill,	1951,	Volume	2,	Ch.	12)	
518	Bryce	and	Kanago	(2013)	data	series	ends	on	25	July,	1940	and	their	last	breakdate	in	the	dollar-sterling	
exchange	rate	is	on	12	July,	1940,	around	the	time	that	the	Battle	of	Britain	begins.	
519	(Churchill,	1951,	Volume	2,	Ch.	16,	final	paragraph)	
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September	to	6.70	francs	on	25	September.	Battle	of	Britain	Day	may	have	marked	a	
turning	point	in	Britain’s	favor,	but	market	participants	appear	to	initially	have	taken	a	
different	view.	However,	following	Hitler’s	abandonment	in	late-September	of	the	
planned	invasion	of	Britain	(Operation	Sealion)	sterling’s	value	stabilized	and	then	
dramatically	climbed,	reaching	a	high	during	this	time	of	9.10	Swiss	francs	on	16	
November,	a	36%	increase	from	Battle	of	Britain	Day.	
	
	 The	third	breakdate	occurs	on	31	December,	1940.	The	Battle	of	Britain	is	
considered	to	have	ended	well	prior	to	this	date.	However,	German	bombing	raids	of	
London	continued	into	1941,	inflicting	significant	damage.	Sterling’s	value	began	trending	
downwards	for	the	remainder	of	1941	and	into	1942	before	reaching	its	nadir	for	the	war	
of	4.95	Swiss	francs	on	4	May	1942.	This	third	breakdate	is	the	only	instance	of	a	
breakdate	from	the	AR(2)	model	that	disagrees	by	over	two	months	with	breakdates	
generated	by	the	mean-only	80-day	window	model	(Table	35	and	Figure	31).	The	gap	
between	the	third	breakdates	for	the	two	models	is	395	days,	which	is	substantially	
greater	than	the	next	highest	gap	of	49	days	for	the	fifth	breakdate;	the	other	three	
breakdates	all	fall	within	two	weeks	of	each	other.	
	
Table	35:	Breakdate	Comparison	Between	AR(2)	and	Mean-only	Models,	80-day	
window,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	Rates	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
Break	
	
AR(2)	Breakpoint	date		
Mean-only	
Breakpoint	date	
Days	gap	between	
Mean-only	and	AR(2)		
1	 18-May-1940	 23-May-1940	 5	
2	 20-Aug-1940	 2-Sep-1940	 13	
3	 31-Dec-1940	 30-Jan-1942	 395	
4	 30-Oct-1942	 5-Nov-1942	 6	
5	 9-Apr-1943	 28-May-1943	 49	
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Figure	31:	Breakpoints,	Mean-only	Model	80-day	window,	Swiss	Fr./Free	£	Exchange	
Rates	Switzerland,	1939-1944	
	
	
	
	 The	mean-only	model	places	its	third	breakdate,	30	January,	1942,	closer	to	
sterling’s	low	point	during	the	war,	and	well	outside	of	the	Battle	of	Britain.	This	third	
break	is	around	the	conclusion	of	the	Battle	of	Moscow,	where	the	Nazis	suffered	their	
first	significant	land	defeat,	a	positive	for	Britain	and	the	Allies.	However,	by	this	time	the	
war	had	expanded	significantly	from	the	European	continent	to	Africa	and	Asia,	and	it	is	in	
these	areas	that	we	find	more	plausible	explanations	for	sterling’s	loss	in	value	around	this	
date.	For	example,	German	General	Irwin	Rommel’s	forces	in	North	Africa	made	two	
noteworthy	advances	against	the	British	when	his	Afrika	Korps	captured	Agedabia	on	the	
21	January	and	then	Benghazi	on	29	January.	However,	the	events	unfolding	in	the	Asian	
and	Pacific	theatres	in	January	1942	perhaps	weighed	heaviest	on	sterling.	During	this	
time	the	Japanese	were	making	advances	on	Borneo	and	Kuala	Lumpur,	while	America	
and	Japan	waged	the	nearby	Battle	of	Bataan.	On	19	January	a	large	number	of	British	
troops	were	captured	by	the	Japanese	near	Singapore,	and	on	27	January	all	British	troops	
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in	the	area	retreated	into	Singapore,	the	so-called	‘Gibraltar	of	the	East’.	On	31	January	
the	Japanese	captured	the	port	of	Moulmein	and	were	threatening	Singapore	and	
Rangoon.	The	British	surrender	of	Singapore	on	15	February,	1942	was	considered	by	
Churchill	to	be	the	“worst	disaster”	in	British	military	history.520	
	
	 The	fourth	breakdate	is	on	30	October,	1942.	In	contrast	with	the	three	previous	
breakdates,	this	fourth	breakdate	marks	the	first	time	during	the	war	where	sustained	
appreciation	in	free	sterling’s	exchange	rate	is	observed.	On	30	October,	1942	sterling	was	
trading	at	7.30	Swiss	francs;	by	5	January,	1943	it	would	nearly	double	to	14.40,	which	
would	mark	free	sterling’s	high	water	mark	for	the	second-half	of	the	war.	On	31	October	
Britain	won	a	key	battle	against	Rommel	in	the	Second	Battle	of	El	Alamein,	and	Rommel’s	
forces	retreated	on	3	November.	Historians	consider	the	Allied	success	in	the	Second	
Battle	of	El	Alamein	as	a	significant	turning	point	in	the	Western	Desert	Campaign.		
	
	 The	fifth	and	final	breakdate	is	9	April,	1943.	The	value	of	sterling	had	already	
begun	declining	from	its	high	on	5	January,	1943,	reaching	12.45	on	9	April,	a	decline	of	
14%.	The	Soviet	Army	had	successfully	defeated	the	German	6th	Army	in	the	city	of	
Stalingrad	in	early	February	1943,	which	is	generally	considered	to	be	the	key	turning	
point	in	the	European	Theatre.	However,	looking	at	events	around	9	April,	as	well	as	the	
fifth	breakdate	of	28	May	determined	by	the	mean-only	model,	a	clear	explanation	for	the	
decline	in	sterling	during	this	period	is	not	obvious	as	events	during	period	appear	to	have	
largely	favoured	the	British.	For	example,	German	Afrika	Korps	troops	surrendered	to	the	
Allies	on	13	May.	The	British	had	been	achieving	success	in	the	Atlantic	against	German	U-
boats	(“Black	May”),	and	April	as	a	whole	was	considered	a	positive	turning	point	for	
Britain	in	the	Battle	of	the	Atlantic.	Perhaps	during	this	time	market	participants	shifted	
their	attention	from	military	events	to	the	great	cost	of	the	war	on	Britain	and	the	likely	
effect	this	would	have	on	sterling’s	value	in	the	months	and	years	to	come.		
	
																																																						
520	(Churchill,	1951,	Volume	4,	p.	81)	
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	 It	is	important	to	note	that	the	time	series	for	the	Second	World	War	ends	on	19	
September,	1944,	or	approximately	nine	months	before	the	end	of	hostilities	in	Europe.	
Important	events,	such	as	D-day	in	June	1944,	are	within	the	time	series	but	may	not	be	
reflected	in	this	breakpoint	analysis	due	to	insufficient	data	and	the	selection	of	an	80-day	
window.	If	a	shorter	window	were	selected,	and	more	breakdates	considered	than	the	five	
in	the	above	analysis,	then	we	can	see	breakdates	clustering	close	to	the	end	of	the	war	
around	D-Day,	as	depicted	in	Figure	28	and	Figure	29.	
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5.5.3	U.S.	dollar-free	sterling	breakdates,	1946-1950	
	
New	daily	exchange	rate	data	obtained	from	the	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	for	
the	Swiss	franc-free	pound	sterling	and	Swiss	franc-U.S.	dollar	exchange	rates	from	1946-
50	were	used	to	derive	a	free	U.S.	dollar-pound	sterling	exchange	rate	(Figure	32).	Per	the	
Bretton	Woods	agreement,	the	U.S.	dollar	during	served	as	the	world’s	primary	reserve	
currency,	and	the	exchange	rates	of	other	currencies,	including	pound	sterling,	were	
officially	fixed	against	the	U.S.	dollar.	As	has	been	described	in	earlier	chapters,	a	chronic	
U.S.	dollar	shortage	afflicted	Britain	and	other	countries	during	this	time.	For	these	and	
other	reasons	it	is	useful	to	test	for	breakdates	in	sterling’s	exchange	rate	against	the	U.S.	
dollar	in	the	latter	half	of	the	1940s.	
	
Figure	32:	Free	U.S.	Dollar/Sterling	Exchange	Rate,	Switzerland,	1946-50	
	
Note:	y-axis	depicts	number	of	U.S.	dollars	per	one	unit	of	pound	sterling	(£1)	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
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The	period	under	study	in	this	analysis	runs	from	3	May,	1946	through	30	
December,	1950.	The	series	includes	1,446	data	points	and	spans	a	total	of	1,703	days,	or	
approximately	the	same	number	of	days	as	the	Second	World	War	break	date	analysis.	
The	time	series	expresses	the	number	of	U.S.	dollars	per	pound	sterling,	with	a	maximum	
and	minimum	values	of	$3.22	(5	April,	1949)	and	$2.30	(3	January,	1948),	respectively;	
mean	and	median	values	are	$2.72	and	$2.73,	respectively.	
	
Given	the	similarities	in	the	data	and	time	period	many	of	the	steps	outlined	in	the	
previous	sections	were	repeated,	such	as	a	log	transformation	of	the	data.	The	Durbin-
Watson	statistic	(0.0088381	p-value	<	2.2e-16)	suggests	the	presence	of	positive	
autocorrelation	and	so	an	AR(2)	regression	model	(Equation	2)	was	again	used	to	address	
autocorrelation	(Figure	33).	
	
Figure	33:	Auto	Correlation	and	Partial	Auto	Correlation	Plots,	Free	$/£	Exchange	Rates,	
Switzerland,	1946-1950	
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Figure	34:	Partial	Auto	Correlation	of	Residuals	of	AR(2)	model,	Free	$/£	Exchange	Rates,	
Switzerland,	1946-1950	
	
The	Durbin-Watson	statistic	(1.9969	p-value	=	0.4762)	supports	the	use	of	an	AR(2)	
model.	Based	on	the	cluster	of	breakdates	shown	in	Figure	35	we	can	see	breakdates	for	
various	window	sizes	clustering	around	1947	and	1949.		
Figure	35:	AR(2)	Model:	Breakpoints	and	Confidence	Bands	for	Alternate	Sized	Windows	
(h),	Free	$/£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1946-1950	
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Figure	36	depicts	four	breakdates	selected	by	Bai-Perron	for	both	a	20-day	and	80-
day	windows.	Both	windows	produce	breakdates	in	1949,	around	the	time	of	sterling’s	
official	devaluation.	The	20-day	model	misses	the	1947	breakdate	that	is	likely	associated	
with	the	July	1947	convertibility	crisis,	while	this	breakdate	is	captured	when	the	window	
is	set	to	80-days	(Figure	36).	Breakdate	results	are	discussed	for	an	AR(2)	with	an	80-day	
window	and	four	structural	breaks.	
Figure	36:	Breakpoints,	AR(2)	Model	20	&	80-day	windows,	Free	$/£	Exchange	Rates,	
Switzerland,	1946-1950	
	
											20-day	window		 	 	 	 											80-day	window	
	 	
	
The	first	breakdate	in	the	80-window	model	is	identified	on	19	August,	1947.	A	key	
event	near	the	breakdate	is	the	21	August,	1947	suspension	of	sterling	convertibility.	
British	sterling,	per	the	terms	of	the	Loan	Agreement	signed	with	the	U.S.	one	year	earlier,	
was	made	convertible	by	the	Bank	of	England	into	U.S.	dollars	on	15	July,	1947.	The	Bank	
of	England	was	hardly	a	unanimous	supporter	of	this	step,	however,	as	the	plan	for	
sterling	convertibility	was	known	inside	the	Bank	of	England	as	‘Operation	Gearcrash’.	521	
Disaster	was	correctly	predicted	by	Bank	of	England	officials	as	Britain	quickly	burned	
through	its	dollar	reserves	and	was	forced	to	abruptly	and	ignominiously	surrender	the	
promise	of	sterling	convertibility.	Free	sterling’s	value	against	the	dollar	dropped	from	
$3.02	on	13	May,	1947	to	$2.30	by	3	January,	1948,	a	24%	decrease.	
																																																						
521	(Fforde,	pp.	159-160)	
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Table	36:	Breakpoints	and	confidence	intervals,	AR(2)	Model	80-day	window,	Free	
$/£	Exchange	Rates,	Switzerland,	1946-1950	
Break	 2.5%	Confidence		 Breakpoint	date	 97.5%	Confidence		
1	 01-Jul-47	 19-Aug-47	 28-Aug-47	
2	 10-Apr-48	 16-Apr-48	 28-May-48	
3	 14-Feb-49	 16-Mar-49	 04-Apr-49	
4	 01-Sep-49	 17-Sep-49	 17-Oct-49	
	
	 The	second	breakdate	in	the	80-day	window	model	is	identified	on	16	April,	1948.	
Free	sterling	showed	buoyancy	during	this	time,	appreciating	from	$2.44	on	16	April,	1948	
to	$3.17	on	17	December,	1948,	a	gain	of	30%.	In	April	1948	the	Organization	for	
European	Economic	Co-operation	was	established	to	coordinate	distribution	of	U.S.	
money	to	Europe.522	The	Marshall	Plan	was	first	proposed	at	Harvard	on	5	June,	1947	and	
disbursement	of	these	much	needed	funds	to	Britain	and	Europe	began	in	July	1948.	An	
article	published	18	December,	1948	in	The	Economist	titled	‘Harder	Sterling’	noted	
sterling's	overseas	appreciation	in	the	past	year	and	the	technical	strength	for	sterling	
after	the	large	sterling	short-position	during	the	pre-convertibility	crisis	needed	to	be	
covered.	
The	third	and	fourth	breakdates	occur	in	1949	on	14	March	and	17	September,	
respectively.	During	the	early	months	of	1949	there	were	persistent	rumours	of	sterling’s	
imminent	devaluation.	On	12	February,	1949	a	memo	from	the	Guaranty	financial	house	
to	the	Bank	of	England	commented	on	the	rising	volume	of	free	sterling	trading,	with	daily	
turnover	estimated	at	approximately	£100,000-£150,000	(Figure	37).	As	noted	in	archival	
documents:	 		
“Subsequent	correspondence	has	indicated	that	the	volume	is	increasing.	Another	
thing	which	leads	me	to	believe	that	the	volume	is	substantial	is	that	even	the	very	
reputable	firms	are	inquiring	about	it.”523	
	
																																																						
522	(George	&	Institute	of	Contemporary	British	History.,	1991,	p.	4)	
523	EC5/1	No.	69,	Bank	of	England	Archive	
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Figure	37:	Summary	of	Weekly	Volume	Data	for	Black	Market	Exchange	Rates,	1949-50	
	
	
	
Source:	Bank	of	England	Archive	
	
The	last	of	the	two	1949	breakdates,	17	September,	is	likely	associated	with	the	18	
September	official	devaluation	by	British	officials	of	sterling’s	exchange	rate	against	the	
U.S.	dollar	from	$4.03	to	$2.80.	The	1949	devaluation	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	
subsequent	section.	
	
5.5.4	Further	discussion	of	sterling’s	1949	devaluation		
	
While	structural	breaks	tests	have	gained	wide	appeal	amongst	economic	
historians	in	recent	years	these	are	not	the	only	means	by	which	new	historical	insights	
can	be	obtained	from	quantitative	data.	This	section	utilizes	the	new	free	sterling	data	set	
to	revisit	the	case	of	the	1949	sterling	devaluation.	Several	economic	historians	that	have	
studied	Britain	in	the	immediate	post-Second	World	War	period,	including	Cairncross	and	
Eichengreen	(2003),	briefly	reference	the	development	of	what	they	termed	
248	|	P a g e 	
	
“sophisticated”	markets	for	‘free’	sterling	in	New	York	and	Zurich,	and	the	authors	briefly	
reference	Pick	(1951)	end	of	month	quotations	for	free	sterling	in	New	York	(Table	37).524		
	
Table	37:	U.S.	Dollar-Sterling	Exchange	Rate,	End	of	Month,	London,	1949	
	
	 $	/	£	 	
Month	 Market	 Official	 Discount	
March	 3.09	 4.03	 23.3%	
April	 3.06	 4.03	 24.1%	
May	 3.04	 4.03	 24.6%	
June	 2.70	 4.03	 33.0%	
July	 2.80	 4.03	 30.5%	
August	 2.83	 4.03	 29.8%	
Sept.	 2.55	 2.80	 8.9%	
Oct.	 2.44	 2.80	 12.9%	
							
Source:	Pick’s	Currency	Yearbook	(1951)	
	
UK	Chancellor	Cripps	made	a	number	of	ultimately	erroneous	public	
pronouncements	prior	to	sterling’s	September	1949	devaluation	that	sterling	would	not	
be	devalued.525	However,	Cairncross	and	Eichengreen	state	that	the	financial	community	
regarded	sterling’s	significant	black	market	discount	as	prima	facie	evidence	of	the	need	
for	devaluation.526	This	appears	to	have	been	also	true	in	North	America.527	There	is	some	
debate	in	the	literature	about	whether	U.S.	policymakers	encouraged	the	UK	to	devalue	
sterling.528	Newton	(1985)	argues	that	the	U.S.	Treasury	and	State	departments	pushed	
not	just	Britain,	but	a	number	of	European	countries	to	devalue	their	currencies	due	to	
challenges	associated	with	exporting	enough	goods	to	pay	for	needed	U.S.	imports.529	
Congress	felt	less	Marshall	aid	may	be	necessary	if	currencies	across	Western	Europe	were	
devalued.	Overall,	perceptions	in	U.S.,	as	expressed	in	the	New	York	free	sterling	market	
and	elsewhere,	may	have	played	an	important	role	in	the	1949	devaluation.	Cairncross	
																																																						
524	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	26;	2003)	“the	development	of	a	sophisticated	sterling	market	in	
New	York	and	Zurich	which	undermined	the	authorities’	attempts	to	segregate	transactions”.	See	also	
(Cairncross	1985,	1992).		
525	(Dow	&	National	Institute	of	Economic	and	Social	Research.,	1964,	p.	41;	Newton,	1985b)	
526	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983,	p.	115)		
527	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	171)	
528	(Dow	1962,	p.	41,	footnote	2)	
529	(Newton,	1985a,	Ch.	7)	
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also	suggests	that	free	sterling	market	expectations,	as	expressed	in	the	exchange	rate,	
played	an	important	role	in	shaping	events	and	were	“used	by	minsters	as	an	indication	of	
the	size	of	the	devaluation	required”.530		
	
Cairncross’	provided	an	eyewitness	account	of	the	policy	debate	of	whether	to	
devalue	sterling	to	$3.00	or	$2.80:	Chancellor	Cripps	asked	Foreign	Secretary	Bevin,	who	
“pursed	his	cheeks,	hesitated	and	then	said	$2.80	and	$2.80	it	was”.531	But	why	was	
sterling	devalued	to	$2.80	rather	than	$3.00?	While	Cairncross	does	not	say,	the	new	data	
shows	that	the	average	daily	exchange	rate	for	free	sterling	in	Switzerland	in	the	nine	
months	before	devaluation	was	precisely	$3.00.	Further,	in	the	seven	weeks	prior	to	
devaluation	the	exchange	rate	was	$2.82,	or	just	$0.02	higher	than	the	$2.80	value	that	
British	policymakers	chose.	The	near	perfect	alignment	of	the	free	market	exchange	rate	
data	with	the	debate	over	whether	to	devalue	sterling	to	$3.00	or	$2.80	represents	either	
an	extraordinary	coincidence,	or	more	likely	suggests	that	British	officials	looked	to	the	
most	recent	free	market	exchange	rate	data	rather	than	the	1949	year-to-date	average	to	
set	the	new	official	exchange	rate	for	sterling.	
	
In	their	analysis	of	sterling’s	1949	devaluation,	Cairncross	(1983)	and	Hawtrey	
(1954)	both	state	that	the	discount	found	on	free	sterling	was	a	characteristic	peculiar	to	
the	black	market	rather	than	an	indication	of	sterling’s	true	value.	In	making	this	point,	
Cairncross	utilizes	Pick’s	monthly	London	‘hand	payments’	data	for	the	value	of	free	
sterling	before	and	after	devaluation	and	states	that	“the	discount…had	never	been	less	
than	23.5	percent	before	devaluation".532	However,	it	is	unclear	how	Cairncross	arrived	at	
his	view	here	as	the	data	from	Pick	(1951)	shows	that	the	discount	was	often	significantly	
greater	than	23.5%	for	the	period	of	May	1946	through	devaluation	in	1949	(Figure	38).	
	
																																																						
530	(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	169)	For	example,	“there	was	also	a	widely	held	expectation	of	devaluation	in	
financial	circles”	(p.	115).	With	regard	to	the	timing	of	policymakers’	devaluation	decision	and	the	view	of	
financial	markets	prior	to	the	Sept.	1949	devaluation,	Cairncross,	citing	a	story	in	The	Banker,	states	“the	
almost	universal	belief	in	The	City	was	that	sterling	would	be	devalued	or	allowed	to	float.	Similar	
expectations	were	entertained	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic”	(p.	117).	
531		(Cairncross,	1985,	p.	169)	
532	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	1983;	2003,	pp.	115-116)	They	state	that	“black	market	rates	continued	to	
show	a	discount	on	the	official	rate	even	after	a	30	percent	devaluation”	of	sterling	on	19	September,	1949.	
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Figure	38:	Discount	on	Official	Exchange	Rates	in	Swiss	Market,	1946-50	
	
	
Source:	Pick’s	Currency	Yearbook,	1951	
	
The	inaccuracy	by	Cairncross	here	is	important	for	two	reasons:	first,	a	change	in	
the	ex	post	discount	provides	some	indication	of	whether	the	free	market	was	pricing	
sterling	at	or	close	to	its	true	value	at	the	time	of	devaluation.	Second,	following	
devaluation	any	change	in	the	size	of	sterling’s	discount	can	help	answer	the	black	market	
illegal	risk	component-true	value	decomposition	question	raised	by	Cairncross	and	
Hawtrey.	More	specifically,	if	the	illegal	risk	component	represented	the	entire	(or	near	
entire)	discount	in	free	sterling,	then	the	discount	following	devaluation	would	be	roughly	
in	line	with	the	pre-devaluation	discount.	
	
The	new	data	from	the	Swiss	market	show	that	free	sterling	in	the	weeks	following	
devaluation	continued	to	trade	at	a	discount	to	the	new	official	exchange	rate	against	the	
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Swiss	franc.533	However,	for	three	consecutive	trading	days	shortly	after	devaluation	(24th,	
26th	and	27th	of	September)	free	sterling	traded	in	Switzerland	at	a	premium	to	its	new	
official	rate	(Table	38).	This	was	the	first	and	only	time	this	occurred	during	the	1940s.	It	is	
unclear	whether	this	negative	premia	reflects	a	‘laundering	charge’	paid	by	actors	who	did	
not	possess	a	legal	right	to	transact,	measurement	errors,	or	other	short-term	market	
dynamics	(e.g.,	traders	caught	‘wrong-footed’).534	An	altogether	different	possibility	is	that	
the	free	market	briefly	judged	official	sterling	to	now	be	undervalued.	
	
	 	
																																																						
533	Sterling’s	official	exchange	rate	with	the	Swiss	franc	was	also	adjusted	downwards	from	17.34	to	12.23	
CHF-£	(a	29.5	%	devaluation)	
534	(Dornbusch	et	al.,	1983)	
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Table	38:	‘Free’	Sterling	Rate	and	Discount	to	Official	Rate,	Switzerland,	Sept.	1949	
Date	
U.S.	$/£	
Official	
Rate	
	
U.S.	$/£	
Free	Rate	
	
	
Discount	
CHF	Fr./£	
Official	Rate	
CHF	Fr./£	
Free	Rate	 Discount	
12-Sep-1949	 $4.030	 $2.8315	 29.7%	 Fr.	17.34	 Fr.	11.220	 35.3%	
13-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8586	 29.1%	 17.34	 11.320	 34.7%	
14-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8806	 28.5%	 17.34	 11.400	 34.3%	
15-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8851	 28.4%	 17.34	 11.425	 34.1%	
16-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8391	 29.6%	 17.34	 11.250	 35.1%	
17-Sep-1949	 4.030	 2.8391	 29.6%	 17.34	 11.250	 35.1%	
19-Sep	1949*	 2.800	 2.5990	 7.2%	 12.19	 10.500	 13.9%	
20-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7482	 1.9%	 12.19	 11.350	 6.9%	
21-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8000	 0.0%	 12.19	 11.900	 2.4%	
22-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8103	 -0.4%	 12.19	 12.000	 1.6%	
23-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8190	 -0.7%	 12.19	 12.150	 0.3%	
24-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8538	 -1.9%	 12.19	 12.300	 -0.9%	
26-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8719	 -2.6%	 12.19	 12.550	 -3.0%	
27-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.8046	 -0.2%	 12.19	 12.200	 -0.1%	
28-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7578	 1.5%	 12.19	 11.900	 2.4%	
29-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7526	 1.7%	 12.19	 11.850	 2.8%	
30-Sep-1949	 2.800	 2.7674	 1.2%	 12.19	 11.900	 2.4%	
	
*Note:	date	of	unilateral	devaluation	of	pound	sterling	against	the	U.S.	dollar	from	$4.03	to	$2.80	and	the	
Swiss	Franc	from	Fr.	17.34	to	Fr.	12.19.	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
	
Perhaps	more	importantly,	the	discount	on	sterling	compressed	significantly	
following	devaluation	and	remained	comparatively	compressed	throughout	the	remainder	
of	1949	and	through	1950	(Figure	39	and	Table	39).	A	cable	from	the	NYFRB	dated	28	
November,	1949	notes	that	considerable	pressure	on	sterling	in	the	market	in	August	and	
September	led	the	NYFRB	to	not	to	sell	any	sterling.535	However,	from	19	September	
onward	the	downward	pressure	on	sterling	in	New	York	abated.	In	the	case	of	the	U.S.	
dollar-free	sterling	exchange	rate,	the	size	of	the	discount	shrunk	dramatically,	from	a	
minimum	discount	of	23.5%	in	the	period	prior	to	devaluation	to	8%	by	1950.	536	For	the	
Swiss	franc-free	sterling	exchange	rate	(an	exchange	rate	which	Hawtrey	and	Cairncross	
do	not	discuss)	the	discount	compressed	by	a	similar	amount,	7%,	immediately	following	
devaluation.537	The	compression	observed	in	free	sterling’s	discount	matches	the	findings	
																																																						
535	OV31/109	10b,	Bank	of	England	Archive	
536	(Cairncross	&	Eichengreen,	2003,	p.	115,	note	12;	Pick,	1955)		
537	Devisenhefte	9.6/9122,	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive,	1942-1950	
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of	more	recent	studies	of	developing	country	black	market	exchange	premia	following	
devaluation.538	
	
Figure	39:	Discount	(%)	on	‘Free’	Sterling	to	Official	CHF	Fr.	Rate,	Zurich,	Sept.-Oct.	1949	
	
Source:	Swiss	National	Bank	Archive	
	
	
Table	39:	CHF	Fr./Free	Sterling	£	Exchange	Rate,	Monthly	Average,	Zurich	Market,	1949	
	 Fr.	/	£	 	
Month	 Market	 Official	 Discount	
April	 12.66	 17.34	 27.0%	
May	 12.25	 17.34	 29.4%	
June	 11.94	 17.34	 31.1%	
July	 11.46	 17.34	 33.9%	
Aug.	 11.13	 17.34	 35.8%	
Sept.	 11.50	 15.24*	 24.5%	
Oct.	 11.33	 12.19	 7.1%	
	 	 	
*Note:	average	based	on	devaluation	on	19	September	from	17.34	to	12.19		
	
Source:	Pick’s	Currency	Yearbook	(1951)	
	
	 	
																																																						
538	(Agénor,	1991;	1992,	p.	22)		
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5.6	Conclusion	
	
This	paper	has	introduced	new	daily	time	series	data	and	archival	evidence	on	free	
currency	markets	in	the	1940s.	These	markets	provided	a	market	perspective	during	a	
time	period	characterized	by	significant	regulation	of	the	financial	system	and	economy,	
and	this	paper	has	shown	how	free	currency	markets	responded	to	events	during	the	
1940s.	The	new	data	clarify	several	points	in	the	literature,	including	how	much	did	free	
sterling’s	discount	reflect	its	underlying	value,	and	why	British	policymakers	may	have	
chosen	$2.80	instead	of	$3.00	for	the	September	1949	sterling	devaluation.		
	
Britain’s	efforts	in	the	post-Second	World	War	period	to	maintain	sterling’s	
inflated	exchange	rate	against	the	U.S.	dollar	and	other	hard	currencies	ultimately	proved	
futile.	However,	what	is	less	clear	is	whether	these	efforts	were	on	balance	worthwhile.	In	
other	words,	would	Britain	have	been	better	or	worse	off	devaluing	sterling	sooner	than	
September	1949?	In	addition,	given	sterling’s	follow-on	devaluation	in	1967,	should	
Britain	have	devalued	sterling	by	an	even	greater	amount	in	1949?	These	and	other	
important	research	questions	about	the	effects	of	devaluation	on	economic	growth	and	
financial	stability	remain	for	further	study.	
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Appendix	1	Dates	and	Descriptions	of	Key	British	Historical	Events,	1939-50	
	
The	following	list	of	events	was	compiled	prior	to	carrying	out	statistical	tests	to	compare	
dates	in	the	1940s	deemed	important	by	historians	with	the	results	of	the	tests.	Emphasis	
here	is	given	to	policy	and	economic/financial	events	rather	than	prominent	wartime	
events	(e.g.,	battles),	which	have	generally	well	known	dates	(e.g.,	commencement	of	the	
Battle	of	the	Bulge	on	16	December,	1945).	
	
Date		 Event	 Summary	
Nov-39	 ‘How	to	pay	for	
the	War’	
published	by	
Keynes	
Described	the	‘inflationary	gap’	(aggregate	demand	
exceeding	aggregate	output	at	current	prices)	which	
would	emerge.	To	ensure	war	supplies	and	limit	inflation,	
Keynes	argued	for	taxation	to	reduce	private	
consumption,	encouraging	saving,	and	rationing.	In	
addition	to	taxation	he	recommended	a	system	of	
deferred	pay	which	would	be	accredited	in	the	form	of	
blocked	deposits	in	friendly	societies	or	other	approved	
savings	accounts,	to	be	released	post-war	when	the	
depression	arrived	and	the	budgetary	impact	ameliorated	
by	a	capital	levy.	‘Thus	the	system	of	deferment	will	be	
twice	blessed;	and	will	do	almost	as	much	good	hereafter	
as	it	does	now	in	preventing	inflation	and	the	exhaustion	
of	scarce	resources	(Crafts	&	Woodward,	1991	p.	65-66;	
Keynes	1940,	p.	405)	
1941	 Keynes	elected	
to	Bank	of	
England	court	
(Fforde	p.	41)	
Keynes	supranational	agenda	fit	with	American	elite	
views	(e.g.,	Hanse-Gulick	proposals)	but	clashed	with	
British	concerns	(Fforde	p.	35)	and	Congress	(p.	49)	Cared	
and	put	effort	into	winning	over	Bank	of	England	that	
Clearing	Union	was	not	inimical	to	management	of	
Sterling	Area	(p.	44).	Correspondence	with	Norman,	etc.	
Bank	of	England’s	expressed	concerns	about	the	practical	
difficulty	of	the	scale	and	time	span	of	transitioning	to	
the	Keynes’	proposal	were	born	out.	
1941	 	First	‘Keynesian	
budget’	by	Sir	
Kingsley	Wood		
(Crafts	and	Woodward,	1991	p.	66)	
14	August,	1941	 The	Atlantic	
Charter	
Articles	IV	and	V	of	the	Charter	declared	support	for	
access	by	all	countries	‘on	equal	terms,	to	the	trade	and	
raw	materials	of	the	world’	and	for	the	fullest	
collaboration	with	the	‘object	of	securing	for	all	improved	
labour	standards,	economic	advancement,	and	social	
security’.	(Fforde	p.	35)	
Sep-41	 ‘Export	White	
Paper’		
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
Sep-41	 Post-war	
financial	
planning	begins	
in	Britain	
Treasury	and	Bank	of	England	already	planning	post-war	
financial	questions	with	papers	by	Keynes	and	Hubert	
Henderson,	of	which	Keynes	outlined	the	policy	
framework	from	which	he	would	not	deviate	‘til	his	
death:	a	critique	of	laissez-faire,	proposed	an	
International	Clearing	Union	with	quotas,	overdraft	
rights,	disciplinary	procedures	for	credits	and	debtors,	
and	an	outline	for	post-war	relief	and	reconstruction	
financing	(Fforde	p.	36).	Bank	of	England’s	proposal	for	
post-war	order	came	to	be	known	as	‘key-currency	
approach’	which	built	on	the	1936	Tripartite	Agreement	
vs.	Keynes’	‘new-institution	approach’	(Fforde	p.	39)	
Dec-41	 Lend-Lease	 	
Dec-41	 Post-war	
financial	
planning	begins	
in	U.S.	
	Treasury	Secretary	Morgenthau	asks	Harry	Dexter	White	
(Treasury	deputy)	to	begin	work	on	what	was	to	become	
Bretton	Woods	
2	February,	1942	 White	paper	
‘Employment	
Policy’	
(Cmd.	6527)	is	the	first	time	the	government	accepts	‘as	
one	of	their	primary	aims	and	responsibilities	the	
maintenance	of	a	high	and	stable	level	of	employment	
after	the	war’	(p.	3)	(Crafts	and	Woodward,	1991	p.	66)	
1942	 Mutual	Aid	
Agreement,	
Article	7	
Linked	wartime	aid	with	peacetime	arrangements.	In	
return	for	aid	Britain	should	render	vague	but	
appropriate	benefits	to	the	U.S.	‘which	the	President	
deems	satisfactory’.	This	clause	came	to	be	known	as	
‘The	Consideration’	and	related	to	commercial	activity,	
freeing	up	trade	restrictions,	etc.	(Pressnel	1985,	pp	4-5)	
(Fforde,	p.	35)	
Feb-43	 Sterling	
conversion	
proposal	
White	plan	conveyed	idea	of	converting	Sterling	Balances	
to	long-term	IMF	obligations	
1943	 Sterling	Area	
Dollar	Pool	
established	
Was	kept	in	place	after	the	war.	Purpose	was	to	conserve	
dollars	by	imposing	licensing	restrictions	on	dollar	
imports.	Rule	required	members	to	deposit	excess	dollars	
and	gold	at	Bank	of	England	(Cairncross	and	Eichengreen	
1983,	pp	25)	
1944	 Montagu	
Norman	retires	
from	Bank	of	
England	
After	an	extremely	long	stewardship	Norman	steps	down	
at	age	72	due	to	illness.	Regular	illness	throughout	his	
career.	
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
1944	 Beveridge’s	‘Full	
Employment	in	a	
Free	Society’	
published	
In	contrast	to	'Employment	Policy’	argued	for	a	specific	
unemployment	rate	(a	low	3%,	deemed	unachievable	by	
Keynes).	
September	1944		 Octagon	Meeting	
in	Quebec	
Roosevelt	&	Churchill,	to	clarify	Lend-Lease	for	final	
stages	of	War	(details	ironed	out	by	‘Combined	
Committee	in	WA	DC	Oct.-Dec.	1944)	but	no	agreement	
on	end	of	Lend-Lease	and	its	post-war	replacement.	
Feb-45		 Yalta	 	
Mar-45		 Keynes	paper	on	
‘Overseas	
Financial	Policy	
in	Stage	III’	
Use	of	imaginative	characterizations	of	various	options,	
such	as	‘Justice’,	‘Starvation	Corner’	(making	do	without	
American	aid),	‘Temptation’	(accepting	U.S.	help	on	
onerous	terms).	
Jul-45	 Potsdam	 	
7	May,	1945	 V-E	Day	 	
26	July,	1945	 Labour	Party	
wins	general	
election	
Surprise	result	
14	August,	1945	 V-J	Day	 Quick	end	of	Second	World	War	was	unexpected	
(Germany’s	surrender	was	forecasted,	but	not	Japan’s).	
Abrupt	end	of	Lend-Lease,	and	with	it	two-thirds	of	the	
funding	for	the	external	deficit,	which	totalled	£10	billion	
over	the	war’s	six	years.	Industrial	reconstruction	was	
deemed	in	urgent	need,	and	many	felt	central	planning	of	
investment	post-war	was	the	most	effective	way	to	
quickly	rebuild.	
20	August,	1945	 Mutual	Aid’	from	
Canada	and	U.S.	
ends	
Just	six	days	after	V-J	day	(14	August)	
20	August,	1945	 1946-47		deficit	
projections	
Budget	deficit	of	$7	billion	nearly	doubled	from	the	year	
earlier	estimate;	trade	deficit	£500-£700	million	(Fforde	
p.	52)	
Sep-45	 Anglo-American	
financial	
negotiations	
commence	in	
Washington	
British	delegation	led	by	Keynes	but	contrary	to	other	
recent	delegations	no	Bank	of	England	official	was	a	part	
of	Keynes’	party.	
Dec-45		 Anglo-American	
Financial	
Agreement	(U.S.	
Loan)	terms	
agreed	upon	
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
10	December	1945	 Siepmann’s	
Committee	
Report	
Bank	of	England	reject	as	impractible	the	idea	that	
Colonial	Governments	should	somehow	be	directed	to	
conscript	private	balances,	but	it	suggested	that	a	
quantity	of	official	balances	might	be	freed,	and	become	
available	for	‘adjustment’	by	cancellation	or	funding,	
through	a	uniform	reduction	of	note	cover	to	80%.	The	
Report	also	pointed	out	that	a	number	of	Colonial	
Governments	had	made	interest-free	loans	to	the	UK	
during	the	war,	which	could	be	written	down	as	part	of	a	
post-war	settlement.	In	short,	any	material	adjustments	
to	the	£3	billion	in	sterling	balances	would	have	to	come	
from	India’s	and	Egypt’s	balances,	which	had	been	
swollen	by	wartime	expenditures	in	those	countries.	
However,	“the	ethical	case	for	cancellation	of	war	debts	
to	India	and	Egypt	was	not	accepted	by	local	opinion”.	
(Fforde,	p.	89-91)	
15	January,	1946		 Keynes	note	on	
‘Sterling	Area	
Negotiations’	
Calculated	a	larger	sterling	balance	than	Bank	of	
England’s.	Like	Harry	Dexter	White,	was	always	
predisposed	to	“conducting	major	surgery”	on	Sterling	
Balances.	Proposed	devaluing	Indian	and	Middle	East	
currencies	by	30%.	
30	January,	1946	 Official	
Committee	on	
Sterling	Area	
Negotiations	
meets	for	the	
first	time	
	
5	February,	1946		 Keynes	note	on	
sterling	balances	
The	‘bankers	ramp’	of	1931	was	mostly	attributable	to	
‘the	reckless	accumulation	of	liabilities	in	the	
immediately	preceding	years	which	we	could	not	hope	to	
meet	when	the	tide	turned.	I	think	we	must	ration	
ourselves	this	time	on	the	extent	to	which	we	use	the	
bankers’	bluff	as	a	means	of	supporting	(temporarily)	the	
prestige	of	sterling.	I	plead	that	this	is	not	a	case	where	
we	can	muddle	through	without	a	drastic	solution,	
grasping	no	nettles	and	just	hoping	it	will	be	all	right	on	
the	day’.	
12	February,	1946	 Meeting	of	the	
Sterling	Area	
Committee	
	Keynes	proposes	a	unilateral	blocking	of	all	sterling	
balances	to	trigger	a	crisis	leading	to	an	across	the	board	
devaluation	of	33%	for	all	starling	area	countries.	This	
idea	was	rejected	as	Keynes	writ	had	been	impaired	by	
the	loan	negotiations.	(Fforde,	p.	94).		
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
15	July,	1946	 Anglo-American	
Financial	
Agreement	(U.S.	
Loan)	ratified	by	
U.S.	Congress	
Loan	was	intended	to	last	for	three	years;	over	half	the	
facility	was	tapped	within	a	year.	
1946	 Labour	Party	
takes	office	
	
21	April,	1946		 Keynes	dies	 Otto	Clarke	“His	death	leaves	the	Treasury	in	a	terrible	
hold.	Keynes	has	been	the	Treasury	over	the	last	few	
years;	he	has	determined	policy,	spurred	on	the	other	
officials	by	criticism	and	help,	conducted	the	major	
negotiations.	This	dependence	has	been	good	in	some	
respects;	it	has	been	bad	in	others	for	it	has	prevented	
the	officials	from	developing	an	individual	technique	of	
thought.	He	has	been	the	brains	and	conscience.”	
Improved	harmony	between	Bank	of	England	and	
Treasury	(Fforde,	p.	95).	
Apr-46		 Sterling	balances	
projections	
Spring	1946	-	Bank	of	England	and	Treasury	calculations	
determined	that	<	£100-60	million	in	the	£3	billion	in	
sterling	balances	could	be	released	per	year	over	the	next	
five	years.	Fforde	p.	106	
Jul-46	 Bank	of	Canada	
shares	intel	with	
Bank	of	England	
Shared	intel	with	Bank	of	England	on	the	£150-175	
million	of	freely	usable	Indian	reserves	which	was	used	to	
plan	Britain’s	‘tying	up’	sterling	balances	negotiation	with	
India	(Fforde,	p.	109)	
Aug-46	 Bank	of	England	
nationalized	
Act	‘formalized’	the	Bank’s	relationship	with	Treasury,	
although	some	argued	at	the	time	best	not	to	mess	with	
success.	“Controversial”	Clause	4(3),	originally	proposed	
by	the	Treasury,	instituted	which	gives	the	Bank	power,	
with	the	approval	of	the	Treasury,	to	govern	the	
proportion	of	commercial	bank	assets	(Fforde,	pp	7).		
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
Sep-46		 Argentina	
bilateral	
negotiations	
Financial	repression	or	good	negotiating?	Argentina	
sterling	loan	terms:	.5%	interest	on	Argentina’s	loan	to	
Britain;	only	£5	million	per	year	of	sterling	allowed	to	be	
released	per	year;	British	owned	railroads	transferred	an	
Anglo-Argentine	entity	which	would	pay	a	4%	dividend	
guaranteed	by	the	Argentine	government;	Britain	
purchases	exportable	surplus	Argentine	meat	for	two	
years	at	45%	above	pre-war	level.	(Fforde,	p.	106)	Waley:	
“Our	strongest	argument	is	that	it	is	in	the	interest	of	all	
countries	which	hold	sterling	that	the	position	of	sterling	
should	be	maintained.	Our	weapon	is	that	we	can	
completely	block	the	existing	balances,	but	it	is	a	weapon	
which	it	would	greatly	damage	us	to	use,	and	the	other	
countries	will	know	this	quite	well.	There	is	no	disguising	
the	fact	that	the	next	twelve	months	will	be	a	very	
stormy	time.”	(Fforde,	p.	108)	
10	October,	1946	 Newspaper	
articles	
Article	by	Oscar	Hobson	on	Clause	4(3)	pitting	bank	
directors	against	shareholders	and	customers.	Other	
articles	from	the	Telegraph,	Daily	Herald,	WSJ	(Fforde	p.	
19,	p.	26-27)	
Dec-46	 European	Union	
of	Federalists	
founded	
	
Dec-46	 Sterling	Area	
held	balances	
reached	£3.7	
billion	
Sterling	balances	held	in	‘Sterling	Area’	were	£3.7	billion,	
or	65%	of	all	externally	held	balances.	(Cairncross	and	
Eichengreen	1983,	pp	24,	)	
16	April,	1946	 Anglo-Swiss	
Monetary	
Agreement	
	
Mar-47	 New	Zealand	
forgives	some	
£10	million	debt,	
Australia	£20	
million	
	
1947	 Exchange	Control	
Act		
Restricted	external	loans	(Cairncross	and	Eichengreen	
1983,	pp	22)	
Apr-47	 Egypt	bilateral	
negotiations	
Import/export	trade	financing	restrictions	intimated	
(Fforde	p.	117)	
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
Jun-47	 Dalton	Egypt	
ultimatum	
Threatens	to	block	all	Egypt	sterling	balances.	Egypt	
relents	and	ceases	to	be	a	member	of	the	Sterling	Area.	
However,	Egyptian	‘ace’	was	to	insist	on	dollar	payments	
from	Britain’s	Egypt/Suez	Canal	based	military	which	
would	amount	to	almost	$80	million	for	1948.	Britain	
relented:	could	no	longer	compel	Egypt	through	military	
force,	but	also	couldn’t	surrender	control	of	the	Suez.	
(Fforde	p.	117)	
5	June,	1947	 Marshall	Plan	
proposed	at	
Harvard,	but	
Congress	had	not	
yet	approved	
invitations	sought	from	European	governments	for	
proposals	
15	July,	1947	 Beginning	of	the	
convertibility	
crisis	
Loan	Agreement	with	the	U.S.	promised	convertibility	of	
sterling	by	mid-1947.	Trade	was	conducted	with	non-
sterling	countries	largely	on	a	bilateral	basis	until	the	
introduction	of	the	EPU	in	1950.”	(Cairncross	1995).	Was	
it	inevitable?	“Disaster”	(Fforde	p.	35)	
21	August,	1947	 Sterling	
convertibility	
suspended	
The	plan	for	convertibility	was	known	as	‘Operation	
Gearcrash’	inside	the	Bank	of	England.	Disaster	predicted	
by	Bank	officials;	marked	the	end	of	the	Loan	Agreement	
strategy	(Fforde,	pp.	159-160)	
Jan-48	 First	French	
devaluation	of	
franc	from	119	
to	214	
Free	franc	rate	was	apparently	more	than	300	francs,	and	
trade	could	be	exchanged	half	at	the	official	rate	and	half	
at	the	free	rate,	making	the	effective	exchange	rate	with	
the	U.S.	264	(Eichengreen,	Global	Cap,	p.	102)	
1948		 First	voluntary	
income	policy	
Ensured	wage	increases	were	kept	well	below	inflation.	
Labour	Government	used	it	close	relationship	with	trade	
union	movement	to	exercise	wage	restraint	(Woodward	
p.	191).	
Apr-48	 Organization	for	
European	
Economic	Co-
operation	
established	
Established	to	coordinate	distribution	of	U.S.	money	
(George	p.	4)	
May-48		 UEF	Congress	in	
The	Hague	
Churchill	speaks	in	favour	of	European	unity	(George,	p.	
2)	
July-48	 First	tranche	of	
Marshall	Aid	
begins	to	flow	to	
Britain	in	2nd	
half	of	year	
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Date		 Event	 Summary	
Aug-48	 Australia	forgives	
a	further	£8	
million	in	debt	
	
Aug-49	 The	City	widely	
expected	
devaluation	
The	Banker,	August	1949,	p.	71	
18	September,	
1949	
Sterling	
devaluation	
By	31%	from	$4.03	to	$2.80.	IMF	only	given	24	hours’	
notice.	
25	September,	
1949	
23	additional	
countries	
devalue	within	a	
week	
7	more	follow	the	23	later.	Barry	says	on	the	franc,	yen,	
$,	and	some	Latin	American	countries	didn't	devalue,	but	
Pick	reports	the	franc	was	devalued	against	$	
25	Sept.,	1949	 Second	French	
devaluation	to	
264,	to	unify	
franc's	official	
and	free	
exchange	rate	
IMF	decree,	France	humiliated.	But	stabilized	French	
reserves	and	allowed	for	some	liberalization	such	as	take	
notes	out	of	the	country	(Eichengreen,	Global	Cap,	p.	
102,	104)	
1950		 Sterling	balances	
had	fallen	to	50%	
of	post-war	level	
(Cairncross	and	Eichengreen,	p.	26)	
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6	Alternative	Currencies:	A	Historical	Survey	and	Taxonomy	
	
	
Abstract:	Alternative	currencies,	which	are	defined	as	any	non-legal	tender	medium	
of	 exchange,	 have	 been	 a	 regular	 and	 sometime	 prolific	 feature	 of	 the	 economic	
landscape	for	at	least	the	last	half-millennia.	Alternative	currencies	often	arise	out	of	
similar	socio-economic	circumstances	and	then	cease	to	circulate	within	a	relatively	
short	period	of	 time.	Regulatory	shifts	and	technology	shocks	account	 for	some	of	
the	 challenges	 that	 alternative	 currencies	 have	 faced	 in	 gaining	 wider	 adoption.	
However,	the	most	commonly	observed	explanation	for	why	alternative	currencies	
decline	 is	 insufficient	 demand	 due	 to	 relatively	 high	 transaction	 costs,	 low	
institutional	support,	 inconsistent	social	motivation,	and	other	 factors.	Present-day	
alternative	 currencies,	 such	 as	 bitcoin	 and	 the	 Brixton	 pound,	 feature	 similarities	
and	 differences	 as	 compared	 to	 past	 alternative	 currencies.	Bitcoin	 in	 particular	
possesses	 several	 radical	 new	 characteristics,	including	 a	 relatively	 decentralized	
structure,	efficient	cross-border	transactions,	global	brand	awareness,	support	from	
powerful	institutions,	and	a	growing	interest	in	the	many	non-currency	applications	
of	its	underlying	ledger	technology.	
	
	
JEL:	E40,	E42,	E49,	E50,	E51,	E58,	E59	
	
Keywords:	money,	currency,	currencies,	black	market	currencies,	national	currencies,	
parallel	currencies,	alternative	currencies,	community	currencies,	crypto-currencies,	
digital	currencies,	virtual	currencies,	Brixton	pound,	bitcoin,	blockchain	
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6.1	Introduction	
	
In	an	influential	1974	paper	economist	Benjamin	Klein	stated	“few	areas	of	
economic	activity	can	claim	as	long	and	unanimous	a	record	of	agreement	on	the	
appropriateness	of	governmental	intervention	as	the	supply	of	money”.539	However,	the	
growth	of	new	types	of	alternative	currencies	like	bitcoin	is	leading	to	a	re-examination	of	
this	view	and	prompting	questions	about	the	possible	use	of	alternative	currencies	
alongside,	or	even	as	a	substitute	for,	national	currencies.540	While	bitcoin,	having	first	
been	introduced	in	October	2008,	is	relatively	new,	alternative	currencies	have	been	a	
feature	of	the	monetary	landscape	for	the	last	several	centuries	(and	perhaps	much	
earlier).541		
	
From	preservation	work	by	numismatists,	archivists,	and	others	we	know	that	a	
significant	number	of	alternative	currencies	have	been	in	circulation	throughout	the	early-
modern	and	modern	period.542	For	example,	during	the	16th-18th	centuries	there	were	
hundreds,	if	not	thousands,	of	unique	merchant	tokens	circulating	within	London	alone.	
More	recently,	prior	to	the	introduction	of	bitcoin	it	was	estimated	that	there	were	
approximately	4,000	alternative	currencies	in	existence;	since	bitcoin	began	circulating	in	
January	2009	more	than	600	additional	crypto-currencies	alone	have	been	created.543		
	
This	paper	surveys	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	to	address	three	research	
questions:	i)	What	factors	explain	the	rise	of	alternative	currencies?	(e.g.,	do	alternative	
currencies	tend	to	proliferate	under	common	circumstances,	such	as	similar	socio-
economic	and	or	political	conditions?)	ii)	Why	do	alternative	currencies	tend	to	decline	
shortly	after	their	introduction	and	do	exceptions	to	this	pattern	exist?	iii)	How	similar	or	
																																																						
539	(Klein,	1974,	p.	423)	
540	For	example,	in	a	18	November	2013	statement	delivered	to	a	U.S.	Senate	hearing	on	Bitcoin,	Chairman	
of	the	Federal	Reserve	Ben	Bernanke	stated	that	virtual	currencies	"may	hold	long-term	promise"	
http://qz.com/148399/ben-bernanke-bitcoin-may-hold-long-term-promise/.	
541	There	is	some	evidence	of	currency	token	use	in	Greek	and	Roman	times	(Burns,	1927,	Ch.	12)	
542	For	example,	the	British	Museum	in	London	possesses	one	of	the	foremost	collections	of	historical	
alternative	currencies.	
543	The	estimate	of	4,000	alternative	currencies	around	the	globe	is	from	(Lietaer,	2004).	According	to	the	
website	www.conimarketcap.com	as	of	April	2015	there	were	approximately	600	crypto-currencies,	the	
majority	of	which	had	non-negligible	market	capitalizations.	
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different	are	contemporary	alternative	currencies	compared	to	historic	ones,	and	what	
does	history	suggest	about	the	prospects	for	contemporary	alternative	currencies	such	as	
bitcoin	and	the	Brixton	pound?	
	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	in	section	6.2	a	conceptual	
discussion	of	money	and	alternative	currencies	and	a	currency	taxonomy	is	presented.	In	
section	6.3	survey	of	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	in	North	America	and	Europe	
over	the	past	500	years	is	conducted.	Section	6.4	concludes.	Throughout	the	paper	some	
of	the	most	common	questions	around	contemporary	alternative	currencies	are	
addressed,	including	whether	bitcoin	should	be	considered	money,	and	how	is	bitcoin	
both	different	and	similar	to	other	alternative	currencies.	
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6.2	Money	and	currency	–	a	conceptual	framework	
	
Today	a	common	yet	somewhat	bedevilling	question	is	whether	alternative	
currencies	such	as	bitcoin	should	be	thought	of	as	money,	a	currency,	both,	or	something	
entirely	different.	Bitcoin	is	also	simultaneously	referred	to	as	a	crypto-currency,	digital	
currency,	virtual	currency,	and	alternative	currency.	These	questions	and	differences	in	
terminology	have	resulted	in	a	great	deal	of	confusion.	However,	the	existing	monetary	
literature	lacks	an	appropriate	framework	for	classifying	bitcoin	and	other	types	of	
monetary	instruments.544	The	purpose	of	this	section	of	the	paper	is	to	help	clarify	what	is	
meant	by	terms	such	as	money,	currency,	and	alternative	currency.	Achieving	definitional	
clarity	is	essential	to	conduct	focused	research;	the	lack	of	a	common,	shared	taxonomy	
makes	the	study	of	currencies	cumbersome	and	difficult	to	follow	for	scholars	and	non-
scholars	alike.	The	taxonomy	introduced	below	will	also	serve	to	link	the	terms	and	
definitions	used	in	this	paper	to	the	terminology	used	in	the	existing	literature,	and	will	
also	help	clearly	answer	questions	such	as	whether	bitcoin	should	be	considered	a	form	of	
money.	
	
6.2.1	Money	–	a	definition	
	
The	effort	of	scholars	to	arrive	at	a	precise	and	shared	definition	of	money	has	
yielded	mixed	results.	Definitional	clarity	has	been	achieved	in	some	financial	areas,	such	
as	the	distinguishing	between	money	and	credit.	As	noted	by	Dwyer	(1996),	“even	though	
a	credit	card	can	be	used	to	make	purchases,	neither	a	credit	card	nor	its	unused	balance	
is	money.	When	someone	uses	a	credit	card	to	buy	a	dinner,	the	purchaser	is	promising	to	
pay	later	with	money”.545	However,	Mankiw	and	Taylor	(2011),	authors	of	one	of	the	
leading	economics	textbooks,	state	“in	a	complex	economy,	it	is	in	general	not	easy	to	
draw	a	line	between	assets	that	can	be	called	‘money’	and	assets	that	cannot”.546	This	
uncertainty	over	what	is	and	is	not	money	traces	back	over	many	centuries.	Some	have	
																																																						
544	See	(Dwyer	Jr,	1996,	p.	3)	for	further	commentary	on	the	confusion	surrounding	the	definition	of	money.	
545	(Dwyer	Jr,	1996)	
546	(Mankiw	&	Taylor,	2011,	pp.	619-621)	
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argued	for	an	a	priori	definition	of	money.	547	Others	contend	that	money	should	simply	be	
considered	as	an	accounting	convention	and	defined	on	the	basis	of	efficiency	and	
utility.548	Arguably	one	of	the	more	elegant	definitions	of	money	was	the	one	offered	by	
Kocherlakota	(1998),	who	long	before	the	existence	of	bitcoin’s	blockchain	ledger	stated	
that	“money	is	memory”.549	In	other	words,	if	a	shared	and	perfect	memory	of	money	
existed	then	there	would	be	no	need	for	notes	or	ledgers;	our	collective	memory	of	all	
transactions	and	balances	would	be	sufficient.	
	
If	one	opens	any	leading	contemporary	economics	textbook	they	will	find	that	
modern	money	is	defined	as	performing	the	following	three	functions550:	
	
1. Medium	of	exchange	–	for	transacting	goods	and	services,	solving	‘double	
coincidence	of	wants’	problem.		
2. Store	of	value	–	retains	purchasing	power	into	the	future.	
3. Unit	of	account		–	a	yardstick;	the	unit	in	which	goods	and	services	are	
priced.	
	
Some	argue	that	these	three	functions	of	money	can	be	defined	hierarchically	(Figure	40).	
According	to	Ali	et	al	(2014):	
	
“There	are	many	assets	that	people	view	as	a	store	of	value	–	houses,	for	instance	
–	that	are	not	used	as	media	of	exchange.	By	comparison,	an	asset	can	only	act	as	
a	medium	of	exchange	if	at	least	two	people	(as	parties	to	a	transaction)	are	
prepared	to	treat	it	as	a	store	of	value,	at	least	temporarily.	Finally,	for	an	asset	to	
be	considered	a	unit	of	account,	it	must	be	able	–	in	principle,	at	least,	to	be	used	
as	a	medium	of	exchange	across	a	variety	of	transactions	between	several	people	
and	as	such	represents	a	form	of	coordination	across	society.	For	this	reason,	
																																																						
547	See	for	example	(Friedman	&	Schwartz,	1970,	Ch.	2-3)	and	(Schumpeter,	1991)	
548	(Newlyn,	1971,	p.	6)	
549	(Kocherlakota,	1998)		
550	See	for	example	(Lipsey	&	Chrystal,	2011,	pp.	448-449;	Mankiw	&	Taylor,	2011,	p.	618).	For	a	discussion	
of	the	differences	between	modern	and	some	historical	forms	of	money	see	(Fantacci,	2005,	p.	3),	who	
states	“in	the	ancien	régime	there	were	two	different	kinds	of	money:	ideal	money,	which	was	used	as	a	unit	
of	account,	and	real	money,	used	as	a	medium	of	exchange”.	
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some	economists	consider	the	operation	as	a	unit	of	account	to	be	the	most	
important	characteristic	of	money.”551	
	
	
Figure	40:	Hierarchical	Depiction	of	the	Three	Functions	of	Money	
	
Source:	Ali	et	al	(2014)	
	
The	above	textbook	definition	of	money,	while	undeniably	useful	and	generally	agreed	
upon,	is	too	abstract	to	provide	definitive	answers	to	questions	such	as	whether	bitcoin	
should	be	considered	money.	For	example,	should	breadth	of	use	be	weighed	in	
determining	whether	an	instrument	such	as	bitcoin	meets	the	definitional	criteria	of	
serving	as	a	medium	of	exchange?	Or	instead,	as	soon	as	something	serves	as	a	media	of	
exchange	for	the	first	time	we	should	consider	this	definitional	requirement	satisfied?	
Going	further,	does	the	particular	instrument	in	question	need	to	be	dominant	in	all	three	
monetary	functions	within	a	particular	geographical	or	state	boundary	to	be	considered	
money?	Or	instead,	if	a	non-dominant	level	of	use	across	a	given	geography	can	still	
qualify	an	instrument	to	be	considered	money	then	precisely	how	much	use?	Also,	how	
stable	should	the	value	of	the	instrument	be,	and	against	what	should	its	stability	in	value	
be	measured,	for	it	to	meet	the	definition	of	serving	as	store	of	value?	Or	instead,	should	
we	say	that	it	meets	this	definition	so	long	as	the	instrument	maintains	at	least	some	
value?	The	existing	literature	does	not	attempt	to	address	such	questions.	
	
																																																						
551	(Ali,	Barrdear,	Clews,	&	Southgate,	2014)	
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It	is	argued	in	this	paper	that	the	above	widely	accepted	textbook	definition	of	
money	can	be	made	more	useful	by	introducing	reference	benchmarks.	In	other	words,	
comparing	two	monetary	instruments	against	each	other	can	help	us	answer	questions	
about	how	well	an	instrument	meets	the	generally	accepted	definition	of	money.	For	
example,	bitcoin	today	in	various	ways	fulfils	all	the	traditional	functions	of	money,	
including	serving	as	a	unit	of	account	for	some	organizations	and	online	marketplaces.	
However,	when	comparing	bitcoin	to	the	U.S.	dollar	it	can	be	definitively	said	that	the	U.S.	
dollar	is	the	more	widely	used	unit	of	account,	as	well	as	the	more	widely	used	medium	of	
exchange,	and	that	therefore	the	U.S.	dollar	is	superior	to	bitcoin	as	a	form	of	money	with	
regard	to	these	two	monetary	functions.	Further,	by	comparing	the	two	over	some	period	
of	time	against	a	clearly	defined	and	agreed	upon	measure	of	value	we	could	also	say	
which	of	the	two	is	a	better	store	of	value.	While	the	introduction	of	such	comparative	
reference	benchmarks	cannot	settle	the	question	of	whether	or	not	bitcoin	is	money	
based	on	the	traditional	definition	of	money,	this	comparison	can	make	clear	which	
instruments	perform	the	different	functions	of	money	in	a	superior	manner.		
	
6.2.1a	Differences	between	money	and	currency		
	
The	primary	definitional	question	of	importance	for	this	paper	is	in	what	way	if	any	
do	alternative	currencies	differ	from	money.	Relatedly,	should	we	define	currency	as	
something	different	from	money?	When	we	think	of	currency	we	most	commonly	think	of	
metal	coins	and	paper	notes	minted	by	governments.	Generally	speaking,	these	national	
currencies	retain	value	from	day-to-day	(store	of	value),	can	be	legally	exchanged	to	meet	
obligations	and	transact	(medium	of	exchange),	and	are	used	to	denominate	prices	for	
goods	and	services	(unit	of	account).	In	such	a	way	national	notes	and	coins	meet	the	
traditional	definition	of	money.	However,	national	currencies	are	not	the	only	type	of	
currency.		
	
As	noted	earlier	the	currency	literature	can	be	somewhat	confusing	due	to	the	
inconsistent	terminology	used.	For	example,	economists	will	sometimes	refer	to	a	
currency	that	is	used	in	some	illegal	manner	as	a	parallel	currency	(or	as	the	‘parallel	
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market’)	rather	than	a	black	market	currency.552	It	is	true	that	such	currencies	often	
circulate	alongside	(or	in	parallel)	to	a	nation’s	legal	tender.	However,	there	are	
compelling	arguments	to	instead	refer	to	any	illegally	used	currency	operating	alongside	
an	official	currency	as	a	black	market	currency	rather	than	a	parallel	currency.	For	
example,	the	term	parallel	currency	is	commonly	used	to	describe	some	legal	(non-black	
market)	currencies.	For	example,	at	the	turn	of	the	21st	century	European	national	
currencies,	such	as	the	Italian	lira	and	Portuguese	escudo,	were	legally	operating	
alongside	the	newly	introduced	euro	during	the	phased	transition	to	the	euro	and	were	
referred	to	as	parallel	currencies.	Today,	many	who	are	advocating	for	the	return	of	
national	legal	tender	currencies	to	operate	alongside	the	euro	in	countries	struck	by	crisis,	
such	as	Greece,	refer	to	these	‘Greek	euros’	(or	‘new	drachma’)	as	a	parallel	currency.553	In	
sum,	while	a	black	market	currency	may	also	be	functioning	alongside	another	currency,	
not	all	such	parallel	currencies	are	illegal.	
	
Why	do	some	substitute	the	term	‘parallel’	for	what	can	more	accurately	be	
described	as	‘black	market’	currency?	One	possibility	is	for	reasons	relating	to	political	
'optics’;	some	researchers	and	policymakers	working	closely	with	countries	may	favour	
using	the	term	parallel	over	black	market	currency	as	the	use	of	the	latter	may	attract	
undesirable	scrutiny.	For	example,	black	market	currencies,	while	illegal,	may	often	be	
tolerated	for	various	reasons	(e.g.,	black	market	exchange	rates	can	often	provide	useful	
market-based	information).	While	it	may	be	necessary	for	policy-related	work	to	continue	
to	use	a	particular	terminology,	for	academic	research	purposes	it	would	be	useful	to	
arrive	at	a	generally	agreed	upon	classification	scheme	for	different	currency	types.	
	
6.2.2	Currency	taxonomy	
	
This	paper	presents	a	currency	classification	framework	that	identifies	five	distinct	
currency	types	-	national,	parallel,	adopted,	black	market,	and	alternative.	These	five	
currency	types	are	organized	into	two	overarching	categories	–	legal	tender	and	non-legal	
																																																						
552	See	for	example	(Agénor,	1992)	
553	See	for	example	(Feldstein,	2010)	
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tender.	This	framework	along	with	summary	definitions	and	examples	is	presented	in	
Table	40.		
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Table	40:	Five	Different	Legal	and	Non-Legal	Tender	Currencies	
	
	
	 	
																											Examples	
	 Type		 Description	 Historical	 Contemporary	
	 	 	 	 	
Le
ga
l	T
en
de
r	
National	 Currency	minted	and	or	legally	
designated	by	a	central	
government	for	use	as	legal	
tender	
U.S.		National	Banks	Era					
(1863-1913)	
U.S.	dollar,	Euro,	
Pound	Sterling,	Yen	
	 	 	 	
Parallel	 Multi-currency	system;	two	or	
more	currencies	used	alongside	
each	other	
Bimetallic	currency	
system	(gold	and	silver);	
Swiss	franc	split	exchange	
rate	markets	(late-1940s)	
1999-2002	pre-euro	
national	currencies;	
Panama’s	use	today	of	
U.S.	dollar	banknotes	
and	national	balboa	
coins	
Adopted	 Foreign	currency	used	as	the	
dominant	official	(or	de	facto)	
currency	
19th	century	Maria	
Theresa	Dollar	used	in	
Africa	
U.S.	dollar	in	Ecuador	
and	Panama;	Euro	in	
Montenegro	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
No
n-
Le
ga
l	T
en
de
r	
Black	Market	 Illegal	(yet	often	tolerated);	also	
legal	tender	exchanged	at	an	
illegal	rate	that	often	differs	
significantly	from	the	officially	set	
rate	
1940s	'Free'	British	£	in	
Zurich	and	NY	
U.S.	dollar	in	Argentina		
(“blue	dollar”	rate)	
	 	 	 	
Alternative	 Legal	(or	tolerated);	neither	
minted	by	a	central	government	
nor	serves	as	official	(or	de	facto)	
legal	tender	
1932	Austrian	Freigeld;	
17th-19th	century	British	
merchant	tokens	
Bitcoin,	Brixton	pound	
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Most	countries	today	have	national	currencies	(e.g.,	U.S.	dollar)	that	serve	as	
legal	tender.	National	currencies	are	the	most	common	form	of	legal	tender	and	are	
also	typically	the	dominant	currency,	meaning	they	face	very	little	if	any	competition	
from	other	currencies	within	the	borders	they	serve	as	legal	tender.	In	a	small	number	
of	cases	foreign	legal	tender	has	been	adopted	as	the	official	domestic	currency.	For	
example,	Montenegro	has	adopted	the	euro,	and	Ecuador	and	Panama	currently	use	
the	U.S.	dollar	as	their	official	currency.	Panama	started	using	the	U.S.	dollar	in	1904	
and	Ecuador	adopted	the	U.S.	dollar	in	2000,	and	both	are	part	of	a	group	of	ten	
countries	that	have	officially	adopted	the	U.S.	dollar.554	While	both	Panama	and	
Ecuador	have	adopted	U.S.	banknotes	as	the	exclusive	paper	currency,	both	countries	
mint	for	circulation	their	own	national	coins	for	use	alongside,	or	in	parallel,	to	U.S.	
coinage.555	A	parallel	currency	is	thus	any	legal	tender	currency	in	use	alongside	one	or	
more	other	currencies.	Historical	examples	of	parallel	currencies	include	the	many	gold	
and	silver	bimetallic	monetary	systems;	one	of	the	earliest	recorded	examples	of	a	
parallel	currency	system	took	place	when	copper	and	silver	circulated	alongside	one	
another	in	Ptolemaic	Egypt	in	220	B.C..556		
	
Looking	at	non-legal	tender	currencies,	a	black	market	currency	exists	when	a	
government	imposes	legal	restrictions	on	the	use	of	a	currency	but	is	unable	(or	
unwilling)	to	enforce	those	restrictions.	Another	example	of	a	black	market	currency	is	
when	the	government	is	unable	(or	unwilling)	to	enforce	an	official	exchange	rate	that	
differs	significantly	from	the	market	rate.	For	example,	due	to	the	persistent	inflation	
and	devaluation	of	the	Argentinian	peso,	the	U.S.	dollar	is	widely	used	today	by	
Argentinians	to	store	value,	transact	goods	and	services,	and	for	setting	prices.	In	
response	to	this	development	the	Argentinian	government	has	placed	legal	restrictions	
on	the	use	and	transfer	of	the	vast	quantity	of	U.S.	dollar	banknotes	in	Argentina.557	
However,	these	rules	have	not	prevented	U.S.	dollars	from	continuing	to	circulate	
																																																						
554	A	number	of	dependencies	also	use	the	U.S.	dollar	exclusively,	including	Bonaire,	British	Indian	Ocean	
Territory,	British	Virgin	Islands,	Saba,	Sint	Eustatius,	Turks	and	Caicos	Islands.	
555	Other	countries	that	circulate	their	own	national	coins	or	notes	alongside	the	U.S.	dollar	include	
Zimbabwe,	Micronesia,	and	Palau.	
556	(Reekmans,	1949)	
557	(Judson,	2012)	It	has	been	estimated	that	more	than	$50	billion	in	U.S.	dollar	banknotes	circulate	
inside	Argentina’s	borders.	See	also	http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-15/argentines-
hold-more-than-50-billion-in-u-dot-s-dot-currency-dot-heres-how-we-know	
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widely	in	Argentina.	The	U.S.	dollar,	which	is	legal	to	use	in	many	other	parts	of	the	
world,	can	therefore	be	considered	a	black	market	currency	in	Argentina.	A	historical	
example	of	a	black	market	currency	similar	to	Argentina’s	use	of	the	U.S.	dollar	was	the	
case	of	‘free’	British	sterling	banknotes	that	were	traded	in	London,	New	York,	Zurich,	
and	other	financial	centres	in	the	1940s	at	a	substantial	discount	to	the	official	
exchange	rate.	The	British	outlawed	and	actively	sought	to	tamp	down	the	exchange	of	
sterling	at	anything	other	than	the	official	rate	during	the	1940s.	However,	these	
efforts	were	largely	unsuccessful	until	sterling	was	officially	devalued	to	more	closely	
match	the	free	market	rate.558	
	
An	alternative	currency	is	any	instrument	that	serves	as	a	medium	of	exchange	
that	is	not	illegal,	or	minted	or	officially	designated	as	legal	tender	by	the	central	
government.	For	alternative	currencies	it	is	important	to	highlight	the	distinction	
drawn	here	between	legal	tender	minted	by	a	central	government	and	currency	
minted	or	sponsored	by	a	regional	or	other	local	government	(e.g.,	municipalities).	
Throughout	history	regional	and	local	governments	have	often	been	involved	with	the	
issuance	of	what	are	often	called	local	currencies.559	When	evaluating	whether	such	a	
local	currency	should	be	considered	an	alternative	currency	a	simple	definitional	test	
can	be	conducted:	can	the	local	currency	be	used	to	pay	for	goods	and	services	
throughout	the	country,	or	pay	taxes	levied	by	the	central	government?	Local	
government	sponsored	alternative	currencies	typically	cannot	be	used	beyond	the	
municipality’s	geographical	boundaries	or	to	pay	central	government	taxes,	and	they	
can	therefore	be	considered	as	an	alternative	currency.	
	
Not	everyone	uses	the	term	‘alternative	currency’	in	the	same	way	it	is	defined	
in	this	paper.	For	example,	Amato	et	al	(2003)	place	‘alternative’,	‘competing’,	‘local’,	
and	‘community’	currencies	all	under	the	heading	of	complementary	currency.560	
Practitioners	as	well	as	scholars	have	also	used	other	terms,	such	as	scrip.561	Recently	
regulators	and	other	officials	have	simultaneously	used	terms	such	as	digital	and	
																																																						
558	(Hileman,	2012)	
559	(Gatch,	2012)	
560	(Amato	et	al.,	2003,	p.	2)	Amato	et	al	incorrectly	reference	Hugh-Jones	(1950)	as	a	work	on	‘loyalty	
points’	as	a	private	currency	when	in	fact	Hugh-Jone’s	paper	is	on	government	points	used	for	rationing	
goods	during	the	1940s.		
561	See	for	example	(Harper,	1948,	p.	13)	
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virtual	to	describe	new	‘math-based’	currencies	or	‘cryptocurrencies’,	like	bitcoin.562	In	
summary,	there	is	a	lack	of	consensus	around	the	appropriate	terms	and	definitions	for	
alternative	currencies	
	
The	many	different	terms	employed	to	describe	the	various	instruments	
defined	in	this	paper	as	alternative	currencies	may	have	as	much	if	not	more	to	do	
with	the	marketing	of	such	instruments	than	any	effort	to	achieve	definitional	clarity.	
For	example,	terms	like	‘complimentary’	may	help	place	a	particular	currency	in	a	
more	favourable	light	with	both	users	and	regulators.	However,	the	myriad	of	
competing	terms	in	use	can	be	confusing,	or	even	inaccurate	in	some	instances.	For	
example,	the	‘complementary’	term	is	often	meant	to	connote	the	idea	that	a	
particular	currency	is	not	intended	as	a	substitute	for	national	currency,	and	this	
connotation	would	seem	appropriate	for	currencies	like	the	Brixton	pound	that	are	
fundamentally	linked	to	and	dependent	upon	British	sterling.563	However,	other	
alternative	currencies,	like	bitcoin,	are	not	necessarily	complimentary	or	similarly	
dependent	as	the	Brixton	pound	upon	a	national	currency.564	Other	problematic	
examples	include	the	use	of	the	term	‘digital’	to	distinguish	bitcoin	from	other	
currencies,	as	digital	can	also	apply	to	the	digital	form	of	national	currencies	like	the	
U.S.	dollar.	Further,	the	term	‘virtual’	may	be	better	reserved	for	currencies	like	the	
Linden	dollar	that	operate	in	virtual	reality	environments	than	applied	to	bitcoin,	
which	serves	as	a	medium	of	exchange	for	non-virtual	goods	and	services.	In	sum,	the	
term	‘alternative	currency’	is	is	suitably	general	to	encompass	instruments	such	as	
bitcoin	and	the	Brixton	pound,	whereas	terms	such	as	‘local’,	‘complimentary’,	and	
‘virtual’	are	useful	for	distinguishing	between	different	types	of	alternative	currencies.	
	
Several	currencies	are	difficult	to	classify	within	the	currency	framework	
presented	in	Table	40,	such	as	the	case	of	Cyprus	following	the	March	2013	imposition	
of	capital	controls.	Did	‘Cypriot	euros’,	which	had	legal	restrictions	limiting	their	
international	movement	and	exchange	into	other	currencies,	meet	the	parallel	
																																																						
562	The	Bank	of	England	refers	to	bitcoin	as	a		‘digital’	currency	(Ali	et	al.,	2014)	while	the	New	York	
Department	of	Financial	Services	and	U.S.	Treasury	refer	to	bitcoin	as	a	‘virtual’	currency.	
563	The	Brixton	pound	has	a	1:1	exchange	rate	with	British	pound	sterling,	and	sterling	that	has	been	
exchanged	for	Brixton	pounds	is	held	at	the	Brixton	Credit	Union	(London	Mutual	Credit	Union).	
564	Indeed,	many	bitcoin	proponents	would	like	to	see	it	substitute	for	and	ultimately	supplant	national	
currencies.	
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currency	definition?	Cypriot	euros,	like	all	other	non-Cypriot	euros,	could	be	legally	
used	in	Cyprus	for	the	purchase	of	goods	and	services.	However,	unlike	other	euros,	
most	Cypriot	euros	could	not	legally	be	used	in	other	Eurozone	countries	to	purchase	
goods	and	services.	This	limitation	made	a	Cypriot	euro,	in	principle,	less	valuable	than	
non-Cypriot	euros.	Based	on	the	framework	presented	in	this	paper	the	Cypriot	euro	
should	be	considered	a	parallel	currency	because	non-Cypriot	euros	could	be	used	
alongside	Cypriot	euros	inside	Cyprus.	
	
Looking	further	back	into	history	we	find	other	currencies	that	present	
classification	challenges,	such	as	the	various	banknotes	that	existed	during	the	so-
called	'free	banking'	period	in	the	United	States	during	1837-1862.565	During	this	period	
banks	issued	their	own	currencies	that	were	redeemable	at	the	issuing	bank	for	specie	
at	par.	These	banknotes	could	be	exchanged	for	goods	and	services	as	well	as	for	
banknotes	issued	by	other	banks.	However,	the	exchange	rates	on	banknotes	often	
depreciated	the	greater	the	distance	they	were	transacted	from	the	issuing	bank.566	
How	should	such	U.S.	free	banking	notes	be	classified?	In	terms	of	the	government’s	
role	in	the	free	banking	period,	banks	were	required	to	meet	certain	legal	obligations	
to	issue	banknotes,	such	as	purchasing	municipal	bonds	and	then	depositing	those	
bonds	with	the	state.	However,	most	state	governments	did	not	enforce	banknote-to-
specie	convertibility.	Klein	(1974)	provides	the	following	description:		
	
“private	bank	notes…were	all	denominated	in	dollars,	where	‘dollar’	denoted	a	
particular	weight	of	gold”;	this	period	could	thus	be	described	as	“much	closer	
to	multiple	monies	circulating	at	fixed	exchange	rates	than	to	multiple	monies	
circulating	at	flexible	exchange	rates”.567		
	
Of	note,	the	instances	of	alternative	currencies	declined	dramatically	during	the	‘U.S.	
Free	Banking’	period.568	Whether	antebellum	banknotes	should	be	classified	as	a	
national,	parallel,	alternative,	a	combination	of	the	above,	or	some	altogether	different	
currency	type	is	open	to	debate.	Similar	classification	challenges	are	confronted	when	
examining	Scottish	and	other	free	banking	systems	found	during	the	17th-19th	
																																																						
565	For	a	discussion	of	whether	the	term	'free	banking'	is	appropriate	for	this	period	see	(White,	2015)		
566	Bank	note	exchange	rates	were	published	in	newspapers	and	other	reports.	For	more	on	the	price	
differences	see	(Calomiris	&	Schweikart,	1991;	Dwyer	Jr,	1996,	pp.	5-6;	Gorton,	1996,	p.	348)	
567	(Klein,	1974,	pp.	439-440)	
568	(Harper,	1948,	p.	16).	
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centuries.569	In	sum,	the	classification	challenge	presented	by	U.S.	Free	Banking	notes	
and	the	Cypriot	euro	illustrate	some	limitations	with	the	currency	classification	
framework	presented	in	this	paper.	However,	the	vast	majority	of	currencies	fit	within	
the	Table	40	framework.	
	
6.2.3a	Four	different	alternative	currency	types	
	
There	are	at	least	six	different	types	of	alternative	currencies,	and	these	six	
currencies	can	be	grouped	into	two	overarching	categories	-	tangible	and	digital.570	
This	alternative	currency	classification	framework	is	presented	in	Table	41	and	Table	
42.	
	
Table	41:	Tangible	Alternative	Currency	Classification	Framework	
	
	 Historical	 Contemporary	
Intrinsic	
Utility	
Metals;	cigarettes	during	Second	
World	War571	
SIM	airtime	minutes572	
	 	 		
Token	
17th-19th	c.	British	tokens;	
1930s	Great	Depression-era	
scrip573	
Chiemgau;	Brixton	pound;	
BerkShares	
	
	
The	different	tangible	alternative	currency	types	are	presented	in	Table	41	in	
the	order	of	their	plausible	first	appearance	and	use	in	history.	While	our	records	of	
financial	antiquity	are	incomplete	it	is	reasonable	to	conjecture	that	items	possessing	
intrinsic	utility	or	value,	such	as	metals,	were	likely	the	earliest	alternative	currencies	
to	be	exchanged.	Intrinsic	utility	currencies	are	also	sometimes	referred	to	as	
commodity	money.	Part	of	the	value	of	intrinsic	utility	alternative	currencies	is	derived	
from	their	relative	physical	scarcity.	Such	intrinsic	currencies	obviate	the	need	for	
abstracting	a	measure	of	value,	which	is	required	with	more-conceptual	currency	
systems	described	below.	Another	advantage	of	using	an	instrument	that	possesses	
																																																						
569	See	for	example	(Rothbard,	1988;	Sechrest,	1988;	White,	1984)	
570	It	should	be	noted	that	some	instruments,	such	as	the	Brixton	pound,	have	both	a	digital	and	physical	
currency.	
571	(Radford,	1945)	
572	Unused	airtime	minutes	on	SIM	cards	are	a	common	alternative	currency	in	many	African	countries	
(Economist,	2013)	
573	(Harper,	1948)	
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widely	agreed	upon	utility	is	the	avoidance	of	geographically	bounded	use;	the	
portability	of	early	currencies	made	it	possible	for	intrinsic	currencies	to	be	used	across	
great	distances,	which	fits	with	our	understanding	of	the	nomadic	nature	of	pre-
modern	humans.	
	
Circulating	alongside	or	perhaps	even	prior	to	the	existence	of	intrinsic	
currencies	were	token	currencies.	Token	currencies	are	also	physical	currencies	but	
with	little	to	no	intrinsic	utility	or	value;	their	value	is	instead	derived	from	social	
constructs,	such	as	agreements	that	they	be	accepted	as	a	medium	of	exchange	and	
that	their	supply	be	limited.	In	recent	centuries	token	alternative	currencies	have	often	
been	issued	by	smaller	institutions,	such	as	businesses,	for	use	in	day-to-day	
transactions	with	different	stakeholders.	These	tokens	are	often	used	only	within	a	
limited	geographic	range,	such	as	a	borough,	town,	or	region,	and	are	therefore	often	
referred	to	as	‘local’	or	‘community’	currencies.	While	efforts	have	been	made	to	
significantly	expand	the	range	where	token	currencies	can	be	used,	a	link	to	a	
particular	set	of	institutions	and	or	location	are	two	of	the	defining	features	of	tangible	
token	currencies.			
	
Table	42:	Digital	Alternative	Currency	Classification	Framework	
	
	
							 																							Closed	 																																							Open	
				Centralized	
Linden	Dollar,		
World	of	Warcraft	Gold	 Flooz,	Beenz	
	Decentralized	 N/A	 Bitcoin,	Litecoin	
	
	
While	digital	alternative	currencies	have	received	a	great	deal	of	public	and	
academic	attention	of	late	they	have	been	an	active	topic	in	cryptography	and	
technology	circles	since	well	before	the	internet	became	widespread.	A	number	of	
crypto	or	e-money	efforts	failed	prior	to	bitcoin.	Benjamin	Wallace	writing	in	Wired	
(2011)	states:	
	
“Cypherpunks,	the	1990s	movement	of	libertarian	cryptographers,	dedicated	
themselves	to	the	project	(of	a	digital	alternative	currency).	Yet	every	effort	to	
create	virtual	cash	had	foundered.	Ecash,	an	anonymous	system	launched	in	
the	early	1990s	by	cryptographer	David	Chaum,	failed	in	part	because	it	
depended	on	the	existing	infrastructures	of	government	and	credit	card	
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companies.	Other	proposals	followed—bit	gold,	RPOW,	b-money—but	none	
got	off	the	ground”.574	
	
It	is	useful	to	distinguish	between	closed	and	open	digital	currencies.	Closed	
digital	currencies,	such	as	Second	Life’s	Linden	dollar,	are	largely	transacted	inside	a	
digital	virtual	world.	Linden	dollars	were	designed	for	transactions	within	the	Second	
Life	virtual	world.	However,	there	is	nothing	preventing	individuals	from	conducting	
exchanges	with	Linden	dollars	outside	of	Second	Life	and	then	arranging	settlement	
inside	Second	Life,	as	has	apparently	happened	through	auction	sites	like	eBay.	Linden	
Lab,	which	created	Second	Life,	retains	central	control	over	the	issuance	and	
governance	of	Linden	dollars.	These	two	features	make	the	Linden	dollar	both	a	closed	
and	centralized	alternative	currency.		
	
Some	community	currencies,	such	as	the	Brixton	pound,	also	have	a	digital	
equivalent	that	can	be	used	to	transact	with	the	same	goods	and	services	as	tangible	
Brixton	pound	notes.	Because	the	Brixton	pound	is	operated	by	a	central	organization,	
and	because	Brixton	pounds	are	largely	transacted	within	a	limited	geographic	range,	
Brixton	pounds	can	be	considered	to	be	both	a	tangible	and	a	closed-digital	alternative	
currency.	In	contrast,	open-digital	currencies	are	largely	unbounded	instruments	that	
can	be	transacted	outside	a	very	limited	and	clearly	demarcated	digital	environment.	
Bitcoin	is	often	characterized	as	the	world's	first	decentralized	currency.	Centralized	
digital	currencies	feature	a	single	issuer-operator	who	maintains	control	over	
important	currency	features,	such	as	supply,	use	rules,	and	other	important	functions.	
In	contrast,	decentralized	currencies	like	bitcoin	function	in	a	more	devolved	fashion	
with	open	source	software	development,	no	single	currency	issuer,	distributed	
transaction	processing,	and	a	transparent	public	ledger	(the	‘blockchain’).	However,	
there	is	considerable	debate	over	the	degree	of	bitcoin’s	decentralization.	For	
example,	in	March	2013	members	of	the	Bitcoin	community	corrected	a	fork	in	the	
blockchain	through	an	organized	effort.	Bitcoin	has	also	come	under	criticism	for	its	
highly	concentrated	mining,	ownership	of	bitcoins,	and	other	aspects.575	
	
																																																						
574	(Wallace,	2011)	
575	For	further	discussion	see	http://bitcoinmagazine.com/bitcoin-network-shaken-by-blockchain-fork/		
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Just	as	some	currencies	are	difficult	to	classify	within	the	currency	framework	
presented	in	Table	40,	several	alternative	currencies	are	not	easy	to	classify	within	
framework	presented	in	Table	41	and	Table	42.	For	example,	should	travellers’	
cheques,	which	were	first	issued	in	1772	and	widely	popularized	by	American	Express	
starting	in	1891,	be	considered	an	alternative	currency?	In	many	ways	they	resemble	
community	currencies	like	the	Brixton	pound,	which	also	has	a	fixed	1:1	exchange	rate	
with	a	national	currency.	While	traveller’s	cheques	could	historically	be	used	over	a	
much	wider	geographic	range	than	most	community	currencies	they	are	also	similar	to	
community	currencies	in	that	they	are	only	accepted	by	select	merchants	and	
institutions.	Because	travellers’	cheques	cannot	be	used	to	pay	taxes	or	settle	debts,	
and	because	they	are	physical	objects,	they	can	be	classified	as	a	tangible	alternative	
currency.	
	
Economics	textbooks	are	beginning	to	give	more	attention	to	alternative	
currencies.	For	example,	Mankiw	and	Taylor	(2011)	briefly	discuss	an	alternative	
currency	very	similar	to	the	Brixton	pound	called	the	Stroud	pound.	The	authors	
describe	how	it	“can	fulfil	many	of	the	requirements	of	national	currencies”	like	the	
British	pound.576	Restaurant	menus	in	Brixton	can	be	found	with	prices	in	Brixton	
pounds,	and	the	local	Brixton	council	government	through	a	program	called	‘Payroll	
Local’	allows	Lambeth	council	employees	to	receive	a	portion	of	their	salary	in	Brixton	
pounds.577	In	other	words,	for	a	certain	set	of	transactions	at	participating	
organizations	within	a	well-defined	geography	there	is	little	practical	difference	
between	the	Brixton	pound	and	British	pound	other	than,	similar	to	a	merchant	loyalty	
or	rewards	scheme,	you	can	often	receive	a	discount	of	10%	on	transactions	by	paying	
with	Brixton	pounds.	However,	Mankiw	and	Taylor	stop	short	of	explicitly	stating	
whether	or	not	currencies	like	the	Brixton	or	Stroud	pounds	should	be	defined	as	
money.	
	
																																																						
576	(Mankiw	&	Taylor,	2011,	p.	620)	
577	There	is	no	maximum	set	of	the	portion	of	Lambeth	Council	employees’	salaries	that	can	be	received	
in	Brixton	pounds,	but	according	to	Brixton	pound	organizers	most	who	are	participating	at	present	
receive	about	£100	Brixton	pounds	per	month.	It	is	also	advised	that	Lambeth	Council	employees	take	
no	more	than	10%	of	their	salary	in	Brixton	pounds	as	acceptance	outside	of	retailers	for	items	such	as	
housing	rent	is	more	limited.	
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While	the	terms	money	and	currency	are	often	used	synonymously	it	can	be	
useful	to	distinguish	one	from	the	other.578	As	noted	earlier	by	Ali	et	al,	some	
economists	argue	that	money’s	most	decisive	function	is	serving	as	a	unit	of	account.	
However,	other	economists	argue	that	serving	as	a	medium	of	exchange	is	money’s	
defining	feature.579	This	paper	argues	that	serving	as	a	medium	of	exchange	may	be	
more	usefully	defined	as	the	primary	function	of	currency,	but	only	one	function	of	
money.	Some	currencies,	like	the	U.S.	dollar,	widely	perform	all	three	functions	of	
money,	while	other	mediums	of	exchange	may	not	serve	as	a	widely	used	unit	of	
account.	A	precise	and	generally	agreed	upon	definition	of	what	constitutes	a	‘store	of	
value’	does	not	exist.	For	example,	some	will	argue	that	the	significant	decline	in	the	
U.S.	dollar’s	purchasing	power	over	time	due	to	inflation	makes	it	a	poor	store	of	
value,	and	it	is	certainly	true	that	there	are	both	other	currencies	(e.g.,	Swiss	franc)	
and	asset	classes	(e.g.,	equities)	which	have	over	a	long	period	served	as	a	better	store	
of	value.	However,	over	the	short-run	(e.g.,	less	than	a	month)	the	U.S.	dollar	has	
generally	effectively	stored	value	over	the	last	several	decades,	along	with	serving	as	a	
widely	used	unit	of	account	and	medium	of	exchange.	Similarly,	some	argue	that,	given	
its	relatively	high	volatility,	that	bitcoin	is	a	poor	store	of	value.	However,	others	argue	
that	bitcoin	is	a	good	store	of	value	given	its	price	appreciation	against	the	U.S.	dollar	
and	other	national	currencies	over	time.	
	
In	sum,	while	all	money	is	currency,	not	all	currency	is	money.	However,	if	an	
alternative	currency	fully	embodied	all	three	functions	of	money	then	it	could	also	be	
considered	money.	In	other	words,	the	designation	of	what	is	and	is	not	money	does	
not	depend	on	law	or	a	government	defining	such	a	currency	as	legal	tender.	
	
	 	
																																																						
578	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	modern	money	and	currency	see	(Bernstein,	1965,	Ch.	4-5)	
579	(Ali	et	al.,	2014;	Lipsey	&	Chrystal,	2011,	pp.	448,	659;	Woodford	&	WALSH,	2005)	
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6.3	Historical	Survey	of	Alternative	Currencies	
	
“It	is	believed	that	an	examination	of	the	record	of	scrip	experience	and	a	
consideration	of	the	conclusions	to	be	drawn	from	it	may	be	of	value	if	similar	
conditions	should	develop	in	the	future.”	
-William	Joel	Canady	Harper,	1948580	
	
Alternative	currencies	are	nothing	new,	and	as	noted	earlier	their	use	may	date	
as	far	back	as	the	early	classical	period.	Numismatic	works	from	the	19th	century	
perhaps	comprise	some	of	the	earliest	published	literature	on	alternative	currencies.	
This	section	of	the	paper	surveys	the	alternative	currency	literature	over	the	past	
several	hundred	years,	covering	the	regions	where	a	relatively	good	historical	record	of	
alternative	currencies	has	been	maintained,	specifically	North	America	and	Britain.	
One	aim	of	this	historical	survey	is	to	examine	whether	there	are	any	commonalties	
between	the	historical	and	contemporary	alternative	currencies,	as	well	as	the	political	
and	economic	contexts	in	which	they	arose.	
	
Before	proceeding	it	should	be	noted	that,	while	extensive	and	reliable	data	
often	exists	for	present	day	alternative	currencies,	the	same	unfortunately	cannot	be	
said	for	most	historical	alternative	currencies.581	Data	gaps	impose	some	limits	on	our	
understanding	of	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	and	present	challenges	in	some	
areas	in	making	comparisons	between	the	past	with	the	present.582	However,	sufficient	
historical	detail	and	narrative	accounts	exist	to	reveal	some	general	themes	and	
patterns	about	alternative	currencies.	
	
6.3.1	Alternative	currencies	in	North	America	
	
Prior	to	the	American	Revolution	there	are	numerous	reports	that	colonists	
made	significant	use	of	privately	produced	paper	money	issued	by	merchants	and	
																																																						
580	(Harper,	1948,	p.	12)		
581	For	a	previous	unsuccessful	effort	to	collect	quantitative	data	on	alternative	currencies	see	(Amato,	
Fantacci,	&	Doria,	2003).	
582	While	bitcoin	and	other	present	day	currencies	afford	higher	quality	data	sets	than	historical	
alternative	currencies,	it	should	be	noted	that	some	of	the	data	on	bitcoin	usage	is	difficulty	to	audit	and	
very	likely	distorted.	For	example,	bitcoin	exchange	trading	volume	is	widely	believed	to	be	inflated	for	
marketing	purposes	(Hileman,	2014a).	
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traders.583		Sylla	(1982)	summarizes	many	of	the	well-known	alternative	currencies	
used	during	this	period,	such	as	wampum,	which	was	a	shell	used	as	currency	by	
Native	Americans,	along	with	other	commodity	currencies	such	as	corn,	pelts,	rice,	and	
tobacco.584	Further	north	in	Canada,	in	1685	a	French	official	created	a	new	‘playing	
card’	currency	by	cutting	a	deck	of	cards	into	quarters,	writing	an	amounts	of	livres	on	
the	cards,	signed	his	name,	and	then	instructed	members	of	a	community	to	accept	
them.	By	1714	approximately	two	million	livres	of	depreciated	playing	card	currency	
were	in	circulation.585	Even	after	the	founding	of	the	Boston	mint	in	1652	there	are	
reports	of	merchant	issued	currency,	and	complaints	of	currency	‘hoarding’	during	
economic	downturns	persist	well	into	the	18th	century.586	Such	complaints	can	be	taken	
as	evidence	of	the	continued	importance	of	alternative	currencies	following	the	
introduction	of	government	supported	currency	in	America.587		
	
Given	the	frequency	with	which	inflation	accompanies	war	it	is	not	surprising	
that	there	was	a	proliferation	of	alternative	currencies	during	the	American	
Revolution,	where	lottery	tickets,	private	tokens	(shinplasters),	and	other	mediums	of	
exchange	circulated.588	In	post-revolutionary	America	banks	frequently	failed,	which	
often	led	to	financial	panics	and	shortages	in	small	denomination	currency	in	
particular.	In	these	environments	various	forms	of	alternative	currency	proliferated,	
including	notes	issued	by	cities,	states,	individuals,	merchants,	and	churches.589	This	
shortage	of	small	denominations	of	currency	is	a	phenomenon	that	has	been	referred	
to	as	‘The	Big	Problem	of	Small	Change’,	a	phrase	that	was	originally	introduced	by	
Cipolla	(1956)	and	elaborated	on	by	Sargent	and	Velde	(2002)	and	others.590	According	
to	Sargent	and	Velde,	the	problem	of	not	enough	small	change	was	rooted	in	two	
issues:	poor	economic	theory	and	inadequate	technology.591	This	‘Big	Problem’	has	in	
fact	been	the	driving	force	behind	the	introduction	of	a	number	of	alternative	
																																																						
583	(McLeod,	1898,	pp.	229-230)	
584	(Sylla,	1982)	
585	(Chalmers,	1893,	p.	118;	Del	Mar,	1899,	p.	118)	
586	(Sumner,	1874,	p.	26)	
587	(Harper,	1948,	p.	10)		
588	(Del	Mar,	1899,	p.	116)	
589	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	14-15)	
590	See	for	example	(Kohn,	2005,	Ch.	7)	
591	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	p.	XVIII)	
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currencies.592	For	example,	in	1792	the	town	of	Albany	in	New	York	state	introduced	
small	notes	to	address	the	chronic	shortage	of	smaller	denominations.593	
	
In	the	decades	immediately	following	the	adoption	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	up	
through	the	Civil	War	bank	money	played	a	more	important	role	even	though	various	
alternative	currencies	issued	by	private	individuals	and	merchants,	as	well	as	those	by	
local	governments,	continued	to	circulate.	A	noticeable	decline	in	alternative	
currencies	was	witnessed	during	the	‘U.S.	Free	Banking’	era	of	1837-1862	–	a	period	of	
relative	peace	from	military	conflict.	However,	Harper	(1948)	notes	that	“the	
proportion	of	local	non-bank	instruments	tended	to	increase	as	banks	failed	with	each	
period	of	crisis	and	depression,	and	to	diminish	with	the	revival	of	business”.594	
	
Once	criticism	of	Harper’s	study	of	this	earlier	period	that	should	be	noted	is	his	
tendency	to	conflate	credit	and	money	(or	currency).	For	example,	he	described	pre-
revolutionary	‘loan	bills’,	such	as	due	bills	and	shop	notes,	which	were	used	by	
‘gentlemen	of	substance’	(individuals	and	merchants)	as	local	money.595	His	description	
states	that	these	provided	“evidences	of	indebtedness”	and	contains	no	discussion	of	
whether	these	bills	circulated	as	currency.	These	and	other	debt	instruments	he	
describes	may	more	aptly	be	termed	credit	rather	than	currency	or	money.	Harper	
does,	however,	highlight	a	number	of	alternative	currencies	before	the	Great	
Depression,	such	as	a	system	during	the	U.S.	Revolutionary	War	period	where	
merchants	discounted	each	other’s	bills.	
	
During	the	Great	Depression	various	alternative	currencies	referred	to	by	
Harper	as		‘scrip’	were	widely	used	throughout	the	United	States	and	Europe,	including	
commodity	notes	exchangeable	for	goods	and	services	as	well	as	municipal	notes.	596		
The	scrip	which	Harper	focuses	on	was	that	issued	by	chambers	of	commerce	and	local	
governments;	self-help	groups,	merchant	groups,	and	others	private	actors	also	issued	
																																																						
592	(Cipolla,	1956;	Sargent	&	Velde,	2002)	
593	(Carothers,	1967)	
594	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	14-15)	
595	(Harper,	1948,	p.	9)	
596	(Harper,	1948,	p.	7,	Figure	1)	Harper’s	thesis	contains	a	map	that	plots	the	different	types	of	scrip	
used	in	different	parts	of	the	U.S.	For	European	alternative	currencies	from	this	period	see	(Amato	et	al.,	
2003,	p.	1)	
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scrip.	Similar	to	today’s	local	complementary	currencies	like	the	Brixton	pound,	one	
purpose	of	this	Great	Depression-era	scrip	was	to	limit	out-of-town	expenditures	or	
purchases	at	non-local	chain	stores.597	Similar	to	today’s	Freicoin,	many	U.S.	scrip	
currencies	and	the	Austrian	Freigeld	incorporated	demurrage,	an	economic	concept	of	
developed	by	economist	Silvio	Gesell	that	is	designed	to	reduce	price	deflation	by	
encouraging	spending.598		
	
A	number	of	challenges	faced	by	Great	Depression-era	scrip	are	also	commonly	
seen	in	today’s	alternative	currencies.	For	example,	alternative	currencies	often	
struggle	to	gain	wider	acceptance.	Practical	operational	issues,	such	as	poor	paper	
quality	and	not	having	enough	physical	space	on	the	scrip	note	for	stamps,	are	also	
quite	common.	The	most	significant	problem	confronting	1930s	scrip	was	the	need	
many	had	to	purchase	goods	and	services	outside	the	local	community,	where	the	
particular	scrip	was	not	accepted.	Efforts	aimed	at	addressing	this	problem	included	
establishing	local	clearinghouses,	inter-community	barter	exchanges,	and	a	national	
scrip	plan,	were	met	with	varying	degrees	of	success	and	failure.	Harper	states	that	the	
national	scrip	plan	proposal	was	“rejected	by	Congress	in	favor	of	plans	by	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	and	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	for	an	increase	in	the	paper	
currency	issues	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Banks”.599		
	
6.3.2	Alternative	currencies	in	Europe	
	
	 In	16th	and	17th	century	England	alternative	currencies,	commonly	referred	to	
as	token	currency	in	the	literature,	came	into	widespread	use.	The	term	token	appears	
to	have	a	number	of	uses.	For	example,	Sargent	and	Velde	define	the	term	token	as	“a	
stamped	piece	of	metal,	often	coin,	issued	as	a	medium	of	exchange	by	a	private	
person	or	company	who	promises	to	exchange	it	for	its	nominal	value	for	goods	or	
legal	currency”.600	However,	not	all	token	currency	has	always	been	metal.	Further,	
currencies	described	as	tokens	were	sometimes	issued	by	public	entities,	such	as	cities.	
																																																						
597	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	1-2)	
598	(Harper,	1948,	p.	3)	Demurrage	incorporates	a	penalty	for	holding	money.	For	example,	stamps	with	
dates	are	affixed	to	scrip	at	regular	intervals	to	indicate	the	depreciated	value	of	the	instrument.	Harper	
notes	that	‘transaction’	stamps	were	more	common	than	the	‘time’	stamp	system	described	by	Gesell	
(Gesell,	1929).	
599	(Harper,	1948,	pp.	5-6)		
600	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	p.	376)	
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There	is	also	significant	evidence	of	earlier	use	in	England	and	throughout	other	
areas	of	Europe	during	the	medieval	period.	Evidence	of	medieval	token	use	has	
primarily	been	obtained	in	the	more	financially	sophisticated	regions	in	Europe	during	
this	period	of	Flanders,	northern	France	and	Italy,	and	Catalonia.	In	contrast	with	
England,	in	France	and	the	Low	Countries	token	currency	was	suppressed	through	
government	action.601	Tokens	were	issued	for	two	reasons:	first,	in	response	to	the	
aforementioned	shortage	of	smaller	currency	units;	second,	due	to	inconveniences	
associated	with	using	silver,	which	due	to	its	small	weight	and	size	was	often	lost.	In	
1594	Queen	Elizabeth	gave	the	Mayor	of	the	Corporation	of	Bristol	approval	to	mint	a	
‘Corporation	farthing’,	which	gained	a	wide	circulation	and	was	able	to	maintain	its	
value.602	Tradesmen	also	issued	lead	coins	up	through	the	early	17th	century.	
	
English	token	currency	were	in	the	words	of	Boyne	and	Williamson	(1889)	a	
“money	of	necessity”.	Echoing	the	tone	and	language	one	often	finds	surrounding	
today’s	alternative	currency	movements,	Boyne	and	Williamson	continue:			
	
“they	(tokens)	would	never	have	been	issued	but	for	the	indifference	of	a	
Government	to	a	public	need,	and	their	issue	forms	a	remarkable	instance	of	a	
people	supplying	their	own	needs	by	an	illegal	issue	of	coinage,	and	in	this	way	
forcing	a	legislature	to	comply	with	demands	and	requests	at	once	just	and	
imperative”603		
	
Boyne	and	Williamson	also	state	that	token	currency	was	illegal,	which	based	on	the	
historical	record	appears	to	be	true	for	at	least	some	of	this	period.	However,	it	does	
not	appear	that	these	alternative	currencies	were	at	all	times	illegal,	such	as	the	
instance	noted	in	this	paper	when	Bristol	was	authorized	to	issue	its	own	local	
currency	in	1594.	As	noted	by	Sargent	and	Velde,	“in	England,	where	the	mint	
																																																						
601	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	pp.	216-218)	
602	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	42)	Given	the	fact	that	the	crown	approved	the	
minting	of	Bristol’s	‘Corporation	farthing’	it	could	be	argued	that	this	was	not	in	fact	a	pure	alternative	
currency.	There	may	also	be	some	confusion	or	disagreement	on	the	exact	date	as	Sargent	and	Velde	
report	a	similar	instance	of	Queen	Elizabeth	approving	a	lead	token	to	be	used	within	10	miles	of	Bristol	
in	1582	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	pp.	217-218)	
603	(Boyne	&	Williamson,	1889,	p.	b-2)		
	 292	
produced	very	few	small	denominations,	tokens	were	tolerated	and	at	times	officially	
authorized”.604	
	
The	year	of	1648	is	the		first	in	which	tokens	are	reported	to	have	begun	
appearing	in	wider	circulation.605	During	the	17th	–	19th	century	the	issuance	of	tokens	
became	widespread	throughout	England,	Wales	and	Ireland.606	A	shortage	of	‘low	value	
copper	coinage’	in	17th	century	Great	Britain	afflicted	trade	and	the	government	did	
not	address	the	shortage	by	minting	more	‘regal	coinage’,	which	was	made	of	gold	and	
silver.	Copper,	which	had	been	used	for	money	in	earlier	centuries	during	feudal	times,	
was	considered	“unfitting	for	the	head	of	the	monarch”.607	In	1404	the	House	of	
Commons	had	been	petitioned	to	solve	lack	of	small	coins	by	minting	lead	tokens.	
Queen	Elizabeth	first	created	a	pattern	for	coins	to	be	minted	off	of	a	base	metal	but	
perhaps	only	Bristol	issued	any,	which	were	used	only	in	a	10-mile	radius	of	the	city.	
The	Romans	had	also	used	copper	coins,	and	many	European	countries	used	copper	by	
1651.		
	
As	a	result	of	the	shortage	of	small	change,	businesses	and	local	authorities	
minted	their	own	copper	coins	‘without	authority’.608	A	wide	swath	of	the	British	
economy	minted	farthing,	halfpenny,	penny	and	tokens	in	the	17th	century	as	show	in	
Table	43.	In	addition	to	commercial	establishments	a	number	of	somewhat	more	
eclectic	organizations	and	institutions	issued	tokens,	including	workhouses,	
churchyards,	colleges	and	prisons.	
	
	 	
																																																						
604	(Sargent	&	Velde,	2002,	p.	217)	
605	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	43)	
606	(Boyne	&	Williamson,	1891;	Mathias	&	Barrington	Brown,	1962;	Whiting,	1971)	
607	(Whiting,	1971,	pp.	13-14,	16)	
608	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	43)	
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Table	43:	Issuers	of	Alternative	Currency,	17th	Century	Britain	
	
Sector	 Examples	
Shops	 grocers,	butcher,	baker,	haberdasher,	tobacco	sellers,	spectacle	makers,	
pewter	shops,	furrier,	bookshop,	cap-maker	
Vittles*	 coffee	houses,	inns,	taverns,	pubs	
Industry	 tallow	chandler,	weaver,	clothier,	leatherworker,	goldsmiths,	oilmen,	
brushmaker,	ironmonger,	coal	mining,	
Services	 barber,	barber-surgeons,	apothecary	
Transportation	 coachmen,	wagoner,	canal	in	18th	century	
Communication	 postal	service	
Institutions	 workhouses,	colleges	(Chelsea	College	c.	1667),	churchyards		(Flemish,	
London),	prisons	(Newgate	c.1669)	
Politics	 political	coins	used	for	“spreading	propaganda,	subversive	agitation	or	
other	forms	of	advertisement”	
*Issued	over	1,000	tokens,	which	was	more	than	any	industry	sector.	
	
Source:	Whiting	1971,	pp.	34-44,	59,	76-7	
	
	
	 These	tokens	have	been	described	as	“ingenious	in	their	style”	and	generally	
contained	information	about	the	trade	of	the	issuer	and	their	location.609		Tradesmen	
often	kept	a	sorting	box	so	that	they	could	keep	track	of	the	various	tokens	produced	
by	other	merchants	that	they	received	in	exchange.	And	in	cities	like	London	there	are	
parallels	with	modern	alternative	currency	ecosystem	firms,	with	‘farthing	changers’	
operating	as	market	makers	and	issuing	their	own	tokens.610	Efforts	at	regulating	the	
burgeoning	token	market	were	introduced	as	early	as	1655	and	again	in	1669	until	a	
proclamation	was	made	by	the	King	of	England	in	July	1672	that	“no	person	or	persons	
should	for	the	future	make,	coin,	exchange	or	use	any	farthings	or	tokens	except	such	
as	should	be	coined	in	his	Majesty’s	mint”.611	
	
Tokens	continued	to	be	minted	for	some	time	despite	repeated	proclamations	
from	the	crown	that	offenders	were	to	be	prosecuted	for	issuing	private	tokens.	At	
last,	a	proclamation	in	December	1674	appears	to	have	succeeded	in	halting	private	
																																																						
609	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	45)	
610	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	46)	
611	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	47)	Possibly	referencing	the	shortage	of	money	
that	the	tokens	were	issued	to	address,	the	proclamation	continues	“his	Majesty	having	given	directions	
for	the	speedy	making	of	a	considerable	quantity	of	farthings,	to	be	made	current	for	exchange	of	
monies”.	
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token	issuance	for	over	a	century612,	until	reports	surfaced	of	widespread	
counterfeiting	of	coins	from	the	official	mint	lead	to	the	reactivation	of	the	private	
token	market	in	1784.613	In	sum,	while	their	circulation	was	interrupted	merchant	
tokens	in	Britain	appear	to	be	on	the	more	long-lived,	and	therefore	successful,	
alternative	currencies.	
	
6.3.3	Alternative	currencies	around	the	World	
	 	 	
While	there	is	significant	evidence	that	alternative	currencies	were	not	simply	a	
North	Atlantic	phenomenon,	there	is	not	nearly	as	much	historical	information	on	
alternative	currencies	in	other	regions	of	the	world.	For	example,	in	19th	century	Japan	
both	Lietaer	(2004)	and	Maruyama	(1994,	1999)	note	that	alternative	currencies	were	
operational.	Japan	also	played	a	role	in	developing	alternative	currency	systems	in	the	
post-Second	World	War	period.614	Today,	it	is	estimated	that	over	600	active	
alternative	currencies	exist	in	Japan.	Lietaer,	echoing	the	sentiment	expressed	by	
scholars	studying	alternative	currencies	during	the	Great	Depression,	references	the	
general	economic	problems	that	Japan	has	suffered	since	1990	as	an	explanatory	
factor	in	why	alternative	currencies	have	been	maintained	interest	in	the	country.	He	
does	not,	however,	argue	that	there	is	a	link	between	alternative	currencies	and	
specific	economic	factors	in	Japan,	such	as	deflation	or	low	or	negative	economic	
growth.	He	also	suggests	that	these	efforts	had	previously	been	largely	overlooked	due	
to	the	fact	that	women	organized	them.	
	
Other	recent	scholarship	on	20th	century	and	contemporary	alternative	
currencies	includes	research	by	Tibbett	(1997),	Amato	et	al	(2003),	and	North	(2007).	
615	Tibbet’s	contemporary	survey	of	alternative	currencies	in	existence	examined	their	
role	as	a	form	of	protest	against	globalization.	In	recent	times	alternative	currencies	
have	gained	traction	in	British	Commonwealth	countries,	such	as	New	Zealand	and	
Australia.		
	
																																																						
612	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	48)	
613	(Searle	&	Cambridge	Antiquarian	Society.,	1871,	p.	118)	
614	(Lietaer,	2004,	pp.	3-4)		
615	(Amato	et	al.,	2003;	North,	2007;	Tibbett,	1997)	
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6.3.4	Historical	summary	
	
Many	similarities	can	be	seen	in	the	conditions	that	gave	rise	to	history’s	
alternative	currencies	and	today’s.	Commenting	on	the	use	of	‘local	money’	in	the	U.S.	
prior	to	1932,	Harper	anticipates	the	return	of	alternative	currencies	in	remarks	about	
the	relationship	between	Great	Depression-era	and	earlier	alternatives	currencies,	
which:	
	
“resulted	from	conditions	sufficiently	like	those	of	the	recent	depression	to	
suggest	the	possibility	that	local	money	in	some	form	is	likely	to	recur	in	
response	to	a	public	demand	under	substantially	similar	circumstances”.616	
	
Throughout	history	and	today	there	appear	to	be	seven	principle	socio-
economic	factors	that	drive	demand	for	alternative	currencies	(Table	44).617	Of	note,	
historical	precedent	is	found	for	all	of	these	forces	except	environmentalism.	
	
Table	44:	Socio-Economic	Forces	Driving	Demand	for	Alternative	Currencies	
	
Force	 Description	
Environmentalism	 Concerns	over	environmental	impact	of	globalization,	‘peak	oil’,	
industrial	agriculture		
Localism	 Protect	‘high	street’	retailers,	neighbourly	commerce	
Technology	 Open	source	software	creates	low	barriers	to	entry;	widespread	
use	of	mobile	devices	
Economic	Sentiment	 Concerns	over	inequality,	quantitative	easing,	inflation,	‘Too	Big	
to	Fail’,	high	unemployment,	slow	growth,	high	debt,	financial	
insecurity	
Inefficiencies	 Slow	and	expensive	financial	system	(e.g.,	2-3%	credit	card	
charges)	
Financial	repression		 Growing	use	of	capital	controls	(e.g.,	Eurozone,	Argentina,	China)	
Speculation	 Currency	appreciation	due	to	wider	use	and	acceptance	(e.g.,	
bitcoin)	
	
In	examining	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	that	have	either	ceased	to	
exist	or	are	in	decline,	three	main	causes	would	appear	to	dominate	-	technological	
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change,	government	intervention,	demand	shortage.	Advancements	in	technology	
have	either	disrupted	or	obviated	the	need	for	alternative	currency.	For	example,	the	
final	decline	and	cessation	of	British	merchant	tokens	in	the	19th	century	occurred	
alongside	the	development	of	the	standard	formula	described	by	Sargent	and	Velde	
for	determining	the	proper	mix	of	small	change	(demand	as	opposed	to	supply	driven),	
as	well	as	technological	advances	in	minting	which	made	the	production	of	small	coins	
less	expensive.	Both	the	technological	advance	in	economic	theory	and	manufacturing	
processes	combined	to	eliminate	the	persistent	shortage	of	small	coins.	
	
	 Throughout	the	history	of	alternative	currencies	governments	have	periodically	
intervened	to	reduce	or	eliminate	the	use	of	such	currencies.	One	example	is	the	
Austrian	Freigeld	currency,	which	was	introduced	in	1932	and	was	outlawed	by	the	
Austrian	central	bank	in	1933.	What	is	not	entirely	clear	is	whether	the	Freigeld	was	
shut	down	due	to	how	similar	it	appeared	to	the	normal	Austrian	schilling	or	because	
the	authorities	feared	that	the	upstart	currency	might	gain	more	widespread	adoption.	
Regardless,	lack	of	sustainable	demand	appears	to	be	by	far	the	leading	cause	of	
alternative	currency	decline.	Early	scholarship	notes	the	persistent	difficulty	that	
alternative	currencies	face	in	gaining	wide	and	sustained	adoption.	More	recently,	the	
UK	LETS	scheme	is	illustrative	of	this	difficulty.	While	LETS	is	still	functioning	it	has	
experienced	a	steady	decline,	having	gone	from	350	chapters	in	1995,	to	303	in	2001,	
and	now	186	in	2005.618	Overall,	LETS	simply	has	not	been	compelling	or	convenient	
enough	to	sustain	its	early	momentum.	However,	such	difficulties	have	not	stopped	
the	advent	of	new	community	currencies,	like	the	Brixton	pound,	that	do	away	with	
the	LETS	barter	approach	to	currency.	
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6.4	Conclusion	
	
	 What	does	the	persistent	pattern	of	decline	observed	for	many	alternative	
currencies	in	history	suggest	about	the	prospects	for	contemporary	alternative	
currencies?	In	comparing	bitcoin	with	the	Brixton	pound,	it	is	the	Brixton	pound	–	
which	is	largely	representative	of	many	of	today’s	local	currencies	–	that	most	closely	
resembles	past	historical	alternative	currencies.	Even	with	support	from	local	
government	and	the	technological	advances	that	the	Brixton	pound	employs	it	appears	
to	be	suffering	from	many	of	the	same	challenges	faced	by	its	historical	predecessors.	
In	short,	very	few	people	live	their	entire	lives	inside	a	geographic	area	as	small	as	
Brixton,	and	this	creates	a	fundamental	limitation	and	inefficiency	with	holding	Brixton	
pounds.	
	
Bitcoin	is	arguably	already	perhaps	the	world’s	most	successful	alternative	
currency	in	terms	of	its	breadth	of	use,	market	value,	and	mindshare.	Bitcoin	possesses	
many	new	features	that	distinguish	it	from	historical	alternative	currencies,	including	
its	relatively	decentralized	structure,	efficient	cross-border	transactions,	global	brand	
awareness,	and	support	from	powerful	institutions.	For	an	alternative	currency,	the	
bitcoin	currency’s	achievements	to	date	are	both	significant	and	impressive.	However,	
bitcoin	faces	many	challenges,	one	of	which	is	the	volatility	of	its	exchange	rate	against	
national	currencies	like	the	U.S.	dollar.	It	is	unlikely	that	many	people	feel	comfortable	
holding	such	a	volatile	store	of	value	for	certain	uses,	such	as	for	monthly	rent	or	other	
similarly	important	payments.	Unless	bitcoin’s	volatility	stabilizes	it	is	unlikely	that	it	
will	ever	become	a	widely	used	unit	of	account	and	thereby	meet	the	definition	of	
money.	
	
While	bitcoin's	decentralized	nature	perhaps	gives	the	appearance	of	limiting	
some	of	the	regulatory	risk	that	has	led	to	the	demise	of	past	alternative	currencies,	
regulators	still	have	many	ways	to	slow	or	curtail	the	use	of	a	decentralized	currency	
like	bitcoin.	For	example,	governments	can	prevent	bitcoin	from	integrating	into	the	
global	payment	and	banking	systems,	as	well	as	limit	access	to	technology	platforms	
like	the	Google	and	Apple	application	platforms	where	bitcoin	software	can	be	easily	
obtained	by	users.		
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Government	interest	in	bitcoin	will	in	part	depend	upon	bitcoin’s	level	of	use.	
In	the	short-run	governments	will	be	primarily	interested	in	its	use	for	illegal	activity,	
such	as	in	the	purchase	of	illicit	goods	and	tax	evasion.	Looking	ahead,	central	banks	
(with	a	few	exceptions)	have	to	date	generally	taken	a	rather	benign	view	of	bitcoin.	
However,	were	bitcoin	or	another	alternative	currency	to	gain	wider	adoption	then	
governments	may	grow	concerned	about	the	impact	it	could	have	on	the	money	
supply	and	the	ability	of	central	banks	to	conduct	monetary	policy.		
	
	 Perhaps	the	most	important	difference	between	bitcoin	and	past	alternative	
currencies	is	the	distributed	timestamp	ledger	on	which	bitcoin	transactions	are	
recorded,	called	the	blockchain.	This	distributed	ledger	has	the	capacity	to	be	used	for	
many	non-currency	functions,	such	as	for	notary	services,	recording	property	title	
changes,	election	voting,	and	novel	products	and	service	offerings	such	as	smart	
contracts.	Ironically,	perhaps	the	many	promising	non-currency	uses	for	bitcoin’s	
underlying	technology	may	hold	the	key	to	bitcoin’s	ability	to	survive	and	thrive	as	a	
currency.	
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7	Conclusion	
	
	
This	conclusion	summarizes	some	of	the	key	research	findings	from	this	thesis,	
outlines	some	of	the	limitations	encountered	during	research	and	how	they	might	be	
addressed	in	future	research,	and	discusses	policy	implications.		
	
An	effort	was	made	in	this	thesis	to	address	the	following	research	questions:	
First,	what	options	are	available	to	a	country	facing	an	unsustainable	level	of	sovereign	
debt?	Second,	how	well	do	existing	economic	frameworks	account	for	political	and	
other	non-quantitative	aspects	of	sovereign	debt	sustainability?	Third,	how	
comprehensive	are	existing	frameworks	for	measuring	sovereign	credit	events?	
Fourth,	what	role	does	financial	repression	play	in	debt	sustainability,	and	how	well	do	
existing	methods	for	measuring	financial	repression	perform?	Fifth,	what	can	
monetary	innovation	in	the	form	of	currency	black	markets,	which	are	a	sometime	by-
product	of	financial	repression,	say	about	the	effectiveness	of	financial	repression?	
Sixth,	what	do	free	currency	markets	suggest	were	the	key	historical	turning	points	
during	the	1940s?		Seventh,	how	do	other	forms	of	monetary	innovation,	such	as	
alternative	currencies,	fit	into	an	overall	currency	framework,	and	under	what	
circumstances	do	alternative	currencies	rise	and	decline?		
	
As	shown	in	the	literature	review,	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	financial	
markets	in	the	1940s	and	the	effects	they	had	on	policy	is	incomplete	at	best.	One	of	
the	main	contributions	of	this	thesis	is	to	bring	a	market-based,	financial	perspective	to	
mid-20th	century	economic	and	historical	scholarship.	What	happens	in	free	currency	
markets	can	have	an	impact	on	sovereign	debt	sustainability,	as	was	shown	with	
Britain	and	the	free	sterling	markets.	Currency	black	markets	in	New	York	and	
Switzerland	undermined	confidence	in	Britain’s	solvency	and	led	to	damaging	capital	
flight	during	the	1947	Convertibility	Crisis,	as	well	as	the	lead-up	to	sterling’s	
devaluation	in	1949.	The	new	archival	data	presented	suggests	that	these	markets	may	
have	played	an	even	greater	role	than	previously	believed	in	guiding	the	choice	of	a	
new	exchange	rate	for	sterling	during	the	September	1949	devaluation	deliberations.	
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This	thesis	has	also	shown	that,	to	address	its	debt	sustainability	challenge,	
Britain	partially	defaulted	on	the	Anglo-American	loan.	Britain	also	engaged	in	various	
forms	of	financial	repression,	which	helped	the	government	pay	less	interest	on	its	
public	debt	and	to	ensure	a	cooperative	marketplace	for	placing	new	government	debt	
issues.	These	measures	were	effective	in	easing	Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	
public	debt	burden.	
	
An	interesting	counterfactual	question	is	what	would	have	happened	to	market	
confidence	had	Britain	emphasized	or	employed	other	sovereign	debt	sustainability	
mechanisms	outlined	in	chapter	2?	For	example,	the	British	Empire	in	1945	was	still	in	
possession	of	substantial	hard	and	soft	assets.	As	a	crisis	mitigation	tool,	could	the	
Empire	have	calmed	market	concerns	through	more	effective	bargaining	and	trading?	
While	the	second	chapter	highlighted	some	recent	examples	of	debt	sustainability-
driven	asset	exchanges,	further	research	is	required	on	how	common	a	practice	
exchanging	assets	was	for	debt	assistance,	and	what	the	overall	impact	from	such	
trading	has	had	on	debt	sustainability	and	other	economic	factors.		
	
Similarly,	given	that	Britain’s	efforts	to	maintain	sterling’s	exchange	rate	proved	
futile,	would	Britain	have	been	better	off	devaluing	sterling	earlier?	Further,	given	
sterling’s	subsequent	devaluation	in	1967,	should	Britain	have	devalued	sterling	by	an	
even	greater	amount	in	1949?	These	are	complex	but	important	questions.	At	the	time	
of	this	writing	there	is	considerable	debate	and	uncertainty	over	whether,	for	example,	
Greece	and	other	Eurozone	countries	facing	economic	growth	and	debt	sustainability	
challenges	would	thrive	or	suffer	by	effecting	a	devaluation	and	or	leaving	the	euro.	
Previous	examples	of	currency	union	exits,	including	the	Soviet	ruble,	the	Austrian-
Hungarian	crown,	and	the	Yugoslavian	dinar,	are	inconclusive.	Further	examination	of	
the	economic	impact	of	sterling’s	devaluation	motivates	further	study	and	could	add	
something	important	to	the	current	debate	over	the	future	of	the	Eurozone.	
	
A	further	contribution	made	by	this	thesis	is	providing	an	advanced	country	
case	study	of	currency	black	markets,	financial	repression,	and	sovereign	debt	stability,	
which	are	typically	studied	in	the	context	of	a	developing	economy.	Many	of	today’s	
biggest	economic	challenges	are	seated	in	advanced	economies.	Previous	findings	
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from	studies	of	emerging	market	economies,	which	are	often	much	smaller	in	size	and	
may	owe	debts	in	foreign	denominated	currencies,	may	not	be	entirely	applicable	for	
understanding	problems	in	advanced	countries.	The	study	of	Britain	makes	a	
contribution	towards	our	understanding	of	these	economic	challenges	in	advanced	
economies	and	may	prove	useful	to	policymakers.	
	
As	highlighted	in	the	introduction,	economic	historians	have	almost	entirely	
overlooked	the	role	of	debt	in	British	post-Second	World	War	economic	history.	Basic	
measures	of	debt	sustainability,	such	as	debt-to-income,	are	not	included	in	much	of	
the	existing	literature	on	mid-20th	century	British	economic	history.	While	there	is	no	
evidence	that	Britain	failed	to	meet	any	of	its	agreed	upon	interest	or	principal	
payments,	the	evidence	is	clear	that	Britain	defaulted	on	the	Anglo-American	Financial	
Agreement	in	the	form	of	failing	to	meet	its	contractual	obligation	of	sterling	
convertibility	and	open	trade.	This	thesis	has	also	shown	how	the	existing	framework	
used	by	economic	historians	for	measuring	important	credit	events	is	too	simplistic	to	
capture	‘partial	defaults’,	such	as	Britain’s.	One	important	question	not	explored	in	the	
thesis	is	the	impact	that	Britain’s	record-setting	debt	levels	may	have	had	on	its	
comparatively	poor	economic	performance	in	the	decades	following	the	Second	World	
War.	There	is	a	substantial	literature	on	the	question	of	why	Britain	underperformed	
its	peer	countries	following	the	war,	and	yet	the	subject	of	Britain’s	dramatically	higher	
debt	burden	has	received	almost	no	prior	attention.	
	
Recent	claims	made	by	academics	and	policymakers	on	financial	repression	in	
the	post-Second	World	War	period	have	been	scrutinized	in	Chapter	4	and	were	found	
to	be,	at	least	in	the	case	of	Britain,	in	need	of	further	examination	and	clarification.	
Ample	evidence	of	policies	and	practices	in	Britain	that	are	typically	associated	with	
financial	repression	are	found	in	archival	documents	and	the	literature.	However,	
quantitative	evidence	from	the	bond	market	and	other	sources	makes	clear	that	British	
financial	repression	was	not	‘absolute’,	or	a	case	of	‘total’	financial	repression,	at	least	
compared	to	more	restrictive	and	effective	financial	repression	regimes	than	Britain’s.	
Chapter	4	critiques	existing	quantitative	methods	for	measuring	financial	repression	
and	shows	that	the	British	government	likely	generated	substantial	financial	repression	
‘savings’	from	below	market	public	debt	interest	rates.	However,	as	noted	in	the	
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chapter,	caution	is	necessary	in	placing	too	much	weight	on	this	new	calculation	of	
British	financial	repression	savings	given	the	paucity	of	data	on	free	bond	yields.	More	
free	market	real	bond	yield	data,	or	the	calculation	of	an	acceptable	synthetic	bond	
yield,	could	offer	a	more	precise	and	robust	calculation	of	savings	due	to	British	
financial	repression.		
	
Chapter	4	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	additional	measures	of	financial	
repression,	such	as	the	use	of	a	compositor	index	to	compare	the	varying	degrees	of	
financial	repression	across	different	countries.	Much	of	the	data	necessary	to	create	
such	an	index	for	Britain	during	the	mid-20th	century	either	does	not	exist	or	has	not	
yet	been	located.	However,	such	an	index	could	be	constructed	for	present	day	
countries	using	contemporary	sources	and	will	be	presented	in	a	forthcoming	paper.	
	
The	final	two	chapters	explore	two	forms	of	monetary	innovation:	currency	
black	markets	and	alternative	currencies.	Periods	of	financial	regulation	and	economic	
uncertainty	often	prompt	monetary	innovation,	as	was	seen	in	the	1940s.	The	new	
data	introduced	in	this	thesis	from	free	currency	markets	in	Switzerland	and	New	York	
provides	one	of	the	few	market	perspectives	during	a	time	of	heavy	financial	
regulation.	Statistical	tests	on	this	data	highlight	the	market’s	view	of	key	historical	
turning	points	during	the	1940s.	However,	there	is	much	we	can	still	learn	from	further	
study	of	these	markets.	For	example,	we	have	limited	information	about	volume	and	
market	participants,	nor	do	we	possess	data	on	the	transactions	costs	associated	with	
these	markets.	The	significant	arbitrage	opportunities	seen	in	the	years	immediately	
following	the	Second	World	War	and	the	subsequent	decline	in	arbitrage	profit	
opportunities	present	another	interesting	question	for	further	study.	Further,	can	free	
currency	market	data	serve	as	an	acceptable	proxy	for	a	forward	exchange	rate	
market,	enabling	the	calculation	of	a	synthetic	‘free’	interest	rate	that	could	be	used	
for	a	more	refined	calculation	of	financial	repression	savings?	
	
Perhaps	due	to	the	problems	alternative	currencies	faced	in	gaining	wider	
adoption	in	the	1930s	and	their	relatively	short	lifespan,	there	were	fewer	‘tokenized’	
alternative	currencies	in	the	1940s	than	during	the	Great	Depression.	Market	
participants	seeking	an	alternative	to	official	national	currencies	instead	either	
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favoured	commodity	alternative	currencies,	such	as	cigarettes	in	Germany,	or	black	
market	national	currencies.	The	substantial	quantity	of	British	sterling	and	dollar	
banknotes	purportedly	available	outside	both	countries	may	have	also	served	to	tamp	
down	the	introduction	of	new	alternative	currencies	during	the	1940s.	Sterling	and	the	
U.S.	dollar	were	both	important	global	reserve	currencies	and	arguably	far	superior	in	
terms	of	their	acceptance	in	various	geographies	compared	to	an	alternative	currency.	
In	short,	black	market	national	currencies	may	have	largely	obviated	the	need	for	
alternative	currencies	in	the	latter-half	of	the	1940s.	
	
Finally,	what	can	be	said	of	the	applicability	of	any	policy	lessons	from	the	
British	case	in	the	mid-20th	century	to	contemporary	events?	Does	Britain’s	ultimately	
futile	battle	to	sustain	sterling’s	exchange	rate	in	the	face	of	market	pressures	support	
the	current	tendency	of	policymakers	to	allow	exchange	rates	to	freely	float	when	they	
are	under	speculative	attack?	Or	did	Britain’s	efforts	to	delay	devaluation	on	balance	
serve	a	useful	purpose?	The	existence	of	black	market	currencies	and	free	markets,	as	
was	the	case	during	the	mid-20th	century,	shows	how	difficult	a	task	it	can	be	for	
policymakers	to	manage	an	artificially	high	or	low	exchange	rate	in	the	medium-	to	
long-run.	
	
The	financial	repression	practiced	by	Britain	in	the	mid-20th	century	appears	to	
have	yielded	mixed	results.	On	the	one	hand,	Britain	appears	to	have	been	capable	of	
generating	substantial	financial	repression	savings	relative	to	GDP.	At	the	same	time	
capital	leakages	and	the	steady	rise	seen	in	government	bond	yields	over	time	suggest	
that	Britain	was	unable	or	unwilling	to	engage	in	the	total	financial	repression	that	may	
have	been	necessary	to	avoid	devaluing	sterling	and	default.	After	the	Second	World	
War	Britain	was	also	something	of	an	exception	in	terms	of	its	track	record	of	financial	
stability	amongst	advanced	countries.	One	of	the	claimed	benefits	of	financial	
repression	policies	(sometimes	also	presented	as	macroprudential	policies)	is	financial	
stability.	However,	Britain’s	string	of	significant	and	lesser	financial	crises	from	the	
1940s-70s	would	seem	to	suggest	that	Britain	did	not	fully	realize	this	benefit.	This	fact	
raises	questions	over	the	effectiveness	of	financial	repression	at	increasing	financial	
stability,	or	it	could	also	speak	to	the	lesser	degree	of	British	financial	repression	
during	this	period.	More	comparative	analysis	between	Britain	and	other	advanced	
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countries	on	the	degree	of	financial	repression	practiced	by	each	would	be	useful	for	
understanding	what	impact	financial	repression	may	have	had	on	both	financial	
stability	and	economic	growth	in	advanced	economies	during	this	period.		
	
With	regards	to	any	policy	lessons	from	Britain’s	post-Second	World	War	battle	
for	debt	sustainability,	the	peculiar	features	of	Britain’s	circumstances	and	position	
during	this	time	must	be	acknowledged.	First,	the	context	surrounding	the	traumatic	
events	of	the	Second	World	War,	and	particularly	the	esprit	de	corps	with	which	
agreements	such	as	Bretton	Woods	were	negotiated	and	drafted,	was	historically	
unusual.	Second,	following	the	war	Britain	benefitted	tremendously	from	a	partnership	
with	a	now	hegemonic	United	States,	which	then	represented	approximately	50%	of	
the	world’s	total	gross	domestic	product.	Britain’s	relationship	with	the	world’s	
dominant	economic	superpower	opened	the	door	to	significant	financial	aid	in	the	
form	of	the	Anglo-American	loan,	debt	forgiveness,	Marshall	Plan	funds,	and	a	myriad	
of	other	support	that	may	have	been	unique	to	having	such	a	dominant	hegemon	as	an	
international	partner.	Further,	while	sterling’s	importance	was	diminished	following	
the	Second	World	War,	Britain	was	still	in	possession	of	one	of	the	two	global	reserve	
currencies,	and	London	was	(and	remains)	a	key	global	hub	for	financial	capital.	While	
these	and	other	aspects	may	make	the	British	case	unique,	one	finding	from	this	
research	is	the	very	significant	role	that	financial	aid	and	support	from	other	nations	
can	play	in	sovereign	debt	sustainability,	particularly	vis-à-vis	geopolitical	
considerations.	
	
In	closing,	this	thesis	has	sought	to	contribute	toward	our	understanding	of	
sovereign	debt,	financial	repression	and	monetary	innovation	by	examining	the	case	of	
Britain	during	the	mid-20th	century.	In	the	wake	of	the	2008	financial	crisis,	many	
questions	have	arisen	over	the	direction	of	macroeconomics	as	a	discipline.	History,	
which	prior	to	2008	had	seen	a	steady	decrease	in	emphasis	in	economic	academic	
programs,	provides	a	useful	empirical	perspective	on	bedevilling	questions	such	as	
“how	much	public	debt	is	too	much”.	While	caution	must	always	be	exercised	when	
comparing	history	with	the	present,	I	hope	this	work	of	economic	history	makes	a	
contribution	toward	our	understanding	of	contemporary	economic	and	social	
challenges.	
